Transcript
Richard N. Haass:
Good afternoon. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. I'm Richard Haass, vice president and director of foreign policy studies. For about the next hour we will have a briefing on the situation in and around the upcoming summit in Korea. I won't spend a lot of time describing this setting—you've got two people coming up who are true experts on the subject—other than to say that this potentially a major event with far-reaching consequences, both immediate to the Peninsula, but also beyond for the region, as well as to United States foreign policy. The fact that so many of you are here today I expect attests to just that.
We're gonna hear from two people who are as authoritative on this subject as any I could think of. We're gonna begin with Joel Wit, who is here as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution—well actually a guest scholar, to be technical. He is writing a book on the U.S.-North Korean agreed framework. He is someone who knows about this not just academically, but very much as a practitioner. He was the coordinator for this process, was there at the side of Bob Gallucci during the negotiation process and much of the implementation process. He will speak first, for about 15 minutes, give or take.
He will be followed by Robert Seuttinger, also here on a visiting basis at the Brookings Institution. Bob Seuttinger is writing a book on the U.S.-China relationship, and particularly about the domestic political contexts both here as well as in China.
Appropriately enough, both of these gentlemen are—they look tired, it's because they are. They are both suffering from jet lag. Joel Wit is just back from Korea. Bob Seuttinger is just back from China. So, what you will get is not only, we hope, a thoughtful perspective, but you will also get a fresh perspective.
Let me begin with Joel Wit. He'll speak, again followed by Bob Seuttinger. Afterwards, we will take your questions. And when you do ask questions, we will pass around a microphone. I ask you to identify yourselves and please be brief, as we would like to limit the statements today to these two gentlemen. Thank you very much.
Joel Wit: Thank you, Richard. As Richard mentioned, I just got off the airplane yesterday, so if I start lapsing off into sleep, you'll all understand what's going on. Anyway, what I'd like to talk about today is the summit, North Korean policy, what's going on in South Korea, and also, finally, the implications for the United States.
First, on the North, I think it's no secret that the North has been in the midst of a major diplomatic initiative to improve its external relations. And this initiative, in retrospect, can be traced back to a Kim Jong Il publication in August 1997 where he laid out his plans for the future in terms of improving relations with South Korea, the United States, and Japan. The initiative gathered a great deal of steam after Secretary Perry visited North Korea in June of 1999, and then has expanded to become truly global over the past year, and it entails improving relations with Japan, Russia, EU, Australia, Italy, Canada, and even some countries in the Middle East, like the United Arab Emirates. And finally, it's intensified with the announcement of the summit and Kim Jong Il's trip to China.
There are many different reasons for this initiative, and I'd like to just go through a couple of them. The first one that's very obvious to everyone is the regime's survival. Getting economic assistance is very important for North Korea and it's using that economic assistance in better external relations to bolster its political stability. And in this context it's important to note that Kim Jong Il's 60th birthday is in a few years, and for those of you who are Asians, you understand that's a very important event. And, many North Korea sympathizers in Japan have suggested to me that all of this is preparation for hi 60th birthday. And also they've suggested that it's also to put the country on firm footing in order to start the next succession process, which, of course, will be his son moving into positions of power.
The DPRK's decision to kind of touch the political third rail of improving relations with the ROK is based on their assessment that Kim Dae Jung is a man they can work with. He has demonstrated consistency and independence in his pursuit of engagement of the North, and this is in marked contrast to his predecessor, Kim Young Sam. And it also may be based on the fact that the Hyundai project of sending tourists to Mount Kumgang in North Korea has proven to be fairly successful from the viewpoint of North Korea. It has earned them a lot of money, and they've also been able to minimize the impact on their own society.
By nurturing relations with South Korea, the North also hopes to put pressure on the United States and Japan to be more forthcoming with assistance. It is no secret that North Korea has been very disappointed with the stinginess of the United States and the Japanese when it comes to providing economic help.
And finally, and this is just speculation, but after six years in power, it may be that Kim Jong Il feels political secure enough to take these kinds of bold new initiatives, and particularly the North-South summit, which must have been a difficult step to move forward with.
What I find particularly intriguing about this whole diplomatic initiative is Kim Jong Il's own personal charm offense that's going on. The summit and the Beijing visit are being viewed in Northeast Asia as a sign of normality after years of speculation about Kim Jong Il and his links to past terrorist acts against South Korea, but now he's being viewed as someone who can be done business with. And it's kind of reminiscent of the initial Western reaction to Gorbachev, where, you know, the same thing was happening. So, the bottom line is, I think that we should be sensitive to the fact that there may be more bold initiatives to come. I'm not sure where, but you know, possible targets include, you know, towards Japan. And so I think we shouldn't be surprised if there's more in the pipeline.
