

DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM and SECURITY in the ASIA PACIFIC

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Panel II: Asian Nationalism and Implications for the Region

DR. RICHARD BUSH: The afternoon panel could be a difficult one because people have had a nice meal and there is a tendency to desire to take a nap or go back to the office, or something like that, so we thought we would have a somewhat lively topic to keep you awake and maintain your interest, and that is the role of nationalism in various places in Asia, and its implications for the region.



Obviously, nationalism has been for the last two centuries a major factor in international life and it has sometimes -- although not always -- had a great impact on the relations between states, creating tensions where they did not exist before.

As we heard though from Deputy Minister Kau this morning, nationalism can take a couple of forms: as he put it, it can be positive in the form of national pride; or it can be negative in terms of pushing governments to pursue hostile courses of action.

As countries become more open and democratic, sometimes nationalism comes to the fore where it did not exist before. This, I think, explains what Lo Chih-cheng was talking about that, in thinking about the concept of democratic peace, that among long established democracies, conflict is not so likely, but recent democracies sometimes, because of the unleashed nationalist feelings, pursue not so peaceful courses of action.

But, obviously also, a final comment, and that is that if you look at different countries in Asia, nationalism and nationalist sentiment takes different forms, and so what we are doing this afternoon is something of a comparative exercise, looking at China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. And to do that, we have a very outstanding panel. Not the quite one advertised in your program, but still a very outstanding one.

We start with China and here, Dr. Jae Ho Chung, who is a Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University, and probably the leading China specialist in the Republic of Korea.

We turn then to nationalism in Japan, and we are privileged to hear on that subject from Dr. Philip Yang, who is Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University.

Our speaker on South Korea was to be Dr. Kyongsoo Lho, who is Dean of International Affairs at Seoul National. I got a message on my voicemail yesterday afternoon that there was an emergency and he would not be able to attend, so I have prevailed, impolitely, on my good friends Jae Ho Chung and Jack Pritchard to offer a few comments in his stead.

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Chu Yun-han, President of the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation. So without further ado, Professor Chung.

DR. CHUNG Jae-ho: Thank you. I thank Richard and Chih-cheng for having me here at this excellent conference.



I realized though, when I went through the agenda, all other three papers for this session start with nationalism, but mine starts with the rise of nationalism in China; so I took a cue from that.

My working definition of nationalism is a past-dependent ideology. It is past-dependent because it is based upon the experiences that really happened in history, and it is ideology or, in a more soft sense, beliefs that are going to be reproduced and even indoctrinated over the years.

I think there is no doubt that nationalism was behind the post-Mao reforms that started out in the late 1970's. Therefore the success, the remarkable success, of China's reform logically led to the rise of nationalism, or nationalistic confidence in China. I think there seem to be two dominant views of Chinese nationalism:

One, according to this first view, nationalism is a fundamental component of Chinese foreign policy, which is based upon a perception of its past inflicted by imperialist powers of the West. Whether or not this national humiliation perception is a myth is in the realm of academic debate but, nevertheless, according to this view, nationalism will be reinforced by the strengthened power of China. And a stronger China therefore presupposes a certain search for hegemony or hegemonic status, and possibly even a China-centered, regional and world order. Therefore this approach prescribes containment as an appropriate response.

Two, the second view interprets it quite differently. According to the second view, Chinese foreign policy contains a, sort of, hypersensitivity to issues related to sovereignty and national integrity. However, despite that, as the reforms become more successful, economic development becomes a real possibility, China will also learn to appreciate the value of cooperation and international norms, and thereby eventually shed its long-held, so called, "siege mentality." Therefore, according to this view, Chinese nationalism could become a more soft and open kind of nationalism, and therefore

positive confidence could actually help contribute to maintaining stability in the region, as well as in the world at large. Therefore further engagement, rather than containment, is a preferred response to China by the outside world .

Of course, there are other variables as well; for instance, during the 1980s I think the Chinese had a much more extroverted type of nationalism. On the other hand, during the 1990s, after Tiananmen, I think they became more reflective of what they had done during the 1980s.

Of course, what is going to happen during this decade remains to be seen. And also there seems to be another variable that is based upon the particular mix of leadership group: whether or not nativists constitute a majority of the leadership, or self-strengtheners, or cosmopolitanists would constitute a major portion of the leadership – that will also constitute the important variable.

However, in my view, given the two different dominant views of Chinese nationalism I have just described, it is not a matter of either/or. I think it depends on two important issues.

First of all, there may be significant variations, depending on the specific issue area concerned; that is Chinese nationalism has manifested itself much more often in the strategic military issue areas, rather than in trade, commerce or economic issue areas. China's record on joining commerce or trade-related international organizations, I think, is a very good indicator compared to its record on joining the strategic military-related international organizations. This also, I think, is related to the rise of the "China that can say no" theory since the mid-1990's.

