Transcript
MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Preview of President Musharraf's Visit. At this time all participant lines are in a listen-only mode. Later there will be questions and answers. Instructions will be given at that time. As a reminder, the call is being recorded.
I would now like to turn the conference over to Dr. Stephen Cohen. Please go ahead.
MR. STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN: Good morning. I'm happy to be with you, if only by telephone. I spent the last two and a half weeks in Pakistan so my perspective is as much of the region as it is of Washington, but Musharraf's visit is very important and I'd like to discuss it with you and respond to your questions.
Let me begin with a summary of what I think the visit is about and what the situation is in Pakistan. It's said in Pakistan that Pakistan has had a critical turning point. I think that Pakistan had about five or six critical turning points in its history, and this may be another one of them. If you would compare Pakistan with a cat that had nine lives, Pakistan has used up six or eight of those lives. I think it got one of those lives back as a result of the January 12th speech of President Musharraf, which really reorganized the debate in domestic politics in Pakistan by reclaiming the earlier dream of Jinnah and that of liberal, secular, moderate Islamic state.
Pakistan is really going to have to reconstruct its civil military relationship. There's going to be elections this coming October. I think that'll be good measure as to how serious Musharraf is about turning over power to civilians. But he has said that he would stay in power for another five years, and he's also indicated that he may have to stay in for longer than that. So I think there's some concern in Pakistan about rule of the military after the elections. My own guess is that they will play a supervisory role. They don't want to actually run Pakistan, but they would like to be what one Pakistani friend called the executive producer of the movie called "Pakistan." They don't want to direct the movie, but they certainly want to influence things from behind the scenes.
In terms of the economy, which is critical, Pakistan has been flat-line for several years. There's been no growth whatsoever, and a huge international debt. Pakistan's Finance Minister, Shaukat Aziz, has been running around the world trying to raise funds. The consequence of 9/11 in this regard have been good for Pakistan, because the U.S. and other states have come up with over a billion dollars in debt relief to get Pakistan over its immediate crisis, but I think there's a question of long-term economic strategy. Pakistan economists have done projections of the future. Even with the best projection, they're going to fall further behind India. With the worst projection, Pakistan is going to be a country of 220 million people with an that's 1/18 the size of India. That kind of Pakistan can't compete in any sense with New Delhi. I think that's one thing the Indians are counting on, is that they'll simply outpace the Pakistanis in terms of economic growth and political stability.
In terms of the Islamization of Pakistan, which was a major concern a few months ago, Pakistan was being talked about as a failed state as a potential Somalia or another Afghanistan, where the Islamists might take over. I think that we exaggerated the rule of the Islamic parties and the Islamic movements in Pakistan, and when Musharraf did crackdown on them after 9/11, it was clear that their power was very modest. He actually began that crackdown, earlier, back in August. The army was very concerned about growing sectarianism within Pakistan. There were riots, assassinations of Shia's riots and a very serious law and order situation. The Pakistani politicians that I've talked to, especially the Shia's, are ecstatic over the the resecularization of Pakistan and the playing down of religious extremists and containment of religious terrorism. But they could bounce back in the future if the present situation doesn't lead to significant economic and political reforms in Pakistan. Above all Pakistan needs educational reforms, because one base for the Madrassahs was simply that the Pakistan government's own educational system had completely collapsed and people were sending their kids off to these Madrassahs for whatever education they could get. The madrassas of course, usually provided free education and often room and board. When I was in Pakistan, the government released the figure that they're 250,000 religious students in Punjab alone, and that's a figure that's far higher than it was in the past.
In terms of Indian relationships and the American role, George Bush is going to find himself in a very difficult position. Musharraf is going to ask him to support Pakistan on the Kashmir problem. Pakistanis have been asking countries around the world to intervene on Kashmir, to serve as a mediator on Kashmir. I don't think that the U.S. is going to play an active role, but I suspect that we're going to notch up our engagement. The problem for the Bush administration is that they've developed a close relationship with New Delhi and the Indians are very resistant to any idea of an American mediation in Kashmir, but I think they may well find language which allows us to play a useful role in helping two friends at least ameliorate a problem, if not solve it. The crucial language to watch here is whether the Bush administration or President Bush will say that Kashmir is a core issue or the core issue, Asia, a central issue versus the central issue. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had that difficulty in Pakistan and India. In Pakistan he said it was the core issue and in India he said was a core issue, and I'm not quite sure where American policy comes down on this point. It's something that certainly the press should follow up on to see how significantly we regard Kashmir and whether or not the United States is going to get involved, if not as a mediator, then perhaps as a facilitator.
