Transcript
Ronald Nessen: Good afternoon, and welcome to Brookings. Welcome to this Brookings press briefing on President Clinton's trip to the Far East. I'm Ron Nessen. I am going to turn you over in just a moment to Don Oberdorfer. He will be the moderator of this afternoon's briefing, and he will introduce you to the panelists who will talk about the president's first step, which is to attend the APEC meeting in Brunei, and then the stop in Vietnam. And the panel also will talk about why the president is not going to North Korea, and talk about some of the other developments in U.S. relations with Korea.
A transcript of this briefing will be available shortly after the completion -- sometime later this afternoon or first thing in the morning -- on the Brookings Web site, which is brookings.edu.
I just want to mention very briefly two other events that will be taking place here at Brookings in the next few days. On Monday -- and this is very timely -- it was actually planned before Tuesday night, but it's a final wrap-up of Steve Hess's project, Evaluating Television Coverage of the Election." And that will be here at Brookings on Monday morning at 10:00. Steve will be the moderator, and will explain his findings about television coverage of the election, and on the panel will be Marvin Kalb, Robert Lichter and myself.
And then next Thursday, additional information about the election -- Andy Kohut will be here to report for the first time his findings of a post-election survey of voters, and that will be on Monday morning at 10:00.
But you are here to learn about the president's trip to Asia, to ask your questions of our panel, and I am going to turn you over to the moderator, Don Oberdorfer. Don has very timely information from that part of the world. He's just back from a trip to Beijing and Seoul. He is currently the distinguished journalist in resident at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, former correspondent for The Washington Post, a former colleague of mine as a correspondent in Vietnam and an old friend. And I would like to turn over this press briefing to Don Oberdorfer.
Don Oberdorfer: Thank you very much, Ron. We have here, as you see, four experts lined up. I am going to introduce them very briefly in order: Catharin Dalpino here, a fellow at Brookings Institution, and she teaches seemingly all over town Georgetown, SAIS, George Washington, former deputy assistant secretary of State for democracy in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the Department of State, formerly with the Asia Foundation; Ed Lincoln here, who was special advisor to Walter Mondale as ambassador, when Mondale was ambassador in Tokyo, and is one of our leading recognized experts on Japan, particularly the Japanese economy, and he will talk about APEC and the president's impending trip to APEC; Katie Oh, Dr. Kongdan Oh, or Katy Oh as we know her -- a long-time staff member of Rand Corporation, now a senior fellow at Brookings -- oh, I forgot to say that Ed is also a senior fellow at Brookings -- who has been watching North Korea for many, many years, and has a most recent book just published by Brookings called "North Korea Through the Looking Glass"; and finally Joel Wit, former Department of State official who worked on negotiations with North Korea over the nuclear program, now hear a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution.
So, so much for the introductions. I've asked each of them to speak very, very briefly, not more than three or four minutes, about in the first case the stop for APEC and then Vietnam, and then briefly about the two places -- the place that he is not going, which our two Korea experts will discuss North Korea.
So, with that, Ed, the floor is yours.
Edward Lincoln: For those of you who aren't familiar with APEC, let me just start by saying it stands for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. It started in 1989. It got elevated through a summit meeting in 1993. In 1994 the meeting recommended moving the area to free trade and free investment by 2010, 2020 for developing countries.
However, in the last several years it appears to have bogged down, which means that this part of the trip -- which by the way is the reason the president is going on this trip to Asia -- could be quite boring from your perspective. There are no major initiatives coming up in APEC this year. About the most that they are going to do in a big sense is to probably put in a fairly strong statement advocating hard work to get the next round of the WTO multilateral negotiations started. That's not a lot.
There are a couple of other things that you might look for though at this meeting. One is specifically on the question of how much of the steam in the trade part of APEC is really being lost. And, in particular, APEC represents a regional initiative trying to open up markets is what we call open regionalism, that these countries are supposed to discuss lowering their trade and investment barriers, but in a way that is open to everyone -- not just open to the other members of APEC. In the past 12 to 24 months, however, there's been a movement on the part of some members of APEC in the direction of bilateral free trade areas. Singapore is currently negotiating an FTA with New Zealand. The Japanese government has begun pushing this idea in the past six months or so. They will start negotiations for one with Singapore early next year. There is talk of Japan doing one with South Korea.
APEC so far has actually endorsed the concept of its members doing bilateral free trade areas, although insisting that they be consistent with APEC. In a broader sense, these are not consistent with APEC. They really undermine the APEC effort, particularly if you think about the fact that what you have got essentially is countries that may begin to turn their chief attention away from APEC towards this bilateral agenda.
