A New NATO For a New Century

Transcript

M. Albright: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. The reason that Mike was so tall is that I'm so short. [Laughter] So we have to build me up here.

Thanks very, very much for that introduction, and good morning to you all. Excellencies of the diplomatic corps, officials of the Brookings Institution, distinguished officials, scholars and colleagues and members of the media, I'm pleased to be here to participate in this national issues forum. I want especially to greet your learned--the learned panelists, Michael Brown, Ivo Daalder, James Goldgeier and Charles Kupchan. Their wisdom will be welcome, for although this is without doubt the right time and place for a discussion of the new NATO and the 21st century, we still have urgent 20th century business to conduct.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was forged in the aftermath of Holocaust and war by the survivors of war, to prevent war. It reflected our predecessors' determination to defend hard-won freedoms; and their understanding that while weakness invites aggression, strength is a parent to peace.

During its first four decades, NATO's might deterred conflict in the heart of Europe, the scene of so much past horror. But NATO is more than a peacekeeper. The shield it provided allowed post-war economies to rebuild, World War II adversaries to reconcile, and Europe's integration to begin. In part because of NATO, the Cold War ended as this decade began, and alliance leaders confronted a new set of questions: How would the alliance hold together now that the adversary had brought it together was gone? If it remained united, what would it do? How should it change? How might the new NATO relate to the new Europe, and what role would Russia play?

President Clinton and his counterparts, with the help of outside experts, including those here at Brookings, have moved steadily but surely to answer these questions. Acting openly and methodically, they have taken steps to modernize and strengthen the alliance, prepare it for new missions, invite new members, establish partnerships with Europe's new democracies and develop strategies for the future.

My plan this morning had been to discuss these and related issues with which we have been wrestling in recent years and which were to be highlighted at the Washington Summit later this month. My intentions have not changed, but the context for my remarks has, for some of the key policies and principles to be affirmed at the Washington Summit are already in practice.

As we speak, NATO is responding to a real post-Cold War threat to its interests and values. We are doing so in a political and security environment that differs dramatically from the past. We are seeing every day the importance of military forces that are mobile, flexible, precise and capable of operating together well. And by acting on behalf of justice and peace in Kosovo, we are reaffirming NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and basic human decency on European soil.

Certainly, we are saddened and outraged by the terrible human suffering we see, the long lines of refugees, the cries for loved ones missing or lost, the cold-blooded butchery. But let us be clear about what is at stake and where the responsibility for this agony resides.

As President Clinton has repeatedly urged, we need to consider the map. Kosovo is a small part of a region with large historic importance and a vital role to play in Europe's future. This region is a major artery between Europe and Asia and the Middle East. Its stability directly affects the security of our Greek and Turkish allies to the south and our new allies, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, to the north.

Kosovo itself is surrounded by small and struggling democracies that can be overwhelmed by the flood of refugees Milosevic is creating. Kosovo is part of an area, the southeast corner of Europe, where World War I began, major battles in World War II were fought. The worst fighting in Europe since Hitler's surrender, occurred in this decade.

Today, this region is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical to our own security, and it cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains divided and wracked by conflict.

Of course there is more than one source of division in the Balkans, but throughout the 1990s, the most damaging has been the ruthless incitement of ethnic hatred by the authorities in Belgrade, not once, not twice, not three times, but over and over again. President Milosevic has seized every opportunity to advance his own power by attacking first Slovenia, then Croatia, then Bosnia and now the people of Kosovo. The result has been a nightmarish cycle of murder and mayhem that has caused chaos in the region and directly threatened NATO's interests and values.

Make no mistake, the atrocities committed by Serb forces in Kosovo were not the result of NATO bombing; they were the reason NATO had to act. It was Milosevic a decade ago who stripped the Kosovar-Albanians of the autonomy to which they were entitled; who launched last spring a campaign of brutal repression; who violated the cease-fire negotiated last October; whose security forces committed acts of barbarism such as the massacre at Racak earlier this year, and who refused to join the leaders of Kosovo in signing the balanced and just settlement negotiated at Rambouillet.

