Transcript
MR. JAMES STEINBERG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to Brookings. It's a pleasure to have you here this morning at our National Issues Forum on the question of the war in Afghanistan, is it over, did the United States win, and what's next? It's a tall order of questions, but we're actually going to cover even a broader set of issues in our discussion this morning. The discussion is obviously very timely with the Loya Jirga coming up in just about two weeks, a little less than two weeks, and renewed attention to the overall situation, security, political, and humanitarian, in Afghanistan. And we're very fortunate today in two respects. First, we have an opportunity to hear a little bit about a very important study that the International Crisis Group has just completed, called, The Loya Jirga, One Small Step Forward, which analyzes the prospects for and the challenges facing Afghanistan as it tries to move forward with its political reconstruction. And we'll have the director of the Asia Program Bob Templer here to talk about that.
But, even more important to kick off our discussions we have President Ahtisaari here today. It's a real pleasure personally for me to welcome him here to Brookings. I've had the privilege over the years to work with him in the variety of capacities that he's served both for Finland and the international community. It's truly one of the most extraordinary records of public service in which he has time after time taken on some of the most difficult challenges that we've faced in the international community dealing with the problems of conflict, and conflict resolution around the world, serving the United Nations, serving Finland and serving the world. He played a role that I was particularly grateful for in helping to bring about the end of the conflict in Kosovo. And I think he deserves a great debt of gratitude from all of us.
Our format this morning is President Ahtisaari will begin with some remarks, and then we'll bring the panel up, both to introduce the study, and then to provide some comments on the political, humanitarian, and military sides of the conflict. One of our potential speakers, Steve Cohen, has just returned from a trip, and we're hoping he'll make it back here on time. We have a very strong group of people with or without Steve, although I'm certainly hopeful he can join us, as he is one of the most astute observers of the region that we have. In addition to Bob Templer, our panel will consist of Roberta Cohen, and Michael O'Hanlon, who are senior fellows here at Brookings. So without further ado, let me ask President Ahtisaari to begin our proceedings.
MARTTI AHTISAARI: Good afternoon. Why do I say good afternoon? Because I flew in from Europe yesterday and I feel like it's afternoon. I owe you an explanation, because I was wondering myself why in God's name I'm here and speaking about Afghanistan. I could only find one reason; that I happen to be the chairman of the board of the International Crisis Group, the organization that during the last couple of years when we have had Kenneth Evans as the president of the organization, and colleagues here in Washington led by Mark Schneider, and many others have actually redone the whole organization. I'm very proud to be the chairman of the board.
I have to warn you that I'm not a particular expert in Afghanistan. I was asking Mark, do you know when I actually visited Afghanistan? And he said, no, I don't know. And I told him it was in 1968 on a grand tour of Asia, which lasted for the month. I was a young officer in the foreign service at that time. But in the position where I am, you are forced to at least read the documentation that your organization produced.
First of all, with this disclaimer, please bear with me, and then after me you will hear the real experts. First of all, I want to reciprocate your kind words. It's always been a pleasure to work with you and your colleagues. And also, I thank Mark Schneider who was the father of the idea that I should be here today, during my U.S. trip.
So as I said, I don't have much experience in Afghanistan, but I do have some experience with the kinds of problems we are confronting there. Jim was referring to Kosovo, and today happens to be three years to the day since Slobodan Milosevic accepted the peace proposal, which ended the NATO bombing of Kosovo, actually created the conditions, which then resulted in ending the bombing. Kosovo had a short war; it was ten weeks long. It has two million residents, relatively good infrastructure, and has the good fortune to be situated in Europe. We benefited in Kosovo from all the lessons of Bosnia and other U.N. missions, and the international community has done some very good work there.
The Kosovars themselves moved rapidly to return home, and rebuild. Yet three years later, Kosovo is for all intents and purposes a protectorate of the international community, and I do not know anyone who thinks this is because the international community has not done enough there. I had a personal experience of this when I, last Thursday, entered Pristina. I was taken from the plane by Norwegian policemen who escorted me through all the formalities associated with the hotel, and looked after me for the 24 hours I was there. That reminded me of the protectorate that Kosovo today is.
Bosnia, almost seven years after the date of the accords, and $53 billion invested in spending, is not yet a fully functioning state. It is worth remembering that Bosnia, which I know quite well from my time as head of the Bosnia Herzegovina working group, '92-93, and from six years of work there, remains heavily dependent on NATO, and the international community for security. I do not want to be critical of Bosnia; I want to use it as an example. Broad progress on all the issues, we must also face in Afghanistan, deep seated ethnic suspicion and hostility, multiple armed forces and security services, refugees, it's happening.
It is happening slowly, and by and large it still does not happen without the international community. Even tiny East Timor, which celebrated its independence last month, still makes heavy use of its U.S. presence, but Afghanistan has 30 times as many people as East Timor, and 10 times as many as Kosovo. Its annual capital income is less than half of Bosnia's, and its infant mortality is six times as high. Afghanistan has undergone three decades of political instability, including many years of warfare, and wholesale destruction of political and physical infrastructure. Even in its golden age, before King Zahir Shah was deported in 1973, it had one of the poorest economies, and weakest governments on Earth. The immensity of the task of rebuilding Afghanistan into something that resembles a functional state cannot be overstated. The path to stability is long, and will be traversed slowly, one small step at a time.
Again, think of the agonizing pace of achievements and set backs in Bosnia, then multiply the saliencies by two, or six, or ten, you can make the choice. The history of reconstruction and reconciliation everywhere, and I have been involved with it, whether in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Namibia, or Northern Ireland, shows that it is not wise to keep a country's citizens out of its governing process. That is why such attention has been focused in Afghanistan, rightly, on moving toward the Loya Jirga, and a genuinely representative functional government.
The quick and successful return of Kosovar-Albanian refugees after the conflict showed that the desire to go home and rebuild is as powerful as millions of dollars in refugee assistance. That is why the focus in Afghanistan has been on helping people to return. And return thus far in Afghanistan has exceeded all expectations. While UNHCR predicted that 400,000 refugees would return this year, 850,000 have already returned in the last five months, but the Bosnia and Kosovo peace processes also demonstrated, sometimes in very tragic and fateful ways, that it is outside support and security which make the difference between hope and fear, between refugee returns and refugee massacres, between governments that can focus on a peaceful future, and governments that cannot escape the murderous past.
