Every presidency develops a leadership style, which has bearing on presidential accomplishments. Historical comparisons shed light on the matter. The following paper compares Barack Obama and Woodrow Wilson in their respective early years.

The narratives of these two presidents share certain elements. Both men were progressive agents of change, who would try to adjust the balance of public and private power in society. Both men took office following back-to-back wave elections, resulting in clear Democratic congressional majorities. Both compiled impressive legislative scorecards. (In the rear-view mirror of history, Wilson’s legacy, which included achievements like establishing the Federal Reserve, would acquire indisputable legendary status.) Each president faced an economic crisis while pursuing his agenda.

For all the parallels, however, key contrasts stand out. President Wilson had more wind at his back since, albeit within important limits, the political climate was more receptive to reform during the Progressive era, and he confronted a less-solid opposition party in Congress. Also, parliamentary rules differed a century ago. Filibustering in the Senate was not the same as it is today. The electoral campaigns of the two presidents differed. And, Wilson was far more predisposed to govern through his party’s legislative majority, rather than bet on bipartisan agreements, and he managed relations with the legislature differently.

There may be lessons here. For instance, could it be that Wilsonian “party government”—however difficult in contemporary politics—still offers a serviceable model during periods of unified party control of the executive and legislative branches, one that at times befits the reality of today’s political polarization more than does a frustrating quest for post-partisanship?

A caveat: This essay does not purport to offer more than a partial, and tentative, comparative assessment. The bookends of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency have been in place for nearly a century, whereas Obama’s record remains very much a work in progress. Observations drawn at the mid-point of a president’s first term can be suggestive, but their limitations are evident. Much of what is observed now may well be overtaken by events. This paper only focuses on domestic issues, not the conduct of foreign policy. As we know, in Wilson’s case international setbacks were ultimately a principal source of his undoing. We have yet to see how world affairs will inform the rest of the Obama years.