Transcript
SUMMARY: This panel covered three general topics relating to Syrian policy:
- The possibility of restarting the peace process with Israel
- Syria's presence and policies in Lebanon, including its recent intervention to extend Lebanese President Emil Lahud's term, and the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 condemning foreign interference there
- Internal reform of the Syrian regime
Discussing his recent conversations with President Bashar al-Asad and other Syrian and Lebanese officials, Ambassador Indyk said that there appear to be significant changes occurring in Syria, and cautiously offered the assessment that there has been a "strategic shift" in Syria's thinking vis-à-vis the United States, the situation in Iraq, and Israel. He said there are indications that some Syrian "old guard" officials are being sidelined by Bashar. Dr. Indyk believes that Asad now considers it to be in his and Syria's interests to cooperate with the United States, particularly in Iraq, where continuing instability or fragmentation would seriously threaten Syria. He also said that President Asad was clear that he would like to reopen negotiations with Israel, and described the president as apparently more flexible and pragmatic on this issue than his father had been. Dr. Indyk also noted that President Asad seems to recognize the necessity of internal reform, if Syria is to be successful in any kind of partnership with the US or peace with Israel. Whether President Asad is now capable of delivering in any of these areas remains the question, but it is at least worth testing.
Ambassador Gabriel addressed the issue of Lebanon, discussing his conversation with President Lahoud on the Lebanese government's anticorruption initiative. Although convinced that the President is personally committed to anticorruption measures and reform, he cast doubt on Lahoud's ability to implement any effective measures. He said the Syrian leadership, despite its avowed desire to see Lebanese reform, seems unwilling to promote the process. He also said the United States must decide where Lebanon fits into its strategic goals vis-à-vis Syria and the region. He posed the question of whether Lebanon is most valuable as a "means to an end" in negotiating with Syria, and what the implications of this will be for U.S. policy.
Mr. Abdulhamid was somewhat less optimistic than Ambassador Indyk about the prospects for Syrian reform; although the president is willing to engage in a reform process, he said, reformers are a relatively weak element in the regime, whereas hardliners continue to wield significant power. He did add, however, that the events of the last few weeks demonstrate the increasing pressures, both internal and external, for reform. Mr. Abdulhamid said that he does not believe anyone in the Syrian leadership today would be willing to surrender or even relax its control of Lebanon, but internal Lebanese and united international pressure on Syria to move toward disengagement will continue to mount. Thus, he says the challenge for the president is to "lose Lebanon without losing credibility."
Both Gabriel and Indyk suggested that the Syrians' willingness to cooperate with the United States on Iraq may be an attempt to gain a "free hand" in Lebanon, although they said this was not conclusively the case. All panelists agreed that Syria is extremely concerned with growing Sunni and Wahhabi influence in the country, and particularly in the possibility of its spreading from Iraq. Discussing US-Syrian relations, some panelists felt that any U.S. approach will have to offer carrots as well as sticks, but debated whether the Syrians will be willing to deal separately with the issues of Lebanon, the peace process, and cooperation in Iraq, or will insist on linking these issues to trade one "card" for another.