Transcript
Q: Is there any recourse available to Chinese who have been victims of oppression at the hands of the government? Can they sue for abuse of authority?
C. Dalpino: Yesterday families of protesters during the Tiananmen Square movement petitioned the government to open a criminal inquiry into the conduct of the crackdown and have raised the possibility of taking their motion to an international forum as well. Given the official position taken after the Tiananmen repression, which has essentially not changed over the past decade, it's doubtful that the government will accept this case for prosecution. It will be important to note, however, how the petitioners are treated now that the case has been proposed. On a more general (and hopeful) note, however, one improvement in China's legal environment since 1989 has been the passage of an administrative law which enables citizens to sue government for abuse of power. The percentage of cases in this category is rising dramatically, and those that do go to court are frequently decided in favor of the citizen-plaintiff. In 1997, for example, two-thirds of plaintiffs whose cases against the government were heard prevailed in those actions. However, high-profile cases with potential political repercussions, such as the Tiananmen families' case, are liable to be viewed by the government in a less favorable light.
Q: Li Peng is considered the one Chinese official most responsible for the massacre in Tiananmen. He now serves as the chairman of the National People's Congress. Does his continued presence in power directly affect the attitude of U.S. policy-makers when dealing with China? Is there anything more you can say about him in this context?
C. Dalpino: Although it's true that many people associate Li Peng with the Tiananmen crackdown, probably the person most linked with it in the eyes of the international community was Deng Xioping. As a general comment, it's very difficult for outsiders to determine which officials within the Chinese government can be classified as hard-liners or moderates; indeed, from outside appearances, these designations can change daily. Although Li Peng is considered by many to be a conservative, he has also strongly endorsed the trend toward direct elections of villagers committees. He will doubtless have considerable impact on the National People's Congress, but over the past several years we have seen the NPC become more assertive as an institution.
Q: What do you expect will be the long-term effects, if any, of the Cox Commission Report on bilateral relations between China and the U.S.? I am not sure what the official Chinese reaction has been, or if the report's assertions will impede the rebuilding of our relationship damaged by both the bombing of the Chinese embassy and the continuing reverberations of Tiananmen Square.
C. Dalpino: Regarding your question on the Cox commission report, it clearly adds fuel to the flames of a bilateral relationship which was already in a volatile state. The anniversaries in China this year (not only for the Tiananmen Square crackdown but also the 50th anniversary of the revolution) and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade had already set the stage for a downturn in the relationship. In order to make progress in any area, both sides would do well to try to build some firewalls into the relationship, so that each issue isn't held hostage to current bilateral disputes.
Q: Since the Chinese Government has always strong-armed political dissenters, why is the Tiananmen Square anniversary so significant? Doesn't the number of people killed or jailed during the crackdown pale in comparison to those mistreated during other tumultuous periods?
C. Dalpino: You're correct that previous periods of political upheaval in China produced far greater numbers of victims: the Anti-Rightist campaign in the 1950's, for example, and the Cultural Revolution. What has made the Tiananmen Square movement so significant in the eyes of the international community is the global media coverage of that event, which obviously wasn't possible in previous periods.
Q: Having remembered that the use of the Statute of Liberty during the Tiananmen protests, I was surprised by the images of the recent protests against the U.S. embassy in Beijing. I thought Chinese students were generally pro-American, are they?
C. Dalpino: The replica of the Statue of Liberty that was brandished during the Tiananmen Square movement probably encouraged Americans to over-emphasize the role that American values played in that movement. At that time the protesters were not calling for an American-style democracy, or even for a change in the regime. They were demanding a regime that was more accountable to the people. There is nothing inconsistent about the Chinese students' call for political improvements and national pride; it is important to remember that all genuine political change originates from indigenous needs and indigenous momentum. Many Americans were surprised when students at Peking University questioned President Clinton about the "underlying motives" of U.S. human rights policy, for example.
Q: How does the U.S. government go about evaluating the status of human rights in China? I know the State Department files a report, but to whom and how often does it do so? What's usually in this report?
C. Dalpino: The State Department's annual human rights report on China is part of a larger requirement mandated by Congress for the Department to report on the human rights of every country that is a member of the United Nations. Thus, even established democracies (such as Canada and the United Kingdom) are the subject of annual reports. The format follows the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; although the focus has traditionally been on political and civil rights in the reports, increasingly cultural and social rights are monitored as well. In drafting the reports, the State Department relies upon a wide variety of information: reports from U.S. embassies, information from human rights groups, press reports that can be verified, etc.