Second, I think variations can also be identified concerning which country China interacts with. The nationalistic outbursts in cyberspace notwithstanding, I think China's management of nationalist sentiments vis-à-vis the United States has been remarkable; not only during the Belgrade embassy bombing, but also during the EP-3 incident in 2001.

I think in the earlier session Frank made a very good comment about the identifiable change in the new leadership's foreign policy approach. If there is one, I think it is that the Chinese leadership has been more forthcoming and more explicit about prioritizing China's relations with the United States. Up to last year, one of the key buzz words for China's foreign policy was to maintain a good relationship with their neighboring countries, but the priority has been shifting a little bit towards emphasizing U.S.-China relations much more than before.

In contrast, I think China has sustained quite nationalistic sentiments, at least on the surface, or at least in the official arena, vis-à-vis Japan. Whether it represents a further need for historical score-settling or Beijing's confidence in disciplining Tokyo, that remains to be seen, but nevertheless I think nationalism, as a kind of institutional memory, still operates vis-à-vis Japan.

What is interesting is the perceptual concern that is taking place in South Korea with regard to China. Since the diplomatic normalization in 1992 between China and South Korea, China has been able to capture the hearts of many South Koreans. Actually, in a predominant majority of public opinion surveys conducted in South Korea since 1993, China has been selected as the country South Koreans feel most positively about, even surpassing the United States.

However, quite a few officials, experts, and politicians in South Korea, the influential policy community at large, are concerned that a stronger China would necessarily put increasing pressure on South Korea, thus constraining the range of options available to the Seoul government.

For instance, I can give you the example of the Dalai Lama case. Certain NGOs in South Korea have been pushing for the invitation of the Dalai Lama to South Korea. However, South Korea's foreign ministry did not want to grant the visa in order not to offend China, because they fear that China could possibly retaliate in certain other areas if a visa is granted to the Dalai Lama. Also, once the Dalai Lama is in the country, foreign ministry officials are concerned that he may say some things that may not be in the interests of South Korea and so on. So there is a certain concern on the part of South Korean officials regarding China's potential ability to influence.

Also there is another concern, a relatively recent concern. It is called the "China Borderland Project," or in Chinese, *Dongbei Gongchen*. The Chinese government has allocated about a U.S.\$2 million budget annually to the Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences.

What this project does is to develop a particular curriculum for ethnic Koreans living in the northeast provinces. They actually re-educate these ethnic Koreans about Chinese history, the Chinese nation, and China as a motherland, or "*zuguo*." It is not really an obtrusive nationalism per se, but I think it is being interpreted by the South Korean government authorities as a kind of expansionist move in the intellectual and cyberspace spheres.

Also this project has included a measure to reinterpret the ancient history of Korea. There is an ancient dynasty called Koryô or in Chinese, Kau Chu Li, from the fifth to tenth century. Formerly, this dynasty was considered to be a Korean dynasty, but now, according to this new project, it is being reinterpreted as a Chinese dynasty; this is now becoming a big controversy in Korea.

Anyway, coming back to the more contemporary period, this year Li Zhaoxing, China's foreign minister, for the first time used the terms "China's Asian regional policy." Before that, in my understanding, no Chinese official had used that term. I am not quite sure whether this really has special ramifications for the region. Some people may interpret it as a kind of prelude to the rise of a new, traditional Sino-centered or

China-centered regional order, but I think China's further engagement with the region should be welcomed and should be encouraged.

More importantly, I think it all depends on whether or not China's engagement with the region as a whole should be based more on interest, or on norms. So far I think China's engagement with the region has been based primarily on interest, but as time goes by, as China's power over the region increases, I think that China might come up with its own norms to impose on the region.

Of course, the Chinese have already done it at a global level, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Just because there is a very small audience who is listening to these norms does not mean that there are no norms that China is imposing. For instance, the U.S. has these principles about reserving the right to use nuclear weapons, first use of nuclear weapons, or targeting nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear powers, and so on. But China has made it very clear that they will not use nuclear weapons as a first use; they will not target nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; and so on. So there are certain alternative norms they are creating, just that there has been a very small audience who is paying attention to it.

So the question is: if China is going to base its foreign policy more on norms which might reflect some of its nationalist sentiments, what can we do? I think much of that future is not written yet, but if they start basing their foreign policy on norms, and if that is going to be a positive one, I think one good example would be significantly changing policy towards North Korea. I think China's North Korea policy made a significant shift in around February or March this year, and if that is one good example of what China has done by basing its foreign policy more on internationally acceptable norms, then I think that should be welcome as a very good indicator of positive change.

So I think East Asia, as a collectivity, has a great responsibility of interacting with and further engaging China in order to shape, or help shape, the future of Chinese foreign policy, and nationalism in particular. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Okay, thank you very much. Dr Yang?

DR. Phillip YANG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



I was asked to write something about the new nationalism in Japan. As a matter of fact, my website, Taiwan Security Research, regards Japan's policy as one of the major aspects influencing the cross-Strait relations and the Taiwanese security issues. Although the cross-Strait equation has a very close relationship with U.S. policy on Taiwan, the Sino-Japanese relationship naturally is having a dramatic impact.