In terms of what the Pakistanis want from the United States, from what I heard in Islamabad, and reading the Pakistani press, what they would like is a more stable relationship with Washington. What has frustrated them very much is that the U.S. has rushed to Pakistan time and time again in the past, only to turn away. They're very concerned that we've shifted towards India, that we've chosen India completely over Pakistan. They would like to have a modest but stable relationship with Washington, whether it involves military ties or not is another question, but they certainly would like to see America engaged politically with Pakistan, and over a whole variety of issues besides Kashmir. They'd like to see economic consistence; they'd like to see political ties. They don't want to be disrespected as a crazy Islamic state. The Pakistanis regard themselves as a modern Islamic state, as a state that has promised to be a beacon for the rest of the Islamic world, a secular Islamic state, one that has a liberal democracy functioning. I think Bush has praised Musharraf as a potential leader in these terms, and I think that's the appropriate thing to do. I don't think it's appropriate, my personal view, to single him out, he has the support of the military hierarchy and most educated Pakistanis would like to see Pakistan turn in that direction.
In terms of the present crisis in South Asia, Musharraf will certainly ask Bush to put pressure on the Indians to slow down their military buildup. You now have the largest military buildup in modern South Asian history, over a million Indian and Pakistani soldiers facing each other, and of course the two countries have nuclear weapons. American diplomacy has been active in this regard, trying to get them to draw down, but so far the Indians and the Pakistanis have been engaged in a contest of seeing who can insult the other the most. Each blames the other for various terrorist incidents that have occurred in their own country, and I think that the U.S. is going to be drawn into this conflict indirectly and perhaps more overtly as the months go by. Clearly our interests are to avert a conflict in South Asia, certainly to avert the use of nuclear weapons. How far we want to get engaged in Kashmir itself is another question. I don't think the administration is prepared to launch a major political and diplomatic initiative on Kashmir, but certainly they're prepared, I think, to offer their assistance as the best they can.
I think that about covers most of the issues. I'm sure you'll ask me about the Islamic extremists in the army itself. This is a question that I've gotten many times. It is true that maybe five or six years ago there was growth of Islamic sentiments in the military. Some of this grew out of Zia's policies, some of this came from the influence of the Iranian revolution, which had its echoes in Pakistan, but I think that recent army chiefs have cleaned this up. They've put radical officers in dead-end positions, and as I have contacts with the senior military in Pakistan, I did not see Islamic extremists. They're certainly devout Muslims, and they are officers who use Islamic groups and even terrorists for their own purposes, but I don't think that you could characterize the army itself as being moving in the direction of radical Islam.
Let me stop at this point and field questions from you as you may wish to ask them. Is our moderator there?
MODERATOR: Our first question is from the line of John Needham with Los Angeles Times. Please go ahead.
MR. NEEDHAM: Steve, what's your impression on continued infiltration from Pakistan across the line of control and aided by the army or ISI?
MR. COHEN: That's an easy one to answer, because the snows are so deep up there, there's no evidence at all of any movement, but there wouldn't be because of the weather. What I've heard from Pakistanis, is that Pakistan will continue to support what it regards as freedom fighters in every way it can, even though it denies doing this by military means. I suspect that this is in fact one of the few assets the Pakistanis have, so the Pakistani government is waiting to see whether there's going to be an Indian response in terms of steps taken by New Delhi with regard to Kashmir. If there is, I suspect that you will see reduction of support for infiltrators going across the border. If there isn't, then you'll see continued Pakistani pressure, of course denied by Islamabad, sending these people across the border.
The Indians themselves believe that they now have a better handle on infiltrators, but I think that the consensus in Islamabad is that Pakistan has made enough concessions now, and it's time for the Indians to begin to make a few statements and concessions to lower the tension in Kashmir.
