Transcript
R. Haass: Well, good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution. I'm Richard Haass. I'm director of foreign policy studies here.
This morning's briefing, as you know, goes under the title: "In the Shadow of Kosovo: President Clinton Goes to Europe." What we're going to do this morning is cover the latest developments with Kosovo, but also essentially preview the president's forthcoming trip to Europe. As you know, he leaves in several days. I believe he stops first in France, where he'll have a series of bilateral meetings with Mr. Chirac and others. He then goes on to Cologne, which is essentially the heart of the consultative part of his visit.
First you will have the G-8 Summit of industrialized countries — seven industrialized countries and Russia. You will then also have the U.S.-EU meetings. And on the sides of those — as we used to say in government, on the margins of those meetings, you will have a series of bilaterals, including one with President Yeltsin of Russia. And then the last chunk of the trip is to various places in the Balkans; clearly, Slovenia, and I understand that the itinerary is evolving as we speak.
He'll be away for over a week, and it's one of the principal European trips of his tenure as president. He obviously goes there at an important time vis-a-vis Kosovo. There will be some loose ends to discuss; one, obviously, in the news today, and that my colleague, Jim Goldgeier, will discuss in some detail, is the question of the Russian role. And it's unlikely that will be resolved before he gets there and meets with President Yeltsin, and that will clearly be one of the big questions. I think, though, there are many other big questions about Kosovo, which Ivo Daalder will address, including the entire question of reconstruction of Kosovo, of Serbia proper, and so forth; how to deal with immediate problems of refugees, as well as longer-term questions of resettlement and reconstruction.
On Russia, besides the question of the force ,there's also larger issues of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the Russian-European relationship that will obviously come up. But I think also what's interesting about this trip, and indeed, it would be interesting even if Kosovo had never happened at all, is that it comes about a decade into the post-Cold War world. Indeed, it was 10 years ago that the wall came down. And here the president of the United States is going over to Europe and he has these two principal consultative mechanisms, the G-8 and the U.S.-EU talks, and these are essentially talks with America's principal partners about shaping the post-Cold War world and international relations, essentially. Jeff Frankel will emphasize the international economic dimension of these talks, the whole question of so-called international financial architecture, several years now into — since the onset of the Asian and global economic challenges. And the question is: What exactly is on the agenda? What is a reasonable set of expectations to have on the economic side?
On NATO, you've now had the first tranche of enlargement. NATO has gone from 16 to 19. We've had the experience in Kosovo. Well, what now? What now and what next for NATO? Where do we go from here in the direction of enlargement? Where do we go next in terms of the Balkans more generally? That set of issues are very much on the agenda. Where do we go vis-a-vis Russia? What sort of a relationship do we envision in the long run between European institutions, trans-Atlantic institutions, on one hand, and Russia?
There are still questions for the United States and Europe. These meetings take place just at a moment when one sees significant evolution in Europe thinking about their own foreign and security policy roles. It's quite interesting that Mr. Solana, the secretary-general of NATO, is going to be changing hats and is going to become essentially the high commissioner of European foreign and national security policy.
And the United States for several decades has long talked about the idea that we want Europe to be more capable, we want Europe to be more united, we want Europe to take on a larger role in the world. Well, as some of us — as some people have pointed out, be careful what you wish for. That may indeed be happening, and the real question is: What is Europe prepared to do? What is on Europe's agenda in the way of enlargement? What is on Europe's agenda in the way of a new foreign and defense policy role? How does the United States perhaps want to influence that? What would — how would we know success if we were to see it in several years? What would Europe look like? What would NATO look like? What would the trans-Atlantic relationship look like?
And one of the things that complicates it is a range of issues where the United States and Europe clearly don't see eye-to-eye: Iran, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and so forth. We have very different ideas about the use of sanctions, about the use of military force, about the use of economic incentives, about the use of diplomacy.
And the reason I think it's important to get all this right is that when one strips away some of the rhetoric on both sides — American resentment about what Europeans are not doing, European resentment about what Americans are doing — the fact is that the United States and Europe remain one another's best friends and best partners. And if the United States is going to have significant assistance in trying to shape the post-Cold War world, not simply in Europe and beyond, it is going to largely have to turn to Europeans. And indeed what might be most interesting about this period is, the most significant test of the U.S.-European relationship may ultimately be beyond Europe. And I say that despite what we've just seen in Kosovo. So, clearly, it's a rich agenda. Basic questions of European security and stability, basic questions of global security and stability that span the economic, the political and the military.
To help guide us through this, we've got three talented gentlemen. We're going to be begin with Ivo Daalder. Ivo is a visiting fellow here at the Brookings Institution on leave from the University of Maryland. He spent time on the National Security Council staff earlier in this administration working on matters of Europe, and he is just completing a manuscript for us on the Bosnia war and the experiences and lessons of that. He is going to talk about Kosovo, talk about NATO and security questions.
And next we're going to turn to Jeff Frankel, also someone who served in this administration, on the Council of Economic Advisers. He occupies a chair here at Brookings and will, I guess, also be occupying a chair pretty soon at a university somewhere near Cambridge, Massachusetts, if I understand correctly. But Jeff is one of the most distinguished economists of his generation, and we are lucky to have him here as much as we do.
Third, we're going to turn to Jim Goldgeier, who is visiting this year here at Brookings. He is a professor down the street at one of the Georges, George Washington University. He has just completed a manuscript for us which will be published later this year as well. In this case it's on the decision to enlarge NATO. And it will be a study of why that decision was taken and how it was taken. And like his two colleagues up there, he also served in the Clinton administration. Indeed, I am the only person standing on this platform who did not serve in the Clinton administration. [Laughter] And I will just leave that alone and not take that one any further.
Let me turn to Ivo. I've asked each of them to make fairly short presentations, seven or so minutes, plus or minus, and then when all of that is done, we will open it up to you for your comments and questions.
I. Daalder: Thanks, Richard. I'm not sure that people inside the Clinton administration really celebrate the fact that some of us were in that administration. That's a different issue.
After what was a clear and disastrous stumbling into war that left NATO with no choice but to stand by and watch as Mr. Milosevic emptied out Kosovo of its Albanian citizens, NATO regrouped and recouped itself in late April. Contrary to the expectations of many, including myself, a concerted six-week bombing campaign, combined with stepped-up diplomatic efforts and, in the last few weeks, a significant offensive by the Kosovar Liberation Army, NATO has now succeeded in achieving what are its revised aims. The Serbs are moving out. NATO, after a 24-hour delay, I am sure is moving in, and the refugees may, therefore, be able to come back.