So I think that, indeed, this is a good time for us to examine whether there is a rise of nationalism in Japan and look at the content of nationalism and its impact on the U.S.-Japan security alliance and, possibly, on Taiwan security issues.

I have two major arguments in this paper. The first argument is that there is a growing trend of new nationalism in Japan and, secondly, since the chairperson asked me to focus on the impact of the new nationalism on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, I argue that currently this new nationalism in Japan is a positive support for a closer and more equal U.S.-Japan security alliance. Just two weeks ago I finished a meeting here in Taipei, in cooperation with Keio University -- that was our eighth time cooperating with the University on the Taiwan/Japan Security Forum. In that panel, I interviewed some of the Japanese scholars from the University of Tokyo, Keio University, and Doshisha University, and they all agreed about the rise of the new nationalism.

But I think that this new nationalism, which is the major shift in the attitude of the Japanese about their country and its security and economic policy, inevitably will have some negative consequences if Japanese politicians and political parties fail to be more prudent in handling it.

First of all, you have to define the new nationalism in Japan. If we asked any Japanese about Japanese nationalism two or three years ago -- even one year ago -- the answer would probably be most related to historical issues like Yasukuni Jinja, textbook issues, and anti-U.S., or anti-U.S. base, and issues like that. But outside probably this so-called nationalism is more than just political positions or attitudes, and the so-called popular nationalism. And those phenomena, as a matter of fact, are only a very small portion of the many phenomena that occur in Japan today.

So what is the rise of a new nationalism in Japan? I argue that there is a growing desire among Japanese to embrace international security and international society with a more active security and economic policy and foreign policies, and to become more competitive in the international economy and trade. So that growing thought and desire to be more active in the international society, I argue, is the rise of the new nationalism in Japan.

Then I tried to discuss the reasons behind this new nationalism and its impact on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. We can probably define the new Japanese nationalism in Japan as a movement to distinguish Japan's new economic and security policy from the old ones, and to distinguish Japan's new international role in international society, especially in the post-September 11 world.

So the new nationalism in Japan indeed actually represents a broad-based resurgence, receiving a wide-range of support from right to left, as indicated by the general election of the House of Representatives that just ended the previous Sunday [November 9, 2003]. The rise of the Democratic Party is a very important phenomenon in terms of Japanese political party politics; indeed even the Democratic Party argues for a new Japan with new security policies.

So I argue that the rising new nationalism represents the changing mindset of many Japanese voters whose sense of the dual political insecurity has also further

deepened as Japan's economy has waned over the past decade. But the rise of the new nationalism, I argue, in Japan is the result of a complex combination of Japan's responses to: first, North Korea's threat -- if you would like to add, probably challenge from China - - and; second, Japan's economic decline and reforms; and, third, the so-called "Koizumi factor", and a new nationalism that has become the active support for Japan's participation in international security policy, especially in the post-September 11 world.

About the North Korea threat and China's challenge, I think that we are all aware that North Korea in 1998 first tested the Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan's main island, and into the Pacific Ocean. And earlier, in fact, North Korea tested two or three short-range ballistic missiles, not to mention that Pyongyang's nuclear program also created Japan's growing concern for its peace and security and led to an open discussion - - this is very important -- open discussion of the emergency law and also whether Japan should revise Article 9 of its constitution, and even to the extent of whether Japan should have nuclear armaments.

So this kind of open discussion was unimaginable probably just a year ago. Anyone who said that would have been called a right wing, or a nationalist, but today it is actually on the agenda of the LDP and there is a lot of discussion, open discussion, of those issues.

Of course, the abduction issues, nevertheless, are the most sensitive, emotional issues in Japan and a lot of people argue that actually the Japanese government should solve these kidnapping issues, abduction issues, before they participate in the six-party talks. And no politicians, no scholars, no journalists dared to respond to this, as the outside view is that there is a little bit emotional or irrational response to the abduction issue in Japan.

So North Korea, and indeed all these issues and the perceived threats, provided the chance for Japanese people to re-examine their own homeland security policy and regulation, and encouraged the rise of the mounting new nationalism.

As for the China factor, the political relationship between the two countries has deteriorated over the past decade, even though the economic integration between the two countries was enhanced. Mutual perception within the two countries reached a new low and, especially with the recent event of a Japanese group in China -- in Zhuhai and Xian - - what happened in Zhuhai and Xian further worsened Japan's image in the eyes of many Chinese.

Likewise, according to public opinion polls, actually in the early 1980s most Japanese felt friendly toward China, but today only half, or less than half, of the Japanese feel friendly toward China. But, there is a change of Chinese attitude towards Japan -- but very mild, as a matter of fact -- that argues that in 1996/1997 China argued that it is unrealistic for China to pull Japan away from the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. China is also taking the new perspective about the Japanese attitude on historical issues, and even the visit to Yasukuni Jinja.

