Camp David II: Another Chance for Peace?

Transcript

Richard N. Haass: Good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution.

I am Richard Haass, the vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies. With me today is Professor Shibley Telhami, who is both a nonresident senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution, as well as holding the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland. As you know, our topic this morning is Camp David II.

What we plan to do is speak about the summit that will be convened just outside Washington, beginning Tuesday, July 11th, where President Clinton is going to host Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, and Ehud Barak, the prime minister of Israel.

The way we plan to proceed this morning is, first, I'll turn to Professor Telhami, and he will essentially outline the principal issues that remain to be negotiated, as well as the politics behind the issues; that is, the willingness and the ability of the two parties to reach compromise. I will then speak again: in this case, on the dynamics of the summit, the possible outcomes, what I think will be the likely outcomes; its consequences, and my recommendations for the role of the United States.

All of this, we expect, will take approximately 20 minutes, though estimation is dangerous in this game. And then we will reserve the bulk of our time for your questions. And we'll have a microphone. And I'd only ask that you be relatively direct and identify yourselves. But first, let me turn to my colleague Shibley Telhami.

Shibley Telhami: Good morning.

This summit is certainly a gamble. It's a gamble, but it's an inevitable gamble. It's a gamble because it clearly is not precooked. The gap remains wide, and the chances of success are not especially high. It's inevitable because I think everybody knew that, ultimately, you are going to have to have a summit because there is no way of bridging the gaps at the level of the negotiations that are ongoing. And the only question was when to hold the summit; whether to hold it now, to hold it later, whether to hold one summit or to hold more than one summit.

And the decision was make to hold it early, rather than late. Perhaps one reason for it is that there is an assessment that time is no longer on the side of an agreement; that actually the later you hold it, the more difficult it will become. And the second reason probably is to preserve some time to recover in case this fails, to have a second chance; so, therefore, the timing.

Nonetheless, I would say that, despite the fact that the gap remains wide on the major issues between the parties, I think there is a reasonable chance that it could work. I think it's a gamble worth taking. Let me go over some of the issues.

Certainly, the official positions of the parties remain very far apart. They have not shifted their positions officially on the negotiating table much at all on the key issues. Unofficially, there's been a loosening of positions, and there are contours that are emerging on the major issues, and there are gaps that could certainly be bridged. And one can envision, if not a total comprehensive agreement, at least an agreement on major issues that may require some additional negotiations on some specifics.

So what I'd like to do is actually go through some of the issues, the core issues, and give a read on where I see them, based on the unofficial around-the-negotiation sentiment--how positions have shifted, unofficially, and where there is room for bridging a gap.

First of all, there is the terms of reference. You know, the Palestinians and the Israelis have been negotiating for the past number of years on, really, different reference points. The Palestinians have been negotiating on the basis of what they assume was 242, U.N. Resolution 242, which they understood to mean, quote, "full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza," and to the extent that there would be modifications of that, they would have to be on practical grounds--security issues, settlement issues, whatever concessions that have to be made--but the frame of reference for them has been U.N. Resolution 242 and 338, which essentially is a reinforcement of 242.

The Israelis, on the other hand, have been, in practice, negotiating on the basis that 242 does not apply in the same way to the West Bank and have, in fact, been negotiating in terms of how much more to give to the Palestinians, more than they now hold, more than they now have. And that's a huge gap, since the Palestinians don't hold much of the West Bank at the moment.

So the terms of reference have been contested. In practice, there has been a conversion, sometimes, of reference. In fact, last week, certainly the Israeli attorney general had a finding which said 242 does not apply to the West Bank in the same way as it applied to Sinai and the Golan Heights, reinforcing that Israeli position. The State Department came and said, "No, 242 does apply. The American position, in fact, is that the frame of reference is U.N. resolutions." And that was a reinforcement of, in essence, the Palestinian position.

But in practice, the Israeli position has been shifting, and it has been shifting--you can read it when you read the question of territory. Only a year ago, the talk was about possible Israeli withdrawal from 60 to 70 percent of the West Bank. Unofficially, there were floated proposals--actually, one formal proposal--of pulling out from about 80 percent of the West Bank. Then there were floated additional proposals of, perhaps, Israeli withdrawal from 92--92 to even 95 percent of the West Bank.

So the terms of reference have shifted, and actually, the Israeli arguments about maintaining chunks of the West Bank have been focused on issues, rather than on principle. That is, on "We cannot afford to pull out of these settlements on the green line," or "We need to have a security presence in the Jordan Valley." So they have been security- and settlement-specific, rather than principle-specific, and that is a very important convergence, I think, in terms of reference.

On the specific issues there has been also some convergence. I think one of the most difficult issues, clearly, is the refugee question, and here there are some red lines for both sides, but there is also room for reconciliation. I think that issue is bridgeable. In particular, despite the fact the Palestinians are insisting to this day, officially, on the right of return, which means, in practice, the return of all refugees to what is now Israel, in fact, there is no Israeli government that will accept that position. I mean, this would negate the idea of Israel and, as a consequence, clearly, the room for flexibility is there.

There is an understanding in the Palestinian camp of this particular Israeli need, but there is an insistence on the recognition of the right of return as a principle. And the reason for it is much more complicated than the actual practical settlement of the issue of right of return. I think it's very helpful to think of the right of return as a principal issue, and then of a settlement of the right of return.

What the agreement will do is settle the right of return question and, in a way, in order to settle it you have to have an acknowledgement. And the settlement of the right of return, which Israel clearly sees as one of the benefits that it would get out of an agreement--Israel wants to close that file once and for all. This is one of the positives that Israel would get out of the agreement, is to settle this issue once and for all, to close that file.