MR. NEEDHAM: How about south or along the— area?
MR. COHEN: That I haven't heard of one way or the other. I haven't see any reports or talked to anybody with regard to —
MODERATOR: Our next question is from the line of Elaine Monihan with Reuters.
MS. MONAGHAN: Hi, Stephen, I have a very quick question. I just wanted to make sure that when you said the difference between the core issue and a core issue, you actually were referring to Kashmir, because you said Pakistan and I'm sure you?
MR. COHEN: I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
MS. MONAGHAN: Earlier on when you were talking about the subtleties of the equation of how the administration addresses Kashmir as a core issue or the core issue, you said Pakistan. I wanted to make sure you meant the issue was Kashmir.
MR. COHEN: If I did say that, then thanks for correcting me. That's right, Kashmir.
MS. MONAGHAN: One other thing, and I apologize if you talked about this on the very beginning, because I missed the first four minutes, but could you talk a little bit about how the Daniel Pearl case will fit into this ?—
MR. COHEN: MR. COHEN: No, I didn't talk about it. While I was Islamabad Pearl was kidnapped, and of course there was a lot of concern from the diplomatic and the journalist community in Islamabad. It's not clear why he was kidnapped and who took him, whether it was designed to embarrass Musharraf, whether it was simply an act of anger against Americans, or a combination. Now the latest news that I have is that they did pick up one of the leading suspects in this, the British Muslim, Omar Sheikh, and they will be interrogating him— as Pakistan police often interrogate people — and they may pick up some clues. But the Pakistani police reports are pretty optimistic about tracking Pearl down. Of course they would be optimistic.
Musharraf himself almost blamed Pearl for going out in what was apparently regarded by the Pakistanis as a risky operation. To be honest, I didn't hear anything in detail in Islamabad about the motives or the groups that might have picked him up. Certainly we're all looking forward to see what the results of the interrogation of Omar Sheikh is and other Pakistanis by the Pakistani police.
MODERATOR: Our next question is from Zahid Ghani with NNI.
MR. GHANI: How are you?
MR. COHEN: How are you?
MR. GHANI: — My question is again regarding Pearl, the American journalist who was kidnapped in Pakistan. How is — Pakistan's action taken in this regard the efforts of the Pakistani police? How do you think?
MR. COHEN: Well you know I have to be in Pakistan, have to have contact with the people involved to form judgment of that. What disturbs me is the accusations both in Pakistan and in India that somehow the other country was involved. I was astonished at the statement by the then Deputy Foreign Minister, Omar Faruque, who said that, "if we were going to kidnap an American journalist we would do it in our own country." Of course I think the Pakistani statements have been equally irresponsible in blaming India on the basis of no evidence whatsoever. In fact Musharraf himself said that the Indians were probably behind this. I think this is bad politics and bad police work, and I hope that the police themselves are more serious about tracking down Danny Pearl.
MR. GHANI: Right. I have a follow-up here. As you could see, the Pakistani police, if you compared it with the American police, American police is much advanced then the Pakistani police, but even then the Pakistan — more than 50 or 70 arrests, they search each and every place — and they have found so many suspects, even the — suspect — decided to extradite him — But if you see other things on the United States, a Pakistani citizen was murdered on September —
MR. COHEN: That's right, and nothing's been done.
MR. GHANI: It's five months, no arrest, not even a suspect.
MR. COHEN: I think that's an important point to make, especially for American—
MR. GHANI: And then the man who killed the Pakistani citizen, he was definitely not a noble, not a gentleman. He was a terrorist, and American terrorist. If the U.S. government cannot find a terrorist in their own country, then how do they claim to Osama in a foreign country like Afghanistan? Can't they do something in their own country? It's five months; the police have failed to make any arrest.
MR. COHEN: Let me say I certainly sympathize with you; I agree with your concern. No country's perfect, some countries are less perfect than others. I think in the case of the Pakistani who was murdered in the United States, clearly there's been a terrible miscarriage of justice and that should be an issue which is raised more publicly among us. In the case of Danny Pearl I think the Pakistani police appear to be moving as effectively as they can, and I don't think there's been any question on the American side that the Pakistani police have not been professional and active in tracking down Mr. Pearl.
