



THE SABAN CENTER
for MIDDLE EAST POLICY
at THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

ANALYSIS PAPER

Number 7, February 2006

A SWITCH IN TIME

A NEW STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA IN IRAQ

KENNETH M. POLLACK
AND THE IRAQ POLICY WORKING GROUP OF
THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY
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PREFACE

This report is the first in a series from the Iraq Strategy Project of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Although it was drafted by Kenneth M. Pollack, the Director of Research of the Saban Center, it resulted from the discussions of the Saban Center's Iraq Policy Working Group. The members of the group, which met during November and December 2005, included:

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Nearly all of the ideas contained in this report came from the discussions of the Iraq Working Group. This report is a distillation of the thinking of the members of the group as interpreted by the principal drafter, Kenneth Pollack. However, *none of the ideas within this report should be attributed to any individual member of*

the group, except where explicitly stated. The members of the group provided substantial comments on various drafts of the report, but were not asked to agree to the final version. As a result, *the opinions expressed in this report should not necessarily be construed as the views of any member of the Iraq Working Group.* In some cases, members of the group may agree entirely with its recommendations; in other cases only partially, or not at all.

We would also like to thank by name some of those who assisted us, such as by providing input for the report, or by reviewing draft versions. They include, at the Saban Center at Brookings, Ambassador Martin Indyk, Avi Dicter and Andrew Apostolou; in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp. Outside of Brookings, we drew on Amatzia Baram; Eliot Cohen; Bathsheba Crocker; Janine Davidson; James Dobbins; Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, United States Army (ret.); Major General James "Spider" Marks, United States Army (ret.); Phebe Marr; Steven Metz; Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl; Ambassador Mark Parris; Lieutenant General David Petraeus; Fareed Yaseen; General Anthony Zinni, United States Marine Corps (ret.); members of the headquarters staff of U.S. Central Command; and other serving U.S. military officers and government officials who must remain anonymous.

Above all, we wish to thank Nemir Kirdar, whose generosity and devotion to the future of Iraq made this report possible.

GROUND RULES OF THE REPORT

“A Switch in Time” is intended to provide an alternative, comprehensive approach for American strategy in Iraq. It begins with the assumption (not necessarily shared by all members of the Iraq Working Group) that although the current U.S. approach is encountering considerable difficulties and appears unlikely to produce a stable Iraq within the next two to five years the alternative proposed by some Bush Administration critics—a rapid withdrawal—would also not serve U.S. interests. While many thoughtful experts and policymakers have attempted to offer a realistic third course of action, none have so far succeeded in doing so. This report proposes such a strategy.

The one aspect of Iraq policy that this report deliberately does not address is domestic American politics. Determining what is politically possible for U.S. policy in Iraq is an inherently difficult proposition. Moreover, U.S. domestic politics lie beyond the writ of the Saban Center and the expertise of the Iraq Working Group. The guiding principle behind this report was to ask non-partisan specialists with relevant expertise to devise an optimal strategy for producing a stable, pluralistic Iraq within the foreseeable future. Whether that strategy is domestically politically viable and what is required for its adoption by the U.S. government and the Congress is a question for others. We believe, however, that a vital element of the U.S. domestic debate over Iraq is a realistic assessment of what “staying, but doing it right” requires.

Finally, another rule we have tried to adhere to is not to place blame on specific individuals for events or decisions. This report discusses the many mistakes and failings that currently hinder reconstruction, both political and economic, in Iraq for the sole purpose of identifying what must change and how. The intent of this report, and of the Iraq Working Group, is to identify the steps that the United States must take to put the reconstruction of Iraq on a path to success. The task of deciding the responsibility for mistakes is best left to future historians.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The reconstruction of Iraq is not doomed to fail, but the Bush Administration does not yet have a strategy that is likely to succeed. The progress made so far is an insufficient basis for a durable solution to Iraq's problems. Many of the positive developments are fragile or superficial, and conceal deeper underlying problems that could easily re-emerge. U.S. policy often focuses on the wrong problems and employs the wrong solutions. The most basic flaw stems from April 2003 when the fall of Saddam Hussein created a security vacuum in Iraq that the United States has never properly filled. This security vacuum has given rise to two separate but related problems:

- An insurgency, based principally in the Sunni tribal community of western Iraq; and,
- A failed state, in which the governmental architecture has essentially collapsed and has not yet been effectively replaced by new, capable military and political institutions.