And in order to close it, there might need to be some acknowledgment of the principle coupled with a settlement that clearly would have various components, including the principle that Israel has already floated of accepting a certain number of refugees, perhaps on the principle of family reunification, and numbers have been floated for about 100,000 or so. But clearly, there has to be a resettlement of the refugees, and that resettlement package, permanent resettlement of refugees, has to be included and there have to be some places for those refugees to be settled. And it can't be forceable settlement and there has to be a compensation package. Certainly the Palestinians have floated the last couple of days a number of $40 billion for settlement, for compensation. That is, obviously, a figure that is going to have to be negotiated.

There are, by the way, numbers that are already out there. The U.N. has done a lot of homework on documenting properties. There are 400,000 properties that are documented with actual valuations of properties at the U.N., so it's not starting from scratch. There's already a stock of data available that makes assessment of properties.

So I think that while this is a complex issue, it's an emotional issue, it's a--for the Palestinians it's a question of identity, it's sort of--the acknowledgment of the principle of return, in a way, reinforces their feeling that their struggle has been worthwhile--the practical solutions are out there, and I think people are realistic about what to expect.

The question of Jewish settlements. Clearly that is a huge issue; perhaps, in my judgment, the most difficult issue because it entails a relocation of populations, and that is politically very, very complicated. And it's emotional for the Palestinians, it's emotional for the Israelis. I think, nonetheless, there is an emerging solution. Clearly, Israel expects that at least the major blocks of settlement along the green line would be annexed to Israel. And then you would be left with some perhaps as many as 60,000 settlers scattered in other settlements that would be essentially inside a Palestinian state.

Now, the real question is, what happens to these? I think the question of annexation of settlements that are adjacent to the green line, certainly the Palestinians are open to it. They have put forth the idea of exchange of land because they want to negotiate on the basis of 242, and they put forth the idea of getting, quote, "land of equal size and quality," perhaps to expand Gaza. That's going to be an issue to be negotiated.

But the real question is, what happens to the 60,000 settlers or so who would remain in the heart of a Palestinian state? There is a clear understanding that you can't have extraterritorial powers. That would be a prescription for disaster down the road. What do you do with that?

And I think here you have a sense that there may be a solution by--not necessarily by forced relocation, but by giving most settlers the option of either getting compensation or new housing under Israeli sovereignty or coming two years down the road to be under full Palestinian sovereignty. And the assumption is that if settlers in those territories have a choice, that they would choose the former rather than the latter. And that would be a way for Barak to manage that politically without having to have television screens showing him removing settlers from their settlements.

The question of Israeli security. Clearly that is a big question for Israel. Barak has made his reputation on the basis that he is tough on security. That is, in fact, why he was elected. And as a consequence, he is going to need to show that Israeli security is actually enhanced, rather than weakened, by this particular package. And he's going about it actually in a number of ways, including one way of consolidating the strategic relation with the U.S. and getting something as a side payment from the U.S. for Israel.

But on the ground, the major issue for Israel is, first, demilitarization; that is the Palestinians would not have a serious army in the Palestinian state. Number two, that they would not have the right to forge military alliances with other states without Israeli approval. And three, the Israeli military having access to the Jordan Valley in order to defend against possible threats that would come from Jordan or Iraq. And in that regard, there has been, I think, a softening of the Israeli position, because initially, clearly the Israeli position has been that Israel would annex--in any settlement would annex that territory. Right now the Israeli position is, "As long as we can address this military issue, the security issue, we can live with a different status on sovereignty." And I think there is definitely a lot of room--a lot of flexibility in this position.

On Jerusalem, obviously, one of the most emotional questions, and perhaps some aspects of it may not be resolved either this month or next month or by September, but nonetheless, despite the gap, and some issues of principle that remain very, very difficult, particularly within the Walled City; I think, for example, their irreconcilable positions about the Walled City of Jerusalem--I'm speaking of the one square kilometer where most of the holy sites are placed--where I think there is no major room for compromise, at least on the question of sovereignty, I do not envision that any Palestinian leader is in a position to accept full Israeli sovereignty over that part of the city, and I do not envision that any Israeli prime minister is willing to accept full Palestinian sovereignty over that part of the city. So that's an area that is going to be shady, it's going to have to be finessed, it's going to be very complicated.

But beyond that, it is interesting to see that there is then a softening of both sides' positions on Jerusalem. In particular, up until really just a few months ago in Israel it was very hard to hear any voices speaking of any compromise on Jerusalem, that Jerusalem would remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. Today you hear voices that accept the notion of expanding Jerusalem, maintaining it as a unified city without borders, but given some control, not just functional control, of Palestinian neighborhoods to the Palestinian state.

The most interesting recent example of that is a statement by Yosi Katz, a member of the Knesset from Barak's bloc, two weeks ago in the Conference on Palestine in Cairo--I have a copy of this with me--in which he floated the idea of giving the Palestinian state sovereignty over clearly Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem, in areas such as Beit Hanina and Silwan. So there is a vision that enables that already on the table.

Obviously, I've only touched on some of the core issues that are very complicated and are going to be difficult. And just to say that while there is a gap and an important gap, there has also been narrowing of that gap unofficially, much more than the official positions would reveal, and therefore, there is a chance that they might reach an agreement on it.

There are a number of very important issues that I didn't touch on, such as water, for example, which is going to be very complicated, very important to both sides. The details of the compensation package, any compensation package, very complex. The actual demarcation of boundaries. You might talk about generalities and percentages, but the bottom line is you're going to have to set boundaries. That's not going to be something that's going to be easy. Timing. All those sorts of issues are very complicated, and that's why it's unlikely that this agreement will be a comprehensive agreement in the sense of settling all the details. The most optimistic scenario would have it that there would be a major agreement on all the major issues, perhaps leaving a lot of details to be negotiated again, and perhaps coming back for another summit down the road.

I was going to speak on the domestic political limitations on both Barak and Arafat. I will leave that for questions and answers so I'd allow Richard to speak for a little bit more.

Thank you.