The second thing is on finance, and basically a similar issue. The finance ministers who meet with APEC have in fact made a pretty clear statement on endorsing the global agenda of the IMF and the World Bank -- although certainly endorsing reform at those institutions. So they have come out very strongly in favor of continued financial reform in APEC member countries, and with a notion of keeping capital markets open to international capital flow.
At the same time, however, we have a brand-new development in this region of the ASEAN plus three -- that's China, South Korea and Japan. That group of finance ministers has now agreed to an expanded swap arrangement among their central banks, the purpose of which is to try to give central banks greater financial resources to combat attacks on their currency. I happen to think that economically that's a very bad idea. And, but in a broader sense, it again raises the question of whether a subset of APEC members will continue to turn their attention somewhat away from APEC and the broader goal and deal with one another in a more cooperative setting in the smaller ASEAN-plus-three group. So that's something that you might want to be watching for at this meeting.
D. Oberdorfer: Ed, you may or may not be the person to address this, and I'm not sure whether someone on this panel does. But APEC also is kind of like a big flagpole in which there are all kinds of side meetings that take place.
E. Lincoln: Oh, yes, well, right. I probably -- I should have mentioned that. But I concentrated on the APEC as an institution and the kinds of negotiations that go on. Actually the more interesting part of what's happening is in fact that because this is a summit meeting the ministers will go first and meet, and then the leaders come in, and they will have a meeting, and that certainly opens the way for both the group session and the bilaterals. And over the last several years that has turned out to be the more interesting part of the meeting. And their agenda seems to be getting much broader than the specific trade and investment issues that APEC started with.
D. Oberdorfer: So you have -- is it Jiang Zemin or Zhu Rongji who goes to this as a leader from China?
E. Lincoln: Well, it should be Jiang Zemin.
D. Oberdorfer: Jiang Zemin. So you probably have Clinton, Jiang Zemin, Clinton with Prime Minister Mori of Japan I presume?
E. Lincoln: That's right.
D. Oberdorfer: And Wahid? Is he coming from Indonesia?
E. Lincoln: Should be. I haven't heard of anybody who is not coming.
D. Oberdorfer: So you -- you know, I would guess from a press standpoint these bilateral meetings are going to be where the action is -- probably more than in this formal setting?
E. Lincoln: That's right. And in fact I think that that sort of nicely flows into some of the other issues we'll be discussing here, because one would assume, for example, that a main topic among these leaders this year will be North Korea, since there have been some changes on that front.
D. Oberdorfer: Right. Catharin?
Catharin Dalpino: The two obvious questions to ask about the Clinton visit to Vietnam is: Should he be going at this time? And, what can we expect to come out of it? And I would say on balance it probably is a good idea for him to go, whatever personal reasons they have for going, such as burnishing his image or putting his finishing touches on his legacy.
There are three reasons. First, it's probably a good idea at this time to solidify the gains that have been made in U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the last couple of years, and those have been normalization of relations, which of course was a major watershed; and the signing of the trade agreement, which we did with Vietnam last July.
It was on Clinton's watch that these developments occurred, and the visit could be described as a modest victory lapse, but really he could only have achieved these with bipartisan support, which he did. And so I don't think the visit can be construed itself as being partisan. I think it does represent the state of U.S.-Vietnamese relations at this time.
The visit will certainly help to sustain U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the transition to the new administration, and I won't go into the new administration because I can't, for obvious reasons. But since foreign policy wasn't a major point of discussion in the campaign, and what discussion there was certainly didn't touch on Vietnam, it is hard to see what scenarios we might spin, should either side emerge victorious in this process in terms of the U.S.-Vietnamese relations.
But we do know that if a new administration hits a rough patch with China, that will impact our relations with Vietnam. And we also probably can guess that in the first few months Vietnam will be subject to a certain amount of benign neglect for the United States as the new administration works out its exact relations with our major allies in the region. So this visit will help to front-load a fair amount of good will and sustain the relationship in that transition period.
And, lastly, the profile is probably appropriate. Clinton will be the first American president to visit Vietnam after the fall of Saigon. He will also be the first American president ever to visit Hanoi. That inevitably is going to be a high profile visit, at least at this point in time. But he is in the neighborhood for the APEC meeting, and that helps to ratchet down the profile a little bit I think to a more appropriate level.
