This paper addresses the question of how to deal with Japan-U.S. trade disputes, focusing specifically on disputes relating to restrictive private practices.
Why is it important to discuss disputes over restrictive practices?
First, it is one of the thorniest kinds of disputes between Japan and the United States in recent years. Since the 1980s, many disputes have arisen, due, at least in part, to U.S. allegations that Japanese markets are closed to imports because of restrictive practices such as exclusive dealings between domestic manufacturers and distributors. It is further alleged that the practices are tolerated and even encouraged by the government. However, the two countries do not seem to have found a way to constructively resolve such disputes.
Second, the interaction between trade and competition policies has become an issue of high priority for governments and scholars worldwide. With regard to trade policy, while concerns about border barriers such as tariffs and quantitative import restrictions are reducing with the progress of trade liberalization, concerns about the effect on trade of policies that used to be considered "domestic"-e.g., competition policy, labor policy, environmental policy, etc.-are growing. With regard to competition policy, the globalization of business activities and markets has made competition policy closely associated with cross border issues. However, there are no established international rules-either substantive or procedural-regarding competition policy or regulation of anti-competitive practices affecting trade. For example, the WTO/GATT does not have binding rules concerning such practices.
Third, from the Japanese viewpoint, competition policy is becoming even more important for Japan as its government proceeds with deregulation. Relatedly, the way of handling disputes on restrictive practices will considerably impact the future development of the Japanese competition policy. In short, such disputes should be handled in such a way as to help strengthen that policy.
The analysis here is placed on the context of Japan-U.S. relations. But considering the factors described above, if Japan and the Unites States could construct a better way to deal with disputes over restrictive practices, it would benefit other countries that may have similar disputes.
It may also suggest alternative international efforts to develop more effective rules related to trade and competition.
First, the lessons learned from recent Japan-U.S. trade disputes, especially the case regarding the Japanese consumer photographic film and paper markets (hereinafter the "film case" or the "film dispute"), will be closely examined. Next, methods for handling disputes over restrictive practices in the near future will be discussed. Finally, recommendations are offered with respect to the future economic relationship between Japan and the United States.
The intent of this analysis is to develop a desirable and practical procedure for dispute resolution. The detailed case studies in this paper-especially the film case-do not represent an attempt to discuss or endorse either party's arguments on the issues in question. Furthermore, this paper will not delve into the theoretical issue of what practices should be regarded as "restrictive."
The conclusions may be summarized as follows:
- While recent Japan-U.S. trade disputes show the growing emphasis on resorting to multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms, the film case shows that the current multilateral system is not well equipped to deal with such disputes (and will not be so in the near future). Furthermore, in this case, bilateral talks did not work properly.
- While the two countries should contribute to the multilateral efforts on the issues of trade and competition, they should also consider establishing a bilateral process of dispute resolution. One option is a mechanism with the following three-steps: cooperation between competition authorities based on the principle of "positive comity"; consultations among competition and trade agencies of the two countries; and finally, a non-binding recommendation by a group of experts.
- The cooperation on competition policy and the new bilateral dispute resolution mechanism may be pursued in a broader, more comprehensive and cooperative arrangement for trade and investment expansion between the two countries. One possibility is that they start exploring an arrangement like the Transatlantic Economic Partnership between the United States and the European Union.
Section 1: International Efforts to Control Restrictive Practices
Before discussing Japan-U.S. trade disputes, it would be useful to briefly review international efforts concerning restrictive practices.
Efforts up to the Present
The question of how to deal with private practices in the context of international trade is, in fact, not new. The 1948 Havana Charter, which was conceived to create the International Trade Organization (ITO), contained a scheme for controlling private restrictive practices.
However, the ITO never came to fruition and those rules on private practices were not carried over into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In 1960, the Contracting Parties of GATT adopted a Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices (the "1960 GATT Decision").
The consultation mechanism based on this Decision was not used for more than thirty-five years, and was triggered for the first time during the course of the film dispute.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, which came into effect as a result of the Uruguay round negotiations, contain some provisions with respect to restrictive practices in specific sectors.
However, there are no binding or general rules on restrictive practices.
At the first WTO Ministerial meeting in 1996, the Ministers agreed to establish a working group to address the issue of the interaction of trade and competition.
The report of the Working Group (WG), which was issued in December 1998, describes comprehensively the discussions at the WG.
But its conclusion simply recommended that the General Council decide that "the Working Group shall continue the educative work that it has been undertaking," without giving a clear guideline for future work.
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) serves as a forum for the competition authorities of its member countries to promote mutual cooperation.
One concrete product is the recommendation of the Council regarding cooperation between national competition authorities.
The recommendation deters conflicts in the member countries' competition enforcement activities, especially extraterritorial enforcement, and effectively tackles the international aspects of anti-competitive practices. The recommendation has worked as a model for bilateral agreements on cooperation between competition authorities, rather than serving as a basis for avoidance or resolution of actual cases.
Other multilateral institutions (e.g., the United Nations) have worked on this issue with little effect so far.
Some regional arrangements (e.g., the EU) have been successful in harmonizing competition policy, but their impact is naturally limited to within the region.
The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum also has undertaken activities on competition policy, but they are mainly for educative purposes.
Between Japan and the United States, the bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty provides a consultation mechanism to be used in relation to business practices which allegedly have "harmful effects upon commerce.
However, this mechanism has never been utilized.
Future Options
A growing number of scholars, officials, lawyers and others are proposing ideas regarding the interaction of trade and competition policies. The main focus is currently on the role of the WTO in this area. Below are the some of the major WTO options proposed with respect to competition policy.
