The India-Pakistan Summit

Transcript

MR. STEPHEN COHEN: Good morning. I'm Stephen Cohen. I am a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings. I would like to welcome you this morning to a pre-brief or a brief press briefing on the forthcoming summit between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. They'll be meeting from July 14th to July 16th in what could be an historic summit between the leaders of these two pivotal states. Various Indians and Pakistanis are predicting great things for this event. Others are predicting disasters. The newspapers from South Asia have covered the whole spectrum of hope, despair, optimism, pessimism, cynicism, you name it, and you can find it. It's—we thought that it would be worthwhile having an American perspective on these developments. And this is the first of what we hope will be several joint presentations by experts drawn from—some of the experts drawn from various Washington-based think tanks dealing with South Asia.

We are only going to be covering the summit, and I would like to remind you that there is a significant development going on in Bangladesh, an election forthcoming, and also some events in Sri Lanka which are quite newsworthy. But if we have time for those events you might want to ask some questions. But we want to focus on the summit.

Will the summit lead to new agreements between the two states? Will they be able to tackle the Kashmir issue and the problems of nuclear instability? What should the United States do to ensure that the India-Pakistan dialogue moves forward?

To answer some of these questions or answer these questions, we have myself, also Ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic International Studies, and Ambassador Dennis Kux, senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. Ambassador Schaffer will discuss the motives behind the Indian invitation and Indian expectations of the summit. Ambassador Kux, who is the author of a recently published book on U.S.-Pakistan relations—there's some material outside—will explore the options open to Pakistan stagnate in Pakistan now under military rules, and several levels of American sanctions. And I'll discuss briefly the nuclear and other issues that might be discussed in the summit. Let's begin with Ambassador Schaffer. We'll allow plenty of time for comments and questions and discussion.

MS. TERESITA SCHAFFER: Thank you, Steve, and it's good to see so many friends in the audience. Let me start with some propaganda. By the time you leave here there will be copies of some of our recent papers outside, and I would encourage you to take home one of each, and enjoy them, because we've done briefings on a variety of different subjects connected with the subcontinent.

I would like to kick the discussion off with basically three subjects. First, what's in it for India. Second, what appears to be the Indian strategy. And, third, what is likely to happen—that's a dangerous one, because I'm in danger of being proved wrong in a very short time, so you will all remember, but I am going to try anyway.

What's in it for India? In the short term, and the subject of much speculation, the prospect of reengaging with Pakistan and looking internationally. In the long term, and much more importantly the prospect of getting out of what I would call the "Pakistan trap," the fact that the unresolved problems between India and Pakistan are a serious impediment to India's ability to accomplish what it would like to in the world. And I think that is the goal that I very much hope that the government of India will keep in mind.

Second, what appears to be India's strategy? Answering this is made much more difficult by the fact that there are sharply divergent views within the government of India, not to speak of within India as a whole. Insofar as one can parse this out, Prime Minister Vajpayee's approach seems to include several elements. Number one, keep some part of the peace process moving, if need be by unilateral moves. There was the cease-fire in November. When that petered out, there was the nomination of Mr. K.C. Pant as the contact point with the various Kashmiri groups. When that didn't appear to be catching anyone's imagination, there as the invitation to General Musharraf. And now in the past few days, there was an interesting move, the announcement by India that it will issue visas to Pakistanis along the line of control. Again, a change in the pattern—not an earth-shattering move, but it keeps the sense that things can change. And I think this is important.

The second element in what I take to be Vajpayee's approach is to entice the Kashmiris—and I am talking here about the Kashmiris from the valley of Kashmir—into the Indian political process. This is tough, because it brings up very quickly the issue of the Indian Constitution, the pledge normally required of political candidates that they stay within the four corners of the Indian Constitution as it now stands—this is taken in Kashmir as code for accepting permanent association with India—something that no Kashmiri politicians, at least none of those not currently involved in mainstream politics in India, is willing to sign onto, at least not at the start of a process.

The third ingredient, at least third implicit ingredient in Mr. Vajpayee's strategy is to make both the Kashmiris and Pakistan a little bit nervous that the process might proceed without them. The cease-fire had that effect on Pakistan, although at least at the start the Pakistan government rose to the occasion and didn't fall into that trap. The invitation to General Musharraf I think ma have had something of the same effect on the Kashmiris. If you believe, as I do, that ultimately a process needs to involve India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, this may not be such a bad thing.

The fourth element in India's concept is to stay in the driver's seat, and hence the attraction of unilateral moves, the most recent of which being the visa issue that I discussed a minute ago.