The United States has devoted considerable energy and resources to fighting the insurgency, but it has consistently employed the wrong strategy. However, more damaging has been the consistent failure to rebuild Iraq's failed state. *Until the United States succeeds in helping the Iraqis build strong, new political and military institutions, a massive commitment of external military forces and economic assistance will continue to be necessary to forestall a civil war.*

Time is already working against the United States. The many disappointments of reconstruction are

increasingly eroding Iraqi popular support, prompting a growing number of Iraqis to cast their lot with insurgent or militia groups who offer them immediate relief, even if most Iraqis understand that this is an extremely dangerous path. Until now, the promise of a new government just around the corner has kept Iraqis from defecting in large numbers. But the installation in 2006 of Iraq's new "permanent" government—the fifth since Saddam's fall—means that it will be four years before Iraqis can shift their hopes to a new horizon. It is therefore essential that this government not disappoint Iraqis as its predecessors have.

The United States must therefore approach 2006 as a make-or-break year in Iraq. Either the new Iraqi government with U.S. backing starts to fix Iraq's problems or continued failure will propel Iraqis into the arms of the militias, likely generating a full-blown civil war. However, the situation is not yet hopeless because so many Iraqis still fear that turning away from reconstruction will mean civil war. If the U.S. and Iraqi governments can begin to produce positive results, they can still win the hearts and minds of most Iraqis.

SECURITY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Security is the most important prerequisite for the reconstruction of Iraq. Although there is no guarantee that reconstruction will succeed with adequate security, it is guaranteed to fail without it. *The key flaw in U.S. military strategy in Iraq has been its inability to provide basic safety for Iraqis. Providing that safety, not chasing insurgents, must be the new priority of U.S. policy.*

Adopt a traditional counterinsurgency strategy. To improve the chances of providing adequate levels of security for reconstruction in Iraq, the United States should adopt a traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy which will, by its very nature, address the dual needs of defeating the insurgency and building a viable state. *The key requirement of COIN is to achieve a ratio of about 20 security personnel per thousand of the population.* For the 22 million Iraqis living outside of Kurdistan, that would require about 450,000 security personnel—well beyond current U.S. and Iraqi capabilities. However, traditional counterinsurgency strategy initially focuses on creating such a favorable ratio only in those parts of the country that are both the most important and the most supportive of reconstruction. These locations become secured enclaves and, with economic resources pouring in, emerge as successful models of reconstruction. They then provide the base from which reconstruction can slowly expand across the country as more security forces become available. These areas are like an “oil stain” or “ink spot” that gradually spreads throughout the country, pacifying and rebuilding those areas that it touches.

Such a strategy in Iraq would begin by reducing the resources devoted to stamping out the insurgency in western Iraq. These would be shifted to securing the critical enclaves of Kurdistan, Baghdad, much of southeastern Iraq, and a number of other major urban centers, along with the oilfields and some other vital economic facilities. The concentrated security focus and development effort should ensure meaningful local economic and political progress. In turn, public opinion within the secured enclaves would likely solidify in favor of reconstruction, while Iraqis outside the secured enclaves would see that the government can offer a better alternative than the militias and insurgents. The United States would train additional Iraqi forces within the permissive environment of the enclaves to allow them to build unit cohesion, trust, and command relationships.

For this counterinsurgency strategy to work, the United States will need to:

- *Make protecting the Iraqi people and civilian infrastructure its highest priority, training Iraqi security forces a close second, and hunting insurgents a distant third.* The single most important mission of counterinsurgency forces is to provide basic safety for the population so that it no longer lives in fear.
- *Shift the strategic emphasis from offensive to defensive military operations, but go on the offensive in the political and economic realms.* Military offensives should only be mounted as immediate counterattacks for insurgent actions or when intelligence has clearly identified a high-value target.
- *Focus on reducing the influence of militias and organized crime in central and southern Iraq, which cripples economic development and threatens civil war.* The militias established themselves there because the United States never properly filled the post-Saddam security vacuum. The only way to reverse this trend is to fill the security vacuum by deploying significant Iraqi and Coalition forces into these regions.
- *Create a unified command structure fully integrating civilian and military operations.* Only a fully-integrated approach is likely to produce success. The United States and the Iraqi government must create a hierarchy of joint committees to integrate military, political, and economic decision-making both horizontally and vertically. These committees should consist of all key players in reconstruction and governance. The Bush Administration’s nascent plan to deploy Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq falls far short of what is needed because it will not erect a national integrated hierarchy.