However challenging the war may have been, the challenges of peace loom at least as large, if not larger still. And I want to step back and really focus not on the minutiae of the peace but on the larger tasks that we face, of which I think three stand out, the contours of which will have to be decided at next week's G-8 summit.
The first is to stabilize Kosovo and to set it on a path toward a secure future. No easy task when you consider what Kosovo looks like today — empty of a population, empty of inhabitable homes, empty of infrastructure that has been destroyed, and empty of an economic base. In the immediate term, NATO will have to be firm in its control of this territory. It will, in effect, run this place. Much like MacArthur ran Japan, McCloy ran Germany after World War II, General Jackson, the British commander of KFOR, the Kosovar force, will be the effective pro consul for many, many months, perhaps even longer than that, given what is likely to be a delay in setting up the international civilian administration, let alone setting up local governing capacities and institutions.
Foremost in the task that General Jackson and his forces will face are the removal or neutralization of one million land mines, of booby traps in houses and roads and bridges, of poisoned wells, of drinking water, et cetera, so that civilians can begin to move freely. This is a mammoth task, even under normal circumstances. And these are not normal circumstances.
Secondly, NATO will have to provide for firm law and order. Soldiers will have to become policemen in order to make sure that there is no revanchism against those Serbs who decide to remain by Kosovars who are returning or who have remained. And indeed one will find many, many disagreements about who owns what piece of property, given that the property rights were shorn by those — by the Serbs as the Albanians were kicked out. The mammoth security task of maintaining law and order will fall in NATO's hands.
Finally, NATO will have to find a way to deal with the KLA, the Kosovar Liberation Army. They have to find a way of making of the KLA a partner in the peace process, rather than an enemy.
A critical ingredient in the ability to do so will be how we talk about, think about the final status of the territory of Kosovo. It is remarkable that we have fought a war without ever addressing the question of what the final status of this territory is supposed to be. It is left open — vaguely so — in the U.N. Security Council resolution passed yesterday.
In my view, it has to be absolutely clear that the international community cannot rule out independence, for doing so provides the KLA no incentive to cooperate with the international community. It is, after all, what the KLA stands for.
But while never ruling out independence, the goal of the international community should be to create a Serbia and Yugoslavia in which the Kosovar Albanians might well be willing to stay. And that becomes task number two: to promote a post-Milosevic democratic Serbia.
The president last night acknowledged what many have long argued: Milosevic is a root cause of the Balkan instability in the last 10 years, and he must therefore go. Economic reconstruction, though not rightly so, humanitarian assistance, which, with the looming winter, will be direly needed inside Serbia, has to be conditioned on Slobodan Milosevic's removal from office, if not his movement to The Hague, where he can stand trial on his indictment for war crimes.
We must begin, however, to start to provide intensive economic and other assistance to the democratic opposition in Serbia, which has been vanquished not just by Milosevic but by this war; by [sic] the independent media that has long existed, though has been shut down by Milosevic. We must support the creation, in short, of an open and liberal civil society inside Serbia, because it is that basis, and only on that basis, that a democratic, post-Milosevic Serbia can emerge.
There may be scope, as well, for other action — covert and not so overt. We could go after Mr. Milosevic's money, and if we haven't started to do so, we ought to. We could work with the Yugoslav military to make sure that they do not support the man who brought the disaster on their country.
In short, we need to move expeditiously, though not necessarily militarily, against Milosevic and his regime. It is only when that succeeds that we can move successfully to conclude what will be the largest and third task that the international community faces, which is to bring Southeastern Europe as a whole into the European mainstream.
Whatever happens inside Serbia, its neighbors have now suffered enough. Clearly, Europe's two poorest countries, Albania and Macedonia, have suffered tremendously, although they stoically have borne the tide of refugees that was the result of what happened of Mr. Milosevic's actions. Bulgaria and Romania not only opened up their borders to refugees and their airspace to NATO bombers, but also suffered economically as commercial routes to the West were cut off by the destruction of bridges over the Danube. These countries have suffered enough. They have proven that they want to be part of the European mainstream, and we owe them our assistance. And indeed, the European Union's Chancellor Schroeder's Stability Pact, which envisages at least $30 billion to be spent on the region in the next five years, is a major start in that direction.
The challenges of peace in the region, inside Kosovo, inside Serbia, inside Southeastern Europe, clearly are real and large, but so are the ultimate benefits. Just as NATO and the United States spent the first 40 years after World War II to stabilize and secure the future of Western Europe, and has spent the last 10 years after the end of the Cold War to put Central Europe on the same path, the challenge for the first decade of the 21st century will be for Europe and the United States to cooperate together to bring Southeastern Europe into the continent's mainstream.
J. Frankel: My job is to talk about the economic discussions that are going to take place among the G-7. These discussions are likely to fall into three categories — and I'm leaving aside the topics of Kosovo and Russia, which do each have their economic sides.
First, the sort of usual discussion of the current state of the global economy with its unusual combination at the moment of very strong growth in the United States, accompanied by weakness in much of the rest of the world. Second, the revised initiative, known as HIPC — this ugly acronym, HIPC — initiative to help the most highly indebted poor countries, which could conceivably turn out to be the most concrete accomplishment of this summit. And then, third, the new financial architecture, on which subject the G-7 finance ministers are meeting soon, ahead of the summit leaders, and are going to submit a report to the heads of state to be released after their summit. I'm happy to take questions on any of these topics, but I'm going to concentrate my remarks on some aspects of the third — the new financial architecture.
The G-7 and the rest of the international financial policy-making community has, over the last eight or nine months, taken quite a few steps in the direction — modest reforms in the direction of trying to reduce the frequency and severity of international financial crises, and the reason is obvious; we have now seen in this decade three complete rounds of international financial crises, most recently in Southeast Asia, Korea, Russia, over the last two years, in '97 and '98; before that, beginning in Mexico in December '94, with the peso crisis; and before that, in the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992-1993. So you can see the motive for trying to tinker with the international financial system so that we don't face as frequent or as severe crises.
The reforms taken so far fall into three categories. First, improving transparency; second, strengthening the financial system, which includes, among other things, steps to reduce the reliance on short-term capital flows, and the steps occur both on the side of the borrowers and on the side of the lending countries; and third, to involve the private sector more fully in rescue packages so we're not just bailing out investors.
Some critics have pronounced these measures too modest to merit the phrase "new financial architecture" and have suggested instead it's like remodeling the house or — probably more accurately — redoing the wiring or the plumbing in the house. Whether or not that characterization is right, I think that the steps that have been taken are quite useful.
