Transcript
Richard N. Haass: Good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. This morning's briefing will focus on events in the Middle East, obviously, and by that I mean essentially more the diplomacy and the violence involving Israel and the Palestinians. I'll also say a few things about the attack, the terrorist attack on the U.S. destroyer yesterday.
What we're going to do, though, first, is begin with my colleague, Shibley Telhami. Professor Telhami has two hats. He holds the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland, and he's also a Nonresident Senior Fellow here at the Brookings Institution. He is widely published, widely quoted on all things dealing with the Middle East. And he will begin speaking for a few minutes on the change in the situation; where and why it is evolving the way it has, and what can be done about it.
I will then speak for a few minutes, giving my perspective, in particular, on American foreign policy; what it's been, what it should be in the future. And then we will reserve the bulk of our time here this morning to your questions and comments.
Sir?
Shibley Telhami: Thank you. I'd like to make basically three points. The first point is to describe the nature of the crisis that we now face; the second is to make some conclusions about why we're in the middle of this crisis; and three, to address the U.S. role in this crisis.
First, I think it's fair to say that we're now facing what might be a fundamental transformation in the conflict as we have known it over half a century. I think it is -- this is not just another cycle in violence that needs to be stopped, I think there is a -- what might be a very dangerous transformation of the conflict.
I think what we have seen in the past half a century is this conflict has been defined in nationalist political terms. This has been certainly an Arab-Israeli conflict, but mostly a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Certainly religion has always been an aspect of the conflict, but the conflict has been defined by both Arabs and Israelis as a nationalist conflict. The Zionist Movement defined itself as a nationalist movement; it was highly secularized. The Palestinian National Movement came into being as a secular national movement at a time when you had secular Arab nationalism, and the religious groups were seen to be the enemies. Political Islam was on the defensive in the context of that conflict.
I think while it was always a very difficult conflict, because it seemed like a zero-sum conflict because you're both fighting over the same piece of land, it was, nonetheless, a manageable conflict because you could deter states, you could negotiate with states; central authorities are easily recognizable, and you knew what the limits were. And in that sense, all of the American diplomacy and the international diplomacy was based on the idea that the aim was to reconcile two nationalist conflicts, to meet the basic aspirations of two people. And in that sense, clearly, all of the negotiations, and certainly the ones that took place at Camp David in July, were aimed toward addressing the nationalist need of the Palestinians as a people and the nationalist need of Jews as a people, and to find a compromise to live on the same piece of territory to have two states side by side.
Clearly, that was tough enough, and certainly, although we came close to signing an agreement, it probably would have had trouble nonetheless. But at least the conflict itself was clearly defined. And I think one can argue, at least since the Gulf War, the U.S. and the international community and some parties in the Middle East have managed to in some way separate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from broader Middle Eastern issues, from broader Arab-Israeli issues.
Well, what has happened in the past two weeks, I think, is we've crossed a threshold which has perhaps led to a transformation of the conflict. Today, I think, the conflict is much more than a nationalist conflict, it is much more than a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is certainly an Arab-Israeli conflict, but even worse, it might be a Jewish-Muslim conflict. And I think this is troubling for two reasons: one, obviously, the scope is different. You are talking then about a conflict that knows no boundaries. You're talking about a conflict that goes well beyond the confines of Israel and the Palestinian territories. You're talking about involving other Arabs, other Muslims, and perhaps other Jews as well. And so, as a consequence, the scope alone is dangerous.
But the second reason may be even more difficult. And that is that when we look at the nature of the conflict as it's evolving over the past two weeks, if it is in fact becoming more of a religious conflict, an ethnic conflict, then governments don't have as much control. In essence, it becomes easier to mobilize at the social level. The mosque becomes a political institution, public passions become driving forces, and governments lose control. And in that sense I think it becomes much harder, much harder, to deal with it. The fact is, we've seen it for example spread into inside Israel between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens of Israel on a scope that we had not witnesses in the darkest days for the past half-a-century.
And so clearly there's been a fundamental transformation that we must stop if we are to have any chance of reconciling the differences between them, because nationalists conflicts can be resolved; religious conflicts cannot.