But most of the Japanese public worries about the North Korean nuclear arms program, though the future challenge of China probably is still one of the major factors that encourages the development of new nationalism in Japan.

Well, economic decline, the second factor: I think that the Japanese economy is suffering from weak competitiveness due to many factors. In order to become more efficient and competitive in the global market, I think the Koizumi government encouraged and, indeed, took some initiatives for this so-called “structured change” in both economics and finance. But although the result is probably still tentative, I think that the political will behind this real transition of economic structure to be more competitive in international economy and trade is very strong, and that probably contributes also to one of the facts that encouraged the development of a new nationalism.

So the “Koizumi factor”: I remember a couple of years ago when I went to Japan - - and the Prime Minister was Mori-san -- and a friend of mine told me that Mori hosted the Okinawa summit of the G7 in Okinawa. There was a joke, but the rumor said it was true, that a Japanese diplomat taught Mori-san some English, and said that “If you see Bill Clinton, you say ‘How are you?’ and he will say, ‘Fine, thank you. And you?’ And then you say, ‘Me too,’ and then we will take over and do the translation.” So when Mori-san met Bill Clinton he said, “Who are you?” and Bill Clinton tried to be humorous and said, “I’m Hillary’s husband.” And Mori-san said, “Me too.”

So I think that reveals this kind of embarrassment and stupidity of those Japanese politicians and, indeed, the Koizumi factor is one of the major factors actually in the past two or three years that encouraged the rise of the new nationalism in Japan and, together with the response to the September 11 incidents, the Iraqi reconstruction. So I think that Koizumi’s agenda and his policy approach has won him the backing of the general public, media and significant sectors of the business community.

I think that Koizumi’s leadership, popularity and, more importantly, policy agenda, directly or indirectly, help the formation of the development of the so-called “new nationalism” in Japan.

So what is the impact of this kind of new nationalism in terms of Japan’s more independent or active security policies? Well, in fact, if you look at the security policies or issues in general, rising nationalism is generally accompanied by a beefing-up of a security policy. So it is very natural for mounting nationalism and more independent security posture to be closely interrelated. So let us look at the development of those security policies, whether they are more independent and whether they really try to develop a self-sufficient policy, security policy, in comparison with the old ones.

I think that after the Gulf War everybody knows that Japan felt humiliated that it donated \$14 billion, but was perceived as engaging in checkbook diplomacy.

During the 1990's Japan actually beefed up its cooperation with the United States, passing a series of regulations and guidelines with the United States, enhancing U.S.-Japan security alliance. More significantly, after September 11, in fact, Koizumi won the parliament support, mounting parliament support from both the opposition and the ruling party, for new legislation extending the role and activities of the SDF, the self-defense forces.

Those laws included an anti-terrorist and special measure law; amendment to the self-defense force law; amendment of the international peace co-operation law; and three national emergency laws, which is the most important, what we call the *yuji hosei*; and laws concerning the special measures of humanitarian reconstruction law, which is applicable to Iraq.

So among those laws—the one I mentioned, the national emergency law—is in fact the most important one, and gave the government significantly increased power to respond to emergencies. The SDF forces can now conduct operations before the Prime Minister issues a mobilization order. Of course, there is the concern about the definition of the threat to Japanese security, and how to define what is the threat, or what is the perceived threat, and whether Japan can make a pre-emptive strike, whether Japan can even go for defensive development of its nuclear weaponry, that is still under debate.

So what's the new nationalism's impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance, a more active and more equal relationship? In fact, the positive development of Japan's policy toward becoming a normal country is unlikely to weaken the U.S.-Japan security framework. And, in fact, the new nationalism so far does not intend to weaken this security arrangement, especially with the development of U.S. hegemonic and military power after the September 11 war. Japan also understands that, in fact, by enhancing the alliance, Japan can participate in more international security activities and contribute to peace and security in this region with the help from the U.S. military presence, either in Japan or in the region.

But, of course, Japan is probably looking forward to a more equal relationship with the U.S. security alliance.

So, in conclusion, Japan, because of its past history and current economic military strengths, catches all our attention to the development of its new nationalism. But, nationalism in and of itself is not wrong. Well, this probably will cause a lot of controversy but this paper argued that there is a growing desire among the Japanese public to embrace international society with a more active, independent foreign and security policy, and to become more competitive in international economy and trade. And for the U.S.-Japan security alliance, current development in Japan's new nationalism is a positive support for a closer and more equal alliance and security cooperation.

However, the rise of the new nationalism in Japan which lies in the realm of taking pride in one's country is different from the self-centered or narrow-minded nationalism that we introduced in the beginning.

However, Japan still has to be prudent, indeed, in facing the continued development of the new nationalism. For instance, should an economic or security crisis like the Great Depression, or September 11, happen in Japan, I would say probably this new nationalism might turn into a negative development. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Jack, would you like to say a few words about nationalism in Korea?