But these are really tactics on not strategies. They can be effective. They can change the game so to speak, and it's a game that badly needs changing. But they are going to only really be effective if two other conditions obtain. One is that the individual moves are followed up. And this is where the cease-fire move lost air quickly when the relationship between India and the Kashmiris and Pakistan got bogged down in the question of whether the Kashmiri political leaders would be allowed to go to Pakistan. I very much hope that the same lack of follow-up will not undermine the very good initiative that is now unfolding with the talks between Vajpayee and Musharraf.

The second thing that has to happen though is that tactics need to be wedded to a serious strategy, one that I hope would involve a vision of really settling the dispute between India and Pakistan, and really arriving at a stable state of affairs in Kashmir. That is going to have to involve a willingness to make strategic compromise—although typically the strategic compromises aren't what you lead off with. And I hope that some—a strategy of that sort is taking root in the government of India. I can't say that I saw an awful lot of evidence of that the last time I was in India a few months ago, but these things do change.

A final thought: What will happen? Well, I expect neither a dramatic breakthrough or a disaster. The best outcome would be the beginning of a process, an agreement by both leaders that they will put their political backing behind a process that may take quite a long time but that would eventually permit both of them to build the necessary political consensus to arrive at a real settlement. Thank you.

MR. DENNIS KUX: Well, good morning. Here we are—or should I say salam aleikum, since we're talking about Pakistan—once more, another summit. I haven't counted them up, but if you go back through the years you can tick them off—Nehru 1953, Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra 1960; Nehru and Ayub. Then you go—you jump forward and you have Simla. You have in more recent years, you have Rajiv Gandhi meeting with Benazir Bhutto in 1988 or 1989. And then more recently you have Gujral and Nawaz Sharif, and then you have Lahore. And in all of these, you do seem to have a pattern that there is a certain amount of hoopla in the build-up—rather in fact the pattern is rather I think like the U.S.-Soviet summits during much of the Cold War—there are some agreements, and then things peter out. One side or the other finds reasons not to follow through. And that certainly was the pattern of the last couple of summits. Let's hope it's different this time.

But let's look at it from the Pakistan standpoint, which is my task in this briefing. It seems to me the summit is a big plus personally for General and President Musharraf. For a couple of years after Kargil he was India's bad boy. India wouldn't talk with him. He was the evil genius behind Kargil, the man who sabotaged Lahore, the usurper of democracy in Pakistan and so forth. And just a few weeks ago India switches and says, We are ready to talk to him. In fact, it switched so surprisingly that he was, in the cricket term, caught—I think I have the cricket term right—"caught on the back foot"—if that's right—because he had been saying, I'm ready to talk to India anytime, anywhere, anyplace—tomorrow, the day after, midnight, et cetera. And it took the Pakistanis a little—they had to catch their breath before deciding to accept.

The second point, again on the personal line, was if you recall when Musharraf took over or appointed himself president and moved Mr. Tarar rather unceremoniously out, around the world there was condemnation—Europe, in this city. One place there was not condemnation was India. The Indians were very quick to say, Good morning, Mr. President. And I think in the South Asian context this would be seen as a plus by Musharraf, acceptance by India, and no longer questioning—in a sense no longer questioning his legitimacy.

But in policy terms also Pakistanis might well say—and I think a number of them do—Our approach has worked. I don't think many Pakistanis, thinking Pakistanis, felt that the jihad in Kashmir would get them Kashmir. But what Pakistan has sought historically all along is to get India to the bargaining table. I mean, this is what the motive was in Operation Gibraltar in 1965 and on other occasions. And they could well say that the struggle has paid off, the hard line that they have adopted on Kashmir has worked, and India is now ready to negotiate—at the negotiating table.

Now that they are at the summit, it seems to me the Pakistanis have sort of two approaches to the negotiations. One is the one which, if you read the official statements, they are likely to follow, and that is the traditional approach. There is only one issue that divides India and Pakistan, and that's Kashmir. This is the core issue. Unless this is solved, there is no point in talking about trade, there is no point in talking about A, B, C, D, E, F, G.

Again, as I said, if you look at the official statements, that would appear to be the approach they intend to follow. And certainly the makeup of the delegation, which is a small delegation and includes only Abdus Sattar, the foreign minister, among the ministers, and rather—and omits one you would have thought if you were going into a broader discussion, the minister of commerce, the minister of trade. And indeed the economic statement which came out yesterday or the day before does not talk about any broadening trade with India.

Now, I don't know whether that's just a tactic or whether it's what is actually going to happen. If it is what is actually going to happen, then I suspect the summit will fail. I would hope that the Pakistanis will show more flexibility. They have in the recent past in the last two summits, where there was agreement essentially to tackle Kashmir, yes, but other issues also.