It is my belief, and it is very much the International Crisis Group's belief that international support for security inside Afghanistan, security for government ministers, and Loya Jirga delegates, but also for refugees returning home, for food and aid deliveries, and for ordinary citizens outside Kabul, must be the foundation of all international efforts there. Right now that support is inadequate. Recent events indicate that the security situation is not improving, and may, in fact, be deteriorating in advance of the Loya Jirga. There have been recent clashes in the southeast, north, and center of the country. The Afghan interim authority has very little power beyond Kabul. Control of the regions in too many cases has diverted to the same groups who held it in 1992, precipitating the instability and civil strife we now know was the precursor to Taliban rule. In several regions independent commanders are receiving support from international coalition forces while refusing to fully support the government in Kabul. It is not apparent whether, or how, U.S. and coalition armed forces are using their influence to reduce tensions and integrate regional commanders into a unified command structure. U.N. ISAF and Afghan security officers have also expressed concern about the possibility to Taliban or al Qaeda attacks Loya Jirga targets, as well as international civilian and military personnel. The Loya Jirga commission staff vehicle was struck by a remotely detonated land mind on April 13. Letters offering $50,000 for a dead Westerner, and $100,000 for a live one have surfaced in Jalalabad.
Deep distrust based on the factional and ethnic fault lines of the last two decades colors how virtually every Afghan perceives events. Fears of intimidation in the Loya Jirga election process are substantial. Indeed, as of last week the United Nations counts eight Loya Jirga candidates killed during this election process. Even a token security presence beyond Kabul would aid Afghans trying to be independent of local commanders. Indeed, the Bonn agreement places responsibility for Loya Jirga security squarely on the shoulders of the international community. In the absence of that security presence, fear that the U.S. and the international community are disengaging, and that extremists offer the only alternative for protection is already resurfacing in popular consciousness and that is a sensation we know only too well in Afghanistan, but also in Bosnia, Macedonia, Rwanda, and other places.
A strong neutral presence in the current environment would be an important reminder that the international community is watching Afghanistan, and the Loya Jirga process closely. Failure to do this would be a telling admission that the game has already been lost, and that the international community does not expect the violent, factionalized, extremist nature of the Afghan politics to change. Expansion of the ISAF and its extension beyond Kabul continue to be almost universally supported among Afghans. That is one way to increase security, but it is not necessarily the only one.
An Afghan journalist told ICG recently, and I quote him, "the best thing the world can do right now is to have an American B-52 fly overhead once a day. It doesn't need to drop anything. Everyone just needs to know that the Americans are still here, and paying attention." To be more concrete, ICG has urged that the U.S. should respond immediately for all requests for security and logistical support from the U.N. assistance mission in Afghanistan, and the Loya Jirga commission, and provide an emergency transportation resource, this includes insuring that the helicopters and fixed wing air craft promised last February are fully operational throughout the next few weeks. We also believe that the United States should reconsider the need to reinforce Afghan security now, before its forces are drawn into a state of collapse, and factional fighting.
Let me offer a brief overview of what ICG believes the Loya Jirga can achieve, and why it is so important that security conditions be created to allow it to succeed. The Loya Jirga is intended to be a national manifestation of community decision-making. Afghans held their first Loya Jirga in 1747, and have employed it on average once every 20 years since. This Loya Jirga was set up by December 2001's Bonn conference of Afghan leaders with two goals in mind, to create a balanced and broadly representative government for Afghanistan, and to create a process for selecting that government that would combine traditional selection procedures, with democratic elements like secret balloting, and procedures to disqualify non-law abiding candidates. The 21 members of the Loya Jirga Commission set procedures for how representatives will be chosen in April. Local district candidate selections have been taking place for the last month. This week, community selected electors are meeting regionally across Afghanistan to choose two-thirds of the delegates. The remaining one-third will be nominated by various civil society groups, and approved by the Loya Jirga Commission itself.
The Loya Jirga Commission must also reach agreement beforehand on the meeting's procedures. With just a week to go, those rules and procedures have not yet been issued, nor has the question of who will set the meeting's agenda been resolved. This delay has heightened suspicion, and political statements around the meeting. All that is clear now is that Loya Jirga will elect a head of state, make some decisions on the structure of the transitional administration, and select key governmental personnel, although which personnel and how they will be selected remains still uncertain.
The Loya Jirga meets next week, between June 10th and 16th. The hopes of the Afghan people are running very high, but so are the power struggles locally, nationally, and internationally, aimed at shaping or subverting the results. Dissatisfaction with the power distribution under December's Bonn agreement has led to deepening factional and ethnic tensions outside Kabul. The key expectation on the part of most Afghans, and the international community, is that Loya Jirga will correct what is perceived as a pro-Northern Alliance, ethnic imbalance in the current interim authority. It is very difficult to conceive of an outcome that will resolve the concerns of the dissatisfied Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, by preventing elements of the Northern Alliance and others from deciding it is not longer in their best interest to participate in the peace process.
The international community must engage now, and decisively so, to present a common front to the Afghan parties. More must be done to establish a dialogue among the disgruntled Afghan factions, with the goal of establishing an acceptable, if not ideal, outcome for the Loya Jirga. The international community must show that it is willing to stay in the thick of a peace process, and whether with B-52s, soldiers, or peacekeepers, nip factional fighting in the bud. The Afghan people deserve immense credit for the intensity of their desire for peace, and the degree to which that desire has held conflict in check across the country, but that same desire has also lifted expectations for the Loya Jirga to unrealistic heights. They will be watching to see not just whether the Loya Jirga process was transparent and fair, but whether its outcome looks fair. The speakers who come after them will offer much more detail about the political and military situation.
I want to close my remarks by recalling that we know what successful reconstruction and reconciliation look like. We know that their base is low, and their cost is high, but we also know what unrestrained civil conflict in Afghanistan looks like, and we know that its cost for Afghans and ourselves is far higher. We must make sure we win the peace in Afghanistan now, and for a long time to come.
I thank you.
(Applause.)
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Martti, for that thoughtful and rather sobering account of the challenges ahead of us.
At the risk of proliferating introductions here, I want to next introduce Mark Schneider, who is the Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Group, based here in Washington. Mark, in addition to being a long-time colleague of mine in a variety of capacities, has also served his country and the world in a variety of important capacities, most recently, before coming to the International Crisis Group, as the director of the Peace Corps, as a senior official at USAID, and at the Pan-American Health Organization. Mark will lead us into the next stage of our discussion.
MR. MARK SCHNEIDER: Thank you, Jim.
Once again, it's my pleasure to be here, to join Jim and the Brookings Institution, to discuss a recent International Crisis Group report, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward. Particularly in the broader context set out by President Martti Ahtisaari, chairman of the ICG Board, questions that were helpfully presented in the announcement of today's session. The war in Afghanistan, is it over? The answer is no. Did the United States win? The answer is, not yet. And what's next? And beyond the question of completing and finalizing the destruction of al Qaeda and either succeeding in capturing, killing, or denying sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, there also is the question of how to expand the regions and the countries where there is no sanctuary given, and no support provided for any terrorist organization which would carry out the kinds of actions that we saw on 9-11. Those are far more difficult questions, and far more difficult tasks. But they're not the only questions.
As President Ahtisaari mentioned, the question about winning the peace, what we define as how to win the war is far more expansive than the military destruction of al Qaeda. When asked whether or not it includes the assurance of a new opportunity for Afghanistan for development, for greater security, and movement toward a more open society, and if it does, and we believe that it does, then it also is required to prevent a return to any extremist capacity to operate in Afghanistan, then much more than defeating al Qaeda militarily is necessary.