AMBASSADOR Jack PRITCHARD: Sure. Yes, let me say that I am probably a poor substitute for Dr. Lo, but will give it a shot and, rather than talk about nationalism as a whole in South Korea, I thought what I would do is to give you a snapshot from a U.S. perspective within a more recent timeframe of some factors that are contributing to a development of a nationalism that is moving Korea slightly towards a more independent foreign security policy.



So let me set the stage by mentioning a few things and one of the main factors in the development of nationalism: a generational change. Where there are U.S. forces deployed in countries, like there are in Japan—and I think a few of these factors apply to Japan as well—generational change is one of the biggest factors. There is a schism between those who experienced what was seen as a positive development in terms of the deployment of U.S. forces in a country—in this case for the Korean war and the aftermath—and over time it is a worldwide phenomenon that young people, who do not have that experience, develop their own views and their own identities with their own country in terms of where it should be going and what that experience means, and it is exceptionally different from an older generation.

In Korea there is, as here in Taiwan, a maturing democracy. As occurred here, it occurred for the first time in South Korea recently with the transfer of power to an opposition party in a democratic and civil fashion that occurred with the election of the previous president, Kim Dae-Jung.

So there is an element of natural pride in the maturation of a democracy and there certainly was a development of pride in the manner in which the ROK really led Asia out of the financial crisis that occurred in late 1997. You add to that the Kim Dae-Jung “Sunshine” policy, one of engagement, coming off a period of some five years under Kim Yong-sam during which the relationship with North Korea was relatively negative, so there is a change in mindset as well, and while not everyone supported the “Sunshine” policy it had a uniqueness that was, I think, appreciated by most Koreans.

This, of course, led to the historic Pyongyang summit in June 2000 and, shortly thereafter, I believe in October, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Kim Dae-Jung. All of which impact the manner in which Koreans view themselves and their countries.

One of the other common traits in situations such as Japan's: North Korea was simply disappearing out of the lexicon as the enemy within South Korea. A lot of public opinion polls, particularly the younger generation, would find that they were more concerned about the United States than they were about North Korea.

This was brought home in terms of how the South Korean public viewed U.S. rhetoric in terms of the development of U.S. policy toward North Korea, to the point, as I mentioned in the morning session, when the President visited Seoul in February 2000, he changed the goals of the trip when it became very apparent that there was a developing hostility toward the manner in which the U.S. policy was being expressed publicly.

So this manifested as unhappiness with U.S. policy, put together with the timing of additional events. The one that is most significant in recent terms was June of a year ago when two middle school girls were killed in a very tragic accident involving U.S. forces personnel. There was an expectation, a demand for justice from a South Korean point of view, whereas the U.S. military was looking to protect the rights of the service people under the United States uniform code of military justice, which is, by concept, different from what the South Koreans expected.

This carried over in the very public protests against this into an underlying theme of anti-Americanism, although to almost any official that I have talked to in the ROK, they would all deny that this was anti-Americanism, but from an American point of view it is very difficult to take a look at very large demonstrations that look, taste, walk and quack, very much like anti-Americanism.

This theme, along with the generational change, was taking place in the development of a presidential election. So there is a perception that Roh Moo-hyun came into power based upon a demographic shift to a younger, more expectant population that believed that South Korea should have its own identity, its own foreign and security policy.

I can go into a number of things here but, as an example, totally unrelated to this but occurring along the same period of time, shortly after the inauguration of President Roh, the United States began a study which was called the "Future of the Alliance" study, in which it was the desire of the Pentagon particularly to rationalize forces in South Korea, cut the numbers, and move people south of the Han River. It was perceived in South Korea by officials that I have talked to not as a normal process which was the intent of the Pentagon, but a reaction to the perceived anti-Americanism by which President Roh was elected, or so went the thought.

There are consequences of this in terms of this positive and negative development in nationalism and what it means to the U.S. alliance. As a concrete example it would be very difficult for me to imagine in the future, if the U.S. were to carry through with its restructuring of its forces in South Korea and there were to be a significant drop in the numbers and the roles in which each of the forces were expected to play, that the continued existence of the combined forces command would not be in jeopardy. For

those that do not know, on the peninsula there is a single military command in time of war in which all forces, U.S. and South Korean, are led by a single command under an American general. So the consequences of that potential pattern would be a further erosion on the view of the threat and, ultimately, a readjustment in practical terms of command structures.

You know, I probably need to stop and let Dr. Chung give a South Korean perspective, which may very well be different from mine.

DR. CHUNG: I am not sure whether my description will be that different from Ambassador Pritchard's, but I have just a few things to add.

First of all, I think there are three distinct characteristics of Korea's nationalism. First of all, this is not a well-recognized fact but Korea, either North or South, is probably the most homogeneous nation on the surface of the world. We only have less than a hundred naturalized citizens; we do not have any ethnic minority, so 99.999 per cent are Koreans.