And the Indians have pointed up another issue which is of great concern, not only in South Asia, but everywhere, and that's the nuclear issue. And Mr. Vajpayee has suggested that they should be doing things in this area as well to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. But of course there's a whole host of other issues. And indeed they have only to go back to the agreements that were reached between Nawaz Sharif and Inder Gujral, and then between Nawaz and Vajpayee to find a way to move ahead.

And I guess the final point, What will happen? While if you follow what is the entering position of the Pakistanis, the summit will fail. I do believe that in Pakistan, as in India, there is a yearning for doing something. And I think personally this is Musharraf's own desire. He is I think hemmed in by the hard liners who prefer to do nothing rather than to give way on making Kashmir—or give way on Kashmir as the only issue. So we will have to see what happens. If I had to predict, I would predict that a process, as Tazie (ph) had said, that the two sides will agree on a process, probably not exactly the same as the one that was laid out in the last two summits, but probably something similar to that. That would be I would think the minimum, and I expect that will happen.

I think a better outcome would be if they not only agree on the process but direct their people, their negotiators, whether it's the foreign minister or the military people, to get moving in a couple of areas. The one is in Siachen, where an agreement was reached and India didn't sign on the dotted line about a decade ago. And the other of course—another is on the nuclear issue. And a third is one which is not likely to come out in public, would be some internal arrangements to lower the temperature on Kashmir. That of course I think would be—that would be the hardest one, but I would hope something like that would happen.

So I am reasonably optimistic that this summit, like other summits, will be a, quote, "success." But whether it's a real success or not will depend on what happens afterwards, if it loses steam, if one side or the other quickly finds reasons to drop off, then we will just have a repeat of previous cycles. And I hope for the people of India and Pakistan that that doesn't happen.

MR. COHEN: I'll say a few words on the perspective of the United States, and then turn to the nuclear issue.

What is in the summit for the United States? I think that this new administration here is still groping for a policy. Apparently the State Department is undertaking policy review now, and hopefully it will be done by the end of the administration's term, three or four years from now.

In the meantime, it's been quite interesting to observe that you get different strokes from different folks. The secretary of State said one thing in terms of American policy. The new assistant secretary of State, Christina Rocca, in a sense echoed that. There's been a remarkable statement by Deputy Secretary Armitage, especially with regard to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which I hope it doesn't reflect American policy, but it may well, I am not quite sure. I am sure we will get clarifications in the next few weeks. So the administration is still groping.

But I think that is one reason in fact why this summit is taking place right now. It is my guess that the Indians wanted to preempt a more active American role in South Asia. I made this argument in an India Today piece that will be forthcoming shortly. I think New Delhi wants to keep control of the process. It wants to be the region's leader. And it can't do that by allowing the United States to come in and in a sense force or persuade the two regional powers to talk to each other. I think it was in part a preemptive move on the part of New Delhi. There are other good reasons for this dialogue, but I think the Indians want us to be seen to be cooperative in taking the leadership, and I think Pakistan wanted to be seen as eager to go and negotiate and discuss a whole variety of issues. So my judgment is that the summit will be a success in that both sides want to create the appearance of a successful summit. Whether they get down to specifics and whether important issues are addressed or not is in a sense beside the point. As long as they create the appearance of a successful summit and they agree to further talks and establish a mechanism by which some of these crucial issues can be explored, it will be a genuine, genuine success.

From an American perspective, I think India-Pakistan, this summit, is a win-win situation. We are very much concerned—I think the U.S. should be very much concerned about the stability of Pakistan. It is not a failing state, but it is certainly a state that undergoing considerable political, economic and social turmoil in the past six or eight years.

India is a rising power. There is a possibility of strategic cooperation or strategic understanding with India. Some in Washington would argue for a grand alliance with India against China. I think that's certainly premature and probably counterproductive. But clearly India is a significantly growing power in a variety of ways, not simply military.

And finally, it is in America's interests to reduce the risk of war in South Asia between India and Pakistan, and to get them in the tent in the whole issue of proliferation. They have proliferated, but clearly they are capable of proliferating or assisting other countries in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. And I think it's an important American interest to work with both states on that point.

Turning to the nuclear question, I would just make four points. I think that after the 1998 tests, there has been a learning process underway in South Asia, in India and Pakistan, about what it means to be a nuclear weapon state. In a sense both countries have woken up to a morning-after syndrome: They've done it; now they have got to find out what the consequences of having done it are. There was an initial period of euphoria, of great expectation on the Pakistani side, the assumption that having nuclear weapons would ensure Pakistani security. And on the Indian side also a similar belief that a nuclear South Asia would not have another war. Well, the Kargil war certainly changed that perception, and I think sobered up New Delhi in terms of the more euphoric view about nuclear weapons.

