The remarkable score made by anti-globalization candidates—43.77% if one adds together the votes for Le Pen, Laguiller, Chevènement, Besancenot, Gluckstein, Mamère, Hue and Mégret (48.02% if Saint-Josse is included)—confirms the impression of a France that sees itself as a leader in the movement to contain international economic integration. Already before the elections, France stood out from among its neighbors by the dynamism of its anti-globalization movements, from José Bové?s supporters to the militants in ATTAC! The French, in fact, seem to be obsessed with globalization, as evidenced not only by the April 21 vote but also by the attention paid to it over the past several years in the press, the bookstores, and political rhetoric.
It is this last point in particular that contributes to the impression of a ?French exception? vis-à-vis globalization: whether it is Lionel Jospin?s ?managed globalization? or Chirac?s appeals by Chirac to ?humanize? globalization, moderate French political leaders of both left and right load their speeches with rhetoric critical of a phenomenon that gets a lot less attention in other European countries and in the United States. This is hardly suprising. According to a series of opinion polls undertaken over the past few years, no less than 72% of the French say they are ?wary? of globalization, 65% see it as a direct cause of social inequality, 56% say that it threatens French identity, and 55% believe it is a danger for French companies and jobs.
And yet, France is a country whose economy and society have adapted remarkably well to this much-criticized globalization. This is clear from the global opening of the French economy, with the trade share of GDP now at 49%, nearly twice as much as the United States and Japan; from the international engagement of French companies, many of which now get more than half their revenues from abroad; or from the opening up of the French stock market, of which 40% of the capital is now imported. Similarly, the departing government?s conversion to privatization, with some 31 billion euros worth of shares sold off by the state under Jospin, or to stock options, which are now used more in France than in any other country except the United States, show how much France has adapted.
This paradox could be interpreted as a sort of collective schizophrenia or as the whim of a country that wants to have its cake and eat it too: On one hand, more regulation, more state, more protection; on the other hand more individual economic freedom, greater choice, more integration with the rest of the world.
The double language could also easily be seen as a sign of duplicity, an impression that clearly contributed to the unexpected election result last Sunday: the French believe that their political leaders say one thing and do another, or worse, that they say one thing to hide what they are really doing. Thus, Lionel Jospin decided to back a law that increases economic regulation and defends the Tobin tax when in fact his government has privatized almost as much as the three preceding right-wing governments combined and opened up major sections of the French economy to free competition. Chirac also avoids speaking frankly to the electorate about the advantages of free trade and enterprise, and instead focuses his speeches on the need for humane, fair and social globalization. In short, those who were only a short time ago the two main candidates speak about globalization (and sometimes against it) in exactly the same way, even as they share the real desire to adapt France to the challenges of the global economy.
Why this gap between words and facts? In a country long characterized by economic dirigisme and the central role of the state in the management of economic and social activity—the antithesis of liberal globalization—it is very difficult, even suicidal, for politial leaders to admit that external constraints prevent them from controlling numerous levers of the national economy. On the contrary, they must prove that they remain fully in charge. Jospin caused a national scandal when he admitted, after the ?Michelin affair,? that the state could not longer administer the economy. He had to swallow his words and then assert to the French that the state was there to protect them against globalization. And when this sort of thing happened again when Danone and Marks & Spencer?s cut some jobs in France, the law on "new economic regulations" was put forth... Instead of explaining to the French that sometimes it can prove necessary to shed a thousand jobs to maintain many more than that, many political leaders opted for demagogy, for example by calling on people to boycott Danone products.
So should this double-language be unambiguously condemned? This is a genuine question, because in many cases Jospin and Chirac defend a managed approach to globalization not to hide the loss of control that they cannot admit but because it?s the only way to acclimatize France to the phenomenon. One must not forget the case of Edouard Balladur, who in the 1995 presidential election campaign openly spoke to the French about the limits of state action, only to find himself pushed out of power. The same thing happened a year later when Alain Juppé?s proposed reforms failed spectacularly. It is thus not difficult to understand why the Jospin and Chirac campaigns took account of these ?lessons,? since the goal of a politician must be first to win power in order to be able to use it.
In the long term, however, as the results of the recent elections demonstrate, such political opportunism can prove costly for France and its leaders. The voters who went to the polls in the first round wanted to show that they were not being duped. It is difficult for political leaders to assert one thing and do the opposite without paying an electoral price. The fact that parliamentary majorities have been kicked out in every single election since 1978, plus the spectacular rise in abstention rates and protest votes also suggest that the French are not being duped by rhetoric designed to hide reality from them.
It is unfortunate that the governments of the late 1990s did not take advantage of the good economic situation of that time to undertake greater reforms and do more pedagogy with the electorate. Why didn?t the moderate left openly admit that globalization has a positive side that should be encouraged even if it is necessary to protect France from its more negative effects? And why does it prefer to reform the French economy and society by stealth while demonizing globalization? A large number of leftist voters decided instead to back candidates who abhor globalization. And why doesn?t the right dare to openly defend liberalism, instead of hiding behind ambiguous rhetoric? It is not surprising that many of its voters chose to listen to Le Pen?s alarmist rhetoric about a France in national decline threatened by immigrants, Eurocrats, and globalization.
The real talent of political leaders must be to find the right path between cynical opportunism of double-speak and the political risks of excessive candor. Where globalization is concerned, both Jospin and Chirac seem to have missed that path.