Q: Since Tiananmen, has there been any change in the degree of freedom accorded to the press by the Chinese government?
C. Dalpino: There has been no dramatic change in the regulatory environment for the press in China since the time of the Tiananmen Square movement, that is, the media has not officially been granted significantly greater freedom by law. However, economic development and rapid economic growth in China over the past decade has increasingly privatized the print media, making it more difficult for the government to monitor and control journals and books. There has also been some privatization of the electronic media, particularly in large urban areas, and non-official programs (some of which bear some similar to American talk radio) are very popular. Lastly, satellite television is making a tangible impact on the Chinese population although the government does attempt to limit access during times of political tension.
Q: How would you respond to those who charge that the United States cannot speak with moral authority regarding human rights violations in China (and elsewhere) when the U.S. still employs the death penalty?
C. Dalpino: It is important to separate human rights advocacy from the human rights record of individual countries. The death penalty is one issue on which the United States and China sometimes agree; in fact, these two countries were part of a minority which opposed a United Nations resolution calling for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. The best response to those who criticize the United States on this issue is to point to the lively debate within the U.S., which demonstrates a range of opinion, and the efforts of some groups to change state laws.
Q: In your estimation, what would be an appropriate human rights "concession" for China to make in exchange for WTO membership if such a deal were possible?
C. Dalpino: I believe it would be inadvisable to put specific human rights conditions onto U.S. agreement for China's admission to the World Trade Organization. Short-term measures that might be conceded by Beijing are unlikely to have much of a lasting impact on China's political development. Moreover, linking trade requirements to human rights in this way could skew both the U.S. economic and human rights policy toward China. It would be better for policymakers to focus on the long-term benefits of China's admission to the WTO, in terms of increased globalization and more transparent and accountable economic policy.
Q: Was there anything the West could have done to prevent the bloodshed caused by the Tiananmen crackdown?
C. Dalpino: The crackdown in Tiananmen Square caught the international community off guard because of the global political climate of the time. In the late 1980's, the world saw the "people's power" revolution of the Philippines and the events which led up to the dramatic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Since China itself had demonstrated increasing openness (and in fact had pioneered economic reforms long before Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies), the West probably underestimated the possibility of a violent response to the Tiananmen Square movement. That would have been the first and most necessary step toward attempting to halt or prevent it.
Q: It seems that the US favors economic goals over human rights in China. Despite the human rights rhetoric, it seems unlikely that the US would jeopardize a major contract in China to plead the cause of a political prisoner. What sort of balance do you feel is appropriate between promoting business ties and lobbying Chinese officials to adopt more humanitarian policies? There have been reports in the news recently focusing on the poor treatment of factory workers in Saipan and abuses of the thousands of Chinese trying to land on Guam in an attempt to apply for asylum in the US. What are US responsibilities in dealing with these problems, especially when they take place on US territories, as well as addressing problems within mainland China?
C. Dalpino: You've asked a number of questions, some of which are broad ones. As the Brookings policy brief of human rights in China discusses, attempts thus far to link human rights conditions with trade in China have been unsuccessful, which does not recommend this as an effective policy path. The reasons lie both in Beijing's response to pressure structured in this manner, and the inability of the U.S. policy community to reach consensus on appropriate linkages. For the time being, a multi-track human rights policy, which supports indigenous trends toward openness in China as well as expresses concern for political prisoners is likely to be more effective. Trade can help with the former, although it is certainly no guarantee of greater openness.
The Saipan issue, labor rights are becoming a growing focusing U.S. human rights policy, and labor issues arising in American territories are drawing particular notice. A first step is obviously to determine the extent to which these territories are required to follow American domestic labor law.
Q: I would think that since the Chinese have re-claimed Hong Kong, the new bonds being formed between the mainland and this democratized society would lead to the development of a more democratic China. Do you see this occurring?
C. Dalpino: Hong Kong's integration into China is bound to have an effect on China's political system in the mid- to long term. At the present time, however, China's arms-length administration of China, which formed the basis for the post-handover government, serves to act as a firewall. Additionally, there is a range of opinion in Hong Kong itself on the political path that the Special Administrative Region will take. However, with the handover Hong Kong now sends deputies to the National People's Congress and there is closer communication between the mainland and the SAR than the pre-1997 era. Since the handover has potential impact on the mainland's negotiations with Taiwan over reunification, all sides are aware that Hong Kong's political development will have a wide impact on greater Chinese relations.
This concludes our online forum with Catharin Dalpino on human rights in China. Many thanks to all who participated in this event, and of course, to Catharin Dalpino for taking the time to answer these questions.