Power and Authority: America's Path Ahead

Transcript

Samuel R. Berger: "Power and Authority: America's Path Ahead"
Prepared for delivery at the Brookings Institution

Introduction

Over the past two years, Americans have seen the world through different eyes, and the eyes of the world have seen a different America. We have suffered and survived the most serious foreign attack on American soil in our history, won two wars and inherited from them the trials of peace, drawn closer to some traditional adversaries and become estranged from some long-time allies, seen the stirring exercise of American power and the chilling decline in American popularity.

The pace of change has been dizzying. But, as Franklin Roosevelt once said, "in the midst of swift happenings," it is time "to pause for a moment and take stock—to recall what our place in history has been, and to rediscover what we are and what we may be." My goal today is to review where we are—where we're on the right track and where I think we're on the wrong track—and to suggest what I believe our priorities should be as we chart the road ahead.

Four Defining Foreign Policy Initiatives

The pivotal moment is of course September 11. In the twisted steel of the World Trade Center, in the smoldering ashes of the Pentagon, America's sense of invulnerability was shattered. That terrible morning changed our view of the world and our place in it. From our earliest days as a nation, we had always seen the world as dangerous, to be avoided if possible. Now we saw the world as hostile, yet unavoidable. We learned that even Manhattan is not an island.

How has America responded over the past 20 months? Four key foreign policy initiatives mark our current course.

First, the war against terrorism became our overriding strategic priority. We smashed the Taliban. We crushed al Qaeda's training camps. And we have taken the fight to the terrorists ever since—although the battle is far from over. Then, the President greatly expanded the boundaries of the fight against terrorists to encompass rogue regimes that could provide weapons of mass destruction to terror groups—linking North Korea, Iran and Iraq in an "axis of evil." Next, he elevated preemption from an option every President has reserved to a defining doctrine of American strategy.

Together, these three initiatives led inexorably to the fourth. Many rationales were offered for regime change in Iraq. But the one that resonated most deeply, and the one the White House relied upon most heavily, was to prevent another 9/11, this time with deadly weapons provided by Saddam Hussein.

All four of these national security initiatives were based on a set of convictions that dominate the Bush Administration: That the requirements of U.S. national security profoundly have changed. That in a Hobbesian world, American power, particularly military power, is the central force for positive change. That it is more important to be feared than admired. That "root cause" thinking is dangerous moral relativism: evil is evil and can never be justified.

What's Right

I believe some of these assumptions and policies are right. In al Qaeda and other anti-American jihadists, we face a mortal enemy. Whatever grievances they exploit do not diminish the imperative of finding and destroying them before they destroy us.

Nor can anyone deny that we have an urgent need to keep the world's deadliest weapons out of its most dangerous hands. Deterrence does not work against suicide bombers whose purpose is to cause massive bloodshed and who believe they answer only to their God.

I believe we did the right thing in Iraq. A confrontation with Saddam was inevitable. A nuclear Iraq would have been an intolerable threat to the United States, and after 9/11, there was a window to act—although not so narrow, I believe, that we could not have gained greater international support and left fewer doubts about our rationale. Still, I am proud of the skill and bravery of our troops. I am pleased that we restored freedom to Iraq's people. And I welcome the chance that has created to help change the dynamic in the Middle East.

I am glad the Bush administration has made the greater Middle East a policy priority. For too long we have extracted far more from this region than we have invested in it. Too many governments have failed to convert their wealth in the ground into opportunity for their people. In Saudi Arabia, there are 25,000 members of the Royal Family who live royally, while unemployment among young males approaches 40%. That simply is not sustainable. Today, pent up frustration and religious extremism in the Arab world imperils America. We saw that on September 11.

Finally, I strongly agree with the view that America must lead with confidence and conviction. We cannot secure a bright future at home unless we show active, robust leadership in the world. President Bush has set ambitious goals. He has acted boldly. I respect that.

What's Wrong

But in important respects, I have a different vision of what American leadership means. It is certainly true that the confident use of U.S. military power can be necessary in this new world. It is not, however, sufficient or self-justifying. And looking at where America stands today, I have some real concerns about where we are headed, and how.

