Saddam Hussein is clearly a dangerous and violent political leader. He has amassed chemical and biological weapons, and used them against both Iran and his own citizens. He invaded Kuwait. He used Japanese and other hostages as a ?human shield? for several months after that invasion. He has tried to develop nuclear weapons. He expelled UN inspectors. His military forces have repeatedly fired on allied planes enforcing the no-fly zones across northern and southern Iraq.

President Bush and some of his right-wing advisors are eager to initiate a war to remove Saddam Hussein and his military machine from power. That initiative has now been temporarily blunted by Iraq?s decision to re-admit the UN inspectors. But there is no doubt whatsoever that military action remains high on the agenda. Proponents of war in the Bush administration will watch for every little obstacle to the inspectors and portray it as a reason to declare the UN effort a failure requiring immediate American action.

But military invasion is not the only option. Indeed, a strong and very public argument has occurred between "hawks" and "doves" in the administration over the past several months. Even many professional military people I know think that invading Iraq is the wrong policy at the present time. With policy still under debate in Washington and ample room to doubt the necessity of war, this is a critical time for America?s friends to speak up. As the Japanese public and government ponder how they should react, I would like to emphasize that there are several very important reasons to oppose war.

First, invasion of Iraq raises huge moral concerns. Without an actual attack by Iraq, or a threat of imminent attack, how can we justify this action? The United States cannot go around the world removing suspicious dictators just because they are not to America's liking. Arguing that he might have some weapons of mass destruction and might possibly use them at some indeterminate point in the future is simply not sufficient justification for a massive preemptive military action.

Second, the administration has revealed no new evidence to prove an attack by Iraq is imminent. If controls on trade (though imperfect) and inspections have stymied Saddam Hussein?s effort to increase his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction for 10 years, why not continue on this path? Containment has not been uniformly effective, but we should be able to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability and keep his chemical and biological capabilities sufficiently limited to make their use unlikely.

Third, attacking Iraq is supposed to be part of the war on terrorism—a war that Japan supports. But the administration admits it has no evidence of a link between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorists. Attacking Iraq because it might possibly use its weapons of mass destruction through terrorist actions in the future is not an acceptable reason for invasion today. Finally, there is little evidence that the Bush administration has thought through the consequences of invasion of Iraq. The United States will win the war—quickly and decisively. But what will be the impact on political relations in the Middle East? What will happen to America's? (And from a Japanese perspective, what will happen to Japan?s reputation as an ally of the United States?) Are Americans willing to occupy defeated Iraq for a number of years as a new political system is built? Who will do the occupying, and who will pay for it? Japan? This lack of clarity in broader or longer-term objectives and the policies to achieve them is especially worrisome, but typical of the simplistic thinking of the hawks in this administration.

Prime Minister Koizumi was right to emphasize the need to work this problem through the United Nations when he met with President Bush in New York. But just a few days later, I listened to Foreign Minister Kawaguchi say publicly in Washington that the U.S.-Japan security relationship is as close as it has ever been, and that she, too, believes the United States always makes the right decisions on foreign policy—practically a carte blanche to the Bush administration on Iraq. To be sure, she emphasized the importance of working through the UN, but other than that, her endorsement of the administration?s policies was unconditional. The danger for Japan is that the hawks in the administration may convince the President that the UN mission is a failure and that the United States must take unilateral action. What will the Japanese government do then?

Sadly, if the Bush administration makes a superficial effort at working through the UN, Prime Minister Koizumi will have little choice but to support an American war on Iraq. Is that what the Japanese people really want? I believe that the world would be better off if leaders like Prime Minister Koizumi would deliver a message of strong opposition to President Bush. Otherwise, the Bush administration might well end up doing something truly unfortunate.