So I think that there has been a learning experience for the past three or four years, since 1998, in South Asia. And this is going to continue indefinitely as the two states learn how to be nuclear weapon states, even though other countries won't call them nuclear weapon states. I mean, if they are called states with nuclear weapons, because "nuclear weapon state" I guess is a particular term that applies to the NPT, those states that had nuclear weapons when the NPT was signed. But clearly India and Pakistan are states with nuclear weapons, even if we can't call them nuclear weapon states.

There is also a unique nuclear triangle. It's not simply India and Pakistan, but it's India, Pakistan and China. China was a significant contributor in various ways to the Pakistani nuclear program, and certainly provided other military technology to Pakistan. And India and China—or India in particular—sees itself as a rival with China. The world has not yet seen a nuclear triangle of this sort, and clearly it may be an insoluble problem, how a stable relationship, deterrence relationship, is brought into existence between three states of disparate size and ambition, and technical capability. I think that's something that is going to be a problem that will be with us indefinitely for the future.

I think that it's likely that there will be agreements on CBMs, confidence-building measures, at this summit. In fact, it's more likely that they will simply agree to implement some of the CBMs that have been agreed to in the past. And I think my perspective is if they only implement half of what they have agreed to do in the past it will be a great success. There have been so many agreements between the two countries, and these have been routinely broken or violated just when they are most needed, that implementing these, carrying them out, providing a mechanism by which they can be verified, would be a major accomplishment. In this area the United States may be able to play some role. There's a lot of American interests in providing technology assistance to India and Pakistan, or other countries for that matter, in verifying that agreements that they have reached are being carried out. This would include various kinds of nuclear risk reduction measures, and other kinds of agreements between India and Pakistan.

Finally, I think that these kinds of agreements, and even a successful summit which incorporated some nuclear relevant discussion, some nuclear relevant agreement, should be—I don't know if it will be—but should be the pretext for the United States lifting its nuclear sanctions on India and Pakistan. The sanctions in my view have long outlived their usefulness. They were meant to deter. They didn't deter. But I think that the U.S. should get something in return for lifting them, and clearly agreements in the area of confidence-building measures, nuclear risk reduction, and so forth, would be an appropriate face-saving device, not for India and Pakistan, but for the United States, to declare that the region is now relatively secure in terms of loose nukes and proliferation.

So I think that India and Pakistan really can do well by doing good. They will benefit from these steps. The United States will benefit from such steps. And I won't predict that they will take place, because it is after all an India-Pakistan summit, and expectations are high, but often not reached.

Let's now give you a chance to ask questions and comments, and we have a microphone there, and if you can please address your question—first of all, please identify yourself, and then address your question to one or the other panelist. Thank you.

QUESTION: I'm Rok Goval from Asia Today at India Globe. One, you may have seen the story, front page story in India Globe that was a question at the State Department: Can India trust General Musharraf, one? Two, you have said in your statement here that U.S. was surprised—it got by surprise to the U.S. officials that India invited General Musharraf, but General Musharraf said that it was the U.S. who pressured India to invite him for the summit. So who's right, who's wrong? And also, is it too much have been written about him or on him? Are we expecting too much from this? Because I have been interviewing Indians and Pakistanis; they're all saying that this has been going for the last 50 years, one after another summit and one after another military governance in Pakistan. So can we trust this man who was behind Kargil? He was a soldier; now, today he declare himself president.

MS. SCHAFFER: Steve argued that one of the motivations in this invitation may have been to preempt an active U.S. policy in South Asia. I don't know whether that's the case. Certainly, it would have been no secret to the government of India that the U.S. was hoping that an India-Pakistan dialogue would resume. I would argue, however, that if the fear of an active U.S. diplomacy in South Asia encourages India and Pakistan to do business bilaterally, from the U.S. point of view this is just fine. The U.S. is not looking for a job; it's hoping for results, and it recognizes that the heavy work really needs to be done by the parties to the dispute, which don't include the United States.

MR. KUX: Trust Musharraf? Yes. Why? Well, last night on television, his mother said so. (Laughter.) But beyond that—

MS. SCHAFFER: You should trust my son, too. (Laughter.)

MR. KUX: But beyond that, everything one knows about the gentleman is that he seems to be a straight-shooter; if anything, he sometimes shoots too quickly. But quite beyond that, and I think quiet sincere and perhaps now that he is in power, realizing the perilous state that his country is in and the need for it to redirect its energies from obsession with India to dealing with its own internal problems. More broadly, I think that your question was answered by what I've been reading in the Indian press, that if you want to make a deal with Pakistan that is going to last, make it with the people who really hold the power, whether you like it or not, and that is the army. And the army—when you make a deal with somebody else as they did in a sense with Nawaz at Lahore, and the army wasn't on board, it all came apart. So if you want to have an agreement, people that I've read in India make the argument that these are the people to make it with.