Let me say one other thing about why we're there. In one word, it's Jerusalem. And I think some people may say this is a simplistic answer. And in some ways, it is. There's been tremendous frustration among Palestinians and among Israelis. They've been at it for a long time. They came so close, they didn't get there. The situation on the ground is difficult. There's pent-up frustration not only on Jerusalem but on every aspect of the conflict. And so clearly, the explosion isn't just about Jerusalem.
But Jerusalem is the reason for the explosion. And I think it is because Jerusalem, in my mind, and I think most people who study these issues very carefully, is bigger than the issue of Palestine. It is bigger than the issue of Israel. It mobilizes. And yes, a lot of groups are going to exploit it for their own ends. Sure, that's what happens. You might have an Islamist group whose aim is really to topple Arafat or to do something else in the Arab world or to object to the order that is out there. But the fact is, they can use it. And that's why it was a mistake, I think, a huge mistake to unleash this issue, to make it the only issue that needs to be negotiated and to even break it down and focus on the issue of the Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount.
Clearly, many of us, I think Richard and I stood here on the -- just a couple of days before the Camp David negotiations started, and the one thing we both agreed is it would be wrong to go for everything. And in particular, I singled out Jerusalem as the issue that could not -- that if people expected that Arafat was going to be able to deliver on that, he could not. One can argue, you know, maybe he should, he would. I think the right assumption would have been to say he could not, and therefore structure the negotiations in a way assuming that that was the case rather than assuming that he was going to be able to do it, and then when he doesn't, to then start recovering.
So I think that was a mistake, and I think it was in part driven by Barak's belief and intent that he could do it. And the American team went along with it. And I think that was a huge mistake that has become a serious problem.
And I want to say a second reason as to why this happened to quickly after Sharon's visit and then the violence that followed. Now, we can argue one way or the other about whether it was really Sharon's visit or not. I mean, I think you can make a very sound argument that we were on borrowed time. Everybody knew the situation is tense. It could explode at any moment. If it wasn't Sharon's visit, it could have been a bombing in Tel Aviv or it could have been a settler attack somewhere, sure. I mean, there's no question the situation was tense and Jerusalem had become an issue.
But the fact is, we still had some time -- people knew we were on borrowed time. What you needed to do is try to prevent every little episode, including Hamas' attacks, in the meanwhile, because if you believed there was an agreement that was possible, you needed to wait for those two, three weeks -- it was a very short window. And you put those -- you put that agreement on the table and then you allow the moderate at least to have something to fight for. You have an agreement; you say, well, you know, we can hold onto this agreement, and you could fight off those people who want to oppose.
Now the moderates don't have anything to fight for on either side. The Israeli moderates say, look, we offered them all that much and they rejected it; how could we defend? And the Palestinians say, well we don't have an agreement, we've had only promises and how could we defend? Neither side among the moderates is going to be able to fight for anything and they're going to go on the defensive. So we have that problem right now.
But a second element, I think, in this spread of this violence so quickly, that cannot be underestimated is what I call the new media in the Middle East; I mean, we have a new phenomenon. And you know, in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I think the media in the Middle East was largely still controlled by the governments. You could filter a lot of the information and you could aim it in a way that would affect public opinion in ways that might suit governmental interests.
I think today we have a very different kind of media -- the globalization of the media -- in ways that nobody could stop the spread of pictures, the images, that we have seen. And I think cameras are everywhere. In fact, in the Palestinian areas alone, there are over 50 little television stations that are private, in every neighborhood of a big city, aside from Palestinian TV. They are so cheap to have; you have cameras, you have TV stations, equipment. It's very, very hard to control information.
And it's not a surprise. If you look at the two images -- or three images that have had the most impact, they were television images. The one on the Arab side was of the boy in his father's arms being shot. And if you look at the media, you know, the very first week of that was nothing but this issue and making whatever people wanted to interpret that. The images mobilize. And the lynching of the Israeli soldiers and the burning of the synagogue in Nablus, those things have had tremendous impact, and they spread the passions very rapidly and it makes it very difficult for governments to control.