The United States’ newly-proclaimed “clear, hold and build” strategy also fails to meet these criteria. In particular, it is being implemented in the wrong part of the country—western Iraq—thereby drawing off forces from central and southern Iraq where popular support for reconstruction is highest but is souring because of insecurity. Consequently, these critical parts of the country are falling under the control of

vicious sectarian militias which could fragment the country and drive it into civil war.

Adopt more appropriate tactics. The change in U.S. strategy must be accompanied by changes at tactical level. Two examples of the many changes to tactical conduct that this report advocates are:

- *De-emphasize detainee counts.* The military has replaced the Vietnam metric of the body count with a new and equally counterproductive metric in Iraq, the detainee count.
- *To facilitate population control, conduct a nationwide census and create a biometric identification card system.* A nationwide census would help identify insurgents and their supporters, and a biometric ID card would make it extremely difficult for insurgents to hide their identities, obviating their ability to mingle freely with the population.

Organizational and personnel changes. This report recommends a great many changes to the personnel, organizational and structural policies that the U.S. military has pursued in Iraq. One example is that all U.S. Army and Marine battalions should be “paired up,” with one of the pair always in Iraq in the same area of responsibility (AOR) and the other at home, resting and training for the next rotation. The two would continue to swap for as long as the U.S. deployment lasts. Officers would be able regularly to exchange information and provide each other with lessons learned. The intelligence sections of the paired battalions would function as “rear” and “forward” elements. “Pairing up” is the best way to deal with the problems of turnover, loss of institutional memory, and the need for frequent rotations to deal with “burnout.”

A better integrated reconstruction effort. Another important failing of the U.S. effort in Iraq has been the dearth of civilian personnel from key agencies: USAID, CIA, the Departments of State, Energy, Agriculture, and others. Very few of Iraq’s 18 provinces have more than a half-dozen American

civilian government personnel working in them. State and USAID must commit far greater numbers of personnel—particularly those with Arabic and knowledge of the Arab world—to the reconstruction of Iraq, even if this means reducing the manning of posts elsewhere. Far more personnel need to be assigned to missions outside the Green Zone in Baghdad.

Training the Iraqi armed forces. The training of Iraqi security forces is progressing better than ever before, but there is still a long way to go before they will be able to shoulder the burden of providing security in Iraq alone. Political pressure to quickly produce more trained Iraqi units to replace U.S. soldiers is the overarching problem that has plagued U.S. efforts. The only way to generate Iraqi troops sufficiently capable of shouldering the burden of securing their country is to give them the time in both formal and informal training to develop.

At this point, roughly 40,000–60,000 Iraqi security force personnel appear capable of contributing in some meaningful way to COIN and stability operations in Iraq. Although far short of the number necessary to secure the country without U.S. military forces, this represents a considerable increase over the past year, and suggests that Iraqi forces should be able to pick up more of the security burden in coming years. However, before this can happen, the United States must address three key problems:

- U.S. military personnel will need to place greater emphasis on the selection and training of Iraqi military officers, especially at tactical levels.
- The U.S. and Iraqi high commands need to make a greater effort to create integrated Iraqi security formations.
- The U.S. will have to make rebuilding Iraq’s military support infrastructure a higher priority if the Iraqi armed forces are to take over full responsibility for securing the country.

BUILDING A NEW IRAQI POLITICAL SYSTEM

The United States will need to help develop a new political system that will secure the trust of Iraqis by persuading them that there are effective, non-violent means to address their problems; that others will not use violence against them; that they will have equal opportunities; and that the state has institutions capable of addressing their needs.

The new Iraqi government's legitimacy will depend on whether it can improve the lives of its people through providing higher employment, more constant electricity, more readily available clean water and gasoline, and the security that underpins all of these necessities.

There are four major problems afflicting the Iraqi body politic:

- Iraq is now a deeply divided society and those divisions are creating animosity, fueling the violence, and preventing the efficient functioning of the Iraqi government.
- Iraq's central government is now fully-constituted but essentially powerless.
- Iraq's political parties have only tenuous connections to the Iraqi people and mostly limit their interaction with their nominal constituents.
- The United States, as the principal occupying power and the driving force behind reconstruction, lacks the personnel, capabilities, know-how, and even the necessary resources to rebuild the Iraqi nation.