Similarly you can turn it around the other side, but you're better off, from a Pakistani perspective, in dealing with the BJP, which is more nationalist, a harder line than with the Congress because they are more—their flank is covered. And so I think that the answer to your question is, yes. It's not a question of trust, in that sense; really it's a question of what sort of a negotiation, what is the position he takes.

MS. SCHAFFER: Can I make a comment on the concept of trust? You don't start a peace process with trust. I can think of no case where a serious peace process was needed and the parties began by trusting each other. The purpose of the process is to create trust, not in the sense of the two parties liking each other—that's irrelevant—but in the sense of the two parties understanding enough about one another's political compulsions and motivations that they feel they can do business

MR. COHEN: A number of years ago I translated "Trust but Verify" into both Urdu, and Hindi, Arabic and Sanskrit—we had a little translation party. And I think that any agreement that the two countries reach, say with the regard to troop withdrawal, presence in Kashmir, has to be verified, has to be verifiable. Whether the U.S. is involved in this or not, it has to be credible verification that is acceptable to both sides.

As for Musharraf's statement that the U.S. was involved—and this is widely reported in Pakistan—I don't think there was—I don't know of any American effort to encourage a summit except that the U.S. has continuously been encouraging the two countries to dialogue. But if it makes it easier for Pakistan to argue that their former ally, the United States, is now in favor of such an event and has pressured the Indians into such an event, then I think that's okay. The Indians will deny it, but whether it's true or not is immaterial. If it made it easier to Musharraf to go to Delhi because he could say the Americans were urging a summit and the Americans put pressure on them, fine.

Let's see, this gentlemen up here.

QUESTION: I think—

MR. COHEN: Could you identify yourself?

QUESTION: I'm Verain Fracosh (ph), retired civil servant. I've served as advisor to governors in Jammu and Kashmir and in other areas of India marred by militancy. What I think we should address is also the question, what is in it for the Pakistani elite, dominated by the army, and for the Indian politics, which is presently in the hands of the BJP? I would say that it might be simplistic to think that the BJP's flanks are covered because they are deemed to be a nationalistic party. Remember that they are going to soon have elections in Upi (ph), which is the heartland, and where they will be made or unmade. And it is quite possible that the BJP is the party that is most anxious—actually Mr. Vajpayee and BJP are not the same. That is the point one has to remember. So I would say that BJP is presently very threatened, because if any concessions are made, then they will be at the receiving end, and they might have it tough going in Upi, number one. Number two—

MR. COHEN: Please be brief.

QUESTION: Ah, yeah. What is the next for the Pakistan army, because this dispute has been their mainstay. So I think on both the sides, the elites who are involved in the process cannot go very far. So my question is, do you still think that beyond appearance of success, anything can be gained?

MS. SCHAFFER: I would say yes, and for the same reason I said in my presentation: that a real success would be the beginning of a longer term and longer lasting process. And in this respect, I think I agree with Dennis Kux, but just to hit the nail on the head, if that process is simply left to the foreign secretaries or whoever, no matter how honorable and brilliant both foreign secretaries are, nothing will happen. Either of us could write the memorandum of that meeting before it ever took place, and spare them the need to meet. What they need to have is the prime minister or the president breathing down their necks and making clear that results are expected, not immediately, but over time.

MR. COHEN: Lawrence Prabhakar, the gentleman in the back.

QUESTION: Lawrence Prabhakar from the Henry Stimson Center. What would be the level of U.S. technical assistance to India and Pakistan if nuclear risk-reduction measures are achieved in this summit?

MR. COHEN: I think that question can't be reached until there is an agreement, and the Indians and Pakistani's decide what level of outside engagement would be acceptable to them, and then they might come to?at that point, they might come to the United States and say?or other countries, for example?and say, We have this need, this requirement; can you assist us with it? It could well take the form not of an American program, but of sort of an international or multi-national program. The U.S. and the Soviet Union?pardon me, the U.S. and Russia have developed a joint risk-reduction center in Moscow, and something like that could be extended to cover parts of South Asia, say early warning or verification of tests or actually detonation. So I think it's too early to answer that question, but I know that a lot of people in America have been thinking about what technology would be available and be useful for the two states. There's an asymmetry because Indians have a little bit better satellite technology than the Pakistanis do.

Deepa Ollapally.

QUESTION: A comment on Steve's description—

MR. COHEN: You're Deepa Ollapally of U.S. Institute of Peace.