What will be accomplished and what's on the agenda? Probably the most significant area of issue would be trade. We had signed the bilateral trade agreement -- the Congress had not yet confirmed it. And there are some areas of the agreement, such as textiles and air transport, which weren't covered in the agreement, but the United States would like to see included in the trade relationship. And this would really be Clinton's opportunity -- and he will be accompanied by a business delegation -- to try and get these onto the agenda. And if he's successful it will help sweeten the whole deal, at least in the eyes of Congress when they act on it presumably in the coming years.
Every senior official, much less the president, tends to go wrong with something in his suitcase, to give away. What will be delivered? The deliverables will be very modest on his trip. Probably they will sign a science and technology agreement, and Clinton is expected to announce an initiative on HIV/AIDS. But these are very modest deliverables, and I think appropriately so at this point. I don't think that we'll see with this visit there will be an announcement of a major upsurge in assistance, for example.
Although it may be done privately, or some parts could be done publicly, Clinton will inevitably have to bring up human rights considerations, and it is appropriate for him to do so. There has been pressure from U.S. human rights groups and from a bipartisan group of senators for him to be quite public in this. That said, although the Vietnamese human rights record certainly needs improvements, there have been some gains in the past several years, including the release of a significant number of political prisoners, and some easing up on religion. And in the latter regard there are moves now to help to certify the Protestant Church in the south, which has gained about I think five-fold since 1975, and the regime had not recognized it as an official church. And I think that we can probably see an acceleration of this certification as being one consequence of anticipation of the visit. Overall, however, U.S.-Vietnamese relations on human rights have been more amicable in recent years than those with China, partially because Hanoi has continued the U.S.-Vietnamese dialogue on human rights, whereas Beijing has tended to stop the dialogue or to postpone it, and I think Hanoi has seen the wisdom of just keeping on talking no matter what is happening on the ground.
Obviously the trip will be very heavy with symbolism, and I think that's probably going to be the major impact. Clinton is sure to visit a site where there is excavation for American MIA remains, and where there is American-Vietnamese cooperation on that. He does, I understand, plan to visit a cathedral in Hanoi and speak with the archbishop there, and that would be very symbolic in terms of concern for religious freedom.
The administration usually likes to find people-to-people activities that underscore the need for freedom and discussion and for freedom of association, and there I understand friends -- or hopes that he will have meetings of roundtables of intellectuals, as well as perhaps a meeting with Vietnamese students and possibly in a cyber cafe to underscore the state of the Internet and the need to loosen it up a little bit.
He will most certainly not visit the tomb of Ho Chi Minh. That would be untenable in the United States, although it is customary for many high ranking leaders to do so. And Hanoi has really helped him out in this regard -- they have closed the tomb for annual maintenance during the visit, so that is something that will be useful.
For their part, the Vietnamese would like to see some discussion and possibly some action on addressing some of the damages of the war, and specifically on Agent Orange. This issue has been raised in the past few weeks.
Whatever is done, it will not be anything that can be construed as reparations. That was never on the table, and indeed in the course of normalization Hanoi was required to pay up money to cancel the debt that the South Vietnamese owed us before 1975. So any sort of assistance however is targeted to damage and war would be modest and politically mutual as possible.
In reading the America's press's accounts anticipating the visit, and the Vietnamese press accounts, it's very clear that this is far more of an emotional issue, this trip, for the Americans than for the Vietnamese. And this tracks I think with broader views on both sides of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and of the fall of Saigon. I think that many Americans, particularly in the military, and veterans will be watching this visit very closely to see that Clinton gives proper deference to the POW/MIA issue, and to see if there is any hint, the slightest hint of an apology. And, if there is, I think that there will be a negative reaction in those quarters in this country.
In that respect, the Agent Orange issue would be a difficult one for him to navigate while he is in Vietnam if that's come up officially on the agenda.
D. Oberdorfer: Thank you. Now we are going to talk about very briefly a place he is not going -- to North Korea, and why he is not going there. So, Katy?
Kongdan (Katy) Oh: Well, the Korean politics has never bored us, from both North and South. But particularly since the June summit of this year between the two Kims of North and South, I felt like it kind of felt like a drama constantly occurring actually made the 007 series stunts to be paler compared to the North Korean ones. And after the June summit, the North and South exchanges have been really dazzling. But at the same time, the U.S. and North Korean relationship also entered a new phase.
Second man of the North Korean nation on military committee, General Cho Myong-nok, ended up to be visiting not only Secretary Albright and this country, but also had 45 minutes at the White House with our President Clinton. And after that, Secretary Albright was visiting as a payback visit to Pyongyang, and while I was actually visiting South Korea, from October 23 to 25.