I think this is a phenomenon that we now have to live with -- governments have to live with. But the bottom line is governments have less control. It's not that they don't have control; they have less control. I think they're still the dominant forces and I think -- but the price for them is higher. So to intervene makes it harder for them or almost impossible to intervene the second time around. So they need assurances that episodes don't repeat themselves because they cannot reemploy the same leverage over and over again.
Let me come to the third point which is about the American role.
I do not fault the U.S. for holding the Camp David summit. I think that was a wise thing to do, and I think had it not been done -- we were facing other deadlines that could have erupted into conflict, and maybe on the same degree and perhaps even more. I think it's not -- I think the U.S. diplomacy had to do something and, you know, we may have had this crisis earlier if we didn't. You can argue with whether the aims were too ambitious, and on Jerusalem I think they were. I have always believed that, I still believe that; I certainly believe it more now. But that was the issue, I think, where there is a disagreement.
But right now, I think it is fair to say that American diplomacy today is facing no longer peacemaking between the Israelis and the Palestinians. That was true two weeks ago; the aim was to get them to agree. Today is no longer just to get them to agree; that's almost a small piece of the problem. The U.S. today faces a major national security crisis because if there is a full explosion, which is now very possible, perhaps even probable, what is going to be at stake is no longer just violence among Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs and Muslims and so forth, which is bad enough, but very serious threats to American interests in a way that is going to stress American relations with the region in a way that is going to put pressures on American assets globally. As we have seen, obviously, yesterday -- we don't know yet what was behind the bombing in Yemen; this is -- this had to have been planned way in advance, but clearly people have a lot of plans on the shelf, ready to be exploited in moments of crisis.
And -- but more importantly, I think it's the economy. It's oil, stupid. I mean, ultimately, I think that prices of oil are likely to be pushed up. We -- the current increase is probably just a spike because of the events. Ultimately, it's going to be a question of supply and demands.
Psychology matters. When you have instability, it matters. And business people have to take into account risk.
But ultimately it's a question of supply and demand, and I think that one can envision a number of scenarios, a number of realistic scenarios, not far-fetched scenarios, that can lead into the reduction in the oil supply before the winter. And that could become a serious problem for the United States, so that the current crisis is no longer about helping Israel and the Palestinians. It's no longer about having a final status agreement. It is no longer about Clinton's legacy. It is now about serious national security interests of the United States, in a way that we haven't faced in a long time, and it has to be taken that way.
In that environment, therefore, I do not think it is a wise thing for us to now be calling people names and starting to assign blame. We might have to do that at some point, because when conflict becomes inevitable, you probably have to take sides, and you have to rally public opinion to take sides. And the U.S. may have very strong views on blaming, and they may be justified. But the point is, the U.S. is the only one at the moment that can deliver some kind of an agreement that would at least stop the violence. No one else can, for whatever reason.
And the problem right now is there is a crisis of confidence between the U.S. and the Palestinians. And we can argue about why the U.S. doesn't trust Arafat. The U.S. does not trust his intentions. And Arafat doesn't trust the U.S. and doesn't trust the U.S. intentions. It makes it very, very hard for the U.S. to play a role in that environment that is effective. There has to be -- and the immediate task is to restore that confidence. There has to be something done to restore that confidence on both sides, or else they're both going to lose on this issue. It's not a question of scoring points; it's a question of protecting national security interests at this time, of being effective diplomatically.
Even if you think that Arafat may in fact be wanting conflict, even if that is a -- I know that's a theory out there. I don't believe it. I think that he's -- it's not in his interest to have conflict. You can argue about what he could have done or should have done, and I think he could have done and should have done a lot. But the question of it -- I don't think his aim is to have conflict. He loses in conflict. He loses -- Hamas takes over. He loses control. He doesn't have an outcome. It's over for him. He doesn't have a conflict scenario that's workable, in my judgment.
But that aside, let's assume that that is a viable possibility, but we don't know. We are very, very unsure about what he does. If we're intervening diplomatically, we're assuming that there is a chance that he might actually want an agreement. Otherwise, we can't even intervene. We can't even have a diplomacy. To the extent that you make an argument or you make a persuasive -- you take a position which says there is a chance that he might actually want a peace agreement, then you have to, therefore, work with that, rather than begin with the assumption that he's not going to have an agreement. And if you think that an agreement is possible, then you have to begin with how to make it possible for him to move forward. Rather than shaking the confidence, you have to build the confidence. Rather than stress him more domestically, to the extent that that is one of his constraints, give him a little space to do so.