There are several areas where reform would be so fundamental and so profound that it would unambiguously merit the title "new financial architecture." One is the question of a global lender of last resort and how big it should be. Another is the question of international capital flows and how free they should be. And a third is the question of exchange rate regimes and how flexible they should be.
This last is the area where I'm going to concentrate the rest of my remarks, and Brookings is releasing today a policy brief of mine on the international financial architecture which is the basis for my remarks.
By exchange rate regimes, we're talking about the choice of a country what to do with its currency, whether to flow freely, let it be determined by the market, or to peg firmly, to set the price and buy and sell however much foreign exchange is necessary to keep the exchange rate at that level, or whether to adopt some intermediate regime, some intermediate degree of flexibility — for example, under a target zone.
Each of these choices has their strong proponents.
On the floating rate side, all the crisis countries over the last two years — Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Mexico before that — have been forced to adopt a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility, and this seems to support those who argue that floating is the right answer for all countries.
But at the same time we've seen movements elsewhere in the opposite direction. We've seen some countries with currency boards, which are very rigid institutional arrangements to keep their exchange rates fixed, weather the storm in emerging markets rather successfully. I have in mind Hong Kong and Argentina, and there are some Eastern European countries with currency boards as well.
And indeed, in January of this year, the Central Bank of Argentina released a report outlining how Argentina might give up its currency completely, might go all the way and adopt the dollar as legal tender in Argentina, which is called official dollarization.
And at the same time we've seen this year the successful completion of EMU, European Monetary Union, the adoption of the euro, among 11 European countries, which is a truly historic development. And this G-7 summit will be the first one since the adoption of the euro, and it'll be interesting to see whether that changes the dynamics a bit there and also in the U.S.-EU meeting.
There's also — there are those who argue in favor of intermediate regimes like target zones. Fred Bergsten is famous for that. And now there's a new fourth position, which is that the intermediate regimes will not work, that countries can choose between very firm mechanisms to peg their exchange rates, like the currency boards or dollarization, on the one hand, or free-floating on the other, but it's no long tenable to stay in the middle. This has become the position of Larry Summers and now Secretary Rubin in his April 21st speech across the street.
My own view, which is explained in the Brooking policy brief, is that no single exchange rate regime, not firm fixing, not floating, not intermediate regimes, not the corners together, no single regime is right for all countries and at all times. The proper currency arrangement depends on the circumstances facing that country. And that probably sounds obvious, except there are some who are getting carried away and who are arguing that a currency board or dollarization is the right answer for everybody, or that increased flexibility is the right answer for everybody, or that one or the other is the right answer for everybody. And I don't think these positions are right, and the brief explains the specific characterization — the specific characteristics of a country that qualify it for fixed or floating or intermediate regimes.
The rigid commitments are right for some, as the traditional lists, small open countries — I won't go through the whole list. Easy examples are Hong Kong, Luxembourg, some Central American and Eastern European countries. The traditional list needs to be modified in light of recent experience, I think. If you have a truly desperate need to import monetary stability the way a country that has experience a hyperinflation does, then that's a good characteristic, and I think that's what puts Argentina there.
Floating is right for others. And indeed for large economies like the U.S., Japan and the EU taken as a whole, it's the only thing that really makes sense. We've seen a depreciation of the euro so far this year. I mentioned that EMU is successful, but we have seen a depreciation of the euro so far this year. And in my mind, that illustrates the way floating rates are supposed to work. Germany, the largest economy in Europe, has been unexpectedly weak, while U.S. has been unexpectedly strong, and it's entirely sensible in a circumstance like that that European currency depreciate against the dollar.
On the other hand, it also illustrates the shortcomings of a fixed exchange rate among the European countries, because some of Germany's neighbors to the west are not experiencing the same weakness that Germany is, and for them a depreciation of the euro doesn't — and an easy monetary policy does not make as much sense.
But my main point is, countries are different. There are some that are in between the small, open, or desperate-to-import-monetary-stability characteristics that qualify a country for a truly fixed exchange rate versus the large economies, like the U.S., E.U. and Japan, which are well suited to floating rate. And it's true that emerging-market countries now face constraints that the industrialized countries do not. Many of them face finicky investors who are very hard to satisfy. And for some it is appropriate to move to one corner or the other, but that doesn't describe all countries.
J. Goldgeier: The endgame on Kosovo reflects what I would call the pattern of the Clinton-Yeltsin bargain that's been in place since 1993. And that bargain is that President Clinton goes out of his way to find Russia — provide Russia a major place at the table as a big European power, bolsters Russia. And remember, he could have chosen a different path. Russia's weakness could have led to an effort to marginalize it, to isolate it. The president has actively sought to integrate Russia into Europe, to bolster Russia, provide it this place. And in return, Yeltsin has, on issue after issue, essentially gone along with the essence of the substance of what we want. Yeltsin has, in fact, accepted that he gets a voice, but not a veto.
Now, when you look at the G-8 forum and think about the meetings next week, keep in mind that this is a forum that the Russians have sought for solving difficult political and diplomatic problems. You know, we may — Richard referred to it, and it is often referred in the West as the Group of Seven advanced industrialized democracies plus Russia; for the Russians, it's the Group of Eight. And they get to be on an equal footing, left out of the economic issues, but on the other issues, there they are on an equal footing with the other major powers in the world. And this is a forum that they like to use for dealing with big political-diplomatic problems — how to combat terrorism, nuclear safety, proliferation issues, and now, Kosovo.
As far as this particular meeting and thinking about the interaction that will occur if Yeltsin attends, as apparently he wants to do, the goal of the United States is to follow the model of Hyde Park in 1995 and Helsinki in 1997, and the model to avoid is that of Budapest in 1994.
Hyde Park, in 1995, October 1995, there had been very difficult discussions between the Pentagon and the Russian Defense Ministry over how and whether Russia would participate in the Implementation Force in Bosnia. Defense Minister Grachev, as he had colorfully said to Secretary of Defense Perry, "You've got me by the throat." Boris Yeltsin came to Hyde Park, and the two presidents agreed that their defense ministers would work it out and they would get it done.
At Helsinki in 1997, March of 1997, difficult discussions had been going on between the State Department, the Foreign Ministry in Russia over the nature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Clinton and Yeltsin met in Helsinki, and Yeltsin made clear that he wanted to work it out, and he directed his foreign ministry to do so.
