Of course, the election result should not be over-interpreted. The fact that Bush beat John Kerry by a margin of 51% to 48% does not mean a massive conservative breakthrough any more than a slim Kerry victory would have meant the end of conservative America. It is true that with 59 million votes, Bush received more votes than any other candidate for U.S. president in history. But the same thing is also true for John Kerry and his 55.4 million votes. America remains deeply divided, with its cosmopolitan, progressive coasts and large cities on one side and its rural conservative heartland on the other.
Still, the reality cannot be denied: the election was a referendum on Bush, and a clear majority of Americans decided to stay the course. Bush received a clear mandate, reinforced by impressive majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives.
What does this mean for American foreign policy and French-American relations? For some Bush administration officials, the President's reelection provides the opportunity to get beyond our differences and to re-launch transatlantic cooperation. In their view, the Europeans saw John Kerry as a deus ex machina that would repair transatlantic relations without any effort on their part. Since this option no longer exists, these officials say, the Europeans will have no choice but to reconcile with the American superpower and its leader, whose merits have just been acknowledged by the American public.
The problem is that these officials do not recognize any need to change their own policy and underestimate the level of Bush's unpopularity among European public opinion. In fact, the Bush victory makes life more difficult for European leaders who want to work with the United States, because they have to explain to their skeptical publics why they support such an unpopular leader. Moreover, the Bush victory only encourages those who would like to make Europe a counterweight that will stand up to the United States. Finally, Bush's unpopularity gives Europeans a great excuse for refusing to increase their military or financial contributions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the efforts of some pragmatists in Europe to overcome the recent difficulties, the new Bush team risks deluding itself if it continues to close it eyes to European hostility and to assume that reconciliation is possible without any genuine American initiative.
But is it not possible that a reelected Bush will, like his hero Ronald Reagan, lead a more moderate foreign policy, seeking to be viewed by history as a peacemaker after a militaristic and aggressive first term? That is highly unlikely, and Europeans would do best to avoid the illusion that Bush is going to fundamentally reorient his foreign policy. The Reagan analogy is deceptive: Reagan did not decide to pursue peace to please the Europeans, but because he concluded that the world had changed. For Bush, there is no Mikhail Gorbachev on the horizon. Europeans should not be surprised if Bush names a hawk like Paul Wolfowitz or John Bolton to be Secretary of State and then asks the world: "Why did you not believe me when I told you we would stay the course?"
This all means that the re-establishment of French-American cooperation is going to be very difficult under Bush II. Yet all hope should not be abandoned. Americans and Europeans still have common interests, and even the Bush administration recognizes—more than it did in 2002 or 2003—that allies are important and that force and conviction are not enough to win their support. But if leaders on both sides do not abandon the illusion that it is up to the other side to change approach, the worst of the transatlantic crisis could still be ahead.
For the French, this means that they must accept the legitimacy of the Bush administration, acknowledge the psychological effects of September 11 on Americans, and confront the simplistic anti-Americanism that one finds too often in the French media. On their part, the Americans must recognize that being attacked does not give them the right to do whatever they want, that they cannot continue to ignore European priorities such as the environment and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that the Europeans sometimes have important contributions to make, intellectually as well as financially. It is also important to put an end to the Francophobia, the equivalent of French anti-Americanism, promulgated by certain American media outlets and by Congress. None of these measures can be accomplished, or sustained, without equal effort from both sides. So who will go first?