Now, how to do that, while at the same time addressing Barak's own problems -- and Barak is facing tremendous stress, and he's been -- he is clearly in a domestic mess as well as a bigger mess. And Israelis feel under siege, as do the Palestinians. You have to, obviously, try to balance that at the same time; it's very difficult. But nonetheless, in my judgment, the only way to do it is to have -- the first thing to do is to have some kind of step to build the confidence with the Palestinians.
I think that -- the latest news I have is that there is a chance that a summit might in fact take place in Egypt on Sunday, and that would be good news. I think that would be a very good step to move forward. And I think with it -- it would be only one small step. I think it might be possible for the president to now appoint an emissary, a personal emissary, who is in charge of communicating with the Palestinians, because I think the communications between Mr. Arafat and the president are really trustworthy at the moment, from the point of view of the two sides, when they're both talking to each other. You can't have the president of the United States on the phone all the time with a leader in the middle of a dragged-on negotiation. And this might be something that the president is going to have to contemplate; someone who would help the peace team put together a realistic proposal on that end.
Let me end -- I know I've been incredibly pessimistic, and I think it's warranted. Those of you have come here to hear the briefings, I've been one of the most optimistic people on this. But let me end up with some things that lend themselves to optimism that we haven't been watching. And I'll just say a couple of things about that.
First of all, today's news are not -- so far, as far as I can tell, are not too bad in terms of the level of violence, particularly after the prayers. That itself is good, and the news about the conference itself is hopefully good. But the bigger story, I think, is that there are a lot of people out there -- in fact, I would posit that there are majorities of Palestinians and Israelis, Arabs and Jews within Israel, who are sick and tired of this conflict and they don't want to see this violence. They're threatened, they're scared, they don't know how to move -- they don't know what action to take. But I can tell you, in my talking, constant being in contact with the region, that there are dozens and dozens of communities that are coming together, of Arabs and Jews, who are now trying to put rallies of peace to reject the violence and to reject turning it into a religious and ethnic conflict, and hopefully, their voices will increase if we give them something to hope for.
Thanks a lot.
R. Haass: Thank you, Shibley.
I realize I neglected to introduce myself. I'm Richard Haass. I'm the vice president, and director of Foreign Policy Studies here.
Let me begin with just one or two comments about the attack on the U.S. ship, and then I'll turn to some of the same issues that Shibley did. And as you will see, if I may characterize a former U.S. presidential candidate, this morning you will get a choice, not an echo.
First, though, with the tragic events of the attack on the Cole. Unfortunately -- it could come from any motive. I could imagine that those behind this, it could have been existential terrorism, people who just hate the United States for what we are or what we do. It could have had something to do with the U.S. military or diplomatic presence in that region. It could have been tied somehow to the peace process and to events between Israel and the Palestinians, though given the level of planning that was clearly involved, it's not something that was put together hastily. It could have been carried out by any one of numerous groups. It could have also had state backing.
The key for the United States right now and the most important tool in the game of terrorism, the most important tool is always intelligence and, obviously, U.S. assets will be trained on this issue. If it turns out there is no state backing that can be identified, U.S. options are few. Most of these groups offer very poor targets to retaliate against or to sanction. If there is state backing, however, the United States has much larger decisions to make about whether, again, there is military retaliation, sanctions, some combination of the two. But again, until intelligence comes up with some hard information that will stand scrutiny in the court of public international opinion, I think American hands are essentially tied, other than to take the sort of steps we are taking to try to limit the possibility of a repeat.
Let me talk about events between Israel and the Palestinians. Why are we having the problems we're having? In my view, it has a lot to do with the sense of let-down after Camp David; the pervasive sense that negotiations were tried and failed and that, as a result, it was now time, increasingly, to try other ways to realize one's political ambitions -- that is, through violence.