In South Korea, the summit obviously has broad-based support. ROK officials are convinced that the North is very serious. The summit is now a subject of an expectations game in Seoul. The ROK government is trying to lower the expectations for the summit, and you find many officials saying that just having the summit means that they've succeeded, and they've also been comparing the summit to the 1970 intra-German summit, where not much of substance really happened. All this is a function of the domestic politics in the South. There's a strong opposition party, which has expressed support for this summit, but it's also waiting for an opportunity to label Kim Dae Jung as naive. And Kim Dae Jung's ability to sustain the momentum started by the summit will depend on maintaining his public support, and that in turn will be affected by perceptions of success or failure.
Let me talk a little bit about the range of possible summit outcomes, and I'm gonna focus on process and substance. On process, I think what South Korea needs is to establish a regular government-to-government contact. So far, South Korea's engagement policy has largely been moved forward through non-governmental exchanges. Government-to-government contacts have been lacking since the early 1990s—or regular government-to-government contacts have been lacking since then—so I think this is something that the South really needs to put in place.
There are two alternatives in that context. One is possibly having more summits after this one. If that were the case, it would really be an extremely important outcome. There's already speculation in Seoul that Kim Jong Il may visit Seoul by the fall. I'm not so sure about that. I'm a little skeptical. In the past, when his father was supposed to have his summit and they were making possible arrangements for a visit to Seoul, Kim Jong Il basically told him "Don't go there, you're not going to be well-received." So, he's likely to be very cautious about visiting Seoul.
An alternative might be lower level government-to-government contacts, perhaps through some of the committees that initially operated in the early 1990s in order to implement the basic agreement reached between North and South in that time period. These committee cover various subjects like economics, reconciliation, military issues and other subjects. If these were restarted, that would be a very important outcome as well.
On the substance of the summit, there is of course a lot of skepticism about what might come out of it. One thing that people are talking about is there will of course be some symbolic language based on past agreements like the basic accord that may lay out a vision of reconciliation. But there also may be some practical measures. On economic issues, from my conversations with South Korean officials, it is very clear that they are looking for mutually beneficial agreements and do not want to have a giveaway to North Korea. They have been talking about steps ranging from South Korea sending coal to the North to help with power generation, and other steps to set up negotiations for agreements for investment guarantees, double tax avoidance and dispute resolution. But I would expect any large scale economic assistance at this time.
Another issue that is on the minds of everyone, at least in South Korea, is arranging for some family reunions for people who were separated by the Korean War. It's a very symbolic humanitarian issue in the South, and without some progress on that I would say the summit results would be open to attack.
On military issues there is also a great deal of hope for restarting direct military-to-military contact under the basic accords military committee. That would largely be symbolic in the beginning, but it would also provide a great deal of fire-proofing against any possible criticism by the opposition party.
So I think the bottom line here is if you want to try to define what a successful summit might look like, from the South Korean perspective at least, I think the South Koreans have to have something that establishes regular government-to-government contact. There may be some economic agreements included, but they have to be mutually beneficial. And the North has to take steps to help reunite some of these separated families.
So what are the implications of all this for the United States? Well, obviously that depends on the outcomes. If the summit is a one-time event, then there won't be many implications. But if it's the beginning of a process of improving North-South relations, and even a gradual process, I think it could have a number of important implications. And what I would like to do is just cover four particular points.
The first point is that improving relations between North and South could prove very stressful for trilateral coordination, and that's the whole process established by Defense Secretary Perry during his recent review of U.S. policy. There have already been some signs of stress in that relationship in the run-up to the summit. We've heard about U.S. and Japanese concerns that the South would not raise nuclear and missile issues. I think those concerns are exaggerated. The South has now decided that it will raise those issues.
But I would like to also stress that even if—and it's a big if—even if the ROK wanted to somehow avoid raising these issues and tried to move forward with improving relations, it really couldn't do it. And the reason is that the ROK can only go so far in improving relations with North Korea because it's limited by its own economic situation. So any process of real reconciliation will have to have the involvement of other countries—maybe the United States, but certainly Japan. And the North itself understands this, which is one reason why it wants the ROK to pressure the U.S. and Japan to be more forthcoming.