R. Haass: Let me go through five issues: why a summit now, whether it's correct to convene it, what are the likely outcomes, what are the consequences of failure, and lastly, what the United States should and should not do.

First, why a summit now? You've got three clocks that are ticking, and it's the ticking of these three clocks that essentially, I think, has led us to Camp David on Tuesday.

The first is Mr. Barak's clock. His domestic base has been gradually eroding--or crumbling, if you prefer a slightly worse metaphor--since he became prime minister. It is not just difficult, it is impossible to see how the simple passage of time will strengthen his domestic base. There are multiple fault lines in Israeli politics, and essentially whether it's the peace process fault line between hawks and doves, if you will, the secular-religious fault line, or any other number of them, the combination of them is increasingly undermining Mr. Barak's capacity to govern. Time will not strengthen him.

Secondly, it's the clock of September 13. This is the day that the Palestinians have increasingly committed themselves publicly to declaring statehood unilaterally, and everyone is worried about it, including the Palestinians. And I'll get to this later, but the bottom line here is, no one knows what will follow from a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians, but very few people, including Palestinians, are sanguine about the consequences. The feeling is, that is likely to set in motion a chain of events where everyone will be worse off. That is worrying not simply to the Palestinians but the Israelis and to the Americans.

The third clock is Mr. Clinton's and the fact that he is now in the last 16th, if my mathematics are correct, of his presidency. And we're right up against the conventions. Then we're right up against the election. And if he is going to do anything in the Middle East in his remaining time, there is no time like next week.

Is it--secondly, is it correct or was it correct to make the decision to convene Camp David II? I would give the answer "yes," with one caveat, which is that if it does fail completely, it will likely add fuel to the fire come September 13th.

That said, I think it's a risk worth taking, because right now we are on what you might call a drift towards crisis. Taking the risk, investing the time, seems to me more than worth it.

Thirdly, what is likely to happen? I would say there's three possible outcomes.

The first is success. And by "success," I mean essentially resolving what has been the core dispute between Israel and the Arabs, which is the Israel-Palestinian dispute. And this would mean taking all the issues that Shibley just outlined--territory, Jerusalem, refugees, settlement, the nature of a Palestinian state, water, what have you--and resolving them, and essentially having a treaty that would resolve this conflict once and for all.

I would describe the prospects for that happening as remote, and I say that despite the extremely generous Israeli position that is reported to be on the table. What Mr. Barak has been suggesting is far more generous and far more comprehensive than any Israeli government at any time has ever put forward. But the gaps are still quite large. I think Shibley Telhami gave you "The glass is half full," I'm perhaps more prepared to give you "The glass is half empty" on the remaining gaps, in part because I don't see a lot of capacity to compromise.

On the Israeli side, I have already noted Mr. Barak's weakened political base. On the Palestinian side, I have seen no evidence of serious preparation of the Palestinian public for compromise. Instead, we have had a lot of positions talking about, not simply going back to the '67 lines but even beyond those lines. And I simply do not think right now the Palestinian polity is psychologically and politically prepared for taking half or two-thirds of a loaf.

Indeed, I'd say here is where in some ways the comparison to Camp David I breaks down. And I think people have to be careful with saying that this is another Camp David. The geography is the same, but there are important differences. You have got much weaker leaders politically, than you had at the time of Camp David. Mr. Arafat is not in the position, say, of President Sadat; Mr. Barak is not anything like as strong as Prime Minister Begin.

You have also got tougher issues. At Camp David I, we were basically dealing with desert and strategic real estate; largely unpopulated or the population density was very low; very few settlements, very few settlers.

Think of the difference here: We are dealing with territory that's close in; that's not just strategically important but is theologically important, psychologically important. You are dealing with 200,000 settlers and over a hundred settlements. You are dealing with the holiest places in Judaism, very holy places in Islam. Again the differences, it seems to me, are fundamental.

You are not talking about making a Palestinian entity whole; you weren't talking about making Egypt whole. Plus here, you don't have an existing state you are negotiating with in the first place. What you are negotiating with is a Palestinian entity, represented by a Palestinian Authority, but not a government. For all these reasons, it's very hard for me, again, to see how an ambitious agenda could possibly be realized.

I would even add to this the idea that if I am wrong--and imagine that you could have everything agreed to on the issues--what each side--and in particular what the Palestinians would likely feel compelled to say, in order to sell it to their own constituency, would probably make it that much more difficult for Mr. Barak to sell it to his, because the Palestinians would likely feel compelled to say, "This is not the end of the game, but this is simply the first stage," because they have not realized all of what they wanted. And it's exactly that sort of rhetoric, which would create even more problems for Mr. Barak, who obviously already has his hands full.

What about the second option? The second option is what I would call a framework agreement. And what you might have here is the Israelis would agree, in principle or conditionally, to the creation of a Palestinian state but with certain ceilings or limits on its capacities. You might have some greater Israeli territorial transfer. You would have an agreement by the Palestinians not to take unilateral action, essentially not to declare a state unilaterally on September 13th.

What you would have, if you will, is a de facto new Oslo agreement that would essentially move this process along, provide enough progress and enough momentum and enough sense of optimism, so come September 13th, the Palestinians would not feel compelled to take unilateral action, which in turn could set in motion a tragic chain of events. This would not solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but it would get us past the immediate point of September 13th, and it would essentially keep the process going. And it would give everybody enough in their pockets to face their own internal constituencies.

The third possibility is a complete failure. And by that I mean, you have people come to Camp David and leave with absolutely nothing to show for it. I would call that possible but unlikely. Indeed, of the three scenarios, I think the most likely by far is my second one, the idea of a framework agreement, something between complete resolution and abject failure.

If, however, I am wrong and there were abject failure, what would be the consequences? Here is how I see it unfolding: September 13th, you would have a growing momentum towards the sense of crisis. You'd have heated rhetoric on the Palestinian side, all sorts of military contingency planning on the Israel side. If you then had, as I think would be likely, a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians come September 13th, I think the Israeli government of the day would feel compelled to take unilateral actions of its own, beyond non-recognition, obviously, of the Palestinian state. I think this would include land annexation, perhaps closure of the territories.