Setting international competition rules or principles. Some argue for an international agreement on competition policy. The contents of the proposed agreements vary, from substantive rules (minimum standards) on specific types of private practices to an agreement on basic principles regarding a "framework, procedure and comity."
Linking competition and the WTO trade policy disciplines. This proposal would introduce competition law principles into the WTO Agreement, especially its rules on antidumping measures. The accommodation of trade policy measures (especially antidumping measures) to competition policy, although not discussed in this paper, is an indispensable aspect of the issue of "trade and competition."
Extending the reach of the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms based on "non-violation" complaints. The purpose of this idea is to apply the current WTO Dispute Settlement system to disputes on restrictive practices. This view will be examined later in this paper.
Granting the WTO secretariat a greater competition advocacy role. One approach suggests expanding the WTO's Trade Policy Mechanism to cover competition policy issues. Another would mandate the WTO to undertake research on the competitive effects of government policies.
Taking no action. Some are opposed to the idea of putting competition policy issues on the WTO agenda for fear that it might lead to watered down principles that would weaken the existing, more effective rules.
Considering the diversity of the expressed views and also the real situation of the WTO Working Group, it will take a great deal of time and effort to reach any consensus on a multilateral plan for dealing with the issues of trade and competition.
Section 2: Review of Recent Japan-U.S. Trade Disputes
Japan-U.S. Trade relations since the 1980s
Until the 1970s, trade disputes between Japan and the United States were mostly related to the surging exports of Japanese products (e.g., steel, color televisions, and automobiles) to the United States. In the 1980s however, the two countries began to have more disputes over the alleged difficulties foreign producers face when trying to enter Japanese markets. Many of those disputes were based on U.S. allegations about closed distribution systems and other collusive or restrictive market practices/structures in Japan.
The disputes relating to private practices have been handled in two different ways. The first is through cross-sectoral talks: i.e., talks under the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII, 1989-1991), the Framework Agreement (1993-) and the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation (1997-). In these talks, the U. S. government raised the issues of restrictive practices as a cross-sectoral, structural problem with the Japanese market as a whole, and the Japanese government, although not necessarily agreeing with the U.S. allegations about the Japanese market, responded by strengthening the Antimonopoly Law and improving its enforcement.
The other approach is a sectoral one. U.S. allegations about restrictive practices in such specific sectors as semiconductors, flat glass, paper products and autos/auto parts have been directed to the Japanese government, mainly to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) to a lesser extent.
The earlier sectoral disputes typically began with the initiation or suggestion thereof of the U.S. Section 301 procedure. The two governments rarely shared a common view about the situation of the relevant market (e.g., whether there were actually restrictive practices in the market) and the real causes of the alleged low import penetration to the Japanese market. Somehow though, they managed to conclude agreements with remedial actions, often including MITI's commitment to use administrative guidance to encourage imports.
However, the Japanese government's (especially MITI's) attitude to such sectoral disputes changed in the mid-1990s. It became more cautious about giving administrative guidance to industries regarding market access of imports. The reasons for such a shift in attitude were as follows:
First, the general trend in Japanese government and society is toward less government intervention in markets and more transparency in the administrative process, a trend was also pushed by the U.S. government in the SII talks. As was evident in the Administrative Procedure Act which came into effect in 1994, the Japanese government recognizes now that it should minimize use of informal actions such as administrative guidance, and rely more on formal actions.
Second, some Japanese officials doubt the efficacy of such guidance as a means to resolve trade disputes. The agreements containing Japanese commitments to administrative guidance calmed down trade disputes in the short run, but in the long run, they did not necessarily lead to satisfactory results, especially for the U.S. side.
Third was the determination to pursue a "rule-based" trade policy. In the 1990s, the Japanese government, especially MITI, came to advocate a "rule-based approach" in dealing with trade disputes. This approach sees internationally accepted rules as criteria to judge foreign countries' actions. This approach counters the "result-based" approach which claims foreign countries' actions to be "unfair" based on unfavorable results of trade (e.g., low imports) and often urges managed trade.
The advent of the WTO in January 1995, and its strengthened disciplines and dispute settlement mechanism, Japan finds it more feasible to adhere to the "rule-based" approach.
From the Japanese viewpoint, the autos/auto parts dispute was significant in the history of Japan-U.S. trade relations in the sense that the Japanese government decidedly demonstrated its new approach to handling trade disputes.
The Japanese government eventually requested consultations on the dispute at the WTO, though it was settled through bilateral negotiations outside the WTO on June 28, 1995.
The U.S. allegations in the autos/auto parts dispute included those related to restrictive practices of Japanese companies. One of the joint announcements made at the conclusion of the dispute was related to the reinforcement of the JFTC and its policy.
The Film Dispute
The First Stage - Section 301 Proceedings
In May 1995, Kodak, a U.S. photographic product company, submitted a petition to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), urging it to initiate a Section 301 procedure regarding the Japanese consumer photographic film and paper markets. Thus, the film case was initiated just when the tension between the two countries was reaching its peak in the autos/auto parts dispute.
Kodak alleged that Japanese domestic photographic film and paper manufacturers, especially Fujifilm, foreclosed the Japanese photographic film and paper markets by engaging in anti-competitive business practices with their distributors. The Japanese government's toleration of the practices was allegedly "unreasonable" as defined by Section 301. The film dispute was the first case that utilized the "toleration" provision.
In July 1995, the USTR decided to initiate an investigation of Kodak's complaint as called for by Section 301.
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