So I think all this points to the need for more careful coordination, trilateral coordination, if North-South relations start gradual improvement, whether the existing consultative mechanism is sufficient, the TCOG is unclear. We may need a more senior mechanism. And we may need a mechanism that includes not just people from foreign ministries, but also others involved in defense policy.
That leads to a second point, and I think it's another important point. If North-South relations start to improve, we also need to pay very careful attention to policy integration, not just coordination. And by that I mean improving—there are two tracks we are proceeding down—improving political and economic relations with North Korea; and another important track which is limiting North Korea's military program, particularly weapons of mass destruction delivery systems and hopefully conventional forces.
I think the danger is that improving political and economic relations will make much greater progress than securing limits on the military. And so what we need to do is avoid the worst of both worlds. And by that I mean a North Korea that is revitalized by foreign economic assistance, and at the same time is using those resources to revitalize its own military capabilities.
We haven't reached that point yet, but there are some signs that North Korea's military efforts are recovering from the crisis, the economic crisis over the past few years. Their military exercises have been increasing, although they haven't reached the level of the pre-crisis level. And there have also been recent reports in the South Korean press that North Korean military spending has increased dramatically in the past year. In fact, it may equal the spending of the previous five years. I don't know if those reports are correct or not, but we need to avoid this kind of situation.
The third point I'd like to make in terms of U.S. policy is that if there is a process of gradual improvement, the U.S. will have to carefully consider not just the end point of a transition away from the current Cold War situation to one of greater normality, but how it wants to play in the process of transition.
Now, everyone understands that process may ultimately affect the future of U.S. forces on the peninsula in Northeast Asia and maybe our whole posture in the Pacific. But if we want to successfully manage that transition, our diplomacy backed by the security presence may not be enough. As reconciliation proceeds, the U.S. troop presence may become—may be viewed more as a negative than a positive in South Korea. And if that is a danger, the U.S. has to play a more active, positive and tangible role to influence the transition. One key component in that role may be contributing economically to any assistance provided to the North during this process of reconciliation. This may be a domestic—a very tricky problem for the United States domestically, though many of us who participated in the KEDO project understand that. But it could have an important impact on our ability to maintain a presence in Korea.
And the last point—last and not least—improving the North-South relationship could undermine U.S. efforts to secure national missile defense to the extent justification is based on the threat from North Korea. You know, I am always—I always find discussions of national missile defense very interesting, because they always ignore political developments on the peninsula, and that really doesn't seem logical to me. It's hard to imagine a process of improving North-South relations, presumably accompanied by warming relations between the United States and Japan that would not undermine current U.S. arguments for such a system. If that process were pursued properly, it would diminish the threat for long-range missiles through more—for example, more concrete long-range flight test moratoriums, an end to exports that would dry up hard currency used to build and develop missiles; perhaps a shrinkage in the North Korean missile production base; and finally maybe even a ban on deploying such long-range missiles.
So I think I have gone over my time limit. Why don't I stop here and let Bob get up here and have a shot.
Robert Suettinger: Joel is a bit of a hard act to follow in terms of providing a detailed discussion of this issue.
The last time I did a press event was about two days before the election in Taiwan. Now I am doing one about three days before the summit meeting in Korea. I would much rather do these afterwards in order to analyze the event rather than try to predict what they are going to be. But nonetheless I'll go forward with just a couple of points in addition to the ones that Joel raised.
When you do these kinds of promontory analyses, you sort of come out answering only the basic question of are you pessimistic or optimistic about the outcomes here. And I am guardedly pessimistic, as I have been over a long period of time.
I think we have to bear in mind that this process is a very small but very important step in a much longer-term practice, no matter whether it turns out to meet expectations or disappoint expectations. Nevertheless, this marks a very important symbolic steps.
Those of us in the West I think have a tendency to look at the substantive rather than the symbolic, and dismiss the symbolic as unimportant. In this case I think that would be a mistake. The fact of this meeting is a very important event in and of itself, and it was of course planned that Kim Il Sung would meet with the South Korean president, but he died before that summit could take place.
Now several years later we are about to have the same event take place with a different cast on both sides, and with a fundamentally different relationship between the two Koreas. But nonetheless the symbolism, the importance of this, the two sides meeting as equals, without either side's allies in attendance, I think is a very important symbolic step and we shouldn't gainsay it.