Power sharing and national reconciliation. Like security, some form of national reconciliation compact, coupled with a new power-sharing arrangement, is a precondition for any progress in Iraq. The greatest obstacle to national reconciliation is the fact that many Sunni Arabs feel alienated from the political reconstruction process by the Shi'ah, the Americans, and, to a

lesser extent, the Kurds. Regardless of these grievances, the Sunnis will still have to make some major concessions. In particular they will need to accept that their share of Iraq's resources will be strictly proportionate to their numbers. The Shi'ah and Kurds will need to reciprocate this and other Sunni concessions by:

- Revising the de-Ba'thification program and establishing a formal truth and reconciliation process.
- Reintegrating Sunnis into the armed forces and civil service.
- Providing greater protection for minorities.
- Revising electoral laws to prevent sectarian chauvinists from running.
- Providing Sunni tribal shaykhs with resources if they stop attacking roads, power lines, oil pipelines, and Coalition forces in their territory, and prevent other groups from doing the same.

Another key goal for the United States is to rein in the Shi'ah. Since the fall of Saddam, there has been an alarming tendency by some Shi'i leaders to overreach. Some now talk about splitting off all of southeastern Iraq to form an autonomous region, much like Iraqi Kurdistan, keeping the revenues from the southern oil fields for themselves. They expect the Kurds will do the same in the north, leaving no oil revenues for the Sunnis. This would be a disastrous development for Iraq as it likely would spark civil wars both within the Shi'i community and between the Shi'ah and Sunni Arabs.

Since the fall of Baghdad, Kurdish political leaders have been the most willing to argue for actions that are in the best interests of Iraq, while jealously guarding Kurdistan's prerogatives. As long as they do not push a maximalist agenda of immediate secession, full ownership of all revenues from the northern oilfields, or an arbitrary solution to competing property claims in Kirkuk, the *status quo* on issues related to them should not preclude solutions to Iraq's other political problems.

They will want something in return for concessions to the Sunni Arabs. The United States should offer them a more equitable slice of foreign aid so that they can demonstrate to their constituents that there are real benefits to remaining part of Iraq.

Decentralization. Iraq's ministries are crippled by corruption, undermanned, and remain tied to sclerotic bureaucratic practices inherited from the former regime. Accordingly, the United States and the new Iraqi government should begin moving toward a federal system in which the central government retains control of the armed forces, foreign policy, monetary policy and currency, national standards including regulation of the media, and regulation of the oil sector (but not oil income distribution). Most other powers should devolve to local governments. This report suggests a range of actions that could assist the process of decentralization, the most important of which are:

- Funds from foreign aid and oil revenues should be provided directly to local governments.
- Control of Iraq's police should be transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to local officials.

A new oil-revenue distribution system. The success or failure of political reconstruction in Iraq probably hinges on establishing a fixed and equitable system for the distribution of its oil revenues. Without such a plan, it is impossible to imagine real national reconciliation because all the parties will continue to fight over the spoils, distracting officials and technocrats from the job of running the country, let alone rebuilding it. Moreover, a fixed distribution plan is necessary to ensure that all the revenues do not go into central government coffers as pure discretionary funding because this breeds rampant corruption and concentrates financial power in the hands of the federal government.

However, it is critical that Iraq's oil-revenue distribution system consist of multiple "baskets" into which the oil revenues would be deposited. This report proposes five separate baskets:

- Basket 1: Federal government funding for national security, foreign affairs, monetary policy and other central government functions.
- Basket 2: Infrastructure development.
- Basket 3: Distribution directly to local governments based on the population in their municipalities.
- Basket 4: An additional pool of revenue divided among the provinces on an annual basis by the Council of Representatives (Iraq's parliament), giving the average Iraqi a tangible interest in the performance of his or her national representatives who would have to fight for as much of this basket for their constituents as possible.
- Basket 5: Direct funding to the Iraqi people. Money from oil revenues should be deposited in individual bank accounts for every Iraqi, earmarked for specific purposes—education, retirement, healthcare, etc., to give Iraqis a direct stake in opposing organized crime and the insurgents who steal the oil and destroy oil industry infrastructure.