And here it seems to me to remind ourselves that, in fact, the coalition and the United States did enunciate goals that were far more expansive. They included the reconstruction, recovery, and movement towards governing mechanisms that encompassed participation and representation aspects of democracy now and full democracy in the future. The basic reality is those goals require levels of security that does not exist in Afghanistan today. ICG, as you know, has argued for some time that an expanded, extended ISAF is necessary. I should add that we're very pleased to see that this is an idea that has not died despite the opposition that's been shown thus far.
Two weeks ago, a bipartisan majority in the House of Representatives approved an amendment to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Authorization Bill. It was offered by Tom Lantos, but it was supported by the chairman of the HERC as well, Representative Hyde. It requires that within the next 45 days, once this is passed, and I believe it will be passed, the administration shall set out a strategy for meeting the immediate and long-term security needs of Afghanistan in order to promote safe and effective delivery of humanitarian and other assistance, further the rule of law and civil order, support the formation of a functioning representative Afghan national government.
Thus far, the administration's response has been to support the establishment of a national Afghan military and funds for that purpose are in the supplemental appropriation bill, which is through the House and about to go to the Senate. And to support the creation of an Afghan national police, and funds are provided to support the German leadership effort on that objective.
But no one, no one, believes that those forces will be ready to provide the kind of security that is necessary to permit development programs to be undertaken, to permit reconstruction to adequately begin to protect the return of refugees over the next several years. It's during that transition period that a security gap not only exists today, but will exist in the future. It will exist sooner in some sense if the actual fighting against al Qaeda moves forward more rapidly to clean them out of their last caves.
And other than the U.S. government, the Secretary-General, Hamid Karzai, most of the international community, and virtually all of the NGOs engaged in development and reconstruction and relief currently in Afghanistan support the extension and expansion of the international security assistance force. ICG has called for a rethinking that would include extension and expansion of that force. They will find ways to demobilize the existing elements of the warlords forces, and that would focus on ensuring that some institutional capacity, international and otherwise, would fill the security gap while the Afghan national military and police are being established. And that, we believe, is the only way to permit the Loya Jirga to succeed.
At this time, to discuss the elements of the Loya Jirga, let me introduce Robert Templer, who is the author of a variety of articles and books on Asian politics, culture and history. He's a visiting scholar at the University of California-Berkeley. He was also the fellow at the Open Society Institute. Before working for ICG as our Asian program director, he was a columnist for the Asian Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, and he's spent much time in Afghanistan, mostly recently in February.
Bob.
MR. ROBERT TEMPLER: Thank you.
All of you should have the report, Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward in the gray envelope in front of you. ICG reports are anonymous, but I think, given the extensive work that went into this one in very difficult conditions, it's worth mentioning that a principal author was Alex Saire (sp), and he was assisted by our office in Islamabad, principally Dr. Samina Ahmed (sp), and Najir Mushtak (sp), and Akil Shah (sp), and also my colleague here in Washington, John Norris.
They, in preparing this report, did very extensive interviews in a wide array of places in Afghanistan, and also in Pakistan, in Peshawar and Quetta among refugees, and some of the political figures who are sort of moving back and forth across the border fairly regularly. And in doing that, they came across one principal concern, which is really that although the United Nations has done a really remarkable job in grafting together the tradition of the Afghan Loya Jirga, a very murky tradition, it has to be said, in that these have been used in a whole variety of different ways in various periods, they grafted that to a process which has been as democratic, really, and as open as possible in a situation where there's very limited security, extremely poor infrastructure, very little in the way of the political resources to harness towards a democratic systems. And it has to be said that they've done a remarkable job in that so far the process has been remarkably peaceful and seems to have engaged the Afghan population in an extraordinary fashion. So then there's a lot to be said for actually the successes that the United Nations has achieved so far.
Unfortunately, in some ways, though, this may be creating a problem in that a lot has gone into creating a fairly open and transparent process in developing the Loya Jirga, but the real anxiety is about the outcome of the Loya Jirga, and how that will satisfy various groups within Afghanistan, principally the divide is between the ethnic groups that make up the Northern Alliance, principally Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazeris, and the large Pashtun community that feels excluded from the political process.
What we found in interviewing across Afghanistan, everywhere from Kandahar, Gardez, Kabul, people in Kabul, even the Pashtuns on the Loya Jirga Commission itself, all felt that Pashtuns were getting a raw deal in this process and there was a very considerable concern at their level of representation.
Now, it would have been impossible to have perhaps satisfied some of the demands the Pashtuns have made, given that their estimations of their own population are significantly higher than any realistic expectations. One of the things you often hear is these very accurate figures about the ethnic division in Afghanistan, if you look at the CIA Web site, they have it down as sort of 17.9 percent. It's sort of extraordinarily spurious accuracy given that all the censuses that have taken place in Afghanistan, and there haven't been many, and the last one was in the 1970s, were really driven by a variety of Pashtun political concerns. And, likewise, the political structures, and the administrative structures within Afghanistan were heavily gerrymandered by Pashtun-dominated administrations. So it's very hard to really tell the extent of political control that could be divided up along ethnic lines in the country.
Given that, the fear among Pashtuns is that the current dominance of the Shiranaza, the group once controlled by Massoud, now really dominated by the three holders of the principal ministries, foreign affairs, defense and interior in Kabul, is going to retain its grip on power.
There are other issues at stake as well. Pashtuns have a sense of entitlement about their own power within this country. There's a definite feeling that they are the sort of natural rulers of Afghanistan, and that this period when they've been excluded from that is something of an anomaly. There's also a sense that they've been shunted aside by the ousting of the Taliban, even though a great many of them were not supporters of the Taliban, but also that they're now being labeled as either Taliban or supporters of al Qaeda, terrorists, that they're being marginalized on a whole array of levels within Afghan society.
And our real concern is that if this process, if the Loya Jirga process doesn't remedy some of this and bring a greater level of Pashtun representation into the government, then there's a serious risk of a much wider split. We were aware that there was a level of Pashtun discontent, but we were surprised to the extent and how deeply that was felt.
At the moment, in some ways, everyone is really waiting for the other shoe to drop in Afghanistan because until the Loya Jirga starts, and until it works out what is actually going to be achieved, we don't really know exactly the decisions that will made, there's a huge amount of doubt as to how things will work out.
I'm surprised at the degree to which nobody has really planned for a variety of outcomes, including the complete failure of the Loya Jirga, which is if there is simply no agreement, or if, for example, the military rejects the current military that dominates the situation in Kabul, the forces under General Fahim, the defense minister, actually reject the outcome of the Loya Jirga, what is actually going to happen, is ISAF going to step in and impose a solution? It's very unclear at the moment.
So while so far I think the international community's response has mostly been very useful, successful, it's very unclear how the political situation is going to develop after the Loya Jirga, and what sort of government is going to emerge out of this process.