One hopes that all the plans have been made, that nothing further is going to interfere with it. And I actually do believe that that is the case. In many previous occasions of course North and South Korea have crippled to the point of calling off meetings over questions such as, you know, the height of the table, or you know minor matters in which one side would try to prove its superiority to the other. I think both sides are to be commended for taking a very cooperative approach to this issue in this case and ensuring that the details of the meetings have been worked out smoothly and without a lot of arguments in advance.
The fact of the matter is, however, that there is no reason to believe at this point that the North is making a fundamental change in its approach to all these problems. Notwithstanding the fact that many commentators have observed what they call a surprisingly good sense on the part of North Korea in terms of pursuing its diplomatic initiatives, nonetheless there are still indications that the fundamental nature of the system has not undergone a significant transformation yet. And I would just point to the fact that North Korea has closed its border with China and is limiting a number of foreign people who are going to be allowed to come into Korea during the month of June, so as to better prepare itself for the summit meeting with South Korea.
I would note that some of the most important arguments have taken place over the size of the delegation that will be brought, and the number of journalists that will be brought into Pyongyang accompanying Kim Dae Jung. And this is not an unimportant consideration: the last think North Korea wants is a lot of journalists wandering around unescorted in Pyongyang. So the fact of the matter is that notwithstanding a much more open approach toward the rest of the world, this is still the regime very, very much concerned about maintaining its control, very, very much concerned about security and the threat that is presented to that security by the outside world.
Let me speak just a moment about something—picking up on a couple of points that Joel made with regard to the security situation in Northeast Asia. If this process proceeds along certainly the track that President Kim Dae Jung hopes it will go along, obviously you are looking at some fairly fundamental changes in the security architecture that we have been looking at in the Korean Peninsula for a long time. I mean, the Cold War has been declared over in the Western world, but it has been declared still very much alive on the Korean Peninsula by me among others, and I think that changing that perspective is going to be very difficult, not only on the ground but also in the minds of people who are looking at it. So if you begin to see a significant reduction of tension, if you begin to see at some point an actual reduction of troops and taking aboard confidence-building measures and the like, you really are going to have a lot of people thinking that major changes are not only underway but are necessary in order to perpetuate this improvement in the relationship. Of course one of the principal targets that will be chosen both in Korea and Japan will be the presence of American troops. And I note that there have already been some protests in that regard in Korea in the last couple of days in the expectation that the summit meeting with lead to amelioration of North-South relations. That of course is, as Joel mentioned and pointed out, is going to be a very, very difficult topic, not only in Korea but also in Japan, because if there is a draw-down of American troops on the Korean Peninsula, there will certainly be an expectation that a similar draw-down will take place in Japan, and that opens up a whole new can of worms of a very different nature.
Another security consideration that I think is important to take note of in this has been the role of China. Of course, the world took note of Kim Jong Il's trip to China in the last week of May, his first trip outside of Korea in a very long time, and his first trip, I believe, to China in something like 17 years. Certainly, it emphasized and heightened the importance of China's role in the negotiation of differences between North and South Korea. China is perceived by both sides in ways that perhaps other countries are not, as being an honest broker. It has been involved in hosting the secret meetings that have led to this summit arrangement, and it's played more or less a very positive role, both in the four party talks and in other circumstances in trying to bring the two sides closer together and into proximity with each other in circumstances that would enable them to come to some sort of an agreement.
I think that we can expect that China will continue to play that sort of a role—obviously not putting itself out and forcing a solution on the two sides, but again, continuing to provide its good offices and its support, particularly for North Korea. Obviously, among the subjects that Kim Jong Il spoke about in Beijing was the continuing Chinese economic support in terms of providing both food and petroleum products to North Korea to keep its economy running.
One last issue that I think needs to be looked on and that is just to reiterate the seriousness and really the immensity of the implications of this process—not necessarily this particular meeting but of this process for the United States. As I said earlier, a lot of U.S. strategic thinking has been focused on a North Korea threat, not only to South Korea, but also to, now, the continental United States in terms of the North Korea missile program and it's nuclear weapons program. It is going to be very interesting to watch, I think, how U.S. focus on weapons of mass destruction in terms of our relationship with North Korea will meld with South Korea's approach towards a gradual, and at least in the early stages largely symbolic amelioration of North-South relations. In a word, they don't quite fit.
And U.S. expectations and hopes that South Korea will carry our water to North Korea in terms of some of these issues, I think need to be dealt with very carefully. We should not entertain expectations that are too high that South Korea will make efforts to solve our problems.