But what would quickly happen is there would be some areas of territory that would become contested. Essentially, the Palestinians would want that--they would say, "These are included in our new state." The Israelis would say, "No way; we want to annex them, or at last deny them to you." You would have Palestinian security forces or Israeli security forces bumping into one another. And this would not be another Intifada. You now have tens of thousands of Palestinian soldiers who are armed, and you would have fire fights and essentially military skirmishes. Sooner or later this would come under control, I expect, after an awful lot of casualties. You would at a minimum have a prolonged interregnum in any sort of negotiation or peace process.

You would clearly then have one political change in the United States: Mr. Clinton would not be around to pick up the diplomatic pieces. It's possible you could have political changes in two or three of the entities. Mr. Barak's prospects would be uncertain at that point, to say the least, and even Mr. Arafat's, given the passage of time, challenges in the Palestinian community, and his own health. So, if and when--and I think it's more a question of when--the peace process of some sort resumed, you would have at least one, possibly two, and not inconceivably, three new faces doing the negotiating.

And my view is that it would be hard to say how we would be better off then, because you would have had this violence, you would have the aftermath and bitter aftertaste of that, and you would also have new facts on the ground that will have been created, and my hunch is that will add to the negotiating baggage that the two sides would bring to the table. So it's hard for me to see how anyone would be better off from this scenario even if, as some people have argued, some sort of a peace process is inevitable. I would agree with that, but the odds of success, I would think, go down.

Lastly, the United States' role. We are an active mediator, which means neither inactive--i.e., we simply are not there to serve the meals; but also, not an arbiter. The United States can only mediate. It can provide bridging ideas, suggest ideas and so forth. But as often has been pointed out, it really is going to be up to the two parties themselves to make the tough decisions.

I would think that what would help in that role, something that was done at Camp David, is to discourage public comments, discourage leaks. This is going to be tough enough if it's kept private. I would actually try to keep down the size of the delegations, if I had anything to do about it. Cellular phones may, ironically enough, prove to be one of the greatest challenges to success at Camp David, too, and one area where technology does not seem to have helped peace processes.

I think what the Israelis have put on the table, as I've said before, is remarkably generous. And I think that an awful lot of the U.S. pressure, or active mediation, if you prefer, has to be on the Palestinians. I have not seen serious movement in the Palestinian position. Shibley Telhami alluded to certain public signals that there might well be. I think that's great, but I think one of the challenges for the United States is to see if it can't translate some of these indications into serious positions at the negotiating table.

I would think that the strategic goal of the United States, though, is to avoid the third scenario I laid out, which is complete failure. And I think the key decision for Mr. Clinton and his lieutenants will be at what point to give up on the goal of complete success and to switch over to the more modest aim of a framework agreement. And sometime, whether it's after several days or a week--you know, if one looks at the schedule, Mr. Clinton's supposed to go off to Asia for the G-8 meeting. One possibility is just before that, or maybe you take a break from the talks at that point, in the latter part of July. But at some point, if it becomes clear, as I think it likely to, that you cannot get a comprehensive resolution of this crisis, then the United States has to basically start tabling and preparing its fallback position. And the fallback position ought to be a framework agreement that, again, allows us to live and negotiate rather than to live and fight another day.

With that, let me end my remarks.

We've got a microphone for your questions, and we ask only that you keep them fairly direct and identify yourselves.

Barry?

Q: Thank you. Barry Schweid, Associated Press. This is a central point but you, Richard, touched on it in a way. What do you think of the wisdom of Israel constantly negotiating publicly, constantly improving its offers--last night two advance people laid out for a dozen American reporters some of the things you've been talking about--before even getting a Palestinian--or the Palestinians--although your colleague seems to think they have also been leaking or flagging concessions--it does seem to be essentially Israel in its usual mode of being very public, very verbal and, of course, topping each offer before the previous offer is turned down. Is that a tactical error, or does it somehow work to Israel's benefit and convince the unconvinced that Israel means to be conciliatory? What do you make of it as a diplomat--as an ex-diplomat and maybe a future diplomat?

R. Haass: I could punt and basically say, you know, we'll know in about 10 days or two weeks likely, if it was a good tactic. But that would be uncharacteristic of me, so I won't do it.

I have questions about it. I think there is a time and a place to go public, particularly if you're at a point where you think either by going public you can pressure the other side into making compromises, or even if you don't think that will work, you can then--in the aftermath of a breakup, you can make sure the bulk of the criticism and the opprobrium falls on the other side.

But I think the Israeli government needs to avoid a situation where it's essentially negotiating with itself, and it continually sweetens offers in the absence of anything forthcoming. Right now the goal is not to get the Palestinians to Camp David; that's been accomplished. I would actually go, if you will, on radio silence at this point. I think the goal is to get the Palestinians, once they're at Camp David, to be more forthcoming. And I don't think at this point simply floating new ideas, which are still going to be short of what the Palestinians say it is they need, I don't see how this strengthens Mr. Barak's hand, particularly given his domestic politics at home. He has to be careful that he avoids a situation where everything he suggests is not enough for the Palestinians but too much for his erstwhile coalition partner.

S. Telhami: Barry, may I just say something on that, because obviously I agree with the point that the Palestinians have not, so far, done enough in terms of preparing the public. I mean, they have floated ideas. No question, they haven't done enough of it. I think they're gambling, and perhaps correctly, that once they have an agreement they can sell it. Actually, public opinion in the Palestinian territories has been more supportive of the peace process, even when the situation has been absolutely awful on the ground, it's been consistent support for it. And after Oslo, despite the limitation, there was a lot of support.