QUESTION: Thank you, Steve. Just a comment on, Steve, your description of India's motive in inviting the general as preemptive. I think the U.S. certainly played a role, but I would describe it rather differently. That is that it seems to me that the improving and the tremendously improved relations between India and the U.S. has made, in many ways, it possible for Vajpayee to invite Musharraf, knowing in some sense that the kinds of hard issues that are going to come up, India's not going to feel the same kind of heat from the U.S. as it has in the past, including Kashmir for example, that there are certain limits and whatever that if that issue comes up, that India can be more confident this time around rather than any of the last 50 years, that it has a little bit more breathing space. So I would describe it completely differently from I guess the way you've described the U.S. role.

MR. COHEN: No, I don't think there's any disagreement. It was the closer U.S.-India relationship that has given India, I think, the strategic freedom to do something like this. My major concern now is that the U.S.-Pakistan side of the equation is deteriorating very badly, and the Pakistanis won't want to be left—the Pakistanis will want to have outside powers which support them, not wholeheartedly, but which do provide support. Right now they have China and to some degree the Saudis, and I think they would like a closer tie with the U.S. And I don't think this is—this would be objectionable to India now. I think India's confident enough of its relationship with the U.S., what each can gain from the relationship, that they do not mind a more normal U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

This gentleman here.

QUESTION: I'm Mowahid Shah (ph). Dennis, you had made the point that perhaps the Jahardi (ph) elements may have pushed in India to the bargaining table, and this was reported today by John Burns exactly, that this is the feeling in India, that the Jahardi elements have forced India to go to the negotiating table, and there are also concerns that it will spill over beyond Kashmir proper into India.

And secondly, Steve you made the point at this particular phase, the U.S. policy is still groping—that's a very interesting usage of the term groping. It's unsurprising considering that Condoleezza Rice last year gave an interview to the New York Times in which she said, among other things, that the Taliban and Iran were allies. So I was just wondering how much of this groping which you describe is attributable to just a lack of plain savvy about the region, and if so, when do you expect this learning permit to expire before damage is done to vital U.S. concerns in that region? Thank you.

MS. SCHAFFER: I think you've already heard from Steve on that, so I'll put my oar in. In a technical sense, yes, I think the administration is groping, and as with any new administration, there is a lot of learning going on about the finer points of many parts of the world. And it's no secret that South Asia is a region that many of the people in the new administration were quite unfamiliar with when they came into office. But I think, actually, that the outlines of a likely U.S. policy are already reasonably clear and that the policy review now taking place is likely to put details on an outline that I think we can already discern. The elements in that are: first of all, a continued effort to strengthen relations with India, building on both an economic base and an emerging understanding about certain strategic subjects, and I would emphasize the selectivity involved because I think any thought of a grand alliance is quite unrealistic. I don't think India wants it; I don't think the U.S. really wants it or is prepared for what it would involve.

The second element with Pakistan is much more uncertain because I think the administration is uncertain about what Pakistan can deliver. And I'm not talking about, you know, deliverables in the Cold War sense, alliance against some third party or something like that. I'm talking really more about the fragility of the Pakistan state. And if the current government's hopes and plans materialize for strengthening the country's institutions and improving the functioning of the state, I think that will be the most important ingredient to an improved relationship with the U.S., which I think this administration would rather like to have.

The third element, though, is that when I think that all is said and done, the U.S. will still see it's primary interest in South Asia, as reducing to as close as possible to zero, the risk of another real war.

MR. KUX: I think on the—to come back to your comment on Jahardis (ph). What I said was not that this is driving India to the table, but that Pakistanis may well conclude, or people in the government may well have concluded that the tactic has succeeded. Personally, I don't think this is what's driving India to the bargaining table. I think that Vajpayee has a great desire to go down in history as the person who finally put this problem behind him for the people of India—for his country—and for Pakistan, and that the tactic he started on last fall, whenever it was when they started with the cease-fire, and then opening up the dialogue with the parties, ran into a dead-end I think in part because the Indians didn't handle it terrible well. And also, internationally, India was—both India and Pakistan, as Steve and Tayzi (ph) have indicated, care very much for what the world thinks of them, that after, you know, a certain period it looked like Pakistan, with its—Musharraf with his point, I'll talk with Vajpayee anywhere, anytime, et cetera, was perhaps going to gain the upper hand, and India, was running the risk of falling behind, or sort of looking not so good internationally, and then I think tactically, very wisely, very cleverly and very boldly, ditched the cease-fire, which normally would have caused him trouble internationally, but at the same time trumped it with the invitation for Musharraf to come for the summit. So instead of getting brickbats, the Indians got roses.

It seems to me, that's what in the short-term really drove him, but I think in the broader sense, Vajpayee really wants—would like to solve this problem in some way or the other. I think he's quite—my feeling is he's quite sincere about that.