Building central government capacity by tackling corruption. Corruption is probably the single greatest factor inhibiting the creation of credible Iraqi political institutions. Like the problem of insecurity, with which it is intertwined, corruption undermines nearly every aspect of reconstruction. This report details over 40 different prescriptions that the United States and the government of Iraq should adopt to fight corruption, including:

- Reducing the monetary size of individual aid and reconstruction contracts.
- Creating an independent NGO responsible for issuing annual "report cards" on the Iraqi fiscal and monetary systems.
- Establishing a special court for cases of corruption to be presided over by a panel of judges, including at least one foreign judge to ensure impartiality.

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- Changing Iraqi perceptions of corruption by educating the Iraqi media so that they are better able to expose corruption.

Reforming the Iraqi political process. The early U.S. decision to allow a group of exiles and Shi'i chauvinists to determine the shape of Iraq's democratic process has resulted in a political structure that is exacerbating many of the problems plaguing the country and could eventually prove disastrous. Iraq's electoral system is based on proportional representation which hinders the emergence of many key features of democracy because it forces Iraqis to vote for party slates. All party leaders have a vested interest in maintaining this system because it rewards party loyalty and favors weak national parties over strong individual candidates. But the result is that the parties currently in power do not adequately represent the aspirations of the Iraqi people, their electoral victories notwithstanding. And the party leaders have few incentives to make the kinds of compromises necessary either to achieve national reconciliation or to address the needs of the people. Instead, they have every incentive to pocket as much public wealth as they can while they remain in office.

It would be preferable for Iraq to move to a version of direct geographic representation, as used in Great Britain and the United States, because this would encourage parliamentary compromise and national reconciliation, and force legislators to pay close attention to the needs of their constituents. Candidates from districts representing mixed populations would have a strong incentive to find solutions that would secure them support across sectarian lines. Of course, the current parties will be reluctant to give up the current system. One solution could be to encourage Iraq to adopt a hybrid system like Germany's, with half of the seats in the Council of Representatives being decided by proportional representation and the other half by geographic direct election.

Even without such a major overhaul of Iraq's current electoral system, there are many changes that could be adopted to reduce sectarianism, make Iraqi political

leaders more conscientious about securing the needs of their constituents, and moderating extremists. One example of the ideas presented in this report would be to make it mandatory by the 2009 or 2013 elections for candidates for the Council of Representatives to have served on either a local or provincial council. If each member of the Council of Representatives has first to serve on local and provincial councils it forces the political parties to pay attention to elections for these lesser assemblies.

Increasing international assistance. Now that the December 2005 elections have ushered in a permanent government, the United States should try to hand over some of the burden of guiding Iraq's reconstruction to an international body. It would be better for the United Nations or some other international actor to take the lead in prodding the Iraqis. *Moreover, the United Nations, through its various agencies, can call upon a vast network of personnel and resources vital to various aspects of nation-building.* But securing greater international assistance from NGOs, the United Nations, and other nations will largely depend on two factors:

- The willingness of the United States to allow the United Nations and foreign countries to play a leadership role—particularly on the political and economic tracks—in the reconstruction of Iraq.
- The willingness of the United States to adopt a true counterinsurgency strategy that would make key sectors of the country safe enough for civilians to perform their missions. Only by creating safe zones in Iraq can the United States hope to entice large numbers of foreigners back.

ASSISTING IRAQ'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Meaningful progress in improving Iraq's economy depends on commensurate improvements in Iraq's security and political fortunes. While the Iraqi economy is not doing well, it is not listless either. Foreign aid continues to flow into Iraq. Although far too much of

Iraq's oil money is siphoned out of the country in the form of graft, much still remains—even if that too is tainted by corruption. The influx of money and the U.S. decision to lift all import duties after the fall of Baghdad, has brought in a flood of foreign consumer goods. So much foreign aid was earmarked for infrastructure repair that Iraq's construction industry boomed. This has taken some of the edge off unemployment while putting money into the hands of Iraq's working classes. Nevertheless, all of these advances tend to be fragile: the influx of foreign aid and cheap imports will not last forever. Iraq's manufacturing, agricultural, and service economies are moribund, crippled by a lack of investment, excessive corruption and inefficient management.

The United States and the new government of Iraq have two economic challenges ahead of them:

- The pressing need to provide more tangible benefits to the Iraqi people within the next 6–12 months, as Iraqis assess whether this new government will be any different from its predecessors.
- The need to help Iraq deal with its various structural problems so that the Iraqi economy can eventually operate under its own steam and provide for the Iraqi people without prodigious external assistance.

