Selecting a Continental Test Site

Officials in charge of selecting a continental site understood that nearly the only parts of the country that would escape fallout were on the East coast. As a U.S. Air Force meteorologist reported in 1948, that region was "predominantly under the influence of westerly winds" and might provide a suitable site.

By 1950, the Government had ruled out anything north of Cape Hatteras (because ocean currents could bring fallout on shore and because fallout could also affect important fishing grounds) and concentrated on five locations, three of which were owned by the Department of Defense, in order to avoid the costly and time-consuming process of acquiring the land (a site south of Cape Hatteras, which the aforementioned meteorologist indicated would be ideal for avoiding "all fallout," was rejected for this reason: Alamogordo-White Sands Guided Missile Range, New Mexico (where the Trinity test took place); Dugway Proving Ground-Wendover Bombing Range, Utah; Las Vegas-Tonopah Bombing and Gunnery Range, Nevada; an area in Nevada, about 50 miles wide, extending from Fallon to Eureka; and the Pamlico Sound-Camp Lejeune area of North Carolina. The last two sites were not under government control and, faced with possible delays in their acquisition, they were removed from further consideration. In the end, convenience carried the day, despite the warnings of Colonel Stafford Warren (the chief of radiological safety at the Trinity test who later headed the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine). After monitoring the fallout from Trinity, he urged that tests not be conducted within a 150-mile radius of human habitation. Gordon Dean, then chairman of the AEC, stated in 1950, "A geographical location as close as possible to the Los Alamos Laboratory, to enable accelerating the pace of the weapons development program, is obviously a characteristic of such desirability that it could outweigh partial deficiencies in other respects."

On January 8, 1951, three days before the selection of the test site was officially announced, Dean was informed by Dr. Charles Dunham, chief of the medical branch of the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine, that while no evaluation had actually been done, there were no serious problems with potential fallout in Nevada and that monitoring would be done mainly for "record purposes." Dunham said, "The only ones we are concerned with are the people who live in the first valley?a town called Alamo. It is not the first valley from the test site; it is about fifty miles as the crow flies."³ Dean continued to ask what would happen to the people in the surrounding areas. "If there was a pretty good sized burst," replied Dunham, "there might be trouble in the valley, if it poured right after, that is a remote possibility." But the people would not be affected, "if they get out and ...they would have several hours to evacuate?it would not have to be done in a matter of a few minutes," and even if rain fell within two hours of a test, the worst thing that could possibly happen would be "minor skin burns." The sheep, on the other hand, "cannot be controlled."⁴

In reality, large amounts of fallout routinely drifted far from the test site, depositing highly radioactive debris across the United States but especially in eastern Nevada, southern Utah, Idaho and Montana (see figure 7-3). Radiation levels were monitored, but even when they became quite high no evacuations were ordered. Instead, reassuring press releases were issued and people were told to stay indoors and, if caught outdoors, to simply remove and wash their clothes and themselves to eliminate any marginal hazards (see chapters 7 and 9).⁵ Even before the very first test, the AEC clearly intended to announce that there was no risk whatsoever from the test.

— by Stephen I. Schwartz

Notes:

² Memorandum, Lieutenant General J.E. Hull, U.S. Army, to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, "Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons," formerly Top Secret (n.d., circa May 1948), pp. 2-3; Memorandum, Rear Admiral W.S. Parsons, Memorandum to Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, "Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons," formerly Top Secret, May 12, 1948 (attached to previous item), p. 7. [Back]

³ Anders, Forging the Atomic Shield, p. 94. [Back]

⁴ Anders, Forging the Atomic Shield, p. 97. In a conversation with a reporter on January 12, Dean was asked what assurances the AEC had given to Nevada officials about hazards from testing. Dean responded that "we assured them that every precaution was being taken; that there was less danger in it than taking an automobile from here [Washington, D.C.] to Richmond." (p. 103). [Back]

⁵ During the Upshot-Knothole series of tests from March 17 to June 4, 1953, shot Simon (43 kilotons) on April 25 deposited fallout across local highways, forcing the AEC to stop traffic and hose down contaminated vehicles. Shot Harry (32 kilotons), on May 19, sent fallout over St. George, Utah, leading the AEC to caution people to remain indoors that morning. Significant fallout from Upshot-Knothole tests was also detected in Troy, New York and there was increasing concern that it had also led to an unusual number of sheep deaths in Utah. Consequently a proposal by scientists at Los Alamos to add an eleventh high-yield test (to avoid the cost of conducting it as originally planned at Enewetak) generated a heated controversy within the AEC, with Chairman Dean making the final decision in favor of doing so. See Anders, Forging the Atomic Shield, pp. 238-239, 256-258. For more on the sheep deaths, see Stewart L. Udall, The Myths of August: A Personal Exploration of Our Tragic Cold War Affair With the Atom (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), pp. 203-216. [Back]