Last year, leaders in Germany and South Korea—two of our closest allies—were elected in part on anti-American sentiment. This year, despite our indisputable strength, we could not persuade even long-time friends like Chile and Mexico to support us in the UN on Iraq, or Turkey to help us in the war, or more than a handful of countries to put combat troops on the ground. And this month, a major global survey found that favorable opinions of the United States have fallen in nearly every country over the past two years, and plummeted in most of the Muslim world, from the Middle East to Indonesia and Nigeria.

As the world's unrivalled power, the United States inevitably will attract resentment. But our actions are contributing to that resentment. Let me touch on five concerns.

First, we are not using the full measure of our power—our moral authority as well as our military strength.

For example: For two years, we essentially stood back from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Now, 2000 Palestinian and 800 Israeli deaths later, the White House has accepted that the parties cannot end the violence themselves. The President's entrance on the stage of Middle East diplomacy is welcome and important—challenging as it will be. But our absence from the field so long cost us dearly around the world.

We went from declaring a Century of the Americas to turning our back on our own backyard—undercutting a Mexican President who had invested his prestige in the U.S. relationship, temporizing on the near-retreat from democracy in Venezuela, giving the back of our hand to an old friend in trouble, Argentina.

While insisting that the world accept our priorities, we've walked away from important efforts to deal with humanity's common concerns—from the Kyoto protocol on climate change to a tougher Biological Weapons Convention.

We've succumbed to protectionist pressures on trade issues that matter deeply to the developing world, such as agriculture and steel. According to the World Bank, rich countries' trade barriers cost poor nations more than $100 billion a year, roughly double what wealthy countries provide in aid.

And while I applaud President Bush's robust AIDS relief plan, and his efforts to boost foreign assistance, as Lael Brainard of Brookings has cautioned, both initiatives "bypass international efforts and existing aid agencies in favor of U.S. programs"—which only reinforces the perception of U.S. unilateralism.

Second, we have diminished our enduring alliances.

After September 11, NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article V declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all. But rather than accept NATO's help in Afghanistan, we dismissed it. This may have served efficiency, but it squandered international solidarity, and wasted the chance to give other nations the greatest stake in Afghanistan's future.

We have allowed belligerent rhetoric to create severe strains in our alliance with South Korea. As a result, many South Koreans today—particularly young people—believe the North Korean nuclear program is not a threat against the South but a response by the North to a threat from us. As North Korea races toward the nuclear brink, our leverage has been seriously undercut by the lack of solidarity with our friends.

In the post-war handling of Iraq, we have chosen control over burden and risk sharing. Instead of reaching out to NATO, Arab countries, and others to share the cost and the considerable risks of a long-term and dangerous enterprise, we have declared ourselves and the British to be occupying powers. As a result, we are the only address for Iraqi frustration and resentment. Of the 162,000 troops in Iraq, 150,000 are Americans. By contrast, 34 nations remain in Kosovo today and we are less than 10% of the force. How long will Americans bear the cost of opening schools in Baghdad while we close them in Oregon?

Third, the doctrine of preemption is more likely to encourage proliferation than to chill it. In the name of scaring nations away from going nuclear, in particular North Korea and Iran, we may actually be causing them to accelerate their nuclear programs—drawing the conclusion that Saddam's mistake was not getting his nuclear weapons fast enough. And when the United States lends credibility to a doctrine of "striking first," it gives countries from South Asia to the Middle East a pretext to act preemptively against their own enemies.

Fourth, while our priority of stopping proliferation is right, our focus is much too narrow. As Senator Sam Nunn has said, right now, "tons of poorly secured plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the raw materials of nuclear terrorism—are spread around the world." The proliferation problem is a complex, global challenge. Yet America has focused most of our energies on one state—Iraq, and with one blunt tool—military preemption.

Finally, we're failing to match our goals with the resources we need to achieve them.

In Afghanistan, the decision to limit a U.S. security presence to Kabul is contributing to its reversion to warlordism and instability.

In Iraq, if we had the same number of troops there per capita as we did at the outset in Kosovo—where no peacekeepers have been killed—we would have 500,000 troops there today. But we neglected the lessons—good and bad—of our five prior peacekeeping experiences over the past ten years.

Overall, the disparity between what we spend on defense and what we spend on other instruments of security—like diplomacy and development—is growing. The entire budget of the State Department and our development agencies today is only one-sixteenth of Pentagon spending—which is one reason the Pentagon often dominates the State Department in driving American foreign policy.