Milosevic poses as the great defender of Serb sovereignty, but it is because of his brutality that an international presence first became necessary to monitor human rights in Kosovo. It is because of his duplicity that the need for an armed international presence to implement any potential peace agreement became obvious. It is because of his cruelty that NATO actions became the only option as he prepared to unleash yet another rampage of terror. And it's because of his arrogance that NATO attacks have broadened and intensified as that terror continues.

As a result of all this, the NATO of the 21st century is being tested now, before the new century even begins. And we are determined to pass that test, using aircraft and facilities from more than a dozen countries, we are striking back hard. We are resolute, because it is in our interest and because it is right to stop the ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the other indicators of genocide that we see.

George Kennan famously described democracies as "slow to anger, but fiercely determined when roused." Today, our alliance of democracies is roused, as is our collective conscience, by the brutal crimes we witness and cannot accept, and will not allow to pass with impunity. Militarily, our immediate objective is to continue relentlessly to degrade and diminish Belgrade's capacity to impose its will on others.

After less than two weeks and despite adverse weather, we are beginning to see the evidence that our strikes are having an effect, hindering transportation and communication, sowing uncertainty, demonstrating allied resolve. As hard as it is, we must be patient and persist. We must be prepared for an extended conflict. But day by day, the damage inflicted by NATO power on the sources of Milosevic's power will grow.

As the fighting continues, so do United States and NATO efforts to assist the front-line states in caring for refugees and preventing a spillover of violence. It is impossible in words to do justice to the magnitude of the refugee crisis. It is a daunting challenge to governments in the region, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the OSCE, the State Department's Refugees Bureau, USAID and a wide range of non-governmental institutions.

There has been a tremendous outpouring of effort, including by millions of average citizens who have donated money and supplies. Last week, President Clinton committed $50 million in humanitarian assistance over and above the hundred million (dollars) we had allocated prior to the current offensive. During the weekend, the United States and other NATO allies agreed to temporarily host a hundred thousand refugees. Yesterday, the President announced the formation of a high-level team, headed by USAID Director Atwood, to coordinate our overall humanitarian response.

In the days ahead, we know we will have to do more for those in and outside Kosovo, both short-term and long-. The need is enormous and will continue to grow. We will be consulting regularly with Congress and presenting the facts to the American people. There should be no doubt that the United States will continue to do its share.

We have also issued a clear warning to Milosevic not to widen the conflict with NATO by seeking to undermine or topple the democratically elected government of Montenegro. Politically, we are working hard to ensure allied unity and explain NATO's case to the world, and to convey the truth to the people of Serbia, who have been surrounded for too long by Milosevic's lies.

Legally, we are cooperating fully with the international tribunal at The Hague. We want those now directing and committing crimes in Kosovo to pay for them the rest of their lives. We are also insisting that Belgrade treat humanely and release immediately, the three American servicemen abducted last week.

Diplomatically, we are in regular contact with Russia, which has expressed strong opposition to NATO actions in Kosovo. We've not been surprised by this, but neither have we given up trying to work with Russia to bring this crisis to an end. Clearly, this would be in Russia's interest because no nation in this century has paid a higher price for instability and aggression in Europe. Russia's hopes for the future lie in a continent that is secure and stable, where those who would exploit ethnic passions are stopped and countries work together to build prosperity and maintain peace.

In the days ahead, we will strive with Russian leaders to make real progress on issues where we have a common interest in moving forward. We will also continue our search for a way to resolve the Kosovo crisis on acceptable terms. And from day one, those terms have not changed. As President Clinton warned President Milosevic yesterday, more empty promises and token half-promises won't do. NATO insists that Milosevic halt his offensive and withdraw his security forces, and that the people of Kosovo be allowed to return to their homes under the protection of an international security force and to enjoy democratic self-government.