And also we went through 36 years of Japanese colonialism, not to speak of the long history of interactions with the Chinese, either Han or not.

Third, given that, the recent rise of nationalism is in a sense overdue, because we did not really see a nationalistic search in the earlier period because of the Cold War; the national security imperative restrained any possibility of nationalistic sentiments popping up in South Korea, although it has been different in North Korea because North Korea has been very nationalistic, vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union.

But in the 1990's things began to change. With democratic transition and maturation, and economic modernization, South Koreans began to look into themselves—introverted reflection, so to speak—to see whether or not they should continue with what they called the “highly dependent” relationship with the United States and so on.

There are a couple of other things that are more fortuitous factors, including the rise of NGOs, which has been the outcome of the democratization in the 1980s. Now the power of NGOs is as influential as, let us say, the Prime Minister in Korea. In the previous administration, if you were leaders of NGOs you did not get invited to the Blue House to meet with the President, but now you do; so NGOs are very powerful.

As Ambassador Pritchard mentioned, there is a young generation coming up; I have done some survey work on the perceptions of South Koreans and there is a significant difference between older and younger generations as to how they perceive the United States and China in terms of their future roles.

Also, there is an Internet dimension. I think President Roh Moo-hyun is the first one who was elected thanks to a cyberspace campaign, which was also aided by the younger generation, who are very familiar with the technology.

Also there was a very interesting event: that was the World Cup soccer tournament, in which South Korea managed to reach the semi-final. I do not know whether you watched it on CNN, but millions of South Koreans went out on the streets to praise, to enjoy and celebrate the events of the semi-final, and that somehow created a feeling of camaraderie. That actually coincided with the death of two schoolgirls in the summer last year, which led on to the candle light protest.

Actually, what was not mentioned here is the apology that should have come about by the United States because, when the rape incident took place in Okinawa, an apology came immediately from the President of the United States, but in this case two schoolgirls were killed, and no apology was forthcoming. First, it was delivered by the Ambassador, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, but that was not received well; and, secondly, when Deputy Secretary Armitage visited Seoul, he delivered it on behalf of the President and that was not received well. And, eventually, President Bush did make an apology but it was too late by then. Then President Roh Moo-hyun was elected president.

So I think this whole thing is not simply episodic. I think there is a structural factor that affects the United States-Korea alliance relationship; that is to say the inherent disparity in the amount of attention given to each other between South Korea and the United States.

When I was staying in Washington last year, I realized that not many experts, even East Asian experts in America know the fact that South Korea is America's seventh trading partner and so there is an enormous gap in terms of perception, or in terms of attention given to each other. If this continues, given the fact that there is already a younger generation coming up, who do not really feel indebted to the United States, because they did not live through the war years, unlike my parents' generations, then I think the United States-Korea alliance is really at a cross-roads.

On the other hand, there is another strong case to be made that is the United States definitely has a role to play and I think that is an "honest broker" role, or the "benign mediator" role, because Koreans do have concerns about a stronger China which might be more imposing than it is now. And obviously it has inherent fears about Japan.

South Korea definitely sees some value in having the United States, which does not necessarily have immediate political interest in the Korean peninsula as much as Japan or China, as an "honest broker" and "benign mediator," but not necessarily as a dominant brother in the alliance that is usually perceived by the South Koreans.

DR. BUSH: I want to thank Ambassador Pritchard, Professor Chung for picking up this burden so well. It was really an imposition on you to ask you to do it, but you did a great job.

We conclude with Dr. Chu Yun-han about Taiwan.



DR. CHU Yun-han: While waiting for the CNAPS staff to help me set up my PowerPoint presentation, let me register a very personal and a very sentimental remark in the beginning. It is always a very gratifying feeling if you witness the organization that you previously worked for getting stronger each day, and a lot of you might be aware of the fact that I have a long time association with the INPR. I was one of the few founding staff of the organization. Literally, I moved in with the furniture about 14 years ago, and I also remember vividly about 13 years ago the INPR's first bilateral conference held abroad was in collaboration with Brookings, and Harry Harding was a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at that time and Dick Solomon was the Assistant Secretary. So time flies.

Also my litmus test for recognizing a well-run organization is whether its staff can set up PowerPoint right the first time, and here you go.

So let me start off my presentation with this: I would argue a very positive contrast of two citations, you know, a crude quote I have taken out of two articles published in *Foreign Affairs* recently.

The first one is by Kurt Campbell. It appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in 2001 and one of the highlights of the article is arguing that perhaps nowhere else on the globe is the situation so similarly intractable and the prospect of major war involving the United States so real. They are not talking about the Korean peninsula; they are talking about the Taiwan straits.

Two years later, in a recent article—again in *Foreign Affairs*—Morton Abramowitz and his co-author come to this conclusion.

“Taiwan is further being marginalized internationally, and increasingly integrated into the Mainland economy. Peaceful reconciliation between the two Chinas thus now seems closer than ever.”