In both cases, Yeltsin was extremely crucial for working out the stumbling blocks that had arisen in the work that was done at the ministry level. He's crucial, and even more so today, because a lot of the views he has about his relationship with the West and the terms of this relationship are views that are not widely shared among the Russian political elite. Yeltsin has basically taken the weak hand that Russia has, and in order to play it better, has chosen this path of getting this place at the table, of having the West help to bolster him while giving in on the substance. A very different way of playing that weak hand would be actively to seek to undermine U.S. and Western interests wherever possible, even try to rebuild military capabilities in order to be taken more seriously. And that path has its own costs, essentially stimulating, rekindling fears among Russia's neighbors, the Europeans, the Chinese. But that is a different path that a Russian leader could choose.
Now, at Cologne, if Yeltsin's there, we'll see the other leaders, and particularly President Clinton, toast his role as peacemaker, whether or not Russia played any role in the actual substance of the end of this war. And I believe that if there are still outstanding issues remaining, stumbling blocks, in this question of how Russia is going to participate in this Kosovo force that implements the peace, I believe they'll be worked out at this G-8 meeting, in particular in the conversations between Clinton and Yeltsin, just as was done at Hyde Park in 1995 and at Helsinki in 1997. And it will be Yeltsin who has to make the call that this is going to work. New stumbling blocks have arisen today as Russian forces went in from Bosnia into Yugoslavia, and there's been talk of the Russians seeking to establish their own sector, their own presence, in a way that is very antithetical to what the United States and NATO seek. They don't want any sign that there might be some kind of partition of Kosovo, and that issue is still remaining as one that hasn't been worked out. Deputy Secretary Talbott has extended his stay in Moscow, but this is one that has to be worked out between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.
What the United States wants to avoid next week at Cologne is a repeat of Budapest in 1994, when Yeltsin came to the OSCE Summit and declared that the West was plunging Europe into a "Cold Peace." The problems that led to Budapest: high degree of lack of communication between the two sides, particularly regarding NATO's plans to go forward with its study on enlargement, and the fact that that trip, the president's schedulers never left him any time for a bilateral with Yeltsin; that meant they didn't have a chance to discuss the issues that were important to them. That's the model that the United States seeks to avoid next week. And certainly if Yeltsin's there, every expectation is that there will be a bilateral meeting between the two presidents.
Longer-term impact: Certainly what we've seen over the past week in the ending of the war and the Talbott-Chernomyrdin discussions helped to avoid what seemed to be a real brewing disaster in the relationship, although problems that have emerged in the last day or so threaten to put things back on that more negative footing.
Now, the United States hopes that if there is this success in Kosovo and the details are worked out between NATO and Russia on how things are going to play out in the implementation force, the U.S. goal is that we can then build on this success to work on other issues in the relationship: START, economic issues, nonproliferation. Talbott went to Moscow this week not just to deal with the Kosovo problem, but also to try to start using the Kosovo success to move on to other aspects of the relationship and rejuvenate certain things that had been languishing. It's going to be very difficult move on these issues — on any of the other issues over the next 18 months because of the electoral cycle. The campaigns in both countries for president means that any big cooperative steps aren't likely between now and the time that new presidents are elected in both countries.
Wouldn't surprise me if, in Cologne, Yeltsin asks his fellow heads of state for a commitment to — and some public signal of a commitment to — a greater economic package. He often, when he gets together with his fellow heads of states in new settings does ask for more money, and why should next week be any different? Keep in mind, the IMF package that's on the table now — you know, this $4.5 billion package is designed solely to pay back the money that Russia owes from the earlier IMF commitments. This is not anywhere near the kind of package that was on the table last summer, the $22 billion package. And, of course, the major stumbling block in further economic assistance has been the failure of the Yeltsin government to get the Russian Duma to pass legislation that the IMF has been seeking, but I think that Yeltsin presumably will want to use what occurred over Kosovo to try to get some kind of signal that the heads of state want to help further.
Now, the political elite in Russia has been extremely upset with what they see as the string of humiliations of the West — of Russia by the West — during the 1990s. They were certainly extremely unhappy with NATO expansion, the invitations to the new members that occurred in 1997, argument being this wouldn't have happened if Russia had been strong. The reaction to the attack on Yugoslavia was that this wouldn't have happened if Russia had been strong. The attack further demonstrated to them that their feelings about NATO expansion in '96, '97, '98 and '99 were correct, because to them NATO is not benign and the attack on Yugoslavia showed it.
Now, you know, the Yeltsin government, Chernomyrdin, can argue, "Hey, this is a major victory for us. We stopped NATO bombing," but I think we've seen the reaction in Moscow to Chernomyrdin that this does little to alleviate the sense of the humiliation that Russia has suffered during the 1990s.
More importantly, this was the first issue that went beyond the political elite and filtered down into the population and really had some resonance with the population as something that was wrong for the West to do and that Russia could not do much to stop it. And I think what that means is that even if things work out here, and Clinton and Yeltsin, as they have in the past, work out differences and move forward on this issue and cooperate as they have on other issues in the past, the next president of Russia, elected next summer, may very well seek a different approach than Yeltsin did. The next president of Russia could certainly easily make the case that accommodation with the West has led to further Russian decline; only an effort to rebuild military strength, to play the nuclear hand a little more riskily can get Russia its real role in international affairs rather than the largely symbolic one that Yeltsin has gained. But still, resources are limited. And as I mentioned before, there are costs to pursuing that kind of approach because of the fears which that approach would rekindle in Russia's neighbors, the other New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, Europeans and the Chinese.
As for attempts to build a new Europe, and tying back into the G-8, you know, for the Russians, again, putting this issue in the G-8 is far preferable than doing it through the Permanent Joint Council that was provided for by the NATO Russia Founding Act. The G-8 is a forum that symbolically looks much better for Russia than having to go through this forum that is dominated by NATO, in which NATO sets the rules. And I think that, having moved these issues to the G-8 during this crisis, Russia is going to be rather reluctant to move issues back and revive the Permanent Joint Council and do things through the NATO Russia forum. And I wouldn't be surprised to see them attempt to institutionalize the G-8 in a way that would allow that to be a forum for dealing with issues on European security so they don't have to do it through the NATO Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council.
Again, as far as the larger relationship goes, the biggest problem isn't Kosovo or even continued crisis politically in Russia; it's the fact that you've got elections coming up in both the United States and Russia. That limits the steps that can be taken on either side if things get caught up into the presidential campaign season. We're likely to see a holding pattern until after both presidents are elected next year.
Thank you.
R. Haass: Thank you, Jim, as well as Ivo and Jeff.
Let me now open it up to you all.
I just ask you to wait for a microphone, to give us your name and your organization. And if you could be succinct, we will try to be succinct as well.