Even as we respond to the crisis in Kosovo, we in NATO and NATO's partners must concern ourselves more broadly with the future of the region. The peaceful integration of Europe's northwest and center is well-advanced or on track. But as I said earlier, the continent cannot be whole and free until its southeast corner is also stable.

In recent years, the international community has done much to assist countries in the region. Our own Southeast European Cooperative Initiative has facilitated a great deal of the efforts and joint and cooperative planning. We know because we have seen that the leaders and citizens of this region want to work and build together.

Once the Kosovo fighting is resolved, we should move forward with new steps. Working with the leaders in the region, our explicit goal should be to transform the Balkans from the continent's primary source of instability into an important part of the European mainstream. We do not want the current conflict to be the prelude to another. We want to build a solid foundation for a new generation of peace so that future wars are prevented, economies grow, democratic institutions are strengthened, and the rights of all are preserved.

Some say violence is endemic to this region and that its people have never and will never get along. That is, I believe, a false and self-fulfilling prophesy that we categorically reject. The people of Southeast Europe, including the Serbs, have experienced long periods of living and working together without conflict. And if you look at the region today, you will see Greeks and Turks operating side-by-side as NATO allies; you will see Macedonians and Albanians and Montenegrans answering the humanitarian call. You will see Christians and Muslims and Jews united in their condemnation of the atrocities being committed. And in Bosnia, you will see NATO and its partners working with ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks to complete implementation of the Dayton Accords.

Success here would remove a major threat to European security and establish a model of inter-ethnic collaboration that is needed throughout the Balkans and around the world. Since the peace accords were signed more than three years ago, enormous strides have been made. It is essential, however, that we not allow events in Kosovo to distract us or simply assume that the future of peace in Bosnia is assured. The nation's bitter divisions are only partially healed. The job of enabling refugees to return safely is ongoing and difficult. And local authorities have not yet assumed the responsibilities for democracy and peace that they must.

The Dayton Accords remain a linchpin of hope for integrating Southeast Europe into a democratic continent. If those accords are to be implemented, NATO must continue to help the people of Bosnia to realize the benefits of peace.

At the Washington summit, our leaders will focus simultaneously on what has been, what is and what will be. Drawing inspiration from the past, they will pay tribute to alliance founders and salute those who have sacrificed through the years to keep our region secure, prosperous and free. They will focus on the present, including every aspect of the situation in Kosovo and the surrounding region. And they will focus on the future, drawing up a blueprint, as the title of today's forum reflects, for the new nation [sic] in the new century.

In so doing, they will be guided by the great lesson of the past century, which is that neither North America nor Europe can be secure if the other is not. Our destinies are linked. That is as true now as it was when NATO was founded 50 years ago. Across the Atlantic, we must stand together and act together as allies when allied action is called for and as friends in helping to shape a more stable, prosperous and lawful world. Some suggest that Europe should take care of Europe, freeing America to concentrate on responsibilities elsewhere.

But this makes no sense. It would create the twin false impression that America doesn't care about Europe and Europe doesn't care about the world. Moreover, it would weaken us both, in and beyond Europe, by depriving the Continent of America's valuable role, while leaving America to assume broader burdens that Europe has the resources and responsibility to share. Such a division of labor would also lead to a division of attention and gradually weaken the indispensable transatlantic bond. We had a taste of divided labor in the early years of this decade in Bosnia. As our unity in Kosovo now reflects, we will not go down that road again.

At the summit, our leaders will unveil a revised strategic concept for the alliance that will take into account the variety of future dangers the alliance may confront. And they will commit NATO to developing military forces that can perform the full spectrum of alliance missions. These include NATO's core mission, the ability to deal with aggression committed directly against one or more NATO members. And they include other potential operations, such as those now ongoing in Bosnia and Kosovo. These differ day to night from the kind of all-out defense of Europe for which the alliance prepared for so long.

Such operations will likely differ in size and length than missions undertaken in collective self-defense. Hopefully, they will be rare. But as is now the case, there may be more than one ongoing at any given time. They may be conducted jointly with partners or other non-allied nations, and by definition they will involve operations outside alliance territory, with all the logistical complication that entails.