The Bonn Agreement was done in a hurry; it was done reflecting a rapidly changing situation on the ground at the time. But also it did build in some serious flaws, and one of them is the short period of this interim government, but also the very short period in which the Loya Jirga itself is going to take place. It's only going to last six days, which is really — they have something like 1,600 delegates, six days is about the time you need to get tea to that many people in Afghanistan. It's going to be hard for them to work through all the issues. I think somebody calculated that if everyone gets to speak, they each can speak for only six minutes during this time. So it's really unclear whether they're going to have the time to sort out a whole variety of political issues and political disputes that have been going on for several decades. Six days is a short period to do that in.
There is also a concern over whether a Loya Jirga really can produce a political solution within itself, and that in the past they've mostly been used to really rubber stamp decisions that were made by a legitimate government, or a government that was seen as fairly legitimate at that time.
For example, during World War II, it ratified the government's decision to remain neutral. Later it ratified a constitution that had already been drafted. In this case, you have a situation where the Loya Jirga is trying to work through a whole variety of issues, and that's a much more complicated, much more difficult process to manage. And so far it seems unclear how exactly that's going to be managed. Although the United Nations has shown some skill in moving fairly rapidly to try and deal with different factional problems as they've emerged.
But a number of sort of outcomes seem possible, and we've developed some of the scenarios on this paper. Now, this paper was published on the 16th of May, so to a sudden degree it's actually slightly out of date already because things have been moving very quickly in Afghanistan, but the scenarios that we present are still really valid in the sense that at some stage there needs to be real decisions on the shape and format of the government, who holds the key ministries, the role of Zahir Shah, whether he'll be head of state, the powers that he'll hold as head of state, and then issues such as the continuation of Hamid Karzai as leader of the government.
None of these things are really completely clear at the moment, but one thing that is clear is that there has to be a redressing of the imbalances that exist. So it means certainly, at least, one or two of the key ministries that are held by Tajiks will have to change hands.
Now, the one that I think Pashtuns would most want to see go is the defense minister who now styles himself Field Marshal Fahim. He seems the most reluctant to leave, and has publicly stated that he wouldn't hand over his ministry to somebody who didn't know about military affairs. He seems very reluctant to take onboard this need to redress the imbalance. He says the people who talk about the imbalance in the makeup of the interim administration are those who support al Qaeda, who never fought against the Taliban. So he seems fairly reluctant to actually move forward on this, which I think is very troubling.
And the response of the international community has not always been as helpful. There's been a relative lack of coordination here in the sense that, for example, on the day that Zahir Shah was arriving back in Afghanistan, General Fahim had been welcomed with full pomp and ceremony in Paris, sending a signal on a very serious level to the Afghan people that the French were more concerned with dealing with the defense minister than they were in the long-term political process in this country. There does need to be a great level of coordination in the international community to avoid the sort of blips that have gone on in that manner, particularly given the real difficulties in enforcing any sort of agreement, and any creating situation in which there is long-term security. We've already heard a little bit about some of the security issues in Afghanistan, and some of the long-term problems.
The response has been, in many cases, well, the security situation looks quite good at the moment in the sense that very little has happened in real terms in the past six months. There have been outbreaks of fighting in various parts of the country, but certainly nothing on the scale of the past ten years and what's happened there. And certainly Kabul, itself, has seemed very peaceful, but it is not a sustainable peace yet, and there's not a sustainable sense of security. The real securities that is needed is the security to get people to go home, to invest resources in rebuilding their lives, rebuilding this country, and that doesn't exist yet. What you're seeing at the moment is a situation where refugees are returning home, but they're returning mostly to Kabul because there's security there. They're not willing to go back to just any place unless they feel a sense of security and a sense of capacity to rebuild their lives.
Likewise, it's almost impossible for the international community to operate successfully outside of Kabul at the moment. And that again limits the capacity to build up a sense of a national government that actually delivers services to its people. And as long as that's going on, what you're going to see is this very real disconnect between the interim administration and the transitional government that takes over from it, and the people out in the provinces, and the power bases out in the provinces.
I think there's an awful lot of debate about Afghanistan, about whether the central government needs to be built from the top down, or whether we need from the bottom up. I think in some ways it has to be built in both directions. There needs to be more to reinforce the capacities of local governments. There needs to be more to be done to develop new political institutions around the country. And more should be done to develop the center of the country, and to develop the power and capacity of Kabul to deliver development to its people.
The situation, I think, is mixed. Certainly this is probably the most optimistic time for Afghanistan in 20 years. At the same time, I think it's very important to be wary of declaring victory too early in the situation.
I have a personal experience of this. I was in Afghanistan in 1992 during the period after the mujaheddin took over. I was working as a journalist at the time. I went around to the various mujaheddin commanders, there were nine different commanders based in Kabul. I spoke to each of them, and they all said, we've signed a peace agreement, we're going to have the formal signing ceremony tomorrow, it's all in the bag, everything is settled. We all love each other now.
So, I went back, typed up a story, and was sending it off on a very old, unreliable telex machine when the power went out. I only sent the first line, which was sort of peace is at hand in Afghanistan. The next morning, I was woken up at 5 o'clock by the first rocket that Gulbiddin Hekmatyar fired into the city. He subsequently killed 50,000 people in the rocket attacks that followed that. So peace in Afghanistan can be very elusive, very difficult to attain, and I think the international community needs to continue to maintain that commitment until it really is nailed down, not to leave too early, or to pull back, or to imagine that a few weeks of peace can be enduring under the current situation in the country is very dangerous.
Thank you.
(Applause.)
MR. STEINBERG: I invite our panelists to come up and join us now and I'm pleased to see that Steve Cohen has been able to join us. Filmmaking has the Coen brothers. We have the Cohens of Brookings.
I'm going to ask our panelists to try to limit their opening remarks to about five minutes, so we'll have plenty of time for questions.
I like to begin with Steve actually. If you would to talk about the overall political situation there and then Roberta will talk about the humanitarian situation and then Mike the military.
MR. STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN: To be honest I've just gone to Tokyo and haven't been able to follow Afghan developments that closely, but I did meet in Japan not only Japanese but some important Afghan scholars and others who have just came back from Kabul.
In my judgment, the most interesting question is whether or not al Qaeda is really destroyed as far as Afghanistan is concerned. The United States went in there primarily to make sure that Afghanistan is not and would not become a base for the operations of al Qaeda or any other international terrorist group and I've not seen a good estimate as to how many people were there to begin with, how many have been killed. Whether there's an organizational integrity left in Afghanistan, whether it's moved to Pakistan, and so forth. I think the administration has concluded that a limited military effort in terms of Afghanistan reconstruction would be adequate and they value publicly now. I think Paul Wolfowitz has been speaking about this.