Now, you have this, what I call, the scenario of war, and a scenario of peaceful reconciliation. These two prognoses can be both far-fetched, but they cannot be right at the same time. They cannot be equally convincing. Right?

This puzzled a lot of observers in the region; you can really pick up a pocket of evidence to try to build up your cases under either scenario. What you witness is a perplexing fact that the momentum for war and momentum for peaceful reconciliation are both gaining steam at a stunning pace over the last few years. For those who subscribe to

the war scenario, I would argue that the PLA is showing hardening opposition all around as it upgrades its capacity, so its military capacity is no longer just a threatening gesture, but now they actually have a range of options to wage high-tech warfare in the Strait. On the other hand, I would argue that the DPP government has hardened its bargaining position, taking Taiwan farther away from a negotiated peace with Mainland China, while the Bush administration is wasting no time doubling-up its efforts in improving Taiwan's integrated sea and air defense and upgrading its own war plans as well as forward deployment in the west Pacific to hedge against a military showdown in the Straits. Even after the September 11, still many people argue that Taiwan remained one of the most dangerous flash points in the region.

Nancy Tucker published a piece a few months ago, which basically echoed what Morton Abramowitz suggested here: that policy makers in Washington have to recognize that economic dependence on and integration with China as well as the changing perception of the island's needs and interests may make unification desirable or at least necessary for Taiwan in the not-so-distant future. At least we should not discount that possibility.

If you try to make sense out of this radically divergent prognosis about the future of cross-strait relations, you may argue, on the one hand, that the two scenarios, or the two prognoses, agree on one thing. They both see that the stressful political standoff is not sustainable over the long term and that the cross-Strait relation might be on the verge of a major departure from the status quo, one way or another.


What drive the views apart are the following three assumptions. (1) They have divergent perceptions about Beijing leaders' national priorities and strategic intent; (2) they have different perceptions about the social, cultural and political implications of cross-Strait economic integration; and, most importantly, (3) they have different understandings of the dynamics of Taiwan's internal politics, in particular the politics of national identity. The last factor has been a major driving force boxing Beijing, Washington and Taipei into an ever tighter strategic spot over the last few years.

Now, what does the future really hold for politics of national identity? So much research has been done on this topic. I don't want to repeat these existing viewpoints. What I am going to do is to offer you what I regard as one of the most systematical institutional surveys that we did, in which we actually highlighted a trend that has been underway for a decade, and which tells us a lot about what the future possibilities are.

We know that the conflict or the tension over national identity in Taiwan consists of primarily two issues. One was the people's self identity, or collective identity, whether a growing majority of the people subscribes to a Taiwanese identity, separate and different from the Chinese identity. Or, whether they still subscribe to ethnic identity to being Chinese.

I know you have read the Mainland Affairs Council's report. But, this is a face-to-face interview that our research team conducted over the last decade. We are more

confident in the accuracy and quality of the data. You see on the dwindling level of exclusive Chinese identity, starting from almost one third of the respondents, or the population, to less than 10 percent in 2002 after the LY election, when our last survey was conducted.



And, you see there is a substantial number of people identifying themselves exclusively as Taiwanese. They were offered three choices: Chinese, Taiwanese, or both.

But, I think the most interesting trend would be that the number of people who possess dual identities actually grew. That means people who used to subscribe to Chinese identity are now subject to a process of transformation to identify themselves as Taiwanese while they do not necessarily abandon their Chinese identity. You can also see that people who subscribe to a Taiwanese identity exclusively actually did not grow after 1996. It hovers around 32, 34 percent, even over the last three and a half years, when Taiwan has been governed by the DPP government with known, strong credentials and a pro-independence platform.

What we should take away from this observation is whether there are significant generation differences on this particular issue. What we found is that actually among the pre-war generation, people above 56, the view on identity is more sharply divided than among the younger generation. So, you have 13 percent still strongly believing in being Chinese. They don't want to recognize themselves as Taiwanese, possibly old-aged members of the Mainlander group. But, there is the largest group of people among the three generations that identify themselves as being exclusively Taiwanese. There is sharp division among the elder generations.

Then you see some trend of convergence. The largest percentage that identify themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese are among what I call the e-generation,

people below 35. That is the trend that is worth watching. That tells you what the future holds on this very divisive and sentimental issue. Let's move onto the second dimension.

I have constructed a typology to find the position people take on the question of independence and unification. Usually, the Mainland Affairs Council asked this question and came up with data that give you a majority, or a great majority, favoring the status quo. Period. We don't think their measure is useless, but it is not entirely revealing.

A lot of people actually hide their true preference behind the easy answer that is 'status quo.' So, we pushed a little bit. We offer them two hypothetical scenarios. We give them a best-case scenario of unification and also a best-case scenario of independence. The best case would be if the socio-economical and political conditions in the Mainland become similar to Taiwan, then the two sides should become unified. This is usually what we mean by reunification. None would advocate an overnight unification.