We have already made progress in developing the capabilities required, but gaps remain. Many allies have only a limited ability to deploy forces rapidly outside their country and to sustain them once they arrive. The need is not so much that allies invest more in defense but that we all invest wisely. For example, we need to ensure that command, control and information systems are well matched; and we need to have forces, not just among a few countries but throughout NATO, that are versatile, flexible and mobile. Our benchmark is clear; we must also--we must be--as good in dealing with new threats as we are in dealing with old. To these ends, we expect the summit to produce a defense capabilities initiative that will prepare the alliance to field forces designed and equipped for 21st century missions. We expect, as well, a related initiative that responds to the grave threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, and their means of delivery. For we cannot prepare for the future if we do not prepare for the greatest danger of the present and the future.

We also support the strengthening of the European pillar of our alliance. It is in America's interest to see a more integrated Europe able to act effectively and cohesively, willing to assume a greater share of our common responsibilities. So we welcome and support efforts to improve European capabilities. We've made the point, however, that to be constructive, such initiatives should be linked to NATO, complement existing activities and be open to all European members of the alliance, whether or not they are in the EU.

Last month, at the Truman Library in Missouri, I was witness to history as NATO gained three new members and America three new allies. For the people of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic it was a homecoming--an irreversible affirmation of their belonging within the democratic community of the West. For the alliance, it was a strengthening; an enhancement of NATO's muscle and reach. These three new members are NATO's first since the end of the Cold War, but they will not be the last.

We are building a future that erases, not replaces, the division of the past. In today's Europe, destiny is no longer determined by geography. Nations are deciding their own fates and around the continent they have been coming together in support of more open political and economic systems.

It is natural and inevitable that as this occurs, other non-NATO countries will achieve the threshold required for serious consideration as new members. A number have already ascended far along this uphill road. At the Washington summit, NATO leaders will welcome this progress and affirm that the door to the alliance remains open. They will announce a concrete and practical plan to help prepare potential new members to meet NATO's high standards and they will assure aspiring members that they will be judged by what they can contribute to the alliance, not by where they sit on Europe's map.

Half a century ago, American leadership helped lift Western Europe to prosperity and democracy. In this decade, the entire trans-Atlantic community is helping Europe's newly free nations to integrate themselves into the economic and security structures of the continent. This is evident in the direct assistance that has been provided by the European Union and our own seed program and Freedom Support Act. It is evident in the EU's plan to expand and in the new roles and missions of the OSCE, and it is evident in the partnerships NATO has forged with emerging democracies. At the summit, our leaders will have the opportunity to take these partnerships to a new level. They will consider a framework to guide partner participation in planning, deciding and implementing certain alliance missions. And they will announce a plan to upgrade the forces that partners will have available for future NATO-led operations. The result will be a NATO with wider military options, partner countries with enhanced military capabilities, and a Europe practiced in multiplying NATO strengths by partner strengths to arrive at the product of peace.

The Washington summit will show how much NATO values its relationships with all of Europe's democracies, including Russia. The inclusion and full participation of each in the transatlantic community is essential to the future we seek, and this is true not only from a security standpoint, for in the 21st century, a nation need not be in NATO to work closely with NATO, to share responsibility for Europe's security, to be integrated into Europe's economy and to reap the benefits of a Europe that is stable and prosperous.

In 1916, when the forerunner of Brookings Institution was founded, Europe was engaged in a war that had begun in the Balkans and that would soon draw hundreds of thousands of Americans across the Atlantic, many never to return. In 1999, we meet, the United States and NATO--as we meet, the United States and NATO are engaged in another Balkan conflict, determined to halt atrocities and prevent wider war.

Some might conclude that in the intervening years, we learned nothing, or else that nothing we can ever do will bring stability to this troubled corner of the globe. There is much in recent headlines and broadcasts to support both these grim conclusions, but I'm heartened by other and, I believe, stronger currents.