Now clearly, the Palestinian side was angered by the Sharon visit and images of individuals being attacked, but I don't think that is where the bulk of the responsibility lies. I do not think the bulk of the responsibility lies in Israeli actions; indeed, had Mr. Sharon not gone, I think some other match would have lit things off.
I would put the lion's share of the responsibility on the Palestinian leadership, on both acts of comission and omission, both at the time of Camp David and afterwards. I'm not suggesting, by the way, that Mr. Arafat can control or stop all the violence and turn it off like a spigot. I am not suggesting that. I accept the notion that some of the violence is ground-up.
But Mr. Arafat has essentially neglected two things: One is his public role as a delegitimizer of violence. Where are the statements that make it clear that Palestinians using force are hurting the Palestinian cause? I do not hear or see those statements. To the contrary, one sees statements talking about marching to Jerusalem. More generally, at Camp David, his unwillingness, I think, to negotiate in good faith had a tremendous impact on the prospects for diplomacy, something I will come back to. Secondly -- in a moment.
In addition, I think Mr. Arafat could be criticized for not calling on the Palestinian security forces to do their job, and those of you who have spent time in the Palestinian areas know that it is not a perfect democracy. It tends to be a fairly buttoned-down environment, and the forces of the Palestinian Authority are quite strong and able to do the bidding of the governing body there. They were essentially absent and allowed things to get out of hand.
Today, there were reports that certain individuals had been arrested. That's obviously welcome, but it's too little too late. So I think that Mr. Arafat can be heavily faulted for, again, acts of both omission and commission.
I also place some of the responsibility on the Arab world more generally. Clearly, there has been a disappointing lack of any rallying behind the peace process. Again, the silence is deafening. Where are the voices in the Arab world for compromise and moderation? I do not hear them or see them.
What about the United States? What about Camp David? Here, I would essentially agree with the critique you just heard from Shibley, and I think we've earned the right to make this critique. It's not simply Monday-morning quarterbacking, but I think we were making it Sunday morning also.
Camp David was flawed. It was flawed by being so ambitious, trying to accomplish so much so soon without having prepared the way. I've written a book about the concept of rightness. When situations aren't right, it doesn't make a lot of sense for diplomats to plow ahead as though all the preconditions were there. Instead, diplomats need to invest their efforts to create conditions of rightness. And in this case, it would have meant investing the time with Mr. Arafat, with the Arab world to try to bring about a context in which ambitious diplomacy had a much better chance of succeeding.
Failing that, if the administration believed that it was necessary to convene Camp David urgently because of the fear that the Palestinians were going to declare a state unilaterally and what that would lead to, and that's was a legitimate concern, then they needed to scale down the diplomacy. Diplomacy has to match the size of the opportunity. It has to deal with the realities of the context. And Camp David is a textbook example of diplomacy that was more ambitious than the context would tolerate or support. And again, either we had to do more to try to shape context, or we had to scale back the ambition of the diplomacy. We didn't. We plowed ahead with ambitious diplomacy in an unripe context, and it failed.
I think also the other criticism I would make of the administration is the lack -- not total, but the general lack of public diplomacy to complement what we were doing privately. If the administration concluded, and I think it would have been the correct conclusion, that the center of the Arab world, the center of the Palestinian community had not been made receptive to compromise, and that their own leaders were not doing it, the United States should have done more to help fill that gap. The United States ought to have been speaking out time and time again to try to go over the heads of the leadership to make the case for peace, to make the argument about why the course of compromise was better than the course of either holding out or the path of confrontation.
There's always a bias on the part of diplomats to think of diplomacy that's something that has to happen privately and in secret. And that's true for one level of diplomacy, for the specifics that are being worked out in terms of compromise. But you've got to shape the context. And when the local leaders themselves are unable, or more likely unwilling, to shape the context, it was incumbent upon the United States and others to help shape that context. And that is where, again, I fault the administration. Again, an act of omission more than an act of commission.
The results though are clear. What we have is mounting anger, but not just anger and bitterness. I think it goes beyond that. I would say in Israel right now, there's few if any doves left in Israel. And the reason is two-fold. One is the sense that what was offered at Camp David by Mr. Barak was by an order of magnitude the most forthcoming, generous offer that any Israeli government had ever made, and it was rejected.