But that said, I think President Kim has done an admirable job in leading up to this meeting and making sure that the United States and South Korea are fully in agreement on policy towards the North, both in terms of nonproliferation issues and on other issues. He has also, I think, been unusually successful in getting Japan and also China to go along with his sunshine approach towards the North. So, I think that in looking at the preparations that have been made for this summit, one has to give considerable credit to President Kim in doing a lot of the initial work to avoid the misunderstandings that have plagued this issue in the past.
R. Haass: Thank you, Bob. Before opening up, let me just say two or three things very quickly, in part to show you that there's not complete unanimity up here on the panel, and just to highlight one or two things.
It's interesting, if we had had this meeting several years ago about Korea, we probably would have been debating scenarios of either North Korea collapse or invasion. And the mere fact that we're having it on the eve of a summit I think it's an interesting development in and of itself.
That said, for many Americans looking at what happens, the symbolism won't count for that much. And it's a potential source of difference between the United States and it's South Korea ally. And what will matter more than anything else is the nature of the conventional and unconventional military threat posed by the North. And unless ultimately one sees some fundamental changes in the degree of threat posed by the North, I think the United States will be very loathe, to say the least, to in any way fundamentally change its policy.
Secondly, I think it's easy to exaggerate the consequences of even an improvement in North-South relations for the American debate over missile debate. The American consideration of a greater role for missile defense is driven by many things, not simply North Korea. It's driven by new technologies, and it's also driven by other so-called rogues. And, in the absence of a fundamental change again in the threat posed by the North, I don't think you will see a major change in the U.S. defense debate. And if there were a major change, I think the implications would be on the architecture and the timing of American defense plans rather than on the basic concept itself. It will create a situation of less urgency and less emphasis on the single site in Alaska architecture, but I still think, even if tomorrow if North Korea became a democracy willing to live in peace with its neighbors—shall we say a less than likely immediate development—you will still have an American debate over ballistic missile defense, though again the timing and the architecture will change.
And I agree also. I just want to stress one thing, which in a word stress is the operative word, and I think that both of my predecessors used it, I know Joel Wit did. Maintaining good alliance relations in difficult times is difficult. Maintaining good alliance relations when things are improving on the ground is even more difficult. Stressful is the word. The consultative demands are going to go up, not down, if there is a modest improvement, and indeed the potential for fissures between the United States and Seoul or, and Tokyo is great. And if the experience in Europe is any guide, the importance of really an intimate relationship between the United States and South Korea will be great. The only way that the Cold War ended as peacefully as it did with a unified Germany inside NATO—this was anything but a preordained outcome—was really because, I think, a very effective American diplomacy. There was nothing inevitable about any of that. And I would just think that here the diplomatic demands are going to be great, but the payoffs also could be great.
And with that, let me open it up. Again, I ask you to identify yourselves, to wait for a microphone, and to be as brief as you might, as I expect there's more than one person who wants to get a question in. Maybe I'm wrong, because I see no hands heading up. Thank you very much. There's a lot of shyness in the audience today.
Question: This happened at a Japanese meeting—
R. Haass: Please identify yourself.
Question: —the first question, then everybody calms down. This is Chris Nelson with the Nelson Report. It was mentioned that one of the things that we might want to look for down the road a bit if this meeting goes fairly well is the North Koreans will continue what I think you see as a policy of variable leverage, they will shift attention back to Japan. You know, they've used the Chinese to get our attention, and they're getting what they think they need out of the South Koreans for now, so, you know, the Japanese might be next. I don't mean this in the negative sense, but if that is what you meant, what kinds of things do you think they might be thinking of to do with Japan, what expectations would they have of Japanese performance back?
J. Wit: Well, I don't know how familiar you are with the issues that are separating North Korea and Japan. There's the issue of the kidnaped families—I mean kidnaped individuals on the Japanese side. There's the Red Army hijackers, airplane hijackers on the North Korean side. There's the demand for an apology and reparations from Japan. The issue is how can each side convince the other that they are serious about resolving these problems. And to some degree it's a question of phasing. You know, each side wants the other to go first. So, if there's some way of dealing with that, then you might see very rapid progress. There may be ways of exchanging, you know, letters between leaders that, you know, put down on paper commitment to resolve the issues that are of concern to the other side in the context of, you know, resolving the other issues as well. So, there are lots of different mechanisms. And I think it's just a question of finding the right combination to move forward. And even though the North Koreans have canceled the most recent meeting with Japan, I think there are unofficial contacts going on that are exploring how to make some progress on these issues.
