Transcript
R. Haass: Well, good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. I'm Richard Haass. I'm director of foreign policy studies here.
This morning's briefing, as you know, goes under the title: "In the Shadow of Kosovo: President Clinton Goes to Europe." What we're going to do this morning is cover the latest developments with Kosovo, but also essentially preview the president's forthcoming trip to Europe. As you know, he leaves in several days. I believe he stops first in France, where he'll have a series of bilateral meetings with Mr. Chirac and others. He then goes on to Cologne, which is essentially the heart of the consultative part of his visit.
First you will have the G-8 Summit of industrialized countries — seven industrialized countries and Russia. You will then also have the U.S.-EU meetings. And on the sides of those — as we used to say in government, on the margins of those meetings, you will have a series of bilaterals, including one with President Yeltsin of Russia. And then the last chunk of the trip is to various places in the Balkans; clearly, Slovenia, and I understand that the itinerary is evolving as we speak.
He'll be away for over a week, and it's one of the principal European trips of his tenure as president. He obviously goes there at an important time vis-a-vis Kosovo. There will be some loose ends to discuss; one, obviously, in the news today, and that my colleague, Jim Goldgeier, will discuss in some detail, is the question of the Russian role. And it's unlikely that will be resolved before he gets there and meets with President Yeltsin, and that will clearly be one of the big questions. I think, though, there are many other big questions about Kosovo, which Ivo Daalder will address, including the entire question of reconstruction of Kosovo, of Serbia proper, and so forth; how to deal with immediate problems of refugees, as well as longer-term questions of resettlement and reconstruction.
On Russia, besides the question of the force ,there's also larger issues of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the Russian-European relationship that will obviously come up. But I think also what's interesting about this trip, and indeed, it would be interesting even if Kosovo had never happened at all, is that it comes about a decade into the post-Cold War world. Indeed, it was 10 years ago that the wall came down. And here the president of the United States is going over to Europe and he has these two principal consultative mechanisms, the G-8 and the U.S.-EU talks, and these are essentially talks with America's principal partners about shaping the post-Cold War world and international relations, essentially. Jeff Frankel will emphasize the international economic dimension of these talks, the whole question of so-called international financial architecture, several years now into — since the onset of the Asian and global economic challenges. And the question is: What exactly is on the agenda? What is a reasonable set of expectations to have on the economic side?
On NATO, you've now had the first tranche of enlargement. NATO has gone from 16 to 19. We've had the experience in Kosovo. Well, what now? What now and what next for NATO? Where do we go from here in the direction of enlargement? Where do we go next in terms of the Balkans more generally? That set of issues are very much on the agenda. Where do we go vis-a-vis Russia? What sort of a relationship do we envision in the long run between European institutions, trans-Atlantic institutions, on one hand, and Russia?
There are still questions for the United States and Europe. These meetings take place just at a moment when one sees significant evolution in Europe thinking about their own foreign and security policy roles. It's quite interesting that Mr. Solana, the secretary-general of NATO, is going to be changing hats and is going to become essentially the high commissioner of European foreign and national security policy.
And the United States for several decades has long talked about the idea that we want Europe to be more capable, we want Europe to be more united, we want Europe to take on a larger role in the world. Well, as some of us — as some people have pointed out, be careful what you wish for. That may indeed be happening, and the real question is: What is Europe prepared to do? What is on Europe's agenda in the way of enlargement? What is on Europe's agenda in the way of a new foreign and defense policy role? How does the United States perhaps want to influence that? What would — how would we know success if we were to see it in several years? What would Europe look like? What would NATO look like? What would the trans-Atlantic relationship look like?
And one of the things that complicates it is a range of issues where the United States and Europe clearly don't see eye-to-eye: Iran, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and so forth. We have very different ideas about the use of sanctions, about the use of military force, about the use of economic incentives, about the use of diplomacy.