And second of all, and here, Shibley again is correct, the impact of those images. It is violence on a retail scale as well as a wholesale scale, and the power of retail violence is that people can identify with it. And these images have shocked people. So it's raised so what we've seen in the last few week is not simply political questions raised about whether the Palestinian leadership will ever be a willing and able partner. But there's much more fundamental questions which are not psychological as well as political. This has caused trauma on the Israeli side. On the other side, also very strong reactions from images, from the frustration. And it is hard for me to see how essentially you go back to where you were.
The idea of trying to get back to Camp David, to try to get a final status solution to the Middle East, I, for one, find it inconceivable for not just the foreseeable future, but maybe beyond that. I just can't see what would lead people to a position where they are willing and able to make compromises in the future, in the foreseeable future, that they were not willing to make this summer. On the Israeli side, I do not see the survival of a government that is going to be in such a position to do that. And on the Palestinian side, I don't see the willingness of that leadership to do that, nor do I see that leadership taking steps which, over time, would give them greater capacity to compromise.
So the idea of trying to roll that large boulder back up the hill towards a final status agreement, I would simply say is -- to say it's questionable doesn't begin to say it.
What, then, can the United States do, given that there are obvious limits to what any outsider can do, even what the world's most powerful country could do. Well, I think there's three scenarios from this point. And here is, perhaps, where Shibley and I disagree a bit on the prescription.
One is essentially to do nothing. Sometimes standing there can be the best strategy. In this case, I'm not so sure. I think if nothing is done, sooner or later violence will begin to mount and there won't be any sense of potentially positive purpose for people to look to or events. Sooner or later you'll have unilateral actions that are taken by one or the other sides; the other will retaliate in kind with unilateral actions of its own; and you're more likely to have heavy skirmishes. And unlike the previous intifada, this is not going to simply be fought with stones; this is going to be much more large-scale or medium-scale military confrontations. Needless to say, that is an unattractive scenario or future.
What about a second approach, which is somewhat akin to what Shibley would do, and essentially what it would recommend is going back to the only path of successful peacemaking in the Middle East that we have known, which is step-by-step-ism. When you think about it, for three decades Middle Eastern diplomacy has been predicated on the notion of gradualism; that the final status problems were simply too big, too hard, and that what you had to do was gradually solve what you could, and in the process, build up trust and build up momentum so that over time you could tackle the bigger, tougher remaining issues. This was the logic of the initial disengagement agreements after the '67, '73 wars; this was the logic of Madrid; this was the logic of, ultimately, on the way to Camp David, the first Camp David; it was the logic of, more recently, Oslo. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that both sides now have disagreements with it.
On the Israeli side, it will be very hard to create support in Israel for handing over tangible assets like territory, which has been at the heart of step-by-stepism in exchange for promises of better Palestinian behavior. I just think that's going to be an awfully tough sale in Washington, given recent events and given the weakness of the Barak government. On the Palestinian side, given that issues like Jerusalem have come up so much to the fore, there's going to be tremendous frustration with agreeing to a process that doesn't seem to solve the fundamental issues. Indeed, if you recall, both sides critiqued step-by-stepism late last spring, and that was part of the reason that we went to the ambitious approach at Camp David, that particularly in Israel, and many of Israel's friends in this country weren't happy with what they saw as the one-sided exchange of Oslo where Israel was giving up tangibles in exchange for promises. Palestinians were frustrated with the slow pace of Oslo, and the United States essentially gave into that.
So it's hard for me, again, to see how we go back to step-by-stepism, as good as it, I think, served us for all those decades given that critique and given intervening events.
Where does that leave us if ambition is not going to work, doing nothing is not attractive, and if resurrecting gradualism may be extremely difficult? Well, my only other alternative and the title I will use for it is what I would call concerted unilateralism. And let me try to explain it.
By this I mean that the two sides would try to informally or tacitly orchestrate a series of unilateral moves in which they are not surprised by what the other does, but, on the other hand, they do not formally sign on to it. Or to put it another way, they try to implement those areas that they had negotiated at Camp David. They try to implement as many of them as they can without formally agreeing to what the other side does. It is the equivalent, if I may use a some