Question: Do you see that as something happening quickly over some time next year? Is there any sense of timing on this in your mind?
J. Wit: It's very hard to say. I just—I just don't know about that. It may be that after the North-South summit plays out, the North Koreans may return and focus more on their relations with Japan. I don't think they can do two of these things at once. It's just too much for them to handle. But, it may be logical that that would be the next step. I don't see the United States as being the next step, actually.
R. Suettinger: Let me just add a point to that, if I could, and that is that the South Korean government has been very assiduous in their pursuit of the point that it is the South Korean government that should play the lead role in the improvement of relations with the North. And I think that they will be very careful to try and make sure that both the United States and Japan understand the importance of that primary role for the South Korean government so that efforts, even if North Korea makes them, to move on to the United States or to Japan as the next step in the improvement process, will probably meet with some resistance in Seoul and create the kinds of stress that Richard was talking about.
R. Haass: Yes, sir, in the middle.
Question: —Well, it's well known that North Korea hopes to establish relationship—relationship with the United States. If this summit goes well, how significant is it, the impact is on the establishment of relations between the two sides? And do you think that the next step or the—probably the North Koreans looking for the U.S. going to work in this direction?
R. Suettinger: I don't want to dismiss the summit as not being a significant step—it's very significant. The U.S. has been pushing hard for years for improving the North-South relationship. But you know, the issues that separate the U.S. and North Korea, we all know what they are, and I don't know if they're going to be affected by the fact of a summit meeting. There is the issue of their missile program, there is suspicions about their nuclear program, on something the North Koreans are really interested in, being removed from the terrorism list. The are very specific steps they have to take to get off that list, and so far, you know, they haven't been willing to take them. They've known about these steps for years. So, it may have some sort of, you know, overall kind of feel good effect on the U.S., but there's still these tough issues that need to be dealt with.
Question: Alexander Mansourov, Brookings Institution. Bob, do you read any significant to the report that two former presidents of South Korea, Mr. Kim Young Sam and Mr. Roh Tae Woo, will be in China during the summit meeting, in light of what you said about the role of China? And (B), North Korea declared that its head of state will attend the millennium summit in New York, hosted by the United Nations. Do you see it, any possibility for whoever is coming, be it Kim Il Sung or maybe Kim Jong U himself, meeting the head of state of the host nation, the United States?
R. Suettinger: In an election year. Both very good questions to which I, you know, the honest answer is I don't know, in either case. I hadn't read the report about the two former presidents being in China, so I have no reason—I have no comment on it.
Question: It is a fact.
R. Suettinger: It is a fact. Well, and I think it's a very interesting—and again highlights the point that I raised briefly in my initial remarks, which is the important role that China is playing in this. And the fact of the matter is that South Korea has established a good relationship and good working relationship, excellent trade relationship, with China, and now looks to China as a power that can be helpful in resolving some of these issue, and I don't think that China's role has been a disappointment to them. So, the fact that President—former President Kim and President Roh are going to be in China is not a surprise. But I don't think one should read any additional significance into that. Neither of the two is a particularly influential figure in South Korean politics these days, and, you know, at least one of them will have to check with his parole board. But, you know, the fact of the matter is that China has played an important role and will continue to do so.
As far as meeting with the president of the head of state at the millennium summit, that is a headache that I'm glad I don't have to try and resolve. And I have no idea as to whether there will be any impetus to do so. I doubt it.
J. Wit: If I could just add one point. I know there are many Koreans here, but for people, other people here, you know, it's very interesting, I think beneath the surface in Seoul there's this kind of tug-of-war going on between, you know, people who want to continue a very close relationship with the United States, and others who see the, you know, their future destiny in war with China and the United States, and it's kind of played itself out in the recent appointment of ambassadors to the United States and to China. The ambassador to the United States was just some first term legislator who—he may be very well qualified, I'm not saying he isn't—but the new ambassador to China is a former foreign minister. And so people are reading a lot of symbolism into that, although it may not be there, but it's there underneath the surface and it's something to be very aware of.
R. Haass: There must be someone on this side of the room. In the back, sir.
Question: Hello. Jed Duvalle, EXB TV. As you're speaking, I remember the trial of Lloyd Bucher in San Diego and the testimony, and the bitterness, and the hatred, and the loathing that were between these peoples, among these peoples, I should say. Do you see not over months or years but over decades a change in tone, a slight thawing? I mean, is there a long, long line that is at least going up a little?