So a small Afghan army will work and a limited ISAF operation confined to Kabul will work because the United States will remain in Afghanistan operating with regional military leaders. We don't like to use the term warlords when it comes to somebody we're supporting and I think warlords, in fact, is a recent label — mujaheddin and various stripes in the past. So I think the administration's judgment is that a limited American effort is adequate and it doesn't need to be very large and primarily because they're looking elsewhere. They're concerned about shifting the whole focus of American policy towards the Middle East. Right now, they're obsessed and consumed with the problem of managing a potential war in South Asia and I think their judgment is that in the long run, Afghanistan isn't that important, while many of us who work in or near Afghanistan are concerned about the future of Afghanistan. I think the American judgment — the official judgment seems to be that a modicum of carrots, a few sticks will be enough to keep the country from collapsing again and once again becoming a host for al Qaeda or any other similar group that might start up.
To some degree I agree with this perspective because I think that what has struck me is as quite impressive is the desire of the Afghan people, especially the expatriates who are now coming back in small numbers who could in a year or perhaps make a significant influence to really reestablish their country in a normal fashion and I think it has to be remembered that some of the worst excesses of Afghanistan were not committed by Afghans originally, but were imported from Pakistan or other countries, particularly Pakistan. And to some degree I do sense that the priorities of the administration putting Pakistan perhaps before Afghanistan are not misplaced. If Pakistan should continue to deteriorate as it has for the past "x" number of years or if there should be a major conflict with India, what we've seen in Afghanistan would like child's play, obviously, in view of the potential of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan and the potential of a Pakistan that becomes a radical Islamic state in a significant fashion in itself and command of nuclear weapons. And even a collapsing Pakistan would spew out nuclear materials and weapons in all kinds of directions.
So I understand the administration's focus and I think — I do question the judgment as to whether a limited military capability for Afghanistan will be right. Phil Durch, who is next door at Stimson Center, has done some work on this and I think we've done some work on this. I tend to agree that the administration's expert on the number of forces of necessary — and I'll let Mike talk about this really is too low. Karzai's estimate of the cost of numbers may be too high, but clearly you need to build Afghanistan from the top down to develop a professional, modern military not so strong that it threatens civilian control in Afghanistan, but strong enough to overpower any one or two of the warlords that might emerge.
The problem is that we're working with those warlords. The U.S. is working with them and we have intimate military relations with a number of them and the calculation is that as long as we're working with them and as long as our B-52s are available in a pinch in a sense that they can be kept under control and they can be contained. In a sense, this is experimental — it's not fixed in the future.
Let me stop there I think and let —
MR. STEINBERG: Roberta?
MS. ROBERTA COHEN: Thank you.
My work at Brookings, as you know, is in the humanitarian area, but one really can't discuss humanitarian or human rights or development issues in Afghanistan independently of the ongoing war in the country. By the ongoing war I mean the operations being carried out by the Western coalition forces against the al Qaeda and the remains of the Taliban. This war may be largely concentrated in one part of the country, but it heavily affects the carrying out of humanitarian development programs throughout the country and that's because coalition military priorities may be undoing the long-term stability of the country as the ICG report suggests.
The Pentagon as we all know has rejected an expanded role for the international security force on the grounds that this will distract from its overall military effort, but this refusal ignores and contributes to the absence of security in large parts of the country, the forces bringing a modicum of security to Afghanistan and to Kabul, the capital, but not to the other cities, and in different areas there's factional fighting, banditry and lawlessness.
Now, we speak about Afghanistan as if it were in a post-conflict situation. We talk about the large returns of refugees and IDPs. Close to a million since January. We talk about the reconstruction funds pledged — about $2 billion for 2002. We speak of the convening of the Loya Jirga and the creation of a central government, but the way the Western coalition forces define their military priorities looks at cross purposes with many of these humanitarian and development objectives, as well as with the creation of a workable Afghan central government.
As already noted, about 40 percent of the returning refugees and internally displaced persons go to Kabul because there's little security elsewhere. The results, of course, are slums sprouting around the capital and tremendous pressure on an already weak infrastructure. Development agencies are reluctant to begin their reconstruction programs in large measure because of the absence of security outside Kabul. Of $2 billion pledged, I believe about $360 million has arrived, but this is devastating in a country where basic services are in ruin and most infrastructure is destroyed. Returning refugees and IDPs are said to be a sign of confidence in the new government, but in fact, they find little in the way of food, shelter, health care and jobs and risk becoming uprooted again and adrift in their own country. The minister of refugees has little or no resources to help the returnees. Even in the cases where the development agencies are actively working on the ground, they have little access and their staffs are afraid to travel, which undermines their programs. As a USAID official acknowledged, it's very difficult for us to get out of town even during daylight hours when USAID staff goes outside Kabul, they do so with military escort.
Moreover, all the talk about integrating women into the political and economic life of the country, which is both a humanitarian and development objective is being undermined by the lack of security. Women are afraid in many cases of being attacked if they don't wear their burqas, if they take jobs outside the home, if they participate more fully in civil society. At the end of April, the minister for women's affairs pleaded before the UN Security Council for an expansion of the international security force, pointing out that security is the main prerequisite for women's participation in public life, including in the Loya Jirga. Afghanistan's development will certainly be crippled if half the population is not able to participate.
Coalition military priorities also have meant arming and financing warlords or regional commanders as they're euphemistically called because of their help in the war against Taliban and terrorism. While it's difficult to completely bypass them, the impact of this support has been to undermine the central government's ability to govern. Both regional commanders competes with efforts by relief and development organizations to strengthen the central government and also to help foster local government. Aid and development agencies have to determine how their resources should flow and they're caught in the middle of conflicting military, political and humanitarian objectives.
Support channel for the warlords has other consequences as well. In the areas controlled by these commanders, especially in the north, there are cases of humanitarian workers being kidnapped, robbed, also killed, often with impunity. Ethnic minorities have been subjected to harassment, beatings, lootings, murder by local militias, with thousands having to flee. The Loya Jirga is not supposed to include persons who have committed war crimes and looting and murder, but there seems to be a general acceptance that such persons will not be excluded. Yet the credibility of the central government and in the human rights areas are put into question. Will the new human rights commission really be able to investigate warlord infractions? Or will it confine its investigations to earlier crimes committed by the Taliban?
Finally, military priorities so overshadow humanitarian ones that insufficient attention is being paid to the critical funding shortfalls facing relief agencies right at this time. The World Food Program still needs to deliver emergency food to nine million Afghans — that's about 40 percent of the population — but it's 40 to 50 percent underfunded. Food distribution could come to a halt by the end of this month. The International Organization for Migration has had to actually suspend its transport services for both IDPs and returning refugees from Iran and has pulled out of IDP camps in the west and the north. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is looking to make cuts in small packages that it provides returning refugees, which only last about 12 weeks anyway and include travel money, some food, plastic sheets and blankets and sometimes housing repair materials and seeds and tools. The UNHCR is currently overwhelmed by the unexpectedly large numbers of refugees returning from Pakistan. Its budget at $271 million for an expected 1.2 million returning refugees and IDPs during 2002 has received only 70 percent of that, and now it needs another $100 to $200 million because the total of returning refugees from Pakistan may well be 2 million this year. Only UNHCR has funding to the end of this month.
