The president's constant companion is a military aide carrying a briefcase nicknamed the "Football," which contains the SIOP Decision Handbook.1 The Handbook explains — with the aid of cartoon-like drawings — the nuclear war plan and the available strike options. Typically, each president has received a short briefing on the briefcase and its contents, although Bill Gulley, former director of the White House Military Office and therefore custodian of the "Football" in the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, remarked in 1980 that no president has ever had a subsequent briefing even though the Handbook is regularly revised.2

Historically, this handbook, prepared by the JCS, has been provided to the President, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense, JCS, and the nuclear commanders-in-chief. This list thus excludes the vast majority of the president's legal successors (see footnote 42 in the text), while including military commanders who historically have been delegated the authority to launch the strategic forces in retaliation to an attack that decapitates the top political leadership.3

Contrary to popular belief, the "Football" does not contain the proverbial "go-code" or the unlock codes needed by the launch crews to fire their ground, sea, and airborne weapons. Those authorizing and enabling codes, created and maintained by the NSA, always remain in military custody at the national military command posts in the Pentagon, and alternate sites around the country.

The President carries special codes to positively identify himself to the key nuclear commanders who might be ordered to launch a nuclear strike. But the military does not need these codes to launch the strike, although it may not accept an order from a president or successor who fails to "authenticate" correctly. Historically, few of the president's legal successors were provided the identification codes, and hence their nuclear authority might have been difficult to establish. Some presidents carried these codes in a pocket or wallet, and they have been misplaced on occasion, such as after the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981.4 Although maintaining the "Football" obviously requires a great deal of communications, security, and cryptographic support, the White House Military Office denied a request from this project for data on the overall costs of the effort citing, in part, an inability to segregate out the emergency action duties of the president's military aides from their other duties and functions.5

Notes:

1 The briefcase earned its nickname because the first SIOP was code-named "Dropkick." [Back]


2 Bill Gulley with Mary Ellen Reese, Breaking Cover, pp. 188-190. [Back]


3 Wainstein, Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, p. 358; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, pp. 46-52. [Back]


4 Douglas Waller, "Fumbling the Football: Now It Can Be Told," Newsweek, October 7, 1991, p. 26. [Back]


5 Letter, Stephen I. Schwartz to Alan Sullivan, Director, White House Military Office, April 4, 1996, and response from Alan P. Sullivan to Stephen I. Schwartz, April 11, 1996. [Back]


Copyright © 1998 The Brookings Institution