MR. GHANI: So that's why it looks very shameful, I mean very bad on the part in why we put President Musharraf on the defensive court? Why should we defensive on clarifying his position on Pearl?
MR. COHEN: I personally don't put him on the defensive on this. I do think that some of his public statements were irresponsible. Blaming the Indians, for example, does not strike me as useful, unless there's evidence. If there's evidence then that's another thing, but my comment was simply that the politicians in both countries, including President Musharraf, really should keep their mouths shut in this and let the police get around to do their job.
MR. GHANI: I appreciate it. Thank you.
MODERATOR: There is a question from the line of Roy Gutman with Newsweek.
MR. GUTMAN: Steve, a question about the various demands that the Indians and Pakistanis have made to each other. The Indians did request or insist on the hand over of a number of suspects.
MR. COHEN: Twenty, right, the famous list of twenty.
MR. GUTMAN: Right, and I don't recall any account that anybody has been handed over. This is something, and they seem to be making this as the condition for relaxing the situation on the border. So is this a case where the president would want to urge Musharraf to hand over a few or to deal with this somehow?
MR. COHEN: Well the Pakistanis then came up with their own list, a list of Pakistanis being held by India, or people wanted in Pakistan held by India. The problem is several-fold. In some cases these are citizens of, in the case of Pakistan. The Pakistanis don't want to turn over one of their citizens to India, yet they haven't prosecuted them in Pakistan. The two countries haven't been very good at extraditing people to each other.
In another dimension of this it could be that some of the 20 and some of the people that the Indians are holding are actually intelligence agents, and no intelligence agency likes to see their people turned over to another country. To be honest, I don't know the details about the particular people involved. Some, in the case of the Indian demand were Sikhs who fled to Pakistan and who were supporting a separate Sikh state in India. I think the Pakistanis feel that they don't want to turn them over for fear that they won't be treated fairly in India. Of course the Indians view this completely differently. To me the whole issue was simply a demand raised by the Indians to justify the military buildup. It strikes me that the military buildup is putting pressure on Pakistan in a moment of Pakistani vulnerability, and also putting pressure on the United States to in turn put pressure on Islamabad, because the Indians have what they regard as a superior moral as well as military position. All of this, of course, stems from the attack December 10th on the Indian Parliament, which was a horrific act and the Indians have treated it very seriously and views that as a prime justification for the military buildup against Pakistan.
The Pakistani fear is that if they give in to the Indians on this demand then there'll be another demand, and another demand, and so forth. Pakistan, especially the military, are obsessed with the slippery slope argument, that once you start making concessions to India, India won't make counter-concessions, they'll simply demand more and more. So I think that in this kind of situation you do need the intercession of an outsider who'll say that enough is enough, or you make concessions yourself, or let's see if we can get the two of you to agree on some kind of format for this dialogue. They seem to be incapable of doing this between themselves. Here's where I think the U.S. can and should play some kind of useful diplomatic role.
MR. GUTMAN: And do you have a sense of what the administration is willing to do on this? Do they have their own list? Have they investigated the cases so that they're knowledgeable enough that they can propose a first step in order to?
MR. COHEN: To be honest, Ray, I don't have any information about that. I know that they're primarily focused on getting the two countries, (a) to support the war on terrorism, which means continuing support from Pakistan in terms of providing military facilities, which I didn't mention in my introductory remarks, which is very, very important to the United States, at least for the short run. And (b) to get the Indians and the Pakistanis, especially the Indians, to sort of draw down their forces and relax the tensions along the border. I don't think that they've got a game plan for step (c), that is what you do beyond where the two countries resume a normal relationship, other than to encourage them to resume a political dialogue, perhaps at the prime ministerial and presidential level. But right now that kind of dialogue I don't think would be very useful. The two countries are more interested in making faces at each other and name calling than anything else.
MODERATOR: The next question is from the line of Stuart Powell with Hirsch Newspapers.
MR. PAUL: Morning, Steve. Just a follow-up on the Pearl question. We've seen deep U.S. and Pakistani cooperation both in the Pearl case, along the border with Afghanistan, and presumably in conjunction with the military operations coming out of Pakistan. What do you think the long-term effect of that level of cooperation, which is kind of new and deeper than it has been, what do you think the long-term effect of that is on this emerging relationship?