Then the problem is with the following question: If Taiwan can maintain peace with Mainland China after declaring independence, then should Taiwan become a new nation state? Again, this is the best scenario for Taiwan independence. And, people might agree on one hand, but disagree on the other. What is interesting is that you come out with nine possible combinations. Then I identify them as a principled believer in independence, who says 'yes' to this scenario of independence but always says no to unification. Even under this best condition, they don't want to be unified with China. These people always say, "No, I would rather live in my own hell than another's heaven."

On the opposite side would be the principled believer in unification, who favored the statement [on unification] but wholly objected to this one [on independence]: "Even if it is cost free, I don't want Taiwan to become independent." But, this group is quite interesting, what I called the open-minded rationalist. For both scenarios, both are at least acceptable. If this condition is conducive or favorable for independence, fine. But, on the other hand, if the condition favors unification, fine as well. So, these are the three major groups that we should focus on, though we have some intermediate categories. People might say no on the one hand, and yes or no on the other. Also, we have what I called the strong believer in the status quo. They don't want any change, any departure from the status quo, either unification or formal independence.

This is the trend data, based on the classification I just offered. But, you can see that the people who are principled believers in unification declined a little bit, not as dramatic as you anticipated. In the early 1990s, it was 26 percent, but now it is still 18 percent. And for people who are classified as principled believers in independence, starting from 9 percent in early 90s to about 20, of course, that is a substantial increase, which is quite conceivable.

Still, comparatively speaking, the largest group is the open-minded rationalists. Their inclination can move either way, depending on the external condition favoring for one possibility or another. That suggests a centralist policy, or a consensus builder, has

to not only combine those principled believers, but also to convince the open-minded rationalists. You can tell from the colors I chose [blue and green]. That tells you a lot.

Neither group constitutes a majority, and they cannot convincingly impose their favorite resolution on the rest of the population. They have to line up with people either belonging to an intermediate category, especially the swing groups, the groups that really hold the critical veto power over our policy toward China.

Table 3: Shifting Political Foundation for Independence vs. Unification

Nine Orientations	Year of Post-Election Survey				
	1993 LY	1996 LY	1999 LY	2000 PR	2002 LY
Principled believer in independence	9.9%	16.8%	22.8%	24.0%	20.3%
Lean toward Independence	2.3%	2.7%	2.4%	2.5%	4.5%
Weak opponent to Unification	1.6%	2.3%	2.1%	0.6%	1.9%
Open-minded Rationalists	24.4%	26.2%	28.8%	34.4%	22.8%
Weak opponent to independence	2.1%	1.9%	1.8%	1.3%	3.1%
Lean toward Unification	4.9%	4.8%	3.2%	2.3%	2.8%
Principled believer in unification	26.5%	23.8%	16.4%	19.3%	18.1%
Strong Believer in Status Quo	7.2%	7.2%	11.0%	6.6%	11.2%
Passivists	21.1%	14.2%	11.3%	9.0%	15.3%
Total	1398	1383	1357	1409	2022

So, I hope leaders in Beijing can read this chart, so that it can relieve some of the anxiety that people in Taiwan are so anxious to push for formal independence through plebiscite or through changing the name of the country. I don't think you have that tangible support at this point. And, this group, I hope, will serve as a moderating force for any politician who wants to practice brinkmanship; politicians will not only have to address the people on the polar ends but also take care of this group's concerns and preferences. For that reason, I don't think the status quo is assembled as the two prognoses I suggested earlier. I will stop here.

DR. Bush: Thank you very much. Very interesting, very perceptive, and even provocative. And, now it is the turn of the audience to be perceptive and provocative through your questions. The floor is open. Please first identify yourself and ask succinct questions. Frank Ching, please.

MR. CHING: (inaudible) ... that was decreasing from 24 percent in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian was elected to 20.3 percent two years later. So, support for independence is actually in decline after he became president?

DR. CHU: I think people who believe that Taiwan ultimately should become an independent state both de facto and de jure, is what this typology actually refers to. So I won't say it decreased, since the difference is not that big. I would say it is stagnant, in terms of level of support for de jure, or formal, independence. And remember, President Chen formally declared "four no's," that actually preclude the pursuit for formal independence during his tenure. This is an open pledge that remains valid up to this point.

Q. (not identified) just a quick question. You have your data updated until the year 2002. Do you have more updated data of this year, because there are so many things happening this year. Could you tell us anything?

DR. CHU: We are still compiling them right now. It will become available around December. It is very time-consuming to do island-wide face-to-face surveys, unlike public opinion polls. The moment it becomes available, I will share it with you.

DR. BUSH: More questions, yes, Richard.

Q: (inaudible)

DR. CHU: That is a good question. The difference is significant enough, which means that there are more principled believers of independence in the south than in the north, which is not shown here. But we have the statistics. But, not as dramatic as the media want to believe, even in a place like Kaohsiung city.

DR. BUSH: Any other questions? No. Then, we should have a coffee break.