Sir?
Participant: George —
R. Haass: You violated the first rule! [Laughter]
Participant: George Condon with Copley News Service. Two questions on the trip. One, a broad question; there's a fear that the president will use this as simply a victory lap, particularly if he adds a stop in the Balkans, as they're talking about doing. Is there anything specific, substantive, we should be looking for to call this trip a success beyond just rhetoric? And secondly, a more specific question; none of you mentioned the stop in Slovenia. Is there any significance and any importance to that stop at all?
I. Daalder: As a frequent and harsh critic of the administration, I think he deserves a victory lap in some sense. I mean, he has in fact pulled the rabbit out of the hat yet again in a way that many of us didn't think he would be able to. In fact, stepping back just 10 days, we looked at this G-8 Summit as sort of the make-or-break on ground forces, the make-or-break of escalating the war. And instead, he's going there meeting with his counterparts who have successfully achieved both a diplomatic and a military — I hate to use the word "victory" when you have 1.5 million people outside of the country and tens of thousands killed — but certainly a success.
So in that sense, you know, don't be surprised if politicians take good news and use it to their benefit. And, you know, to some extent that's justified. But I hope that in doing so, the larger issues that still await to be decided are in fact tackled in a way that Jim mentioned on the Russia issue, and then use this in order to further the strategy that seems to be developing of taking Southeastern Europe — of addressing the issues in Southeastern Europe in the same ways that we did in the Bush administration, and the Clinton administration did in terms of Central and Northern Europe after the Cold War. That's the kind of vision you are now looking for. And if you get that, at least on the political, military side, I think you have a success.
R. Haass: Do you want to say something about Slovenia, even NATO enlargement?
J. Goldgeier: Yeah. You know, Slovenia is the leading candidate to be the next member of NATO, if and when NATO goes forward with a second round of enlargement. They basically met the criteria, and the only holdup has been that NATO has wanted to issue invitations to a group of countries for a second round, and so there was no move to include Slovenia this year, and that — at the NATO summit that was put off — the issue of a second round was essentially put off till 2002.
But I would hope that what the president can use the trip to Slovenia for is to highlight what happens when a country in the Balkans chooses the right path, essentially accepts the effort by the West to include those countries that want to make a commitment to democracy, human rights, market reform, and et cetera.
You know, here Slovenia that has done that, wants to be included, wants to be in the EU, wants to be in NATO, and the president should highlight all the things they've done well and in fact the likely rewards that they will get, in order to make the point that others in the Balkans should follow this same path. And I think that having — that at the summit having not taken the opportunity to issue an invitation to Slovenia on membership, as some of us argued prior to the summit, I think it's unlikely that he would take that step on this trip. But he can use it to make these points and really set things up for — particularly for the next round of NATO enlargement.
R. Haass: Let me say — on standards for success, let me suggest three.
One is that you have a serious plan for relief and reconstruction, and that includes a clear sense of European — of Europe bearing the lion's share of the burden on resources, but also Europe signing on to the conditionality, explicitly, that nothing more than narrow humanitarian help will go to Serbia so long as Milosevic or anything like him is in power. So that's one standard of success.
Secondly, on the Russian side, to work out the specific question of where Russian forces go, what they do, and so forth in Kosovo. But beyond Kosovo, I think it's important that he and Yeltsin begin to try to bridge some of the differences on humanitarian intervention, which is a fundamental disagreement between the United States and Russia, about the legitimacy of using force within states — of outsiders using force within states, and also, on the economic side, probably two things: One is to see if some progress can be made on Russia and, more generally, what Jeff Frankel was talking about: progress on some statement about international economic reform, whether it's the question of debt relief or something to deal with, again, exchange rates, or something else. But I think those are the sorts of areas that this trip is going to have to be measured by.
Yes, ma'am?
Participant: Francine Kiefer [sp] of the Christian Science Monitor. I'd like to get a sense as to how realistic you all think it is for Russia to get more aid from this trip and what our conditions might be for that?
R. Haass: Jim.
J. Goldgeier: Well, the immediate issue is this package that's on the table from the IMF that's there to pay back — it's to be offered to pay back the loans that Russia owes from the earlier commitments. The IMF wants to give that money, and the Russians know that. I think the IMF will.
What has been discussed over the last few weeks as efforts have been made to try to figure out how to get that money to Russia, given the conditions that the IMF has laid down, is to try to figure out ways in which the Russian government can take action without getting legislation passed by the Duma — what can they do through presidential decree and other means that would satisfy enough of the IMF concerns that they could do this package.
I don't think the Russians can get any more than that, unless the Duma demonstrates that it's really ready to pass the legislation that has been discussed. Part of the problem there has been the turmoil in the Russian government, the efforts by the new prime minister, Stepashin, to put together a new government and to start to put together a program. That's inevitably going to delay the whole effort at working something out between the government and the Duma, so I don't think that's there.
So I don't think there's going to be any kind of specific commitment made, but I think what Yeltsin is going to try to do is to try to get some signal that the West really wants to move forward beyond this particular package and be clear about the kind of steps that are necessary in order to demonstrate that at least this is coming, if Russia can take certain steps.
R. Haass: One of the problems on that, Francine, is there could well be a growing gap between Russian expectations and Western preparedness to act. The Russians feel now they're owed something —
J. Goldgeier: Right.
R. Haass: — so if anything, they expect conditions to be eased. The chance of getting money through the U.S. Congress with easy conditions is somewhere between zero and nil. [Mild laughter] And what concerns me here is, if anything, I see this divide getting larger. So we are still going to demand significant reform. Or to put it another way, conditionality will be substantial, and the Russians are in, if anything, less of a mood and less of a condition to provide it. So I think that ultimately that problem remains big and possibly getting bigger.
J. Frankel: Maybe I just could add to that, and I agree with it, but that what happened in August of last year was quite significant. When Russia devalued and essentially defaulted, and the IMF and the G-7 declined to throw good money after bad, there were some who said, well, it must be that IMF is just out of money. And then when Congress went ahead and passed the new arrangements to borrow, finally, and the quota increase, I think it sent the right signal to investors, which is that the international community, the IMF, is prepared to help out countries that adopt the right policy reform, such as Thailand and Korea, which are now beginning to enjoy the fruits of that, but are not prepared to throw money down rat holes where the right policy reforms are not being made, even really important places like Russia.
