Transcript
Summary: On April 15, 2005, the Saban Center hosted Dr. Boaz Ganor, founder and executive director of Israel's International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. Dr. Ganor is one of Israel's foremost experts on counterterrorism issues and recently authored The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers, which was published this past month. Dr. Ganor's discussion focused on policies for combating terrorist activity, using Israel's long history in dealing with multiple terrorist groups to illustrate effective and ineffective policies.
According to Dr. Ganor, by virtue of the fact that since its inception, Israel has faced threats from multiple terrorist groups—including Palestinian (Hamas), Shiite (Hezbollah), Global Jihad (al-Qaeda), and emerging Jewish extremism—the Jewish state has been forced to confront multiple dilemmas, including: How can one win a war against terrorism? Is it even possible to win? Can a state be victorious over terrorism by relying solely on its military? Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Israelis developed a number of innovative solutions to the problem of terrorism that have degrees of applicability to countries other than Israel.
Dr. Ganor suggested a distinction between two types of terrorist groups: "skeleton groups"—those that do not represent a civilian constituency, and "popular groups"—those that represent a civilian constituency or a cause supported by civilians (examples include Hamas and the IRA). Drawing this distinction is critical, Dr. Ganor argued, because against a skeleton terrorist group, the most effective policy for a state would be to rely on military action. However, for a state to combat terrorism emanating from a popular terrorist group, military action may not be enough.
Dr. Ganor argued that in confronting terrorist groups, both intent and capability were critical. He argued that the intentions of the group could be gleaned from its motive—the political events that caused the group to embark on a terror campaign. However, he also argued that it was equally important to gauge the capability to conduct terrorist attacks of those with the motive to do so. With this in mind, Ganor said, one might argue that effective counterterrorism measures would address both motivation and operation capability. However, there is a natural contradiction between pursuing both factors simultaneously. Specifically, by pursuing policies that lower a terrorist group's capabilities, a state may fire the group's motivation and its constituency to even greater levels of violence. For example, state-conducted military strikes against terrorist targets may generate large casualties and may therefore cause the affected population to side with the terrorist group. Additionally, terrorist groups may use such military strikes as propaganda in its efforts to attract supporters. Many call this phenomenon of state-conducted military strikes generating higher levels of terrorism the "Boomerang Effect."
Nevertheless, Dr. Ganor suggested that it was worth pondering whether the Boomerang Effect really exists. The "pro" side points to such incidents as the wave of Hamas bombings that occurred in Israel after the 1996 assassination of Hamas' chief bomb maker, Yehia Ayash (known as "the Engineer"), which was widely attributed to Israel. For these analysts, the determining factor of terrorism is motivation. Specifically, a terrorist group will launch an attack in response to a specific event. However, other analysts argue that terrorist groups do not base their attacks on motivational factors but conduct attacks when they have the opportunity to do so—thus for them, only capability really matters. Although the terrorist groups may claim their attacks are in response to specific counterterrorism measures, they likely would have occurred regardless. These analysts point to the absence of any increase in terrorist attacks following Israel's targeted killing of Hamas leader, Sheik Ahmed Yassin in 2004. If motivation was the source of terrorism, one would think the killing of Yassin would generate high levels of attacks. Therefore, the fact that attacks did not occur seems to suggest that the operational capability of the terrorist group was severely damaged.
Dr. Ganor argued that effective counterterrorism policies are those that, on a case by case basis, account for the determining factor of terrorism—whether it be motivation or operational capacity. If the key factor is operational capability, then counterterrorism policies should heavily favor military strikes. If the key factor is motivation, then counterterrorism policies should refrain from aggressive military strikes. Dr. Ganor then indicated his belief that Hezbollah's activity is dependent on motivation whereas Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Jihad are driven by their respective operational capabilities.
The discussion then focused on key elements of counterterrorism. Dr. Ganor mentioned intelligence as the most vital element, followed by offensive measures, defensive measures, deterrence, international cooperation, and educational campaigns. He argued that in using each of these counterterrorism measures, a state faces multiple dilemmas (the Boomerang Effect is one dilemma of using offensive measures). For example, if a state has intelligence concerning an upcoming terrorist attack, it must decide whether to release the information to the public. The dilemma rests on the fact that intelligence must be precise, up-to-date, and intimate. Therefore, once intelligence is released to the public, the terrorist group will examine how the information was leaked and attempt to strengthen its internal network to prevent further leaks. Alternatively, the terrorist group will change the time or location of the attack. The state therefore faces a dilemma of whether to release intelligence information to the public, and if so, how much to release.