MR. COHEN: I think the most important effect would be in terms of the attitudes of each side towards the other. We had grown to a point where we regard that the Pakistani military as a bunch of Islamic zealots, extremists and not trustworthy. I think if the Pakistanis are behaving professionally, and I think in this case they probably are, I think our views towards Pakistan will change somewhat.
In the case of Pakistan there's widespread anti-Americanism throughout the entire military establishment, similarly among politicians and the press. They see us as having abandoned Pakistan time and time again. We've assisted this process by cutting off military training, for about eight or nine years now. So I think that the most important impact will be in terms of attitude change. If this is followed up by some kind of institutional structure relationship, they have in fact signed an agreement to resume defense talks and perhaps to increase military training of Pakistanis and America. I think there's also an agreement just signed for joint military training and exercises between the two militaries. I think that's important dimension and it doesn't compromise our relationship with India. And of course the Indians shouldn't see it as a zero-sum game, as they often do, and as do the Pakistanis. I think it's possible for the United States to have a much better relationship with Islamabad than retain the growing ties we have with India. It will require very careful diplomacy, but the military diplomacy is one aspect of this, to develop close ties, especially to the armed forces of Pakistan, which are still very politically powerful in that country.
MR. PAUL: Thank you.
MODERATOR: There is a question from the line of John Needham with the Los Angeles Times.
MR. NEEDHAM: Steve, the military facilities, did you get any indication from the Pakistanis how long they think the United States might want them for? Is there going to be another chance for permanence?
MR. COHEN: I think we've signed an open-ended agreement, I'm not sure how long the duration is. In a sense these facilities are transient and resupply facilities. The Americans and the Pakistanis have said this is not a base. There won't be any permanent American forces in Pakistan. However they will be such that American forces, especially aircraft and ground forces, can come in and out very quickly.
I'm not quite sure what the purpose of this is. Clearly the war in Afghanistan is winding down. A long-term physical presence in Pakistan could create political problems and resentment in Pakistan, and I think it's going to be interpreted as a base rather than a transient facility. Sometimes these things become rhetorical covers for what is a more substantial relationship than you would otherwise have. I think this is worth very close examination, the degree of whether these facilities are simply temporary and whether they're going to be used to facilitate American force movements elsewhere, or whether they are going to evolve into some kind of base facility. That, I think, right now would be a serious mistake. As I said earlier, the anti-Americanism in Pakistan is very, very strong, and Musharraf himself probably does not want to be too closely associated with the United States, should say, perhaps, an aircraft using one of these bases attack a country or a country which has close relations with Pakistan. I'd say that would be particularly the case of Iran. The new U.S./Pakistan relationship is straining Pakistan's relationship with Tehran and the Iranians, especially after the "Axis of Evil" speech, are especially infuriated with the United States. I think that the Pakistanis don't want to be in the line of sight of Iranian anger for the sake of simply a few facilities that they've provided the Americans. But clearly their support was vital for the war in Afghanistan, but as that winds down the question of the purpose of these facilities in Pakistan, I think there's going to be two or three of them, are unclear.
One facility is very important, and certainly I think is politically defensible, that is Pakistan has given a big chunk of Karachi Airport to the International Security Force that's going to be operating in Afghanistan. That, I think, is in Pakistan's interest, as well as America's interest. I think that's an agreement with the U.N.
MR. NEEDHAM: Okay.
MODERATOR: There is a question from the line of Roy Gutman with Newsweek.
MR. GUTMAN: Steve, I noticed that you mentioned, of course, that Pakistani treasury is really depleted and their economy is down, but I read a few weeks ago during the Tokyo pledging conference that they had promised something like $100 million to help rebuild Afghanistan. I'm curious where the money comes from and how is it going to be—
MR. COHEN: Well they've actually built up foreign exchange reserves now. I think it's up to $6 billion. It had been down to one billion, which was bottoming out. I think they've got $6 billion now, which is not great, but Shaukat Aziz is sort of inching along. His problem is that the generals don't understand economics, and so he's had to do this pretty much on his own. But I think that this is the least they could do in terms of the damage they had done to Afghanistan over the years by the support of Taliban. For a country like Pakistan, $100 million is not that great an expense. What the Pakistanis are worried about is the cost of supporting the American facilities may or may not be repaid. I think that's something I haven't found out about, but I heard from one source that Pakistanis were not getting compensation by us for the use of their air bases. I think that's something to check into.