During that visit, Secretary Albright was discussing the possibility of a Clinton visit to North Korea. Since then, the debate has been very active. As you know, the press coverage of Secretary Albright had been really negative all in all. And I also attended a lot of meetings, including the November 2nd small group working dinner with Secretary Albright at the Department of State. I voiced at all these many interesting meetings my grave reservations about a Clinton visit to North Korea. And since I have only but a limited time, I must say that you should buy the book and read the reasons, because all the reasons are elaborated in the book. But, to be polite, I'll give you my reasons.
Reason number one. Although there are different camps of opinions prevailing today among the speculations and assumptions, I think North Korea has not really changed fundamentally their strategy just opening the doors and have a reform -- fundamentally, socially and economically with other countries. Basically there are stunt-like dramas of trying to gain in the negotiation points, bargaining positions, and gain the maximum without really losing their control and grip over the current regime.
If I were Kim Jong Il, I have three clear goals. The number one goal to be preservation of Kim's power and control over the people and society and economy; and number two, using whatever existing force, technical and strategic tools and the weapons -- weapons in that sense not just military weapons, but all other tools, to be very effectively to sustain the so-called our and South Korea's and Japan's and the world's attention towards them to gain the maximum material benefit without losing the grip on their society. And, number three, basically the third goal is that using those strategic tools very effectively for the maximum benefit. Based on this assumption and observation, I thought that Kim Jong Il was doing a very brilliant and creative approach to gain the new attention, but without really changing the society. And that's the number one reason why I was against a Clinton visit to North Korea.
The number two reason is South Korean domestic sectors, but I will get to that after that.
The third reason is that President Clinton, as a very brilliant and smart politician and the leader of this country, he is not just going there in my opinion for the legacy or some kind of like a lame-duck time, and let's have a great time in a, you know, very strange country in North Korea. I think he is going there actually for really serious resolution or talks; that is, including the weapons of mass destruction and North Korea's game to play with us -- that is, nuclear missiles.
So he is going there for serious talks with the North Koreans, and North Korea flirted with us, saying that I have some kind of hidden cards, or We will be serious when he comes. But in my opinion, he is not giving up, Kim, he is not giving up his position, in a sense that there will be some kind of fundamental suggestions for the positions, but not really substantial improvement. In that case, if President Clinton is going over there, coming back without having any fundamental resolution signed in agreement, I think the risk is very high and very dangerous.
Lastly, South Korean domestic sectors. I have a strong respect and admiration for the President Kim. I supported him for the last 20 years, and I think he is one of the greatest strategists and a person of vision and strong leadership. And I think he and his key advisors really deserve the credit, because of their persistence and insistence and patience, so-called engagement policy toward the North Koreans really achieved a lot. Kim and Kim sat down, and drinking and toasting each other, and really there was some kind of process of reconciliation. So, for their part, I give them duly credit.
But, at the same time, when I was in Seoul from October 22nd to 29th, for a week, when I met all sorts of different people from different sectors of the society, I was really shocked to hear that so-called mechanism of debate and airing out the different views and opinions are really blocked today in South Korea. Some of them even joked to me that there is no need to have Cabinet members, because President Kim and a couple of very key advisors are deciding major key issues in dealing with North Korea. And while the engagement policy to be the best option, I think blocking these kinds of different opinions and help trying to create some kind of a very conflicting and dividing kind of ideological spectrum, and not to listen to the other side's stories are very dangerous. In a sense that I think our leadership in the United States is listening only to maybe the very smooth and brilliant surface without seeing the undercurrents of South Korean domestic politics. Basically I am saying that if President Kim Dae Jung is losing some kind of economic grip furthering the financial and economic reform, I think any wrong turn of the economic situation will kill the North Korea policy of today. In that sense we have to be a little bit more sensitive towards South Korean domestic politics. That's the third factor of why I aired my grave reservations towards President Clinton. As of now, I think he is not visiting, and that's the end of my story.
D. Oberdorfer: Well, now let's see if Joel Wit has a different perspective.
Joel Wit: Well, actually I do, surprisingly. I would like to deal with the three reasons why Katy says Clinton shouldn't go in a second, but I do have a very different perspective, and my perspective is that Clinton should go, and it's a qualified "should-go," but, nevertheless, I think he should go. And the reason for that is that if we can structure a trip that is in the national interests, then it is worthwhile having him go there. So I am not going to be like George Bush here and say in the national interest without defining it, so let me give you a few criteria that the trip should be measured up against.
