Transcript
MR. JAMES B. STEINBERG: Good morning and welcome to Brookings for those of you here and those of you in the television audience. This is the latest in our running series of briefings on events related to the war on terrorism.
Today we're going to play Washington's favorite power game of the week which is "What's Next?" and look at the options both in Afghanistan and more broadly.
We'll begin today with Steve Cohen who's a Senior Fellow here at Brookings to talk about the future plans and choices for Afghanistan and also in a broader South Asian region, particularly in light of the current tensions between India and Pakistan following the terrorist attacks last week.
Then we'll turn to Martin Indyk who will look at both the rather volatile situation in the Middle East and the choices on the counter-terrorism war there. Martin's a Senior Fellow here at Brookings.
Then finally Senior Fellow Ivo Daalder who will look at some of the broader questions about overall U.S. strategy and particularly the choices that the United States faces in terms of taking on the challenge of counter-terrorism by itself or continuing to try to build coalitions.
So without further ado let me turn it to Steve Cohen.
MR. STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN: Thank you, Jim.
We've left some handouts outside which cover some of my past statements about the situation and also some work I'm doing now, particularly on building a new Afghanistan army.
I think the Administration really set itself three large goals in South Asia. One was to rid Afghanistan of its terrorist guests, although parenthetically President Bush has also personified this in a search for Osama bin Laden, and also to rebuild Afghanistan into a more normal state.
Second, I think there was great concern that what had happened in Afghanistan could happen in Pakistan, and Pakistan was headed down an Islamic extremist road. There's been some attention devoted to dealing with that aspect of the problem. Part of this has been assisted by the fact that we are now once again an ally of Afghanistan, though we don't know how long that will last. There are American forces based in Pakistan, and I'm not quite sure what the duration is, let alone the roles and missions of those forces.
Thirdly, I think an objective of this Administration as stated by President Bush in one of his first major television addresses, was to deal with the Kashmir problem, really to deal with the larger India/Pakistan problem.
In terms of the first goal, I think today both the fighters and also the U.S. spokesmen have said in effect that al Qaeda is not a significant military force. I think we can count on Afghanistan being terror-free for some time, but presumably a major reconstruction effort will be devoted to Afghanistan to ensure that it doesn't once again become a base for Islamic or other forms of extremists operating there.
As to locating Osama bin Laden, apparently there was never any hard evidence that he was in the Tora Bora region. I've been on the Pakistan side of that area. Clearly this is a place where you can hide out indefinitely.
In fact one of the interesting sight-seeing tours that you'll see when the Khyber Pass is opened up again for tourism is that the British built all kinds of fortifications back in the 1920s, even the turn of the century, to guard against a Russian, then German invasion. So there are a lot of places to hide, a lot of caves, a lot of fortifications in the Khyber area. It will take a long time to go and hunt each of them down.
My guess is two things. That Osama may well have skipped town. He may have gone to Pakistan earlier, conceivably to Karachi and then out of South Asia some place else, or he may have flown directly using some of the aircraft that he had in his command much earlier in the war, leaving Afghanistan. I don't have any idea, I don't have any guess, but I think the Administration thought they had him cornered which is why they released the tape, to demonstrate that he was really a bad guy.
In terms of Pakistan— Also, there's a paper out that I've just written on building a new Afghan army. I think that will be one of the urgent priorities for the UN and for any other interested country is to build a military establishment in Afghanistan that at least reduces the level of warlordism that has prevailed there.
Secondly, in terms of our goals with Pakistan, I think we're headed down the right path. Pakistan seems to have made a major turn in its domestic policies away from extremism, but still I have some doubts about the nature of the U.S. program in Pakistan. We're apparently giving Pakistan a lot of economic assistance, but it's unclear to me as to how much that is, whether it's one year or multi-year, and whether in fact it's going to be spent wisely in terms of rebuilding and reconstructing the basic civilian institutions that Pakistan, that have deteriorated in Pakistan over the years. I think there are some important questions as to what the substance of this American relationship with Pakistan will be.
Thirdly, and really more acute in terms of the immediate future, there is once again, we're back here again, a significant heightened tightening of India/Pakistan tension. There are a lot of causes for this but basically you have two countries which cannot live with each other, they certainly can't live without each other. Each regards the other as their major enemy. The series of terrorist attacks in Kashmir, now a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament have been attributed directly to Pakistan and to Pakistan government agencies including the ISI. The Pakistanis of course deny this.
We're coming into the season of fighting. The weather in South Asia is turning very nicely for large-scale military activities and with the uncertainty over the amount of nuclear weapons they have, the location, whether they've been made into warheads or not. Also uncertainty about the command and control systems in each country. I think we're headed towards still another major regional crisis. Again I expect the United States to be drawn into this in the form of crisis management. Whether we'll be successful or not, I don't know, but clearly it's time for the American Administration to think through its larger South Asia policy in terms of India/Pakistan relations.
Until recently we've basically only intervened when there's been a crisis. I think the Administration is contemplating getting involved in a South Asia peace process as a more sustained, deeper engagement with India and with Pakistan to help deal with the Kashmir problem. Not to resolve it, but at least to manage it.
But it may be too late for