Evidently, the link between humanitarian relief and development assistance and the overall stability of the country doesn't seem to be fully appreciated. The U.S. has been forthcoming on the humanitarian emergency side, but others have withdrawn support because they believe the crisis is over and there's also been a lack of media attention lately which makes the situation seem less useful. But even more to the point, the concentrated focus on the war against terrorism to the exclusion of what I would call broader security objectives has made it difficult to bring center stage the importance of relief and reconstruction aid and basic safety of civilians, the importance to the long term stability of the country. The United Nations together with the Afghan government is left to oversee political and economic reconstruction without timely or adequate resources and without the military forces needed to ensure stability.
Thanks.
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Roberta. That's a very sobering account of the challenges ahead and I'm sure Mike is going to give us a equally candid assessment of what's been done and what remains to be —
MR. MICHAEL O'HANLON: I'll just make a couple of brief points on the military issue so we can get to discussion.
I share my colleagues' concerns about the insufficiency of the current ISAF, but I think we're in a bit of a dilemma in that to take President Ahtisaari's analogies from earlier this morning, if you compare the size of Afghanistan and the population of Afghanistan with those of Bosnia or Kosovo, you recognize it's not possible, it's just not realistic to think about imposing the kind of order in Afghanistan with any realistic ISAF that we have to some extent been able to impose in the Balkans. And, therefore, you have to, I think, set your sights at a level of country-wide presence that is not intended to achieve the long-term goal that I think Steve rightly laid out of being able to potentially overwhelm one or two warlords if necessary. That's not a feasible goal for a broader ISAF mission.
What the goal has to be, I believe, is trying to instill the kind of confidence that Roberta mentioned as lacking. What this means is working with the regional militias in most cases, not using the threat of military force against them so much as the threat of less aid and less diplomatic engagement. We do have those B-52s as our ultimate potential asset, but we're not going to use those except in extreme conditions. For example, the recent attempt to assassinate Hekmatyar, which I fully approve of, by the way, because he had allied himself with the Taliban and al Qaeda, if someone goes to that extreme, I think we do have the wherewithal to threaten ultimate military power against that kind of a warlord. But most people are not going to have that kind of liberty. They're not going to make the mistake that Hekmatyar did of going to that level of engagement with al Qaeda or the Taliban and we're not going to have the resources even with an expanded ISAF to try to use lethal military force to impose a solution.
So I think you have to set your sights at a middle level of engagement, and what that means is trying to help protect aid efforts, trying to monitor the human rights practices of some of the regional warlords, and trying to monitor the basic kind of security in the streets of some of these other cities without imposing it yourself, without being responsible for it yourself. That's a difficult peace operation or stability operation to conduct. It's the sort of thing that can get you into trouble. It probably rings a few bells with some of you when we think back to the experiences in Somalia and other places where we try to have sort of a middle level, of course not really enough to impose settlements, but more than simple peacekeeping or simple monitoring.
So it's a real problem, but the alternative is to I think let the country potentially remain in the kind of chaos that it is today where even if violence is not widespread, reconstruction is relatively absent and you just don't — you aren't really keeping your pledge we made last fall to the Afghan people of helping them recover their country, rebuild their country.
So I'm just letting some sobering thoughts I believe on the basic nature of what kind of a military operation is needed more than we're doing now, but let's not have any illusions that we can really create the kind of countrywide stability with a Western-led stabilization force that we'd perhaps had been able to in the Balkans, and it's going to be a very challenging mission. I think those of us who support an expansion have to be doing so with our eyes fully wide open about what it might entail.
Having said that, just two words on what kind of a force might be appropriate is mid-level. I think the kinds of numbers that have been commonly bandied about, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000 international peacekeepers, that's about the right level for the kind of mission I'm proposing. That's a tough force in and of itself to come up. The United States would have a hard time generating the contribution. But I would propose one specific idea that we contribute some of the forces, some of the Marines that are now at Okinawa, who, I believe, are not needed as much for the East Asian security mission as is often alleged. I would get into some of the reasons if you like later, but my point is that we have to get specific about which countries can contribute which additional forces, and it's not easy. And those of us, again, who propose an expansion of ISAF have to be very sober about the fact that it's not going to be easy.
I'm giving you one specific example about U.S. forces I think might be available, 1,000 or 2,000 Marines from Okinawa. I would welcome Japanese and South Korean participation in this kind of a force. I would welcome some of the European countries that are not presently engaged as heavily in Afghanistan to be more heavily engaged. I'd like to see what future NATO aspirants could do to help us here. But even when we collectively put pressure on people and try to pool a larger force, it's going to be hard impose peace, and, therefore, as we go ahead we're going to have to keep our sights modest about what an expanded ISAF can do. And those of us, again, who propose it have to be willing to answer the objections of people like Secretary Rumsfeld, because right now he's in no danger of losing the debate on where we go with this force. And I'd like to see him lose the debate because I do agree in the end with my colleagues that we need a broader effort than is currently underway and I'll stop there.
MR. STEINBERG: Mike, before we turn to the audience, let me ask a few questions. First, what's your assessment about how the transition to the Turkish leadership of ISAF is going? And second, I think it would be helpful if you could say a word about the other dimension, the military operation, the U.S. military operation in trying to deal with the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda, both in Afghanistan itself and what appears to be the case, which is the presence in Pakistan?
MR. O'HANLON: My impressions of the hand-over of the command to the Turks — Bob may be in a better position to comment. But my sense is that the Turks will do a good job. I think they're relatively good at this kind of a straightforward mission. I think the British have established and the ISAF have established a pretty good presence in Kabul. It's the sort of mission that I think is being done competently and there's a pretty good sense of success. There's an unlikelihood of people challenging the international community in Kabul itself given the proximity of American, British and other outside forces at Bagram Air Base. I don't expect the Turks will have major problems and I think they are a competent military — able to handle this transition. That's probably the most I can say on that broad issue.
As for the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, trying to root out the remaining elements of al Qaeda and the Taliban, I think this mission at this point is going about as well as we can hope. I think it's the sort of thing where you've got to be patient, you got to expect your results will not be particularly productive at any given moment. You may or may not find another top leader of al Qaeda, but simply keeping them off balance is of some benefit. And I think we're ultimately going to have to accept the fact that these people are going to be able to escape or reposition or hide, but, hopefully, they have to do it in small groups. Hopefully, they can't reconstitute and find a new sanctuary.
The bad news is that even if they can't do that, we may have to stay with this kind of a mission for a couple of years, if not longer, in order to maintain the pressure, because what we've seen tactically in the last couple of months is an inability to find al Qaeda and Taliban. And I'm not sure that's going to change fundamentally regardless of what happens in the India-Pakistan crisis, regardless of what happens in other domains, other realms of this effort.