J. Wit: Between the United States and North Korea? Well, you know, it's very hard to say. I mean, I can talk about some of my personal experiences in North Korea. And, you know, I've been there many times and those personal experiences, one of the characteristics is not this kind of bitter give and take that you may have seen back then, with people in certain parts of the government like the foreign ministry and other parts who are more of my age, my generation, there's a much more reasonable give-and-take, I'm sure. On the other hand, I've had experience with North Korean military people, particularly last year when I had to visit Kumchang-ri and was surrounded by thousands of them, and those people are, you know, very hard line people. And they haven't probably, they probably haven't changed much since the experience you're talking about. So, it's a very mixed picture, I think. And now I never get to go back to Kumchang-ri
Question: My name is Ok-Nim Chung, visiting fellow of the Brookings Institution. Let me make a brief comment, if I may, to Joel's remark on the new ambassador to the United States from Korea. The reason why President Kim selected Mr. Hong as the new ambassador to the United States is not because U.S. is not important to the security interests of Korea, but because he's one of the close associates of the president. So, president himself puts important on the U.S.-South Korea close relationship. That's why he appointed Mr. Hong as the new ambassador, so you don't have to worry about anything about.
J. Wit: No, I'm not worried. And you and I understand that that's a good thing, but in the press, as you know, there is a lot of back-and-forth about that.
Question: I know. One question to my American colleagues. As it seems to me, if something to do with election year in the United States, that's why the U.S. has made very little progress in its dealings with North Korea. And secondly, it's well—my sense is if support there is big progress in inter-Korean summit, it would be, it sounds like it's a real big problem to the U.S. strategy towards the Korean Peninsula. So, my question is, what will be the next administration's policy towards the North, regardless of which party will take power? Will there be some kind of drastic approach toward North Korea, like Mr. Richard Armitage implied if the Republican candidate will become elected as the president, he will take drastic approach like in the issues in U.S. troops, and he will take bolder approach, more aggressive engagement of the North. Something like that. So, what is your personal views on the new administration's policy toward the North?
R. Suettinger: Well, in many ways, of course, statements made during a campaign are often things that have to be dealt with after you actually get into power. And sometimes, one can't follow one's campaign statements, as President Clinton learned with regard to China policy. The fact of the matter is that either administration is going to be confronted with a dynamic situation on the Korean peninsula. And I think one thing that most American policymakers when they get into these positions learn very quickly is that you can't take an ideological approach, that you have to be pragmatic and practical, try to deal with the issues at hand and deal with them in ways that don't make your life more miserable in the future.
So I think that no matter whether Vice President Gore is elected or whether Governor Bush is elected, that both of them will be inclined toward taking a careful approach at managing these issues. There are, as you indicated and as Joel indicated as well, going to be some serious problems and some difficulties in managing the variant expectations as to what the United States wants from a North Korean relationship and what South Korea wants from a North Korean relationship. Those are going to require very—as Richard implied—very intimate discussions, very careful discussions among the policymakers involved. And I think that it won't matter whether a Democratic or a Republican Party is in the administration; it's going to be a process that will be undertaken very seriously.
J. Wit: Just one more point. You know, part of what the North Koreans are doing, I think, is basically creating barriers to change in U.S. policy, because, you know, the coordination process works both ways. It's not the U.S. kind of keeping control of what South Korea and Japan are doing; it works the other way, too.
So South Korean and Japanese policy are heading in a definite direction right now. And I think that direction will certainly limit the ability of any new administration to adopt a policy that may be contrary to engagement. So the next administration I think is going to find its policy choices very narrowly constrained.
R. Haass: Sir?
Question: My question is to Mr. Wit. I was—
R. Haass: Would you please identify yourself first?
Question: My name is B.J. Yang from the Korea Economic Daily. I was told that Mr. Wit was involved in the agreed framework creation. And this morning I would like to remind in the audience that there was a meeting in the AEI that one panelist came up and said agreed framework, under the agreed framework, like, to order a reactor was going to be—I mean, it seems to be an unwise choice. He did not explicitly say renegotiation is necessary, but he thought it was a bad idea.
At the end of the meeting, Dean Wolfowitz came up to the lectern and said agreed framework must be undone. And another panelist in the meeting for my ambassador to Korea said it was not actually agreement. Isn't it reflecting the mentality of American approach to this, and it is a long story, about nine years. And what is your response to this kind of mentality?
