Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series
For several years, Pakistan has been struggling to contain a virulent Islamist insurgency centered in its northwest frontier, much to the concern of the United States and the international community. Six experts weigh in on aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice and how they may be applied specifically to the deteriorating situation in Pakistan.
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In this Series
2009
September 10, 2009
Leading counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen argues that Pakistani security forces have performed inadequately against insurgents in the frontier with Afghanistan because poor governance and societal weaknesses have been exacerbated by decades of violence and lawlessness. Heavy-handed military tactics by the army have resulted in a perpetuation of violence, and have only further undermined local governance. A fundamental rethink of Pakistan’s political strategy is therefore necessary.
June 25, 2009
A dictum of counterinsurgency theory is that no two insurgencies are exactly alike. The conflict underway in Pakistan’s northwest frontier, in many respects, bears little resemblance to the wars that have been fought by U.S.-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Joshua T. White takes the basic principles learned from the American counterinsurgency experience, and analyzes how each of those principles may be applicable to the frontier context, while also providing recommendations for first steps that can be taken by the Pakistani military, in conjunction with the U.S. government.
June 08, 2009
The United States has a long but convoluted history of counterinsurgency, or COIN. Janine Davidson outlines the American experience with insurgency, describes the basic principles of successful COIN operations, and provides a glossary of the often confusing and controversial terminology used by the U.S. military and government in the context of non-traditional military operations.