But on the Israeli side, I mean, the trick, obviously, is to balance between strengthening your negotiating hand and preparing your public for concessions. I mean, that's the issue. And clearly, the positions have moved very, very dramatically in the past few months, and the public has to be aware of it rather than be completely shocked. Now, I'm not sure what the answer to it is, but it's a delicate balance.

R. Haass: In the second row here.

Q: Thanks. Nick Berry, Center for Defense Information. Mr. Haass, in your three scenarios you're a little pessimistic about a solution. If I remember correctly, in your book, "Conflicts Unending," you said that solutions are more possible if you have very strong leaders or very weak leaders. You made the case that they are very weak leaders, weak leaders that are getting weaker. Doesn't this bode well for perhaps more than the framework, but more of a solution? And add that to the fact that Clinton is in a fairly weak position, and wanting to be in the history books, will probably throw a good bit into the pot to favor the solution?

R. Haass: First of all, I did not set up this question to have one of my books plugged--mainly because I think it's out of print by now!

Let me be more specific. You're right, leaders do have to be either extremely strong in order to negotiate and sell an agreement at home, or so weak that they can't resist it. I think here we may have the worst of all worlds where the leaders are in between. I'm not sure they're strong enough to negotiate serious compromises and sell them at home, but I'm not sure that they're that weak that they can't resist it.

Indeed, Arafat, in particular, is in a position to walk away. And he could then say he wouldn't sell the birthright of the Palestinian people, he was a purist. I could see where he could do that. It's more difficult for Barak to do that, because it seems to me it's hard for him to ultimately face the polls as the peace candidate who couldn't deliver. So I think he's in a more problematic situation.

But, no, I don't think anyone is so weak, or where the unevenness is--is so great that either side can essentially impose its will on the other. So, in that sense, I actually don't think this is particularly ripe. I think there is, in any political negotiation, you've got to have leaders who, as we've just talked about, are in a position to sell it and who want to sell it.

And I think you basically do have the desire factor on both sides. I think both leaders essentially would like an agreement in principle. I don't think either leader favors the status quo, which is so different than you might have had, say, in the Syrian negotiation. But here I really do have questions about the capacity to sell, and you may have that in-between situation, again, where they're strong enough not to agree but perhaps not strong enough to compromise.

S. Telhami: You know, I'm not sure, actually, I agree with that completely, in the sense that I think that they both badly need it. In fact, I think they badly need it more than Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin needed it; and, in fact, Anwar Sadat expected failure, had prepared for failure, and Begin could have lived with failure, as long as he preserved the relations with the U.S.

In this case, yes, I think both leaders are weak, and the weakness, in some ways, limits them. They have red lines. And, clearly, Arafat is in no position to agree to full Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. I think he can't survive that, not just in terms of his own people or the Arab states, but actually in terms of his own legacy. This is a man who built his legacy on the Palestinian cause; this is a symbolic issue. I just can't see him ever accepting that notion. Similarly, I can't imagine that any Israeli prime minister would accept that, you know, Israel is going to become mostly an Arab state. I mean, that's just not possible.

But short of that, I think the scenario that you painted about the failure is a very strong argument why they desperately need an agreement; not just that they want it, but they really need it, because the alternative to them, while it's, maybe, viable, is potentially disastrous.

R. Haass: I agree, and that's why I think we'll get a framework, rather than the full package.

S. Telhami: Right.

R. Haass: I think that that might be the compromise approach that is as much as the political traffic can bear, but avoids the risks and penalties of complete failure.

Q: Norman Kempster, with the Los Angeles Times. Accepting your point that the United States is a mediator and not an arbiter, what is the most we can expect Clinton to be able to do here? What are the cards he has to play? What are the pressure points he can push?

R. Haass: Good question. I think there's a few things the United States can do. One is obviously just help in coming up with bridging positions and packages. Sometimes in negotiations it actually helps to make it more, not less, complicated, because you can give people trade-offs. What they can't in area one they can get in area two. So the United States can help there.

I think there's the threat of public description, that if the United States goes out and, by what it says and how it says it, it clearly puts the blame more on one side than the other. I think that carries tremendous weight. So if one side knows that the United States is essentially frustrated or fed up with it, they have to live with that. I think, more positively, the United States has lots of carrots in the way of--whether it's in strategical operation with Israel, all sorts of military and technological transfers that could be made; in terms of aid packages, trade arrangements; to essentially go out and beat the drum around the world for financial packages to help, in particular, a new Palestinian state.

So I think the United States has a combination of carrots and sticks it can bring to Camp David. I just wouldn't exaggerate it, and by that I mean I think the United States, by everything it says or threatens to say or everything it promises to do, can provide the last few percent, if you will, of an agreement. But I don't think we can either promise or threaten enough to substitute fundamentally for what the parties themselves are unable or unwilling to do. So we can play a clinching role, if you will, but we can't play--we can't really play more than that.

It's also going to mean that in order for us to play it, at some point, Mr. Clinton is going to have to speak to the American public and the Congress, and that's been missing a little bit here, and one sees rumblings on the Hill and elsewhere, where people aren't quite prepared for the price tag that may come. And an important part of this is going to be bolstering the process, and whether you get a complete package or, as I think more likely, a partial package, the United States is going to have to be prepared to take out its wallet, as are the Europeans, as are the Arab governments, the oil producers, as is Japan and others. And I think we should be prepared to both lead such an effort and contribute to such an effort, and that's another place where you need some public preparation. So it's not simply Mr. Arafat and Mr. Barak who have to prepare their publics; I would hope that Mr. Clinton would use the bully pulpit that is the Oval Office to prepare the American public and the Congress for what we may be asked to do.

S. Telhami: May I just add to this? If you review the American role in the mediation up to now, it certainly has been a role that is almost less than a mediator, in the sense that the U.S. has not been putting forth very clear bridging ideas on the table in most cases. And that may actually end up being a justified position. Frankly, I think people may look at this as being a reasonably good approach, given the fact that if we look a year ago, there's no way that American mediators could have put forth on the table the kind of concessions that are now likely to happen by the parties themselves. And it would have been shut down in the political environment in Washington.