So I think we're going to have to keep them off balance, expect relatively modest and occasional tactical battlefield successes. That's still an accomplishment in and of itself. The problem is it doesn't lead you to an exit strategy very easily and we may have to keep up this kind of pressure with 7,000 Americans in Afghanistan and 10,000 to 15,000 more in the vicinity, and a number of allied troops well into 2003, 2004.
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you. Let's turn to questions from the audience. We have microphones, so if you — after I've recognized you, if you would wait until the microphone arrives and then please identify yourself and then ask the question.
Right over here.
Q: Otto Kreisher with Copley News Service.
Afghanistan has never had a history of strong central governments, you know, some of the panelists could maybe talk about what kind of government transition or long-term you could expect to really work? Would they have to live with the regional power bases of the differing warlords if they, you know, try to reign them in — keep them from fighting each other and resisting some kind of central administration? Can you really envision a strong central government given Afghanistan's history?
MR. STEINBERG: Bob, do you want to start?
MR. ROBERT TEMPLER: Well, I don't think there's going to be a strong government, but you do need a government that can deal with some basic functions. For example, rebuilding the road networks in the country, coordinating aid, dealing with foreign policy, monetary affairs. I mean those are basic set of institutions that really have to be done at a central level. There's no point in having ten different currencies around the country, you have to have one.
So I think those things — it's not unrealistic to expect Afghanistan to recreate those sorts of institutions. Whether the central government is going to be able to impose its rule on every square inch of the country, that's not going to happen. But I can see a situation where, with substantial assistance, the basic institutions of state could be reconstructed fairly successful.
MR. COHEN: Yeah, historically, Afghanistan survives as a state because it balanced different outside forces, Americans and Russians, Americans and Soviets rather. Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, everybody was in Kabul. Everybody had an aid program. Everybody was doing something in the countryside. Eventually, among other countries, the U.S. withdrew and the balance of power within Afghanistan tilted, and it tilted toward the Soviet Union or toward Soviet elements and that destabilized Afghan politics.
A new Afghan state really has to either restructure — recreate that balance, which I think is very typical, or else require enough integrity of its own as a country that it doesn't need to have outsiders, you know, playing a significant role in its domestic, economic and political affairs. And I think that it does need an army of a minimum quality, not only to keep down the warlords or regional separatists, and so forth, but also so it doesn't need outside military power for internal uses.
So some degree of autonomous military integrity is necessary. The danger is that that autonomous military capability will become so powerful that you wind up with a military government in Kabul, that the army will take over, and this is a very, very difficult time of nation and state building. It's really Aristotle 101, going back to the basics of trying to reconstitute a state. The one advantage that that the Afghans do have is that there is a sense of Afghan nationalism, Afghan identity. People often talk about, you know, there is no state physically in terms of the mechanisms of state, but there's a sense of Afghan identity that is shared by the Tajiks and Hazeris and others, so it's not that you have a disparate group of people that have no relationship with each other.
I think it can be made to work. It will require a lot of outside assistance, military, technical assistance, but above all, non-interference by Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, because they were the ones who really led to this present round of catastrophe.
MS.: (Name, affiliation unintelligible.)
I would like the panelists to address another point of the program today: the — an analysis of the current situation vis-à-vis a broader anti-terrorism campaign. In particular I would like to learn whether some comparison can be drawn from a recent report the ICGS published on Somalia.
Thank you.
MR. STEINBERG: Mark, do you want to —
MR. SCHNEIDER: Clearly what we're arguing is that there are in a variety of countries a continuing need to focus on the existing organizations which are in groups, which are preventing movement towards any kind of national governance that moves forward and that denies the opportunity for terrorist organizations to take hold, and if there's a need to focus on what the international community can do, whether we governments in order to prevent them from falling into a failed state category where they become vulnerable terrorist organizations. Somalia is one instance, we were looking at what opportunities might exist to move toward a different structure in which there were some opportunities to bring a national — some kind of national governance in operation again with some serious questions about how optimistic one can be.
MR. STEINBERG: I think there are two dimensions. The bottom one, as Mark suggested, is that to what extent do these territories become sanctuary for terrorists and terrorist organizations? But also on the sort of individual and social level, to what extent do they become circumstances which become in effect fertile ground for recruits, and to what extent, because these societies lack the other set of opportunities for people to pursue, does the opportunity for fundamentalist religious groups, madrassas and the like, become an opportunity essentially to train people in the ways that are supportive of terrorists? So I that there are broad security issues that we face in all of these countries.
So the problem of course is that it becomes very daunting, both because of the scale of it — if you look at the number of countries around the world that are potentially in this category — and second the timeline problem, which is most of the strategies to deal with these are very — things at best, given our limited tools and limited resources, things that take quite a long time, as the discussion of Bosnia and Kosovo has indicated. And yet the urgency or the need to address the terrorism problem is extreme. So that tends to lead to a continued emphasis on military intervention and, as the president suggested over the weekend, pre-emptive tools which may be successful if you have the right intelligence or the right specific facts but become a continuing game of whack-a-mole where you knock some people down in one place and they appear again in another.
All the way in the back.
Q: Peter Gantz, Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. I wanted to tie a couple points together there that Michael was making at the end. On the expansion of the ISAF, I'm not sure that the debate is some — or that the need needs to be to concentrate on where to find U.S. troops. The word — the quiet word in the hallways is that our allies, particularly the allies that are more interested in gauging peacekeeping would be inclined to at least consider if not participate in an expanded ISAF if it were not for the fact that the U.S. isn't willing to provide intelligence, logistical and extraction support. In other words, the U.S. is going to come and back up this ISAF, that it would be expanded. So — and I know ICG has made that point in a variety of their reports.
As I hope the Lantos Amendment comes to debate in the Senate, during the next couple of weeks, I hope that that's — I think that needs to be more of a focus, that there's an understanding that we don't need to find U.S. troops to participate directly, but that it needs to be an understanding that needs to back it up. So any comments there.
MR. O'HANLON: It's a good point, I'm not sure American forces would have to formally be part of ISAF, but think about what they might have to do just to do the extraction. Let's imagine that we have international forces in Herat, in Western Afghanistan. The U.S. Marine presence in southeastern Afghanistan is not close enough to Herat to be a viable extraction force, in my judgment, which means you would have to do something like what I was saying and take some of those Marines out of Okinawa or from somewhere else and put them perhaps in west central Afghanistan to be the extraction force, so they don't have to be a part of ISAF, but it does lead to a larger American military presence in Afghanistan. I support that, but nonetheless, it should not be confused with simply being willing to be a back up. We have to actually have more people there.
I would submit that in the end, by the way, Secretary Rumsfeld is just as concerned about the difficulty of making tactical decisions about when we do what as he is about strains on forces. For him, if we had a much greater ISAF presence in Afghanistan, it becomes a much harder problem for him and for commanders because they have to decide when you threaten force, when you don't. These kinds of issues are — and Jim knows this far better than I do from personal experience — but these kinds of issues can be so consuming for top leadership.