Meanwhile, at home, we simply have not sustained an urgent focus on homeland security. Less than 5% of cargo containers that enter the U.S. today are inspected. The Coast Guard has said it needs more than $4 billion to secure our ports; yet only $463 million has been appropriated so far. Frontline first responders still lack essential resources and training. Much of our critical infrastructure remains vulnerable. Terrorism is not on the run, but homeland security still is in a crawl.

Where Do We Go From Here?

So where do we go from here? Let me suggest five priority areas that advance the safety and security of our people and the reach of our values—democracy, tolerance and peace.

First, we must finish what we started in Iraq. Mark my words: strong forces will build for an early exit—concern from Arab neighbors about a sustained US military footprint in the region, uneasiness by the military with an extended peacekeeping role, mounting costs at a time of cuts in domestic programs, and ongoing risks to our troops. There will be a growing temptation to define the victory in narrow, more achievable terms—dislodging Saddam and liberating Iraqis—as opposed to the current ambition of building democracy in Iraq, let alone the region.

But if Iraq gets mired in chaos, it will be not just tragic but disastrous—confirming mistrust of the U.S. and fueling instability in the region. We are right to give priority to restoring law and order. But in addition to internationalizing our efforts, sooner rather than later we must Iraqi-ize them—giving Iraqis a meaningful role in shaping their future. We cannot postpone politics in Iraq while we restore order; politics is going on every day in Iraq—in the mosques and marketplaces and neighborhoods. The longer we wait to begin creating a credible interim Iraqi authority, the more likely the power vacuum will be filled by radicals and opportunists.

Second, we must be as unrelenting in the pursuit of peace and progress in the Middle East as we were in the prosecution of war. The flicker of hope we saw as the result of the President's efforts in Aqaba will not survive on its own. Systematic efforts to sabotage progress—by Arafat, by Hamas, by zealots in Israel—should not come as a surprise. Nor should they cause us to wilt. Tough as this issue is and will be, nothing will happen without us.

All three leaders face difficult challenges. Prime Minister Abu Mazen must demonstrate he is willing to take on Hamas. There will be no peace unless Hamas is brought under control. Prime Minister Sharon must reconcile his obligation to do what is necessary to protect Israelis with the long-term advantage to Israel of giving Abu Mazen a chance to succeed. This can include resumption, area-by-area, of trilateral security cooperation that essentially stopped terrorism from 1996-2000. And President Bush must impress upon all of the participants at Aqaba—including the Arab leaders—that those who seek to defeat progress must be stopped by concerted action or the conflict will regain new ferocity.

More broadly in the region, we must push authoritarian governments to reform if they hope to survive. I disagree with those within and outside the administration who view Iraq essentially as a pro-American aircraft carrier from which we launch regime change across the Arab world. An arrogant, heavy-handed U.S. crusade for democracy is sure to fail. But there is much America can do—in support of pluralism, openness and reform—to align ourselves with the internal physics of change in the region.

Third, we must tackle the threat of WMD more creatively and comprehensively. We must deal firmly and clearly with the North Korean crisis. We must make clear to the North Koreans that further separation of plutonium will result in serious consequences—even military if necessary. We must stop characterizing talks with them as succumbing to blackmail; decide what it is that we need and then negotiate seriously—prepared to say "yes" to a good agreement and ready for the consequences of "no." As for Iran, their support for terrorism and nuclear weapons program are dangerous. But the internal dynamics here are both more complex and more promising than Iraq. Let us initiate overt action in Iran—an open challenge to put all issues on the table. Their terrorism and weapons program, our sanctions and isolation policy. Let the Iranian leaders be the obstacle between the people and their manifest aspiration to rejoin the world.

And more broadly, we need a serious, systematic counter-proliferation policy that deploys all the tools we have—better intelligence, smarter export controls, covert action, focused missile defenses, a dramatic expansion of cooperative threat reduction programs, deterrence through the threat of devastating retaliation if any nation uses WMD against U.S. territory, forces, or allies, and, when necessary, military action.

Fourth, we should rebuild our alliances and treat them as an asset, not a liability. "Coalitions of the willing" sometimes are necessary, but they are not a substitute for enduring alliances, where regular contact builds common perceptions of the dangers we all face.