But when the--in order to bridge the gap, there is no escaping some bridging ideas, because neither party is going to put that forth on the table. It's just not going to happen. And so the U.S. is going to have to formulate some ideas--not a peace plan, not an imposition--but clearly is going to have to think about ways of conveying, you know, third-party solutions or suggesting them, negotiating, as the basis of the negotiation.

And I also agree with the point of selling the accord and preparing for it, not only domestically, frankly, but in the region. I mean, one of the major failings of Camp David I was to sell that agreement in the region. There wasn't enough preparation to sell with other Arab countries, and ultimately, Egypt was left alone. It was a major success in the U.S. Historically, it looks like a very important success. Let's not forget that in the region it was seen to be a disaster. Most people had rejected it. There wasn't enough preparation to reach out to get a coalition to support it. And that needs to be done during--before, during, and after this process.

R. Haass: Sir? In the back.

Q: Thank you. Dick Uliano from CNN Radio. This sense of unease or disquiet or uncertainty that you described in the Palestinian community about the September 13th deadline--does that raise the likelihood that the Palestinians might be looking for something, anything, to at least come up with a framework, so there can be a backing away from September 13th?

R. Haass: I think up to a point, but when you say "anything," you know, like everything in life, the devil's in the details.

But yeah, I actually think, as is often the case in bluffs, this is one that people don't prefer to play out. Just as I think if Mr. Barak had had his druthers, the Israelis would not have withdrawn unilaterally from Lebanon, but that bluff would have translated itself into an agreement with Syria and ultimately Lebanon itself, so too I think that Mr. Arafat would prefer not to have to give in to the growing momentum to unilaterally declare a state on September 13th. He knows full well the risk he takes. And ultimately, if push comes to shove, the Israelis are bigger. They can shove back harder. So my hunch is that, as a result, he wants--he'd like to avoid it.

And I could see him accepting an agreement that, for example, had another territorial transfer, that perhaps talked about the principle of Palestinian statehood and so forth. He would--all he needs at this point is enough to essentially find a way to back out of that corner and saying the process is promising enough and good enough. And I don't think that's beyond the wit of man. I would actually--I would be surprised if we couldn't at least get that.

S. Telhami: You know, on this question, there's no question that all parties, as Richard said, do not want the unilateral declaration. It's not in anybody's interest. It's sort of a lost--it's a threat. It's a serious threat. It probably would happen in an environment of no possible agreement on the horizon. But it would--Arafat would need a lot, including, you know, sort of the acceptance of statehood prior to that in order to shy away from carrying out the threat. Perhaps by the end of the year--I wouldn't say September 13 necessarily. In fact, the PLO Executive Committee in essence gave him license to declare it any time between September 13 and the end of December.

But you have to remember the backdrop in the region. You know, here we're talking about the summit. In the regional--I just returned from the region last week. If you look at the coverage in the region, much of the coverage is still about Hezbollah. Much of the coverage is still about how they've succeeded, the victory, the glorious victory of armed struggle, and how the PLO and Arafat are selling out and how they're going to Washington to do this and that. And the backdrop is this pressure of fighting off against this trend that's emerging that, you know, the conclusions--and I think the erroneous conclusions--that were drawn from the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. And it is that pressure that he's under right now, and that--you know, he needs to try to figure out a way to resist that in the fall.

Q: You talked about carrots that the United States could offer. Have there been any estimates of price tags by the United States over the long term for this? And also, should the United States be prepared to send military troops for peacekeepers in this transition? What kind of role does Congress play, and the reluctance of Congress to approve this aid and this sending of troops over there, how does that affect the negotiations?

R. Haass: I haven't seen authoritative price tags. A lot depends upon the details of an agreement, how many people are moved on the Israeli side, what sort of security arrangements are agreed to, the amount of Palestinian refugees that are allowed to be brought back, what sort of allowance you'd have. I think you're talking about, you know, tens and tens of billions of dollars. But I wouldn't assume the United States necessarily does the lion's share of that. I think the EU would do a lot, I think the Arab oil producers would be asked. If you look at the Gulf War pattern, for example, the Japanese, the Koreans and others would be asked. Everyone has a stake in Middle East stability.

I think, though, there are some things the United States would uniquely do, which would in particular be certain types of military and intelligence transfers to the Israelis so they felt that they had been compensated in the security realm adequately for what it was they were risking.

I would not foresee peacekeepers in this type of an arrangement. This is not analogous to the Sinai or even the Golan, where you're essentially giving back territory to a state and you've got some sort of a buffer zone between. The distances are too small. The Israelis and the Palestinians, if this is going to work, cannot depend upon international peacekeepers. It has got to work on its own merits. And they are going to have to work out cooperative arrangements, which indeed to some extent they have. There's already all forms of functional cooperation between Israeli and the Palestinian police and security and intelligence officials. And this is not just going to have to be continued, it's going to have to be deepened. But I would think that there simply won't be call for some sort of an international presence because you're not going to have large areas of empty space between Israelis and Palestinians, as you have in the Sinai and as you would conceivably have, say, in an Israeli-Syrian agreement.

Q: I'm Rick Little with the Dallas Morning News. Why have the comments from the Palestinian side over the past couple of days been so pessimistic, predicting no chance for success, while the Israelis, as Barry noted, have been talking about concessions?

S. Telhami: Actually, the Israelis have also been pessimistic. I mean, Barak's assessment was a 50-50 chance. I don't call that optimistic. Today, actually this morning, many within his own government were saying that they don't hold out much hope for success. Both sides have been pessimistic. But I remind you, that is the typical, the normal approach to a major negotiation. You want to--you don't want to raise the expectations. If you listened to the rhetoric before the Camp David Accords, that's exactly the kind of rhetoric that you heard--that's Camp David one. Before Sadat came to Camp David to meet with Begin, he actually rounded up many of his ambassadors from the around the world to give them a lecture about the likely failure of the summit and to prepare for a public opinion campaign following the failure. It's not an unusual thing. That's what I would do, if I were in their place.