Dr. Ganor argued that a state should not release intelligence information to the public unless the state can accompany the warning with concrete recommendations (such as what location to avoid). Merely warning the public that an attack may occur, Dr, Ganor argued, is of little value and may generate confusion.
Regarding the issue of deterrence, Dr. Ganor said some analysts claim it is impossible to deter terrorists, specifically suicide bombers, because they have nothing to lose. However, Dr. Ganor argued that terrorism, and even suicide terrorism, is a result of a calculated cost-benefit analysis on the part of the terrorist group (although not the bomber himself or herself). The factors that go into this analysis may be irrational to some (specifically Western observers), but to a terrorist, they are highly rational. To create effective counterterrorism deterrence policies, therefore, one should calculate what the terrorist's and terrorist group's cost-benefit analysis might look like.
From the perspective of a terrorist group, a suicide attack is the most rational of choices it faces when deciding on a method of attack. First, a suicide attack is effectively a "smart bomb" capable of seeking out the most vulnerable target and thereby inflicting the most damage possible. In Israel, suicide bombings represent less than 0.5 percent of all terrorist attacks, yet they account for over 50 percent of casualties. One reason for this is that suicide attacks guarantee success. Even if the terrorist does not reach his desired target, he can detonate the bomb when surrounded by security forces. Second, suicide attacks generate media coverage that is beneficial to the terrorist group. An outside, nonpartisan observer may deplore a terrorist attack of any kind, but may evince degree of sympathy for the perpetrator in the case of a suicide bombing. This outside observer may think conditions must be so bad for the terrorist that he had to resort to suicide—therefore there must be some legitimacy to the terrorist's claim. Third, from the perspective of the terrorist group, suicide attacks reduce risk. The group does not have to worry that the attacker will be caught and interrogated. Nor does the group have to devise a plan for extracting the attacker from the scene of the attack—invariably the most difficult element of any terrorist attack. Dr. Ganor argued that because all suicide attacks are highly planned by groups, a state should focus on crippling the operational capability of these groups.
However, Dr. Ganor also cautioned that suicide attacks may even be rational to the individual attacker. The attacker's cost-benefit analysis may include benefits that would result from his suicide attack, including increased material benefits and respect for his family, and the fulfillment of beliefs relating to the afterlife. Therefore, Ganor argued, counterterrorism strategies should include reducing the benefits an individual perceives he will attain if he carries out a suicide attack. Ganor recommended that there be an international effort to support Muslim scholars who oppose extremist views that condone or even make suicide attacks seem attractive.
During the question and answer period, Dr. Ganor expounded on his suggestion of combating the motivational factors behind terrorism. The United States, Dr. Ganor argued, should help the Muslim world strengthen its opposition to the small element of radicals who generate terrorist motivation. The United States should provide funding for education and welfare programs.
Dr. Ganor also commented on the issue of what defines terrorism. Dr. Ganor argued that an internationally united front against terrorism is stymied by the fact that different countries have very different definitions of what constitutes terrorism. For Dr. Ganor, "Terrorism is the use of violence against civilians to achieve political ends." This, according to Dr. Ganor, should be the universally held definition. As such, it may be legitimate for affected populations to use guerilla warfare—attacks against combatant and noncombatant army personnel—to achieve political ends against a stronger enemy. However, any attack against civilians—including Palestinian attacks against Israeli settlers—should be denounced by the international community.
In concluding the session, Dr. Ganor touched upon the psychological effect of terrorism. There are two types of reactions to a terrorist incident: rational fear and irrational anxiety. Rational fear, according to Ganor, is heightened vigilance that does not prevent an individual from conducting daily activities. Irrational anxiety, according to Dr. Ganor, is a fear that incapacitates an individual to the point where the individual cannot conduct daily affairs. This, according to Dr. Ganor, is what the terrorists want.