The first one is: Is it okay with our allies? And I think that's probably the most important criteria, and particularly South Korea. And I would like to deal with Katy's other points in a second, but I think the point here is that the South Korean government strongly supports a visit to North Korea by President Clinton. So that's the first factor, which I think is very important.
The second factor here is: In the context of his trip will he clinch a deal that is in our national interests? And by that I largely mean not just something about improving relations between the United States and North Korea, but a deal that deals with the threat of their missiles to the United States and to our close allies in the region. I mean, we have been harping on this for years, and certainly since 1998, about the threat posed by North Korea's missile program. So if we can clinch a deal that deals with that threat, and part of that has to include a visit by President Clinton to Pyongyang, I would say, fine, let's go ahead and do it.
There are of course a number of criticisms that are floating around, some of them valid, some of them not. People think that Clinton going is just another sign of diplomatic tourism. I would say that the criteria I have enunciated should deal with that problem. The other problem people talk about, Well, what happens if the Republicans take office or if they win the election and are about to take office? Should Clinton take such an important step in that context? I would say we need to look a little bit at history here, and the fact is that, for example, in the transition from Bush to Clinton, President Bush sent 30,000 troops to Somalia. So we need to look at it in the context of history. There may need to be some consultation, but nevertheless, I don't think our foreign policy should be paralyzed because of the transition.
Just to briefly deal with Katy's three arguments, I tend to agree that there hasn't been a lot of change in North Korean society over the past three years. It's kind of been one step forward two steps backwards. But, nevertheless, I am not sure if this is the proper criteria with which to base our foreign policy towards North Korea. The fact is we have to avoid mission creep in our objectives with North Korea. And our first and foremost objective is to deal with the security threat posed by North Korea to ourselves and to our allies.
On the second point, about South Korean domestic politics, I think Katy is also right. I have heard from many South Koreans that they feel they are not free to speak out about the current government policy. Nevertheless, once again, I don't think that we can base our policy towards the North on all the different currents in South Korean domestic politics, because, you know, one minute we hear from the South Korean government that we shouldn't go, or should improve our relations with the North, such as we heard from Kim Young Sam. And yet there were others within the society who thought we should have improved our relations at a much more rapid pace, such as Kim Dae Jung, who was in opposition then. So, you know, we can't -- we have to focus on what the South Korean government is telling us, and I am certain the U.S. government is very well aware of all of the underlying domestic political currents in South Korea today. I don't think we don't understand that.
And on the last point, about Clinton going there and the North Koreans kind of dangling things in front of us without really giving anything in return, I would be extremely surprised if the administration sent the president of the United States off to Pyongyang without having some idea of what was going to happen there. So I don't think that's a real danger.
D. Oberdorfer: Okay, ladies and gentlemen, you have heard these presentations. It's up to you now. So if you want to ask a question, direct it to the person you'd like to answer, or generally if that's the way it is. There's the mike. Please identify yourself just for the record, and try to ask questions with a question mark at the end of it. And it's your show. So who would like to go first? No questions? Over here. Go ahead. We'll get you in a second.
Q: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to be first. My name is Andrew Pierre. I am now at Georgetown University. And on Catharin Dalpino's discussion with a visit to Vietnam, about a week ago I was asked by senior officials preparing that visit what do I think that the president's message should be, particularly in the open fora, such as the Hanoi University speech that he is going to be giving. And my response was, well, it will be just after the U.S. election, he should discuss the American election process and how we have alternates, and how we run democracy. A little bit difficult now perhaps. But I would suggest that the main impact that his visit can have, beyond very minute deliverables I would say, is a political psychological one of representing a country that's not really very well known to a lot of even somewhat educated Vietnamese; and an alternative way of looking at society than they have at present -- democratic, multi-party, pluralistic society. And that to the extent that after this election he is able to talk about that, I think that would be a very good thing to do. I also think that is a --
D. Oberdorfer: Andrew, have you got a question?
C. Dalpino: I can respond to that.
D. Oberdorfer: Okay, why don't we let Catharin respond?
Q: I'm asking for a response. I'll just take one more minute. As I understand his agenda, he is going to be meeting with the three top officials. But that doesn't get him very far down into the Congress Party and its structure. So should he not also be giving an address before the National Assembly, which contains not only the Politburo but the Central Committee, and really gets him down into the inner workings of the Vietnamese government? The question.