When you have a broad national military situation, and a force that's not quite big enough to dominate, you have to constantly assess whether you want to get involved in a given flare-up or not. I think that's probably as much of Secretary Rumsfeld's reservation about an expanded ISAF as is the actual number of troops required.
MR. STEINBERG: I have to say Mike that I think you can make the opposite argument from what the administration is making which is that the extent of the ISAF is effective, it can reinforce the efforts of what we're trying to do in the direct anti-terror war because you create an environment which is less conducive to the operation of dissident elements and also makes it harder for them to see a possibility of stirring up discontent and therefore undermining government. I think there's a case to be made for seeing and it is complementary rather than tension.
MR.: I think you also have to see that the visible presence of an ISAF, with the capability to have a deployment in major — seven or eight major urban areas in the country, acts as a deterrent, and acts as a deterrent in a way that hopefully avoids the necessity for extraction or direct the imposition force.
Q: Don North, Northstar Productions.
I wonder if any of the panel have observations on the reestablishment of free media in Afghanistan and how the lack of security outside Kabul is also constricting that. Obviously it's needed to get journalists outside Kabul.
MR. STEINBERG: Bob, do you want to —
MR. TEMPLER: Well, there's been some movement in this direction, but even within Kabul in terms of free media you're seeing a lot very heavy handed pressure by members of the interim administration to control the media there — journalists being threatened, radio Kabul is very much — radio Afghanistan is very much under the thumb of the defense ministry and the interior ministry at the moment. So I don't think they've gone very far on that, and it's clearly an insecure — you can't have a free media in a completely insecure situation.
Afghan journalists have been a target for killings and imprisonment by warlords around the country for a long time now. There's been limited movement in terms of training and things like that, but I don't think it's gone very far. I think it's actually been one area where the United Nations has been a bit weak. I think they should have set up a radio station, been more aggressive in terms of promoting information about what was happening within the country.
One of the problems in Afghanistan has been the shortages of information that people have and the difficulties in making informed political decisions. Too much information is controlled by warlords.
MS. COHEN: I would just add that the lack of information is extremely difficult than for the refugees and in terms of those persons knowing where to go back to in the country. They really don't have very often good information on where it's safe, where there are jobs, where they should go. This is creating a lot of problems.
Q: Frank Method. I represent UNESCO in matters relating to Afghanistan. UNESCO actually has a fairly aggressive effort on radio broadcasting. Unfortunately, it's rather short term and it's hard to get the funding for the long-term capacity development, but short term there is a major emphasis on that.
I want to make a comment just following on Roberta Cohen's remarks here. I think something has to be done here really to light a fire under the donors and to draw attention to much of the shortsightedness of much of the donor funding. I just heard last week that IOM has been forced to shut down its internal transportation program. This is a major tragedy that is going to greatly complicate the return of refugees, the return of qualified Afghans, the internal air transport systems under which all kinds of NGO's and others depend.
There's been a generous support for the return to schooling as part of the short-term humanitarian affairs, the effort to rebuild the ministries, to do longer-term planning, to rebuild teacher training capacity itself has gone nowhere. UNESCO has 38 million dollars of authorized programs there. It's been able to raise $2,500 over the last year. This is incredibly stupid. I don't know what to do about it other than to ventilate on it.
Thank you.
MR. STEINBERG: Can't quite reach the first person back there — over here, sorry.
Q: (Off mike.)
MR. STEINBERG: That's an interesting question. Bob, do you —
MR. TEMPLER: Well, they've done the selection process on a district basis, not really on a tribal basis. It's been done in a slightly different manner. I mean, in the past it used to be a matter of local tribal leaders selecting people. So indeed they did come from across the border, and then the king selecting a certain number of representatives from around the country.
This time it has been done in a sort of more orderly administrative process whereby they took each province or unit and then selected people from within those. The border there is very fluid. People move back and forth. I'm sure there are some people who — I mean, lots of Afghans, also resident in Pakistan. I think there's a clearer sense nowadays, in administrative terms, of who has citizenship in which country and who's going to be involved in this. So I don't think there — I don't think there'll be a sort of direct Pakistani involvement in that way.
MR. STEINBERG: Before we close, I'm going to take the chairman's prerogative here, and since we have the benefit of Steve Cohen here, is to ask Steve to give us a few closing thoughts on the situation between India and Pakistan and what we should be looking for in the days and weeks ahead.
MR. COHEN: Well, I think that you'll probably see a significant American effort go beyond good advice, urging India and Pakistan to behave properly, and perhaps some American thinking about the larger, I won't say peace process, but addressing the issues that are motivating both India and Pakistan and Kashmiri. I — really for many, many years Americans have not had a South Asian policy except to urge restraint on the disputeds. I think there's a realization growing — there certainly should be a realization growing, even in Tokyo there's a realization growing — that we cannot go on like this — crisis, after crisis, after crisis, with two nuclear-weapon states indefinitely because that's what will happen. I suspect that Rumsfeld at least or Armitage in particular probably going to bring some new idea with him. Otherwise it makes no sense in sending him out there.
In terms of the substance of the issues, the Indians are really — have practiced since December of strategy of compellance; that is, putting pressure on the United States and Pakistan to change Pakistani behavior. This hasn't worked very well, partly because we don't know whether the Pakistanis have changed their behavior, whether they're capable of stopping movement across this legendary line of control. It's the Indians who have been the judge, the jury, the accusatory, and presumably the executioners in this spirit. I think the Indians are probably going to have to concede some international or American or other monitoring of the line of control, which they've rejected so far. The Pakistanis will have to behave properly in terms of not shipping people across the line. The real problem is that the number of radical Islamic groups operating in India and in Pakistan and in Kashmir proper — they have no interest — their interest is in fermenting war between India and Pakistan.
They are as much after Musharraf as they are against the Indian government. They are not interested in the Kashmiris; they are interested in a larger Islamic struggle. A lot of them have moved to Afghanistan to Pakistan, some of them moved to Kashmir itself. These are the people who are the most dangerous because as soon as — as sure as we can predict that the sun will rise, when Armitage arrives in India, there's going to be an atrocity someplace up in Kashmir. Indians will blame the Pakistanis, the Pakistanis, will blame the Indians. It will probably be caused by an independent group of radicals — who I think are diminishing in numbers, I think it's their last gasp — who would like to foment a larger crisis. I think it's up to American diplomacy to really come in with new ideas, not simply the old idea of urging both sides — of urging restraints on both sides.
It does effect the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and in a sense it effects the probability of transforming Pakistan into a state that does not actively support these types of groups. So I think there are big state support. I would hope that — okay, hope is not a policy, but I would expect that Armitage is going out with something more than the highest good wishes. If that's all he has he might as well stay home.
MR. STEINBERG: On that note, let me thank you all, particularly President Ahtisaari and our panel. Thanks for coming to Brookings.
(Applause and end of event.)