Participant: Leo Rennert with McClatchy Newspapers. Two questions. The first one: By the time of the next G-8 summit, both parties will have picked their standard-bearers and it may be less of a "Clinton moment" than next week. Do you feel that Clinton, for this reason, sensing this may be his last hurrah on the world stage, may feel a greater need to have a productive summit, that he will want to leave his mark, knowing time is against him?
And second, with regard to the economic and financial side of the summit, what do you see, if anything, beyond the modest reforms already in place?
R. Haass: I'll let Jeff take the second of the two. I don't see this sort of a meeting as leaving Mr. Clinton's mark or contributing particularly to a legacy. I think that — and it really comes back to George's question — the temptation will be to highlight what was accomplished in Kosovo, to basically reinforce a sense of what was accomplished and to try to make some progress on the next phase, which is essentially the implementation.
I would simply hope he would resist the temptation to dwell on the former, i.e., on what was accomplished, and put most of his calories behind what needs to be accomplished. Quite honestly, last night, when he said that NATO and the United States did the "right thing" I think that was fair enough. But then when he went on to say "we did it in the right way," I would respectfully disagree. And I think the record of the last nearly three months is that NATO and the United States did not do it the right way. And to somehow define success — I thought Charles Krauthammer had it exactly right in his column this morning: we have defined success down. To define success and the meeting of objectives as somehow creating conditions for the return of most of the refugees, that is an awfully modest definition of success. Again, it does not say we accomplished nothing; yes, we did accomplish something, but words like "success" and "victory", if I were still writing speeches for presidents, I would banish from the lexicon. That seems to me to be an exaggeration, and an unfortunate one, of what was accomplished here.
Jeff, why don't you address the economic side?
J. Frankel: Yes. We don't know exactly what will be in the G-7 finance ministers' report to the heads of state; we won't know until the heads of state meet on it and form a consensus and release it. But it's a fair bet that it will be a continuation of the efforts of the last nine months, or indeed, the last several years, in that the steps that are in there — I'm not going to go through all the technical details of what's likely to be there — but that they will be both modest and useful, and some of it will be new. I mean, we move along incrementally.
But I would say one of the frontiers where there's some new ground being opened up, judging from statements of Treasury officials and otherwise, have to do with the composition of capital flows. There's more of a consensus now than there used to be that heavy reliance on short-term capital flows in emerging countries, as opposed to foreign direct investment and other longer-term flows, is dangerous. And steps to try to respond to that — prudential banking regulations. For example, in some countries it might be appropriate to have higher reserve requirements on short-term borrowing abroad, and perhaps even go further to the kinds of penalties on all short-term capital flows that Chile has had in the past. And that's on the borrower's side. On the lender side, we have the Basel Committee updating its rules to, for example, change the situation where if one of our banks makes short-term loans to a sovereign government in an emerging market country, that that gets a really favorable risk rating, which seems no longer to be appropriate; and new facilities at the IMF, the CCL, Contingent Credit Line, which is where the exchange rate regime comes in, by the way, because there was a — there's now a suggestion that countries that get into crisis because they've used up their foreign exchange reserves defending an intermediate regime or an adjustable peg that wasn't really defensible shouldn't be bailed out, which is actually quite reasonable. So I think we're seeing some progress on lots of fronts and some new progress in those areas.
R. Haass: Mr. Powell?
Participant: Hey, Richard. I just wanted to ask —
R. Haass: Sir, you have to wait for the microphone, or you will give your option.
Participant: I'm Stewart Powell from Hearst Newspapers. I just wanted to ask what the future is of humanitarian intervention and to what extent you'll see the G-8 and Russia come to some sort of agreement on when, where, how to do this better next time.
R. Haass: Clearly, it's — humanitarian intervention — let me take a step back. Clearly, humanitarian crises will continue to recur. They have been one of the regular features, for better or — well, essentially for worse — in the post-Cold War world. And Kosovo is highly unlikely to be the last. Indeed, there are several there were ongoing before Kosovo and are still going on in Africa. So clearly it's continuing.
Secondly, I think there is a greater consensus in the United States and Europe that there is an emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention, that when a situation in a country deteriorates badly, either because of what the governments do or can't do to promote order or to take away from order, that the international community does have either a right or an obligation to intervene. And intervention can take many forms. It can be diplomatic. It can be through political or economic sanctions. It could be through military force.
And military force can itself take many forms. It could — as we've seen, it could be arming insurgents, which is what, you know — or it could be through air power, ground forces, safe areas, what have you.
So I think there's a growing consensus, in principle, that something can and should be done. But that consensus is largely limited to the United States and Europe, and even there it's not absolute.
Where clearly you don't see it is Russia, China, India, and a lot of the rest of the world. And China in particular called humanitarian intervention — they would describe it as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, which has always been one of the principal building blocks of Chinese foreign policy.
So the challenge for the United States and others right now is to try to build greater consensus on when the — when humanitarian intervention ought to be triggered. What would warrant it? What kinds of conditions would warrant it? Then there needs to be greater consensus on what needs to be done, what kinds of instruments should be used, about whether you need certain types of U.N. or other authorization to act.
So I would simply say this one of the big fault lines of post-Cold War international relations where a lot of diplomatic work needs to be done. I think it makes sense for the United States and Europe to continue to talk about it, because clearly it's part and parcel of NATO's future mission. I think it's a good subject for Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin to talk about; it's something, the next time the president gets together with Jiang Zemin, they ought to be talking about in some ways to anticipate some future crisis. I think we've got to think more about it in terms of our military forces — how they're designed, structured and operated.
So I would simply say it's a growing piece of international relations, but there's a lag, or a gap, between the importance of this issue and our diplomatic and military preparations to cope with it, and it's one of the reasons that the Kosovos and Bosnias and Rwandas and Somalias have proved as controversial and difficult as they have.
And lastly, I think the president needs to talk more to the American people about it. And I would just simply say that one of the things that concerns me about Kosovo is that our air-power-only policy may have made it more difficult in the future to rally the American people behind humanitarian interventions where more than air power is required. We may have actually raised, not lowered, that bar. So I would simply say that, again, it's one of the reasons we have to be careful about using the word "success." Here is — what this reveals is simply how much political, diplomatic, intellectual military work needs to be done before we have a widely accepted doctrine of humanitarian intervention that the United States and others are able and willing to implement.
I. Daalder: May I — two cautions, if I — on everything that Richard said, which I agree with. On the U.S.-European consensus, I think it doesn't go beyond Europe. That is, that humanitarian intervention by NATO or by that coalition of states may well be possible in Europe, but not outside of Europe. If you look at how the countries that were least likely to support this action in fact supported it, like Germany and like Italy, it was a very Eurocentric argument about stability and security and talked about, "In Europe we cannot have this happening again." Of course, in Africa it happens all the time and there's the implication.