C. Dalpino: But to answer your -- I think that might be interesting and desirable, but probably it is improbable at this point, so it's sort of a moot question. Nor do I expect there to be the kind of debate on human rights that we saw when Clinton went to China between Jiang and Clinton, et cetera. I think there is sort of a tacit agreement on both sides to soft pedal it a little more than that. Obviously the demonstration effects that you are alluding to, like, you know, the meeting with the intellectuals and going to the university, will be important. And the Internet cafe is particularly supposed to be something that could be seen in that way, because of the present role of the Internet in Vietnam, and not only because it is not picking up as much as it is in countries such as China, but there are some regime attempts to control it in China -- but also simply for technical reasons, that they are having problems disseminating that. So that would be a very strong message.
But you were very brave, Andrew, in assuming that by the time he goes to Vietnam we will have an election to talk about. You might want to skip that.
D. Oberdorfer: We could have some of these countries come here and tell us how to run an election after this week.
Q: -- I am a visiting fellow here, so maybe I should have asked this question to Mr. Wit and Madam Oh, but since I usually don't have such a precious chance much, so I will just ask the question here.
Listening to the statement from both of you, my feeling is the reasons why he should go and the reasons why he should not go are those mostly known to us for many years. So my question to Mr. Wit is: If it is so obvious that he should go, because there are chances or windows of opportunity to improve the relationship in the direction of the, let's say the security -- more secure Korean Peninsula -- why do you think he decided not to go?
My question to Madam Oh is: If it is so obvious that North Korea would not change, and it does seem to be changing at the moment, why the American government, given it did think about this possible presidential visit to North Korea?
D. Oberdorfer: Joel?
J. Wit: Well, I may not be fully informed here, but I don't think any final decision has been made whether he would go or not. I think the decision certainly has been made that he shouldn't go on the end of this trip.
What happening is there has been progress in talking about the missile issue, and I think the administration is trying to digest what the progress is and what the next steps might be. So the option of Clinton still going before he leaves office I think is still alive. There has been no final decision made yet.
D. Oberdorfer: Katy, do you want to answer your part?
K. Oh: That's right, the decision is shelved, because most of us, and especially some Korean affairs basically, such a haste without really considering all sorts of options and strategic considerations would be very foolish and the risk will be very high when he returns without any tangible substantial results. So a Clinton visit is still possible -- maybe even after the inauguration -- as a kind of previously -- or newly stepped down president. And then with an elegant envoy position he can make a trip maybe next year, or maybe even after the voting returns come out. So I think it is still up in the air.
But I think as long as we know what we are doing, I think that's the main key factor of whether he should go or not. And my judgment was that we were not actually very ready, and keenly aware of both the North and South in our domestic and strategic situation. That's the first part of the question.
And the second part is that with knowing that potentially that maybe North Korea is not changing, why is he going? Why was anyone offering that idea? My assumption is that there is a diplomatic momentum, bureaucratic momentum, the process is going on. And maybe also there is some kind of wishful thinking that, why not? The CEO of the United States has such an impact, maybe North Korea's Kim Jong Il indeed, as he surprised us many times, maybe he has a hidden cause. And, who knows, he can offer such incredible goodies in saying, Hey, Bill, you can have it, and let's have a talk. And so I think that assumption might not be totally absent. But, at the same time, I think the most important factor in the kind of inertia kind of relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, that Marshal Cho arrived here kind of like surprised us, and then Madam Albright going over to North Korea. You kind of build up process, and momentum was I think a main factor. So as long as we know what we are doing, I think it may push the next process.
D. Oberdorfer: Over here.
Q: David Sands at The Washington Times, for Mr. Lincoln. I noticed you said that both on the finance side and the trade side there are countries in Asia -- you must mean in Japan -- not quite with the APEC program these days. Is there skepticism about APEC among these countries? Are they trying to undermine it? Or what's the -- why are they getting away from some of the things APEC --
E. Lincoln: Good question. I think at least on the financial side part of the recent skepticism or maybe shift in focus comes out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, that certainly there has been resentment around the region at the notion of Western or American or Washington consensus policies being pushed at Asian countries, in a sense that it was our fault they got into trouble in the first place, because it was Western or foreign investors who pulled their money out because of the financial collapse. So there is an undercurrent at least, and certainly stronger in some countries. Obviously we all know that Mr. Mahatir has been saying such things ever since the crisis occurred.
That seems to dovetail with something which may be a new trend in Japan that I don't know enough details of yet. There's always been a tension in Japan between being a Western country or being an Asian country. For the last 50 years it's been the Western side that has won out, and Japan has pursued sort of a global trade policy, global financial policy. In the last year or so there does seem to be some ascendancy of the more regional Asia crowd in the Japanese government, and part of that has been the interest in regional financial arrangements. You know, at the fringe you even get people talking about currency unification between Japan, China and South Korea, which I think at least is at least 50 to 75 years off in the future. But the talk is there, and it was not there a couple of years ago.