MS. SCHAFFER: There's somebody in the third row also. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Nisha Desai with the House International Relations Committee. I wanted to go back to the motivations and dynamics within Pakistan for Musharraf to negotiate with Vajpayee. I've heard it said here, and I've heard it said elsewhere, that the two key factors right now from the Pakistani side, being the economy and Musharraf's deep concern about the failing economy and the international isolation. And yet it seems like those two factors don't seem to be influencing Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan and their relationships with the Taliban, and there's equal economic consequences and equal international pressure on that front. And I would kind of like to get your feedback on, you know, if you think that there's a different dynamic that would, perhaps, allow Musharraf to go further on the India front than he has been able to on the Afghanistan front, or whether you think those pressures are equally going to constrain him really moving forward with India as well.

MR. KUX: Well, I think he's chosen to move ahead on the Kashmir front, and not chosen to move ahead on the Afghan front, and I think that, indeed, is the big problem, big current problem that is making it difficult for the administration, at least in its eyes, to move ahead with Pakistan more favorably.

Why on Afghanistan? I guess one way of looking at it is, "My patan (ph), right or wrong, my patan." I mean, Pakistan for so long has wanted to have—and one can understand this from a Pakistani perspective—a friendly government in Afghanistan, that it is better from Pakistan's strategic perspective as they see it, to have even this wretched government of Taliban there. Plus the feeling that they're not sure what they can do about it; the genie is out of the bottle. And so I think they are prepared to live with it, at least so far, even though it has isolated them internationally. I think it cost them heavily in rebuilding a relationship with the United States. I think this is their biggest problem with Washington right now.

MR. COHEN: I would add that it may be easier to claim success in dealing with the Indians in Kashmir than it would be in dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan. And I think Pakistanis, even some of the hard-liners, have begun to redefine the Kashmir issue. I think they've moved it away from issues of high principle and aggrievement against India, the original sin that the Indians committed in their eyes and also the territory of Kashmir to the plight of Kashmiris. And Pakistanis are aware that the Kashmiris themselves are undergoing a terrible ordeal and that they have played some role in this in a sense by supporting some of the Jahardi (ph) groups and some of the extremists. And the Indians, of course, have a massive military presence in Kashmir, and are not behaving with kid gloves; it's a very brutal, brutal operation.

So I think that Pakistanis are being—I think if India were, I think, in agreement or a process—not an agreement, but a process which moved towards relieving some of the plight of the Kashmiris will be politically acceptable for many Pakistanis, not all of them, but many of them. They could say, well, we haven't gotten India to agree to a plebiscite, but what we have done is gotten India to ease up on the Kashmiris themselves. And, you know, let's kick the problem down the road another five or 10 or 15 years. In the meantime, they do have this problem in Afghanistan which has brought a lot of international criticism on their head. I'm not sure how much credit they will get for moving ahead with the Indians in Kashmir. I would hope that it will be significant and that the rest of the world will take that into account when shaping its Pakistan policy.

Let's see. This gentleman here.

QUESTION: Hi, I'm Manav Sachdeva. I just had a quick question. I was wondering that the U.S. sometimes does not have the same level of trust with either India or Pakistan, because Pakistan had an allied relationship with the U.S. earlier, and now India is the one that's favored. And I was wondering if the U.S.—if it puts pressure on the European Union to play the role or be ready for the role of any kind of mediator outside help once a deal is reached? Wouldn't that be, in a way, a better, far-reaching solution in a sense that European Union doesn't have any history of distrust on either side?

MR. KUX: Well, the trouble with that is that the European Union doesn't speak with one voice. If it spoke with one voice, it would play—it could play a big role, but it doesn't. So what you have in South Asia are half a dozen foreign policies of different countries rather than the Union other than the very, very broad sense in terms of being for democracy, being for a solution on Kashmir.

MR. COHEN: We have time for a few more questions, Dr. Khadian? Right.

QUESTION: Good morning, I'm Rajish Khadian, a part-time scholar. Does the panel expect some sort of an initiative on Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline? If so, what reaction do we expect from the U.S. government?

MS. SCHAFFER: The short answer is, I'll be a bit surprised if there is an initiative on such a pipeline. From the point of view of relations within South Asia, I think it would be a very positive development. I'm afraid the U.S. government would still be horrified, however.

MR. COHEN: Let's see. Mak Basoot (ph). This gentleman.

QUESTION: Well, in you we have three very perceptive analysts.

QUESTION: I think that I can hardly add anything to the presentations you have made, but I'd say that we need to understand Pakistan's perspective and policy posture that we have taken in the recent past. As you know, the issues between India and Pakistan are very complex and complicated. We do want to conduct public diplomacy and communicate with New Delhi in the run-up to the summit, but we have to be very cautious in not raising expectations. As Ambassador Kux said, that in the past there has been a lot of frustration and we want to avoid that. I think that we are also hoping that New Delhi would not take any unilateral moves, like for instance, on easing travel restrictions and so on, and about the meetings of DTMO through media, that first they would be communicated to the respective foreign ministries, and then there would be a proper reaction.

