Missile Defenses Have a Long History

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists — January/February 1997

In "The $4 Trillion Deletion," (November/December), Stephen Schwartz asserts that last year congressional proponents of a missile-defense crash program made two devious claims?first, that despite the potential threat, missile defense was seriously underfunded until the Strategic Defense Initiative was established in 1983; and second, that the United States had never before deployed a ballistic missile defense system.

Schwartz then states that half the money spent on ballistic missile defense since the mid-to-late 1950s was spent on SDI, and the biggest chunk of the rest was spent building the Safeguard ABM system in North Dakota from 1968-1978. He also says that although Safeguard was the only functioning U.S. missile defense system, a few months after it became operational the Air Force shut it down.

Let me set the record straight:

On funding: After the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, ABM funding dropped precipitously?in 1973, not 1978. And it did not increase significantly until SDI began. However, under the Bush and Clinton administrations, funding for defense against ballistic missiles was deemphasized so that theater missile defenses could be pushed ahead. It was the Bush and Clinton years that congressional ABM proponents were referring to when they complained about underfunding.

On deployment: The United States has never before deployed a complete ballistic missile defense system. Congress authorized a four-site Safeguard system to protect U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. One site was completed and construction of a second site partially complete when Congress shut the program down. It was shut down because the ABM Treaty permitted only one site, and a single site was expensive to operate and, by itself, incapable of protecting a sufficient number of U.S. missiles. One-fourth of a system is not a complete system.

Another inaccuracy is Schwartz's statement that the Air Force terminated Safeguard. Safeguard was an Army system?and it was shut down by Congress, not by the Air Force. Although declared operational, the Safeguard site at Grand Forks was operated for about six months by an Army team working with the system contractor, Western Electric. Only the perimeter acquisition radar, north of Grand Forks, continued in operation after the site was deactivated.

Ellery Block
Huntsville, Alabama

Stephen Schwartz replies:

Ellery Block is right about the management of Safeguard. Like all earlier ABM programs, it was an Army effort. Unfortunately, his other attempts to "set the record straight" do just the opposite.

Despite the ABM Treaty, funding for ABM programs did not drop "precipitously" in 1973. According to Defense Department budget data, total ABM expenditures from 1971-76 were as follows (in 1996 dollars): 1971?$5.7 billion; 1972?$4.3 billion; 1973?$2.8 billion; 1974?$1.8 billion; 1975?$1.0 billion; 1976?$0.9 billion. Safeguard was terminated in early 1976, but funding continued through 1978 to cover deactivation expenses. Annual spending for ABM programs did not bottom out until 1980.

Concerning what "congressional ABM proponents" really meant, let's examine the record. First, in the Winter 1996 issue of Orbis, Pennsylvania Republican Cong. Curt Weldon wrote:

"In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, Congress funded, without controversy or fanfare, programs that researched potential defenses against missile threats. However, these programs received minimal funding and little attention from members of Congress. Not until President Ronald Reagan's 'Star Wars' speech on March 23, 1983, did the concept of missile defenses receive national attention."

Weldon's statement is factually challenged. It ignores all ABM programs up to and including Safeguard, suggesting these efforts started 20 years later than they actually did. It also credits President Reagan with first bringing missile defenses to national attention, again rewriting history. The reason for "minimal funding and little attention" during the period cited by Rep. Weldon is not because no one was interested but because Safeguard had just been terminated and nothing had replaced it.

Second, Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain wrote in the May 22, 1996, edition of The Wall Street Journal, "This country has spent 13 years and $38 billion to develop capabilities to defend effectively our citizens and our troops overseas from ballistic missile attack. It is time we deployed a system that will defend Americans at home." This statement not only understates total SDI expenditures but again ignores all previous ABM efforts and expenditures, including the deployment of Safeguard.

Finally, in the September 1996 issue of Commentary, former Senate staffer Angelo Codevilla notes the existence of ABM programs "from the 1960s through the early 70s," but erroneously asserts, "If, year after year, the U.S. government has decided not to deploy defenses, it is not for lack of technically competent means."

Whether these examples display attempts to ignore the facts or ignorance of the facts, they are disturbing.

Here are the facts: President Richard Nixon proposed Safeguard in 1969 as a scaled-down, reoriented version of the highly controversial Sentinel program. Sentinel envisioned a 15-site system to protect cities from Russian and Chinese missile attack. Safeguard?originally designed as a 12-site system?was to protect ICBM bases at an estimated cost of $10.3 billion ($43.2 billion in 1996 dollars), excluding annual operating and support costs. Congress was deeply divided and the Senate approved the first phase of development only on the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Spiro Agnew.

The ABM Treaty soon limited the number and location of ABM installations, reducing Safeguard to two sites. Work proceeded most quickly at Nekoma, North Dakota, with the intention of protecting 150 Minuteman ICBMs at nearby Grand Forks Air Force Base. However, in 1974 the ABM Treaty protocol further restricted the United States and the Soviet Union to one site each. After spending nearly $6 billion ($21.5 billion in 1996 dollars), the lone site at Nekoma became fully operational on October 1, 1975.

But the Army had already decided that it would reduce readiness at the site to "below full operational status" as of July 1, 1976. Then, during consideration of the 1976 defense appropriations bill, the House Appropriations Committee also voted to deactivate Safeguard immediately, arguing that the limitations of a single ABM site, coupled with the recent Soviet deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), meant "the utility of Safeguard to protect Minuteman will be essentially nullified in the future." (Ironically, the U.S. developed MIRVs in the 1960s to overwhelm the Soviet ABM system around Moscow.) The committee further complained that "the [Defense] Department has not demonstrated a willingness to exploit whatever experience may be available from [operating the site at full readiness for one year]."

When the measure reached the House floor, North Dakota Republican Mark Andrews, the state's single representative, declared: "Because this ABM site does not have defense capability in today's technology, it does not make much sense for me to stand in the well of the House and argue for the expenditure of another $60 million [the actual amount was $85.3 million, or $238 million in 1996 dollars] just because the expenditure happens to be in my State. I think the committee made the right decision..." The House approved the committee's action.

The Senate Appropriations Committee rejected the House position, approving the administration's full request. When the Senate took up the bill on November 14, Massachusetts Democrat Sen. Edward Kennedy offered an amendment to terminate Safeguard funding immediately. Kennedy was opposed by, among others, both North Dakota senators and the chairman of the Appropriations Committee. They cited letters from the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which claimed that ending the program before July 1976 would halt plans to operate and test the various Safeguard systems.

But Kennedy asked, "If this ABM site has real security value, why is the Army reducing its operational state in July of next year?" His amendment was narrowly defeated, 39-40.

Kennedy returned four days later with another approach: no funding cut but immediate termination of the program, with the exception of the new electronic phased-array Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR). Now opponents produced a letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense W.P. Clements, Jr., who charged that shutting down Safeguard "would be a direct act of unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States..." To this Kennedy responded, "The Army itself is planning to make this non-operational next year...They have to get their story straight over there if they expect anybody in the Senate to understand their position."

This time, Kennedy's amendment passed, 52-47. It was incorporated into the final bill, which was approved on January 27, 1976. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1977 (published January 27, 1976) stated, "In accordance with FY 1976 Congressional direction, operation of the Safeguard system has been terminated...PAR will remain full operational in support of the NORAD warning and attack assessment mission." Safeguard was thus fully operational for less than four months. The Army initiated the plan to shut it down, and Congress delivered the coup de grâce.