R. Haass: They're busy lowering the bar of expectations.

Sir?

Q: Charlie Wolfson, CBS. Shibley, it's perceived, at least, that Barak is much more anxious to be at Camp David too than Mr. Arafat. Is Mr. Arafat's stated reluctance to come tactical or is it real?

S. Telhami: Well, it's a very interesting question. And I think it's probably both. I think Arafat would have preferred, would have preferred waiting till later for two reasons. One, because, you know, he would have hoped that the gap would be narrowed a little bit more; I think everybody else would have hoped that; but also because it would be closer to his threat, the September 13 threat, because he sees that as a lever. And when you come to Camp David now without that lever, there is a chance that there might another agreement, you're reluctant to show all your cards. And so he wanted one summit to do it.

I think he did get a number of things to happen in the past few weeks. One is, he acted as though he was being very tough in the negotiations, you know--in fact, you know, the other side of not preparing his public is that he sounded as if he was really trying to hold out on the major issues. Number two, he got this State Department statement last week reiterating their position that the negotiations are based on 242 and 338, which clearly is something that he badly wanted before he enters into this negotiation. That helped him come to the negotiating table.

This has not, though, altered the impression, the very, very strong impression in the region that all the pressure is going to come on him because he's the weaker party in the negotiations. I don't agree with that. I agree with Richard on that one, that he in some ways there are red lines he simply just cannot--he can walk away from, he would rather walk away from than accept. So I don't think it will be an asymmetrical pressure system in those negotiations. But clearly, he's got a weaker hand to negotiate with.

R. Haass: Since Shibley just uncharacteristically agreed with me, let me take issue with something he said.

I actually think Arafat has some reason to be worried. The Israelis, as I said before, have been, I think, extraordinarily generous. They have put forward some very positive positions, and I haven't seen anything on the Palestinian side. And as a result, I think Mr. Arafat has to expect that Mr. Clinton is going to say, "Okay, what are you prepared to do to make an agreement possible? Where are you prepared to come back from your stated positions? What are you prepared to give Barak so he could sign an agreement or sell it to his own public?"

Right now Arafat has essentially been out there stating maximal positions. So I think he has every reason to expect to come under pressure because he can't expect to come to Camp David and simply be given on a platter his stated preferences. That is not in the real world. So he had better expect to get some pressure. And if he's unwilling to meet the United States and Israel half way, then I think he should expect the public and private criticism.

Sir? Just wait for the--I don't mean to give you a workout here.

Q: --Swiss daily, Tages Anzeiger. A question for Mr. Telhami. What makes you so relatively optimistic that the question of refugees can be solved? If you go to--as I've recently done--if you go to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, even in Jordan, you get sort of a different kind of reading on that topic.

S. Telhami: First of all, I didn't say "optimistic"; I said the gap has narrowed significantly.

But I should say this is an incredibly emotional issue for Palestinians, and it is emotional not just because, you know, people want to go back to their homes, but because it, in a way, is the raison d'etre of this struggle. I mean, when the refugee problem was created, the mobilization, the political mobilization, even before the idea of the state came up, was the right of return. This is why they remained in the refugee camps. It sort of explains to them why they have put up with so much suffering for a half a century. It sort of explains to them why they have put up with so much suffering for a half a century.

They need an acknowledgment of that. They insist on an acknowledgment that they have a right of return. And they insist on the acceptance of responsibility for that. Now, that's on the one hand. And I think that in some way has to be out there to handle this particular issue. This is a psychological issue, it's an emotional issue, it's a very important issue. I don't underestimate the importance of a psychological issue.

This is separate from: Okay, there is a right of return, there is a problem, there is a responsibility. How do we settle it? And the settlement of it, obviously, is going to have to take both sides' interests into account. That's the basis of the deal. The basis of the Oslo deal was to acknowledge the idea that there will be two people, two states. And you can't just then resolve that into one state; that just negates the entire idea.

Now, having said that, it is clear that some people are not going to accept it. And frankly a Palestinian government--a PLO or a Palestinian Authority--is not in a position to sign off individual rights of people to return or for property. What it can do, as an authority--it doesn't represent--the PLO is not a state; the Palestinian Authority is not a state. And even if it is a state signing this agreement, those refugees in Lebanon are not citizens of the state under international law. So the extent to which it can actually give--you know, settle their rights to return, individually, is questionable by international law.

What it can do, however, is close the collective file; that is, the file for collective Palestinian rights to return, the right of the state of Palestine to demand any extraterritorial jurisdiction over any part of Israel in the future.

And it can provide a package, a package of compensation. Any refugee who wants to buy into the package would agree that that buying into the package is a settlement of their right of return. You don't give up a right; what you do is you settle a right. So if I am a refugee in Lebanon and I have a package, which says: "We are going to give you three options: Get into a pool of being one of those who are going to go into Israel, whatever the number is; or moving into a Palestinian state, or going to be settled permanently somewhere else. You have those choices. Plus, you are going to get, you know, $15,000 compensation." I am just giving this from the top of my head.

But, if they were to accept that, then they are essentially signing off accepting the right of return. You have to have something in it for individuals, not just for the collective. But that's the kind of deal that it is; it's not that you're going to get every individual to accept it. There will be individuals. And I assume that there will be legal cases down the road, even after an agreement, where individuals are going to file for individual rights. And nobody can control that.