General Musharraf has given positive signals. All of his statements that have been issued before the summit and after that, they are positive in tone. We have given a very strong signal that we want to engage in there, and indeed we consider it to be an historic moment and an historic opportunity, and we look forward to talking to India, but it has to be a genuine process. We should not talk past each other, we should not talk to each other, and probably this is the first time this is one of those summits where we would talk to each other on substantive issues, and we would be able to engage each other, and hopefully, we shall set in motion a genuine process that could lead to results.

Of course, Siachen—I'll just wind up—Siachen is there; nuclear CBMs are there, and other issues are there. We shall discuss. In fact, if you look at the history of our summits, our agenda has been predetermined, but Kashmir is the most important issue and we have to address this issue, both sides.

Finally, just one comment. There are concerns about Pakistan's economic fertility, and I can tell you that, yes, we have had difficulties in the past, but I have read reports from IMAC and the World Bank, and we still have difficulties in certain sectors, but our economy in other areas—manufacturing—has turned the corner, and I think that we can hope that the situation in Pakistan will stabilize in the near future.

Thank you.

MR. COHEN: We have time for one more question. This gentleman over here.

QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Lincoln Mayer. I'm from the Directorate of Public Communications for the Pentagon, and I was curious as to what role, if any, you think the U.S. military could or should play, furthering U.S. political goals of regional peace and stability. I know you mentioned that there needs to be verification of any nuclear CBMs, perhaps U.S. satellite technology might play a role. And just what other roles, again, if any, U.S. military might have to play? Thank you.

MR. COHEN: I don't think there's a direct role that the U.S. military should play in or around this particular summit. In fact, that might be quite counterproductive. What I think one missing part of our policy, significant, has been—one missing piece of the puzzle has been the total absence of contact between the U.S. military and the Pakistan military. For various reasons, we've sanctioned Pakistan, and Pakistanis can't get military training here. Because the Pakistan army remains an important political force in Pakistan, even though we may not like it or we may hope that Pakistan as a democracy, does have a political consequence. And also because Pakistan is an important country in its own right in terms of its strategic position, there should be some U.S. military ties with the Pakistan military, especially the army. And because of various levels of sanctions, things have been cut off. I would hope the summit would produce enough agreement so that the U.S. could determine that these kinds of ties could be restored.

I think the U.S. should emphasize, of course, assistance to Pakistan's civil societies: universities, educational programs, helping Pakistan's bureaucracy rebuild themselves, perhaps assistance to the political parties in learning how to be political parties again. But there should—the U.S. Pakistan military tie was historically very important. Some have criticized it, but, I think, on balance it is something that should be restored. Fortunately we are developing these kinds of ties with the Indian military, not for political reasons but because the Indian military is going to be strategically important in the Indian Ocean area.

With that, let me—

MS. SCHAFFER: I'd like to add one thought on that. In his opening presentation, Steve Cohen mentioned the possibility that at some stage in the game, India and Pakistan might approach the United States for assistance in verifying an agreement. There are a number of precedents for this thing which I think would be worth people's while to think about if they could be useful. In the Middle East, for example, there is a long-standing practice, which I believe still continues, of U.S. government-planned and known by everybody over-flights of Sinai and parts of Syria, with the results of these overflights being shared with Israel, Egypt and Syria so that everybody is being given the same information. This is a kind of activity that has been done elsewhere; conceivably something like it might be useful. There is, of course, the long-standing history of the U.S. monitoring—involvement in the monitoring, which is technically multi-lateral in Sinai.

I think that there's a fairly rich array of things where the U.S. military has been of assistance to other peace processes, which, at the appropriate time, would be worth thinking about. Let me emphasize, however, that we're a long way from that appropriate time now.

MR. COHEN: One final word, and then we'll conclude. South Asia is a region of about a billion people, a billion-plus people. It has two nuclear weapon states. It's the world's largest concentration of people living under democratic rule. Until very recently, Washington, D.C., has had no centers of any consequence that dealt with South Asia, and I'm happy to—I think we're evidence that—this meeting is evidence that Washington has now achieved a sort of a critical mass in this country in terms of proliferation—I shouldn't use that term, but it's achieved a certain gravity of expertise, and we—

MS. SCHAFFER: South Asia watchers are proliferating. Be careful. (Laughter.)

MR. COHEN: So I hope that not only this kind of joint activity, and we're pleased for this joint activity, but we hope to conduct many in the future.

MR. KUX: [Off-mike and inaudible.]

MR. COHEN: Yeah. (Laughter.)

MR. COHEN: Thank you very much for coming.

[APPLAUSE AND END OF EVENT.]