Transcript
SUMMARY: With crime on the rise and rebel militias effectively wielding power in various parts of the country, Iraq's interim government has struggled to reshape its national security institutions, the hallmark of any sovereign state. In many respects the current government is following in the footsteps of the now dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which for over a year sought to rebuild Iraq's dilapidated national security infrastructure under fire from terrorists and armed insurgents. A key goal for the CPA was to build security institutions that not only could protect Iraq's territory and citizens effectively, but also were compatible with the long-term aim of establishing a liberal, democratic political system in Iraq.
At a recent Saban Center discussion, three key participants in the CPA's efforts reflected on the successes and failures of Iraqi security reform to date and the future challenges facing this crucial endeavor. As one speaker remarked, equipment and materiel are not the most important aspects of successful security reform; rather, it is the principles involved—such as civilian oversight and democratic accountability—that will have the greatest impact on Iraq's future, and possibly the future of the entire Middle East. Beginning with this assumption, the discussion centered on the theme of rebuilding Iraqi security forces and institutions as a prerequisite for further democratic development and stability in Iraq. Principal themes included the importance of institution-building, of more robust training for the Iraqi security forces, particularly at the local and police levels, and of ensuring civilian oversight and accountability within a government recognized by Iraqis as legitimate.
Much of the discussion focused on the army, an institution that has slowly been rebuilt from the ground up since the CPA's widely criticized decision to disband the old Iraqi army in May 2003. In the view of speakers and participants, this decision was basically sound despite some possible flaws in its implementation. The former army was made up largely of oppressed Shiite conscripts who deserted en masse after the fall of Baghdad, leaving behind only the mainly Sunni Arab officer corps. For the former opposition groups and the vast majority of Iraqi Shi'ah and Kurds, the idea of retaining this remnant of Saddam's army was completely unacceptable. Moreover, the top-heavy structure and overall poor professional quality of the old officer corps made it more or less useless as the core of a new Iraqi security structure. On both practical as well as political grounds, therefore, the CPA saw no choice but to discard what little was left of the army and start over from scratch.
The U.S.-led training program for the new Iraqi army has aimed at creating three infantry divisions within two to three years, to serve as the core of a force that could eventually defend Iraq on its own. Perhaps the most critical component of this effort is the effort to develop a new officer corps, which has absorbed many former opposition militia members as well as a few Shiite officers from the old army. The U.S.-run academy for noncommissioned officers in Iraq and the Jordanian armed forces have both played a useful role in training new officers and inculcating them with the values of a professional army loyal to the state. It is important not to rush this process, however. A continued U.S. commitment to training leadership elements is essential if Iraqis are to be able to take over full responsibility for their own security in the long term.
Typically overlooked in many discussions of Iraq's security is the importance of building effective civilian institutions at the national level. In rebuilding the ministry of defense, three basic principles guided the process: 1) strengthening civilian control over the armed forces; 2) ensuring that the ministry was simple and functional; and 3) closely integrating civilian and military staffs. Despite the success of these efforts in many respects, there is continuing mistrust among military and civilian elements of the ministry, and problems remain for the ministry of defense in the areas of communications, intelligence and budgeting. Likewise, the continuing weakness of the ministry of interior contributes to Iraq's domestic insecurity. By contrast, the work of the Ministerial Cabinet for National Security—a mainly civilian body headed by the prime minister and including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, justice, and interior—has been fairly effective.
The third critical field for security reform is the internal security forces. Although the need to combat the insurgency has forced the interim government to use the army for internal security, the army cannot fulfill this function in the long term without undermining its primary function, which is to defend against external aggression. The local police are important for combatting crime, but cannot be expected to face down an armed insurgency that uses rocket-propelled grenades to attack their stations. The highest priority, therefore, should be the training of specialized internal security forces that are specifically trained to fight insurgents and hold urban areas once they are retaken. In the long run, it is these kinds of internal security services and not the army that will be the guarantors of Iraq's internal security.
In response to questions about the timetable for eventual U.S. withdrawal, speakers stressed the fact that Iraq was still a long way from being able to take care of its own security needs without outside help. There was general agreement that the current reforms and training programs should enable the creation of fully functional Iraqi security institutions within two years, allowing the United States to begin withdrawing its forces by 2006. There is no effective way to rush this process, however. Speakers criticized past training approaches that placed a mistaken emphasis on "quantity over quality." They emphasized that the training process must be efficient but adequate, so that the end result is not incompetence and the need for retraining later on—which, paradoxically, only slows the process down. It was pointed out that the internal security forces, such as local police, national guard, and internal intervention forces, should be the focus of U.S. training efforts, since they will be involved in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts that directly affect Iraqi security in the short term.
In the long term, speakers felt strongly that successful security reform entails not only building effective structures, but also basing them on principles that are compatible with the emergence of a democratic system in Iraq. The principle of civilian control of the military is exceptionally important: the army's logistical support structure was thus specifically designed to prevent it from being able to act without civilian approval or to intervene outside Iraq. Similarly, the new Iraqi national intelligence service may gather information but is forbidden to make arrests or detain suspects—a crucial restriction, given the role of the former mukhabarat in repressing dissent and terrorizing the populace under Saddam's regime. The speakers acknowledged the problem of cultural barriers to reform, citing Iraqis' inexperience with civilian oversight, accountability, and the principle of checks and balances. For instance, it was difficult at first for many in the Iraqi military to accept the idea that a civilian and not a uniformed officer should head the Ministry of Defense, which is a key element of any democratic system.
The problem of ethnic and factional tensions was raised at several points. Speakers pointed to the danger of allowing one ethnic or minority group to again consolidate power in Iraq, which would reinstate the cycle of repression and conflict that has plagued the country in the past. Accordingly, security reforms have aimed to ensure clear lines of command and control within the security sector, but also to disperse control of the security services across several ministries and cabinet officials, in order to avoid the concentration of power and prerogative in one individual, institution, ethnic group, or minority. In the long run, a sustainable arrangement will require ethnically integrated security forces, confidence-building initiatives and accountability measures, and public information campaigns to reinforce the concepts of civilian rule and transparency in the armed forces.
In the final point to emerge from the discussion, security sector reform cannot bring stability to Iraq in the absence of a legitimate government. In the long run the key to draining popular support for the guerrillas fighting U.S. and Iraqi forces in Iraq, and thus defeating the insurgency, lies in reversing the widespread perception that the government is illegitimate and does not represent Iraqi interests. Thus, there was consensus that the upcoming elections must succeed in creating a government that is broadly representative and is seen as legitimate by the majority of Iraqis. Far from being a luxury that can be discarded in the name of fighting terrorists or rebels, democratic legitimacy is a fundamental requirement if Iraq is to attain security or stability in the long run.