So I think the notion that we will see the similar kind of consensus among the same kind of countries willing to indulge the same kind of costs when the crisis is in the Sudan or in Sierra Leone, I think, is not yet there. There's a lot more work even between the U.S. and Europe, who share a common view that human rights and sovereignty may, in fact — may need to be weighed in such a way that human rights sometimes win out over sovereignty, which is not what anybody else thinks.
Secondly, I think we haven't begun to even count the costs of what this intervention cost, not just in dollars and in lives on the Kosovar and Serb side. I mean, we had an 11-week bombing campaign, not something you're likely to repeat anytime soon. We were inches away of a ground force decision and everybody was taken by surprise, not only that Mr. Milosevic caved but that therefore you didn't have to go into this decision — and let's be real on implementation.
It's not only $30 billion just to deal with the region; we're going to be there for many, many, many years, if not decades. I think that is appropriate, I think that's what NATO's new role is. But it is likely to make people more hesitant to engage in this kind of thing the next time. So, while I do think there is an emerging consensus between the Western — the North Atlantic community, as George Will put it this morning in his column, I'm not sure how far it goes geographically or even inside Europe.
R. Haass: Sir?
Participant: Ken Fireman [sp] from Newsday. A question for Mr. Goldgeier. In light of the political dynamic in Russia that you outlined, with Yeltsin's position becoming more and more isolated and unpopular both with the elite and with the population as a whole, to what extent have Western actions in Yugoslavia fed that dynamic, and to what extent was that avoidable?
J. Goldgeier: Oh, the Western actions in Kosovo certainly fed it. It's the Western actions in Kosovo that really led to this phenomenon where you really for the first time had 90 percent of the Russian population expressing anti-American, anti-NATO sentiment, really a real sense that this was a wrong thing to do, that this showed that, you know, NATO and the United States were up to no good.
Avoidable? You know, it gets back to the previous question of consensus about humanitarian intervention. You know, we saw a crisis and we saw ethnic cleansing and felt that we had to take an action in order to stop this humanitarian crisis. And it was unavoidable because we wouldn't have been able to get the U.N. support for it because of the Russian and Chinese veto. And part of the problem about this consensus with Russia regarding humanitarian intervention is that there will be no consensus with Russia unless it's through the United Nations, where the Russians have not just the voice, but the veto.
And the problem here is that, you know, the Russian response to this war was not, as a lot of people depicted it, you know, "How can you do this to our Serb brothers and sisters?" It's, "How could you do this to us? You took advantage of our weakness. You humiliated us. You only did this because we're weak." There's very significant sentiment in Russia this was not done for humanitarian reasons but, in fact, to help expand U.S. and NATO influence in the Balkans. And the concern in Russia is that, given how weak they are, then in fact NATO could even conceive of acting on Russian territory in order to protect certain populations. And that may seem preposterous to us in the West, but the Russians take this seriously just because they recognize how weak, in fact, they are, and one of the reasons why they have a difficult time going along with the consensus that has been emerging in the West about humanitarian intervention.
So, the war certainly helped to feed these perceptions. I don't — since we wanted to act, in that sense I don't think it was avoidable. We've done a lot, however, to help the situation by having made the explicit decision to include the Russians, to bolster their position, to give them a lot of the credit for the diplomacy. I think that helps a great deal on this particular event. But that's not going to reverse the sentiment that has emerged, and I believe that sentiment is likely to grow stronger.
And to get back to Richard's point, you know, they're not getting a heck of a lot out of, you know, what I described as the bargain. You know, Russia has continued to decline, Russia has continued to be humiliated. You can't argue that the relationship with the West has really borne fruit for Russia, and I think that that will get exacerbated and emerge in the next Russian presidential administration; exacerbated even further by the trend in the United States really to move away from the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Russians are quite concerned about that, and as that happens, that's going to feed this further and you're going to see the Russians really saying, you know, "All we have left is our status as a nuclear power. That's where we gain the currency," and to try to move to use that in some way, which is going to cause a further worsening of relations between the West and Russia.
R. Haass: We've got time for a couple more. Yes, sir?
Participant: Steve Solomon [sp], freelance. In view of the importance of the EU and U.S. relations for the post-Cold War world, I'd like somebody to address the trade tension issue and what might be on the agenda in terms of — perhaps at the U.S.-EU talks, and what would be a goals there?
R. Haass: Jeff, do you want to take one?
J. Frankel: Well, of course, there have been these tensions over the banana dispute and genetically modified organisms and hormone-fed beef. What some of them have in common is judgments adverse to the EU but then a slow process of implementation, and a dispute settlement mechanism that isn't really enforceable, or enforced. And if they could agree on steps to beef up enforcement, that might be a good thing, but I don't think that's likely to happen.
On the other hand, there's dissatisfaction with our — in many countries, including Europe — our putting up some barriers on steel imports. I'm not sure what's on the agenda, on the trade agenda for the U.S.-EU.
R. Haass: Yes, ma'am?
Participant: Thank you. Jodie Enda from Knight-Ridder Newspapers. Ivo Daalder, you mentioned a little bit about a post-Milosevic Serbia. I'm wondering what role you think that kind of discussion will have in this meeting.
I. Daalder: Well, I think it actually will have a big one. Clearly, the conditionality issue, under what conditions are we going to provide non-humanitarian, economic reconstruction assistance to Serbia. Two governments have publicly made clear that they will not participate in providing any assistance — the United States and Britain. The pressure will be tremendous to get an agreement writ large that we can use this large package of European money, by the way, to force agreement on the conditionality with Mr. Milosevic. And the indictment helps tremendously in getting countries like Germany and Italy and even France to come along on that score. So I think that's going to be a big issue.
I would hope, though I have no reason to believe whether it will or will not be on the agenda, but I would hope that the notion of strengthening the democratic elements in Serb society are going to be clearly on the agenda, most notably in terms of media, where we can have tremendous influence, and in helping the democratic groups who have suffered tremendously by the fact that the war led to a rallying around Mr. Milosevic, and some of whom, in fact, were killed as a result of that. But that there is an incentive here and a joint EU-U.S. movement to provide financial and other assistance to the democratic groups in order to build both from below, as well as the incentive from above, to go — to move quite rapidly to a post-Milosevic society.
