Transcript
RICHARD BUSH: Kim Jong II, himself, has based his rule on support of the military. I suspect, but cannot prove, that he sees the military as an important prop to his succession arrangement, and so testing the missiles and testing the nuclear device is an effective way of cultivating that military support. So, we have three factors at work: a desire to set the negotiating table; a need to test; and a need to secure Kim Jong II's succession. Of course, there have been serious diplomatic consequences from the provocations that North Korea's engaged in, but someone decided that these three factors together were powerful enough to justify the course of behavior we've seen in the last six months.
Now, in thinking about what United States and other interested parties can do, let me just sort of lay out a framework, and in doing so one has to sort of think about the three factors that I've mentioned. I suspect that how these different factors are weighted in the minds of North Korean decision makers influences how the United States and others should respond. And the international community faces, I think, two dilemmas -- on the one hand that there is the desire to punish North Korea to some extent to demonstrate that its provocations have consequences; on the other hand, this punishment is most effective if it is based on multilateral consensus. And some parties are less likely to go for tough sanctions and tough pressures than others. China is the most important case in point. The second dilemma is when will be the opportune time, when will be the most likely time to get a change in North Korea's policy behavior? Is it in the short term through a mix of carrots and sticks? Or is it in the long term once Kim Jong II passes from the scene?
My own view is that, with respect to the first dilemma, we should pursue whatever set of sanctions the multilateral traffic would bear. As far as the second dilemma is concerned, I'm not sure that we can achieve that much in the current environment. I think North Korea's made a decision that for the foreseeable future it will be base its security on keeping nuclear weapons, and so if we are going to get a change in that stance, that may have to wait until we have a new leadership in Pyongyang.
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