Transcript
UNDERSECRETARY FORD: I want to emphasize one point of context before I start. I will say some things today that some might interpret as critical of the Army. So it’s important for you to understand that I believe the Army is the nation’s most important institution. As the sergeant major says, we are the little glass box on the wall that says “in case of emergency, break here.” For 230 years, whenever America is in trouble, we say send the Army, they can fix it.
Today’s Army force structure and missions have been in flux for almost two decades. In the early ‘90s, we cut the active force from 782,000 to 482,000, and reduced civilian and reserve structures as well. We have supported continuing operations around the world and at home, and we currently support major CENTCOM requirements in two AORs simultaneously. Over the last seven years, the nature of our support to CENTCOM has changed dramatically with offensive capabilities augmented and sometimes supplanted by forces performing counter-insurgency and stability operations missions. At the same time we have undertaken numerous organizational changes, adopting modular formations to increase combat effectiveness. Thus, we have tried to sustain a very high up tempo of non-traditional missions, and at the same time we are maintaining readiness to perform our more traditional missions. To support these requirements since 9/11, the Army has used reserve component structure and supplementals to cover most of the glaring capability gaps. But we struggle to provide the forces requested by combatant commanders, and to program required capabilities within current in-strength guidance. There just isn’t enough force structure to go around, and that’s what I want to talk about today.
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