R. Haass: Just a few more.
Participant: [Name and affiliation off mic] I would like to go back to what — Richard, what you said at the beginning, and ask you to expand on U.S.-European tensions, how those might come up on defense sharing, trying to boost Europe's percentage that they're putting into their technology and into their military, and also on the rebuilding effort, where Clinton has made it very clear that the U.S. did take the lion's share of the air campaign and so now Europe must foot the bill, and how are we going to see that? I mean, is the unity that was stressed within NATO, is that now going to be — are we going to see the fault lines?
R. Haass: On the first issue, on European defense, what's interesting is one of the unexpected consequences, I think, of Bosnia, and particularly Kosovo, of what often turned out what the United States was not prepared to do is that it's forced the Europeans and, above all, the British to rethink some of their attitudes towards European defense capabilities. And I think, again, one of the unexpected consequences of what we've seen over the last few years is a greater spur to Europeans to develop greater capabilities and more independent capabilities so they have options even when the United States isn't quite sure what it wants to do. And these options could be exercised independently, as a European effort, or it could be a greater European contribution to some NATO or transatlantic effort. But I do think we've moving in that direction.
Now, that's in principle. To translate that into spending, and the right kind of spending — you know, what's always interesting about defense, what's always more interesting than how much you spend on defense is how you spend it, and that applies to Americans as well as Europeans. And the real question is, will the Europeans begin to develop the sorts of advance strike and projection forces that you're going to need? And the principle reason the United States flew the bulk of the sorties and shot the bulk of the cruise missiles is we're the only ones who can do it. Europeans simply haven't invested in those sorts of advanced weapon systems. If anything, the gap has gotten greater, which is dangerous for transatlantic cooperation in the future as well as dangerous for Europe if Europe indeed wants to assert itself on the European, much less global, scene.
So I think you're seeing a lot of statements recently and agreements about it. You're seeing Mr. Solana's career decision. But the translation of all that into — you know, we'll only know in however many years whether it actually happens; but I think, if I had to bet, it's happening, but it will take longer and probably be less than we would think.
On the rebuilding side and the reconstruction side, I think the message in the last couple of days also from here is Congress is not going to give Mr. Clinton much of a blank check. And the argument will be that we did contribute the lion's share of the military costs of this undertaking, we took the lion's share of the risks, and since Europe was unable to do that, or unwilling to, it only makes sense that now Europe picks up the lion's share of this part of the burden. And some Europeans will be comfortable with that; some won't.
But I think that's — let me put it this way. I don't think the Europeans have a lot of leverage here because if they're not willing to do it, it's not as though we're going to pick up more of the price tag. But I do think the Europeans have a considerable incentive here, given that the geography — sort of like real estate; what counts is location, location and location? I think the same thing may apply here. So the Europeans do have considerable incentive to put in the bulk of the costs. And I think one of the interesting questions — and Ivo just touched on it, as well — will be whether we can build a widespread consensus about conditionality. Because if not, that could emerge as a difficult issue, because it's clear to me Congress will not authorize one dime for anything other than very narrowly defined humanitarian help for Serbia.
I think Kosovo, we'll obviously authorize some money, but again, it'll be modest because there the argument will be the Europeans ought to do it. And this will be one of the — and again, where we began, you know, half an hour ago — how to measure the results of the next week or 10 days — I think this will be one of the issues to look at, which is whether the Europeans are willing to essentially take out their wallets in a fairly large fashion and, two, whether we can agree on the political guidelines for the reconstruction.
But I don't think Mr. Clinton has a hell of a lot of flexibility here, because I don't think Congress will give him much.
I. Daalder: Let me just add to that that I think the problem is much less worse than it used to be. One, on troops. The Europeans have pledged 85 percent of the 50,000, whereas the U.S. conducted 52 percent of the strike mission, 70 percent of the total sorties.
On money, I don't think there is any European government which believes that the United States will even come up with 10 percent of the $30 billion. We had a tremendous difficulty coming up with $600 million for Bosnia. A U.S.-led peace initiative, a U.S.-led — I mean, clearly, this was a U.S.-led operation. From the get-go we have made this a European-led operation, and so far, I think, remarkably, the Europeans not only agree with that sentiment but have made very clear that they're ready and willing to provide that kind of financing.
The real issue, then, becomes when we demand to lead the civilian effort, as we sometimes pretend to do. You know, it's a notion that an American ought to be appointed to run a EU-financed, U.N.-authorized and U.N.-run operation doesn't strike me as highly realistic, and I don't think that Mr. Annan's going to fall for it.
R. Haass: We've got time for one more. I apologize for — [inaudible].
Participant: Thank you. Well, good. I'm — [name inaudible] — of Italy. Let me come back to Russia. Has Mr. Primakov been the major Russian casualty of the Kosovo crisis? I mean, is this a proof of the strategic choice of Yeltsin to be pro-Western? After all, Mr. Chernomyrdin has been a very effective, very flexible negotiator from the Western point of view. Thank you.
J. Goldgeier: The general Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin approach to the relationship with the West is a very different one than the Primakov approach. The Primakov approach is much more standoffish, wants to — and Primakov has sought to have Russia included as a major power, but more on Russia's own terms, really sought more to think about how Russia might be able to play in a real multi-polar world and try to work to balance U.S. power, and really has not accepted U.S. leadership.
The Yeltsin approach has been much more pro-Western. It's been tempered over time, but largely because the hopes from, you know, '92, '93, '94, have not been borne out. I think had Primakov stayed in the government, Russia would be taking a very different approach than it has since his departure. I don't think his dismissal had anything to do with Kosovo but, rather, had everything to do with Russian politics, as does most of what's going on in Russia today, and the situation with Yeltsin. The appointment of Chernomyrdin was really as an anti-Primakov move and the concern of Yeltsin about his own position and what would happen in the future. But the by-product of the dismissal has been an approach that is different than Mr. Primakov would be taking, and at this point, we don't know enough about Mr. Stepashin to know about what kind of approach he wants to take with the West, but certainly he knows what happened to Primakov as Primakov grew stronger and sought to marginalize Yeltsin. So I think that should he desire to remain prime minister, he won't make that same mistake.
R. Haass: Let me just close with three things. One is my apologies for those who had their hands up and we couldn't get to them. Secondly, if you didn't pick certain things up on your way in, I hope you pick them up on your way out. We've got the next issue of "Brookings Review," which technically gets published in about a week; is dedicated to Europe and Russia. There's Jeff's policy brief. We've got a new book that just came out on Transatlantic tensions, looking at these out-of-area questions. There's also Elizabeth Pond's recent book on Europe, as well as other books on Europe and American foreign policy. Last, I want to thank these three gentlemen, and I want to thank all of you for coming here this morning.
[END OF EVENT]