R. Haass: It's also just important to remember that there is a difference between the right of return and the reality of return and the economic absorptive capacity of any Palestinian state will be far less than the potential number of people who could come back, if everyone actually exercised this right. And so I think we are talking about much smaller numbers than the so-called pool of Palestinian refugees. And also I think, even if I am wrong and there was a larger economic absorptive capacity, I don't think everyone would exercise the right. It's--again, we're talking here about symbols, which is not necessarily good news because symbols are often more difficult, rather than less difficult, to compromise at a negotiating table.

We have got time for about two more questions, and then we've got to wrap it up. Yes, ma'am, in the third row?

Q: Thank you. My name Sharon Kehnemmui and I work for FoxNews.com.

I am wondering: You said that the U.S. has been less than a mediator at times. And the way I understand it is Carter basically held the two leaders hostage during the first Camp David, until they came up with a solution. I am wondering what you think the impact will be of Mr. Clinton's departure, and his comings and goings, and what your sense of the U.S. expectation is out of this event?

S. Telhami: Do you mean by the departure to Asia, whether he will leave them behind and go and come back before it's finished? I assume that they're keeping their options open. I assume that a cancellation is still a possibility. And why cancel if you don't know what's going to happen? I assume that's what's happening there.

But in terms of less than a mediator, I think the U.S. has been, quote, more of a "facilitator." It has been extremely reluctant to put forth its independent ideas. And I said there were times when that was very justified, actually. But right now you can't do that. You can't bridge this kind of gap without putting forth ideas.

The hostage question is interesting. I wrote a book, actually, on Camp David. I researched that very, very thoroughly. And very clearly, the timing of the Camp David was very important. The pressure, the isolation created a certain sentiment that propelled them toward movement. But during Camp David, there were times--during Camp David I, that is--there were times when both leaders were about to depart, and particularly Sadat. And there I think Carter used his bilateral leverage very effectively.

It is in a way, as Richard said, it's really sort of a mistake to make too much of a comparison because it's a very, very different situation. In that case, Egypt and Israel came to Camp David focused more on preserving their strategic relations with the U.S. than on reaching an agreement with each other. And Carter understood that that was a most important leverage that he had in playing them against each other. In this case there is no such thing. There is no possible competition for a strategic coalition. I think, you know, Clinton has his own incentives why he wants a deal, and largely a personal one, but ultimately could afford to walk away from it. And I think that it's a very, very different structure.

Q: Chia Ting Chen, freelancer from Bethesda, Maryland. And the settlement both for the refugee and settler are very complex and expensive. If the U.S. is the so-called "active mediator," and also we have heard that the question of what the U.S. can offer, is Clinton able and willing to foot the bill both as principal contributor and also hand out a hat? And also, he needs to have a framework how to do the settlement.

R. Haass: I think if there's progress at Camp David II, I think that will put the United States and Mr. Clinton in a position where they can effectively campaign domestically and internationally for the necessary support. And indeed, having convened this summit, that is implicit in that, that you will then follow it up with whatever is necessary.

And my own view is, if there is progress, particularly if there's a lot of progress, that will create opportunities and possibilities that may not be so obvious now. Certain people who seem to be reluctant or resistant to funding or otherwise supporting a peace process I do not believe will continue to be reluctant or resistant if indeed there is progress. No one will want to be held accountable for seeming to pull the rug out from under a significant accomplishment.

So quite honestly, I don't take all that seriously, the complaints or criticisms or statements that are being made which suggest that Mr. Clinton will have trouble raising the necessary funds, either domestically or internationally. If this thing really goes well, and in a sense if my skepticism proves unfounded, I think that will give Mr. Clinton all the ammunition he needs.

Whether he--coming to your second question, as I understood it--whether he in fact has a framework, I would be surprised at this point, particularly a fallback framework. I think that's the sort of thing that will emerge from the negotiations and consultations up at Camp David. They'll get a sense of what the parties can agree to, what is necessary to get us past September 13th, and so forth. This will be an act in progress.

We've got time for one last question. The gentleman behind you. Here.

Q: Miles--

R. Haass: Miles, why don't you just wait 10 seconds? Here we go.

Q: Miles Pomper from Congressional Quarterly. Following up a little bit on that, in terms of the Hill, do you see--how much resistance do you see to the aid package because of the controversy over Falcon?

And also, is there any--in terms of--the last few years, there's been a lot of linkage between parties in Israel and parties in the United States--Likud and the Republicans, the Labor Party and the Democrats. And the Republicans, when the Wye River settlement came out, were fairly reluctant to fund that, because they saw it as political opportunism on Clinton's part ahead of the mid-term elections. Do you see that as a problem for this, if there's a package here, especially if it's not comprehensive, if it's just a framework agreement that still demands money?

R. Haass: A couple of good questions.

I think there's a fundamental difference between Camp David II and the Wye, which is that you've got a Labor prime minister, someone of that orientation, in the case of Barak, who is essentially doing the running and the pushing for a peace agreement, as opposed to a Wye, when one had a Likud prime minister, Mr. Netanyahu, who was clearly, shall we say, a reluctant peacemaker. And you had much more the image of American arm-twisting at Wye than I think you'll have at Camp David over the next few weeks.

So if the Israeli prime minister enthusiastically embraces what emerges, and he essentially blesses the agreement, then I think that takes care of a lot of your political resistance or problems on the Hill.

The question of the Falcon--for those of you not up on it, the question of Israeli transfers of certain AWACS-like technology to China--yeah, I think that is a cloud that will complicate the administration efforts. And it's not--it's still not clear to me that Israel will necessarily go through with that. I think that it can expect to come under growing pressure, and I think that is yet--that's not a done deal, if you will, on the Hill, because I think there is genuine and widespread pressure that truly troubles the friends of Israel and not just others.

And I think there was another part of your question, but I've--I probably lost it in that tangle.

Q: [Off mic]

R. Haass: I want to thank my colleague Shibley Telhami, from the University of Maryland and Brookings, for joining me this morning. And I want to thank all of you for coming here to Brookings to hear this briefing. Thank you. [Applause]

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