On the trade side, I am not sure what drives it. Again, it's a little bit unclear. Part of it may be just that APEC has gotten bogged down. There was an initiative in '96 on information -- there was an information technology agreement that was an APEC agreement that then got pushed up to the WTO and was adopted that would drive tariffs on information technology equipment to zero for all signers of the agreement. In '98 there was an attempt to follow up on that with something that was called the EVSL, early voluntary sector or something like that -- agreement that had nine different product areas in which APEC countries would agree to lower their tariffs vis-a-vis the whole world to zero. That failed in '98, in part because of Japanese opposition on the fisheries and forest product part. There has been no major initiative out of APEC since that time. And so there is a sense of momentum tapering off. That may be what leads individual countries to say, Well, if this isn't working let's go play a bilateral game.
There is some speculation that the Japanese, who with their upcoming negotiation with Singapore and possibly with South Korea, could be trying to play the game that we did in the Bush administration, and that is to use the threat of going down the route of signing bilateral agreements with favored trading partners as a means to try to generate some momentum in the WTO to get the next round of WTO negotiations going. And one of the reasons we entered into the NAFTA negotiations was essentially that: it was a threat from the Bush administration saying, If you are not going to finish the Uruguay Round in a satisfactory fashion, this is what our policy will be -- we are going to go down a regional route. I doubt that that's what is happening in the Japanese government, but it is a possibility. Again, I think it's more a struggle between different factions in the government and then at least at the moment those who said, you know, this global and regional stuff is not really going anywhere -- let's go play the bilateral game.
D. Oberdorfer: Question? Here, the front row.
Q: I'm Daniel Morisaku. My question will go back to Ms. Dalpino about Vietnam. Would you elaborate a little bit more about a possible U.S. stronger stance on PRC, how that will affect the U.S.-Vietnamese relations?
C. Dalpino: Could you say that --
Q: If the new administration takes a stronger stance towards PRC, how --
C. Dalpino: Well, the point I was trying to make is that whatever happens in the U.S.-China relations is in the near term going to affect U.S.-Vietnamese relations, and that Hanoi is going to take note of that, and that will be instructive. And sometimes Hanoi sees some of the disagreements and acts accordingly in terms of trying to manage the U.S. a little better, and I would point to human rights as being one of those. And in other ways they sometimes want to demonstrate solidarity with Beijing. But they are not going to get out ahead of Beijing on most things. I think the timing of the trade agreement was very illustrative. In fact, they were not really going to go forward and push on that, or even you know respond to American initiatives, until the U.S. agreement with China on WTO had been settled.
So inevitably, not only because it's in the neighborhood, but also because of the history between the two countries and slight warming between Beijing and Hanoi in recent years to -- what -- my point was that there is going to be fallout, good or bad, that will affect the U.S.-Vietnamese relations as well.
D. Oberdorfer:: A question?
K. Oh: You can ask questions about South Korea too.
D. Oberdorfer: Yeah.
Q: -- I have a short comment in the way of rebuttal and a simple question. I was actually shocked to hear you say the South Koreans were not free to speak against President Kim Dae Jung's North Korea policy. Those opposing your opinions are actually carried by domestic newspapers in Korea. Actually most of the articles in the Korean newspapers are the current status of North Korean and South Korean relations, and analysis articles expressing concern at the pace and the direction of North Korea and that South Korea and the U.S. is taking toward North Korea. I think even last Friday there was an article in the New York Times contributed by an opposition camp in Korea that was endorsed by the head of the opposition camp. And I think that this shows that they are reasonably free to express their views.
And one of the high ranking members of the opposition party came to Washington, D.C. some time ago and held a session at the CSIS and expressed the voice from the other side. That was my comment.
And the second question I have is about the change of North Korea, the prospect of change. I agree that the change cannot be a proper criteria for deciding President Clinton's visit, but the expectation of such a change can be one. And as Dr. Katy Oh said, North Korea may be just taking a tactical posture of taking advantage of what's available to them. But continuing the long period in which is more than half a century -- a long century of tense confrontation that has been going on between the Koreas -- would it be reasonable to expect North Korea to show changes in military postures and security related matters overnight? Or should we just be satisfied with the symbolic and non-military changes they are taking, and expect them to change in the future?