In the long run I think what they should be asking for and we should be providing is significant assistance in terms of economic and social reconstruction for Pakistan, especially the bureaucracies. They have no income tax collection system, but they've got to themselves tighten their belts and begin taxing agriculture, which goes untaxed in Pakistan. There are a lot of things that could be repaired quickly. It's a question whether Musharraf has the political will and the political courage to make these kinds of changes, which would make him unpopular in Pakistan for awhile, especially among the landed aristocracy, but which I think are essential to get Pakistan moving as a modern country.
MR. GUTMAN: Well your point about the generals not understanding economics, that's not the only place that happens. So is there something that the administration is planning to do to assist them or might do to assist them so that economic reform can develop?
MR. COHEN: I've been in Pakistan and I came back to Washington and then zipped off to Chicago, where I'm at right now. So I don't know if they have any special plans on the economic side. I do know that even before all this happened Congressman Major Owen, was very interested in assisting Pakistan's basic education. These were not sanctioned. These got in under the sanction, so even before all of this started we were providing modest support for Pakistan basic and elementary education. I think the administration probably has plans for more expansive educational assistance program to Pakistan, but I haven't heard the details of this, to be honest.
MODERATOR: There is a question from the line of Stuart Powell with Hirsch Newspapers.
MR. POWELL: Steve, I just wanted to ask you, is there one or two things that we should look for in the Bush/Musharraf talks, where we could say that Bush has rejected or spurned some request that Musharraf felt was important?
MR. COHEN: Well I think clearly at the top of the list, two would be important. One would be military and I'm not quite sure whether the Pakistanis will ask for significant amounts of military hardware; they may be content with expanded military training and joint military exercises, which is what they are getting. So if they do ask for hardware, above and beyond that I don't know what the Bush administration response would be. I suspect it might be to defer that and wait and see how the elections turn out, and perhaps make that kind of modest sale to a nominally civilian government in Pakistan after October.
The second big issue would be Kashmir. I think we have to watch very carefully the language that the Bush administration uses when it describes Kashmir, whether it's a core problem or the core problem. It's important for the Pakistanis and equally important for the Indians. So I think Colin Powell and the state department are going to have to come up with some language which at least mollifies the Pakistanis, shows that we're still interested in Kashmir, without frightening off the Indians, who are very concerned about an overt American role in Kashmir.
Privately many Indians are perfectly willing to see America engaged in Kashmir. In fact during the Kargil conflict of 1999, they urged the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. So they publicly and privately said that they would like us to put pressure on Pakistan on Kashmir. This means necessarily that we're going to have to put pressure on them to do certain things in Kashmir. So I think we've actually put ourselves in the middle between these two countries. Furthermore, there are a lot of developments occurring in Kashmir, political developments that are happening very quickly. I don't want to go into them here, but it could be an opportunity for the United States to play a slightly more active role there. So I think military hardware, military equipment, and Kashmir, with textiles as a close third. The Pakistanis have asked for lower tariffs. I believe Musharraf is meeting with some of the American textile firms. I don't know whether Bush has the political power to push this through Congress. It's a difficult problem. There's a huge textile lobby here protecting the American garment and textile industry, so I think the Pakistanis may wind up being disappointed on that count.
MR. POWELL: Thanks a lot.
MODERATOR: There are no additional lines queued up with questions at this time, Doctor. Please continue.
MR. COHEN: Any other questions I can respond to, or repeat questions? Okay, I guess we've run out of time or we've run out of questioners. Let me thank you for calling in. I hope this has been useful. It's my first experience with a telephone press conference, and if it worked out well then perhaps we'll try it again. I think that this concludes our dialogue.
MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, this conference will be available for replay after 2:30 p.m. today until February 15th at midnight. You may access the replay service by dialing 1-800-475-6701 and entering the access code 627392.
That does conclude your teleconference for today. Thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.