And the reason I think it's important to get all this right is that when one strips away some of the rhetoric on both sides — American resentment about what Europeans are not doing, European resentment about what Americans are doing — the fact is that the United States and Europe remain one another's best friends and best partners. And if the United States is going to have significant assistance in trying to shape the post-Cold War world, not simply in Europe and beyond, it is going to largely have to turn to Europeans. And indeed what might be most interesting about this period is, the most significant test of the U.S.-European relationship may ultimately be beyond Europe. And I say that despite what we've just seen in Kosovo. So, clearly, it's a rich agenda. Basic questions of European security and stability, basic questions of global security and stability that span the economic, the political and the military.
To help guide us through this, we've got three talented gentlemen. We're going to be begin with Ivo Daalder. Ivo is a visiting fellow here at the Brookings Institution on leave from the University of Maryland. He spent time on the National Security Council staff earlier in this administration working on matters of Europe, and he is just completing a manuscript for us on the Bosnia war and the experiences and lessons of that. He is going to talk about Kosovo, talk about NATO and security questions.
And next we're going to turn to Jeff Frankel, also someone who served in this administration, on the Council of Economic Advisers. He occupies a chair here at Brookings and will, I guess, also be occupying a chair pretty soon at a university somewhere near Cambridge, Massachusetts, if I understand correctly. But Jeff is one of the most distinguished economists of his generation, and we are lucky to have him here as much as we do.
Third, we're going to turn to Jim Goldgeier, who is visiting this year here at Brookings. He is a professor down the street at one of the Georges, George Washington University. He has just completed a manuscript for us which will be published later this year as well. In this case it's on the decision to enlarge NATO. And it will be a study of why that decision was taken and how it was taken. And like his two colleagues up there, he also served in the Clinton administration. Indeed, I am the only person standing on this platform who did not serve in the Clinton administration. [Laughter] And I will just leave that alone and not take that one any further.
Let me turn to Ivo. I've asked each of them to make fairly short presentations, seven or so minutes, plus or minus, and then when all of that is done, we will open it up to you for your comments and questions.
I. Daalder: Thanks, Richard. I'm not sure that people inside the Clinton administration really celebrate the fact that some of us were in that administration. That's a different issue.
After what was a clear and disastrous stumbling into war that left NATO with no choice but to stand by and watch as Mr. Milosevic emptied out Kosovo of its Albanian citizens, NATO regrouped and recouped itself in late April. Contrary to the expectations of many, including myself, a concerted six-week bombing campaign, combined with stepped-up diplomatic efforts and, in the last few weeks, a significant offensive by the Kosovar Liberation Army, NATO has now succeeded in achieving what are its revised aims. The Serbs are moving out. NATO, after a 24-hour delay, I am sure is moving in, and the refugees may, therefore, be able to come back.
However challenging the war may have been, the challenges of peace loom at least as large, if not larger still. And I want to step back and really focus not on the minutiae of the peace but on the larger tasks that we face, of which I think three stand out, the contours of which will have to be decided at next week's G-8 summit.
The first is to stabilize Kosovo and to set it on a path toward a secure future. No easy task when you consider what Kosovo looks like today — empty of a population, empty of inhabitable homes, empty of infrastructure that has been destroyed, and empty of an economic base. In the immediate term, NATO will have to be firm in its control of this territory. It will, in effect, run this place. Much like MacArthur ran Japan, McCloy ran Germany after World War II, General Jackson, the British commander of KFOR, the Kosovar force, will be the effective pro consul for many, many months, perhaps even longer than that, given what is likely to be a delay in setting up the international civilian administration, let alone setting up local governing capacities and institutions.
Foremost in the task that General Jackson and his forces will face are the removal or neutralization of one million land mines, of booby traps in houses and roads and bridges, of poisoned wells, of drinking water, et cetera, so that civilians can begin to move freely. This is a mammoth task, even under normal circumstances. And these are not normal circumstances.
Secondly, NATO will have to provide for firm law and order. Soldie