J. Wit: Well, you know, I agree with what Bob said, that people say a lot during the course of a campaign and then find that they have to, you know, be practical. And, you know, I wouldn't be—I wouldn't want to be on Ambassador Wolfowitz's delegation to South Korea and Japan to try to, you know, to implement that kind of policy. It's just not practical at this point. The agreed framework is not going to be undone by the United States the way that some people may be advocating.
The other point I'd like to make—and, you know, unfortunately—fortunately and unfortunately I've been involved in this process for the past six years. And I have to say that in probably the past five years I have not heard one new argument why the United States shouldn't have done, you know, what it did in 1994. The arguments against it have been the same for the past five years. The counter-arguments have been the same for the past five years.
And you know, at this point, I don't know—I don't really know what to say, except, you know, if someone could come up with a new argument why this agreement is a bad agreement, I'd be very happy to listen.
R. Haass: We've got time for one or two more. There's a gentleman in the back waving a pen.
Question: Hi. My name is Hiroshi Fuse from Mainichi newspaper, Japan. First of all, welcome back to Washington, Mr. Wit.
So let me ask you about a question on Russia and the U.S. summit, which took place on the 3rd and on the 4th in June, on this month. So the president of the United States and the president of Russia have agreed to set up a joint monitoring system of the missile launch and some space vehicle and, I believe, which could detect and notify the launch of a missile of North Korea.
And my question is, how do you think about it, this kind of monitoring system? Is it significant for U.S. and Japanese diplomats to have this kind of measure?
And the second point is, how do you think about the policy—Russian policy towards North Korea? Is it going to be changed under the Putin administration? Thank you very much.
J. Wit: You know, I'm not really an expert on Russian policy, so it's really hard for me to answer. And Alice—Alexander probably knows a lot more than I do.
But it seems to me that just my general impression is that Russia is becoming much more active on the Korean peninsula. And you know, the foreign minister was there recently, and other officials have been visiting. And there's been a lot of speculation about Russia helping North Korea rehabilitate its power industry, because many of the plants were built by the Soviet Union. And they're not operating now, and it's been an important bottleneck in the North Korean economy.
So there—you know, there may be an important role out there for Russia, not just in the security area, but also in the economic area, in terms of trying to engage North Korea.
On the first question, you know, I'm sorry, but I just don't know enough about that now. So I'm not going to be able to answer. Maybe Richard knows more.
R. Haass: You know, on the joint station, I don't think there's a lot to say. It was one of the—you know, for those of you who did not follow the summit intimately, it was one of the modest agreements in the nuclear realm, where the two sides could not agree on the big issues. I think this is something that's essentially there to not so much deal with the North Korean threat but to help the two countries really build confidence to deal with more fundamental potential situations of uncertainty or confusion, dealing with what might be some sort of suspicious event, and to allow them to confirm exactly what it is or, more importantly, what it is not.
I don't see that, however, as in any way aimed at North Korea. What was potentially more North Korea-specific was Mr. Putin's suggestion about thinking about the idea of common boost-phase architectures for ballistic missile defense. And that's something that's attractive to the Russians because it means that anything the United States did in the area of ballistic missile defense would be limited to essentially close-in challenges such as potentially posed by North Korea and would not pose a threat to the Russian strategic arsenal itself. But we're a long ways away, to say the least, from U.S.-Russian agreement there or on anything else.
We've got time for one more. The gentleman in the back. Yes, sir?
Question: Egan Oschtat [sp] from the Swiss daily, Tages Anzeiger. Could you gentlemen please elaborate for a layperson in Korean affairs the importance of family reunions?
J. Wit: Well, as you know, there were many families separated by the Korean War. And there have been very large numbers thrown around, like 10 million people. I think a lot of—the numbers are probably much smaller now because, after all, it's been, you know, almost four decades. And periodically there have been these efforts—and it's a very important issue in South Korea—efforts to try to reunite these people, to get them together again and to see each other again, and they really haven't ever worked out that well.
So it's an issue that has a great deal of symbolism in South Korea. And it's basically a humanitarian issue, although maybe the North Koreans view it as something that might contaminate society. I don't know.
But it seems now that finally, from everything I've heard, that there will be progress on this issue. And honestly, I think there has to be progress, because if there isn't progress, the summit will not be viewed as a success in South Korea.
R. Haass: With that, we want to thank you. Clearly, the events next week will be an interesting way of celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. And I want to thank Joel Wit and Bob Suettinger and thank all of you for coming here this afternoon. And I promise we will do another briefing if the summit turns out dramatically different than either of these men suggested today.
[END OF EVENT]