We should energize NATO, not just structurally, but in mission—fighting terrorism, stopping weapons proliferation, and providing muscle to peacekeeping operations. We must repair the dangerous breach with South Korea, think creatively about a new architecture for cooperation in a changing Middle East, and get back in the game of shaping global arrangements that deal with global problems. We can stomp away from the table where agreements like the Kyoto Protocol are being hammered out. Or we can stay and work to address our concerns through tough and persistent negotiation. One thing is for sure: we cannot walk away from the consequences, like the dangers of global warming. In this case, a rising tide will sink all the boats.

Of course, partnerships must be reciprocal. Our allies must do their part—rather than seek to constrain U.S. power or "free ride" on U.S. coattails. For others to define their role in the world in terms of constraining the U.S. is foolishly to miss the point: the biggest danger in a world of growing disorder may be too little concerted power, not too much. We should all be clear: we only strengthen our enemies when we divide ourselves.

Finally, let me return to the centrality—for our time—of the fight against terrorist enemies that still threaten us.

The first dimension is offense: to better organize ourselves for a long-term fight—from further reform of our intelligence apparatus to focusing on the military strategy, forces and technology that can better enable us to defeat this enemy.

The second dimension is defense, dramatically accelerating efforts at home. The government must be the catalyst for getting this job done right.

But there is a critical third dimension to the war against terrorism that we have neglected—call it isolating the extremists rather than ourselves. We cannot destroy every potential terrorist. But we can, over time, dry up their appeal and reduce the anti-American hostility they exploit.

We should not apologize for America's power. It has more often been harnessed to good than to ill. We must work to preserve it. But we need to arm ourselves with more than bunker-busters to succeed. Yes, it is important to be respected. But it also is important to be admired.

Particularly at a time when we are using the hard edge of our power to protect ourselves, we must lead—and be seen as leading—on the agenda of shared well-being.

That is an important part of what we tried to do in the Clinton Administration. We invested in the military technology that performed so well in Iraq and we doubled and tripled efforts to fight terrorism. But others around the world also saw us energetically working for peace—in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, the Balkans, South Asia. Africans noticed when President Clinton flew half way around the world to preside over a peace conference on Burundi with Nelson Mandela, not because it would produce instant results but a lasting impression. Central and Eastern Europeans were indelibly affected when we championed NATO's expansion to new democracies. Leaders in Latin America and in Asia believed that at least they had a seat at the table on the effects of globalization when we convened the Summit of the Americas and created an architecture for dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. The whole world noticed the risks we took for our friend Mexico when the peso fell into crisis, and the way we worked to bring former adversaries Russia and China closer to the international community.

The fact is we cannot afford tunnel vision in a global world. We are more likely to earn others' support for our priorities when we pay attention to theirs. We are more likely to shape the outcome of events when we are in the game rather than on the sidelines. The more America pulls its weight on the problems that challenge our common humanity, the more authority we command. To the greatest extent possible, in the world we face we should use our dominant power to build coalitions around us, not against us.

Some want to shackle America's power. I want to unleash it—not just the example of our force, but also the force of our example.

Conclusion

As we go forward, we must be clear about the true nature of the choices we face. We don't have to choose between our interests and our ideals, between the willingness to act alone when we must and the will to work with others when we can, between confidence in our own ability and the conviction that alliances are an asset. These are false choices.

But we do have to choose what kind of leadership we will bring to a troubled world: determined or domineering, bold or brash, confident or cocky, high-minded or high-handed. We do have to choose to commit the resources that are commensurate with our ambitions, or else half-hearted efforts and hasty exits will breed cynicism and chaos.

And we must offer the world a positive vision—one around which nations who share our values can join their strength. It is not enough for a great power to be defined by what we are against. To lead in the global age, we must show the world what America is for.

I believe we can do that. Our country has met many great challenges in our history. Time and again we have risen from adversity. We have rescued freedom from tyranny in humanity's darkest hour. Today no less than before, America's greatness also is America's responsibility: to stand for something larger than ourselves, to act when others can or will not, to preserve "the sacred fire of liberty," to champion hope over fear. That is the spirit and character of America. That is what will sustain us.

A transcript of the question and answer session is available online. (PDF—90.5KB)

View Full Transcript »