K. Oh: Thank you for the comment, and I -- you are absolutely right -- in the public opinion making community media, and the discussion debating fora, there are a lot of voices aired, and then off and on the New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times -- all these opinions are duly translated and then everybody is hearing. Maybe I'm into too much of the high level policies, the community, that when I am talking about when the leaders are listening there is no really alternate mechanism to accept the so-called public opinion or positions to be discussed and then digested and to be furthering their different opinions. And I am talking about very high levels. And in a sense, these stories were not told by actually the journalists or the businessmen on the street, or by taxi drivers, but actually by the Cabinet members and by the incumbent very high ranked members, that they are sometimes feeling that they are isolated from the process. So that's kind of my comment to your comments.
And about the change -- if I don't expect any changes from North Korea, I will change my specialty -- which means maybe I'll specialize on African politics -- or maybe going over to the real market, to be working for the company and to make more money. I really expect that they are changing. And then there is a potential of changes and evolution is very high. But I think our policy approaches and so-called coordinating all sorts of wisdom and approaches in a very creative way as North Koreans have been very creative I think have been very weak. And I predict it actually in my book the different approaches and different tools of analysis to approach North Korea to make them change actually further. And I think so far we have been having some kind of practical successes, but no in a fundamental strategic sense. In that sense I do have a hope we can try different measures.
D. Oberdorfer: Joel would like to add something, sure.
J. Wit: A small point here. I didn't mean before to give the impression that I don't care if North Korean society changes or not. But I think the point here is that, you know, our focus is on the security threat, and that could change, and I think there have been signs over the past seven years of that changing, particularly in the nuclear area. But we focus on that. And in the process of engaging North Korea and trying to deal with their security threat, it is very likely a by-product of that could be changes in their economic structure and maybe other changes in their society. But, you know, to target our efforts on North Korea on those kinds of things I think would be a serious mistake. So what we should be looking for is as a by-product of our effort to engage North Korea there will be changes. That's the hope at least.
K. Oh: Let me just air one of my strong opposition against that statement. Although this is for you, for your podium, but nonetheless this is a very serious fundamental difference. North Koreans will not change unless we push them to change. And North Koreans will not give up their nuclear missiles unless we do our best to make them give up fundamentally after they change their internal society. And that's a different order of priority and different understanding -- that's currently where I'm standing, and I strongly state this with a very clear understanding of what North Korea has been about.
D. Oberdorfer: Okay, well, we had a good difference there. Any other questions? If there are none, I think we will conclude this meeting. Thank you all for coming. We have one somewhere. Okay, last question.
Q: Thank you very much. My name is Claudius Fischbach with the German Embassy. What I read from Hanoi these days is that obviously Vietnam would expect some kind of generous gesture of reconciliation by the American president during his visit to Vietnam, perhaps because the foreign minister of Vietnam said recently that Vietnam would look for a bigger and faster response from Washington to help ease suffering caused by the Vietnam War. I mean, it's perhaps not necessary or not feasible to talk about reparations, but what about for instance additional humanitarian aid or development aid, or measures in that direction -- is that feasible?
C. Dalpino: Well, that's actually happening. And the United States Agency for International Development has opened an office now in Hanoi, and the development assistance levels are going up. The point here is that the visit will not be the occasion either for a great quantum leap; nor is it the occasion to announce the opening of something new. This is the trend that has been going on for several years; in fact, even before normalization USAID was giving funds for prosthetics. So I think it's true to say that all of our assistance post 1975 -- and obviously it's still very new -- it's only been for the past five years or so -- has largely addressed some of the damage of the war. But in terms of a major package, which is clearly intended to address those damages, I think it is going to air more on the side of modest increases, and this will not be a visit in which a change of direction will be announce or a great quantum leap.
D. Oberdorfer: Well, you all have heard some views about the president's forthcoming trip. Let me just say that three years after the Asian economic crisis, which threw this whole area of East Asia into a turmoil, as well as the United States government's response to it -- in fact, the president is going out there, spending the time that he is with APEC, and particularly with the other leaders of China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, I think is a very notable thing, even at the end of his administration. And going to Vietnam is something that is a tremendous significance to Americans because of our history with Vietnam. He is going to try to prove I think that Vietnam is not just a war, it's a country too -- an important country to visit. The fact that he is not going on this trip to North Korea, as both Katy and Joel said, doesn't mean he may not end up going there before his term of office is over -- it depends on really developments and the diplomatic dance between the United States and North Korea. So it's a very significant venture for him. Let's hope he can go with a clear conscience as to how the political problems in this country are going to be resolved. And thank you all for coming, and thanks to our presenters for presenting.
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