There is tension between these short-term and long-term requirements. It is therefore critical that the United States and the new government of Iraq set clear priorities for economic policy for the next year. Immediate growth is needed in the sectors that are most important to the short-term well-being of average Iraqis. In all other areas of the Iraqi economy, the emphasis should be on long-term structural reform.

Short-term efforts. Those issues in the Iraqi economy targeted for short-term improvement should be those that Iraqis have identified as of greatest concern to them—employment, electricity, oil production and export, corruption, agriculture, decentralization, banking and investment, and foreign aid projects.

Lack of jobs is one of the greatest complaints of Iraqis. However, this is one area where short and long-term needs run at cross purposes. Nearly three years into the reconstruction effort, Iraq should be moving away from aid programs that fund what are often nothing more than make-work projects concentrated in construction and infrastructure repair. Iraq needs to be shifting its emphasis to more economically viable and productive methods of employing its work force. However, because progress in Iraq's economy has largely been limited to just a few sectors, jobs do not yet exist in the economy to absorb large numbers of Iraqis if these make-work programs are ended. *Thus, despite their inefficiencies, the United States must maintain adequate levels of funding for current Iraqi construction projects and other programs that generate large numbers of jobs.*

The revival of Iraq's agricultural sector, critical to the economic reconstruction of Iraq, has been badly neglected. Iraq has some of the most fertile land in the Middle East and was at times a net exporter of agricultural products. Enhanced agricultural production could help diversify Iraq's economy away from its current dependence on oil. Moreover, agriculture is far more labor-intensive than oil, making it an excellent way of curbing unemployment. This report advocates a number of steps for the revitalization of Iraq's agricultural sector such as ensuring that the Iraqi government stops importing food for its ration basket and devolves to local governments control over contracting and administration of agricultural programs.

Electricity blackouts are a constant complaint of Iraqis. Immediately after Saddam's fall, Iraqis ran out to buy every type of household appliance imaginable. As a result, demand for electricity to run these items quickly outpaced every Coalition effort to repair and expand the capacity of Iraq's electricity generation and distribution sector. Thus, while the United States and other foreign donors must continue to increase generating capacity (and the grid's ability to import electricity from neighboring countries), it is equally important that the Iraqi government move to curb

demand by installing meters in every Iraqi home and business while ending electricity subsidies.

The longer term. The United States will also have to ensure that Iraqi economic growth is sustainable over the long-term. Iraq's economy remains hobbled by costly subsidies dating to Saddam's era and before. The principal subsidies on food, gasoline and electricity constitute 21 percent of the Iraqi government's budget. Imports of gasoline and other refined petroleum products—which are then sold at subsidized prices—cost the government another 10 percent of the budget. These subsidies negate and distort market forces. Because these are all “sacred cows,” quickly eliminating them is probably impossible. Instead, these subsidies should be phased out over the next several years. In particular, most poor and middle class Iraqis remain dependent on rations provided by the government since the imposition of UN sanctions against Iraq in 1990. It will be impossible to do away with the food basket overnight and there are concerns about its monetization because of problems with corruption and violent crime. *Consequently, it might benefit Iraq to employ a system of food stamps for underprivileged Iraqis in the meantime.*

There is nothing more important to Iraq's long-term economic prosperity than improving the state of its educational system. The United States and the international community have already provided considerable assistance, largely in terms of building schools, raising the pay of teachers, providing revised textbooks, furnishing school supplies, and eliminating Saddam's worst flunkies from university positions. There is still a great deal more to be done. Iraq suffers from the same problems in education as other Arab states: there is little emphasis on interactive learning, rote memorization is employed in every subject (including the sciences); creativity tends to be stifled; there is an overemphasis on the humanities (including religion) at the expense of science and math; teachers are provided with few incentives to stimulate or engage with their pupils; and the entire process is rigidly prescribed by the central government. The result is that, like elsewhere

in the Arab world, students graduate from the educational systems with few of the kinds of job skills needed to compete in the globalized economy. This report offers a number of suggestions regarding the revival of education in Iraq, including the funding of new programs to teach English, scholarships for Iraqi students to study in the United States, and the commissioning of a high-level and comprehensive study of Iraqi education by leading American educators.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

One of the principal themes of this report is the essential need to integrate military, political and economic programs to foster reconstruction across the board. There are always bound to be successes and failures in an effort as grand as the reconstruction of Iraq. Proper integration, however, increases the prospects for success in one field which can help generate symbiotic achievements in others, creating a self-reinforcing process. Unfortunately, the opposite is also true.