Historically, Balkan conflicts have torn Europe apart. Today most of Europe is united in opposing tyranny, and all of it, except the leaders in Belgrade, supported a negotiated peace. Historically, acts of violent repression have occurred off-camera, hidden from public view. Today, despite Milosevic's best efforts, global media coverage leaves no doubt about the savagery taking place, and there can be no question about the world's need to respond.

Historically, violence in Southeast Europe has been contagious, spreading like wildfire amidst the tinder of ethnic grievances and fear. Today we are wary but encouraged by progress in Bosnia and by the vigorous efforts of leaders in other parts of the region to prevent violent outbreaks. Historically, atrocities have been committed by the strong against the weak, with no stronger force standing guard. Today, NATO is determined to use its strength to halt the abuses, restore stability and return to the people of this region what President Clinton has called in another context, the "quiet miracle of a normal life."

In our era, the great divide is not between East and West, North and South or right and left; it is between those ensnared by the thinking and habits of the past and those inspired by the possibilities of the future, between those who are prisoners of history and those determined to shape it.

From our vantage point, at the threshold of a new century, we must vow together to free ourselves from the recurring nightmares of the old. We must dedicate our power to the service of even more powerful ideals. And we must affirm our faith in the ability of men and women, working together across national and ethnic lines, to forge a future better than the past.

It is that faith which inspired NATO founders when they first gathered in Washington 50 years ago; it is that faith which guides NATO in its actions today, and it is that faith which will unite NATO's leaders when they assemble again in Washington later this month.

Let us never forget that NATO's preparations and operations are not directed against any particular people but against aggression, terror and chaos. Nor should we ever fail to remember NATO's intent, which is to develop, with our partners, a security system that will embrace all of Europe and enable children on both sides of the Atlantic to grow up and grow old in freedom, security and peace. To that mission, I pledge my own best efforts and respectfully solicit both your wise counsel and support.

Thank you very much. [Applause] Thank you.

I now would be very pleased to take your questions.

Yes, Mr. Ambassador? If people could identify themselves, please.

Participant: I'm the ambassador from Romania. Is it working?

M. Albright: Yes.

Participant: Thank you for this wonderful speech. It is delighting and refreshing, and we look forward to the summit. It's a great event for the transatlantic community.

M. Albright: Thank you.

Participant: You referred to a broader need for a strategy for southeastern Europe just to make America live up to its traditions of integrating Europe as a whole. Do you expect the summit to look into a broader vision for that region? And which is the place of NATO as it enlarges? And what is the place of the European Union and America on the economic dimension of this strategy?

M. Albright: Thank you. First of all let me say that I am very pleased with discussions that I've had with Foreign Minister Plesu about the kinds of meetings that have now been taking place in Bucharest of members from the Balkans that are getting along. And I use that as an example of what the future can hold; the ability to be able to work together on functional issues and the hope of the future, and I salute you and your country for having organized this and for the role that Romania has been playing.

I think that also it is very important, as I outlined the goals for the summit, is that we are looking generally there is the open door, and that is very much our policy, and that will be made quite clear in the summit declaration; and our desire to have a more aggressive action plan to provide a road map for how members--new members can join; and the discussion of new missions that clearly extend to all the regions in Europe. So I think that that future aspect of it will be very important.

I think it is also very important to make sure that the other structures in Europe--EU, et cetera--underline the importance of everybody working together and expanding to the countries that are ready to be members of these all-European organizations in order to underline and strengthen what we have been talking about, a Europe whole and free.

Thank you.

Back there.

Participant: I'm Barbara Slavin of USA Today. I'm wondering about your personal reflections during the past two weeks as someone who is a refugee from the last horrible conflict in Europe; what has been going through your mind? And I know you perhaps don't want to answer this at this point, but are there any things that you would have done differently in terms of diplomacy or military strategy to have tried to prevent what's going on now in Kosovo?

M. Albright: Okay. Thank you. I know that much has been made about my background, but I think that any American who has the privilege to live in this country either by birth or by coming here as a refugee understands the importance that standing up for our values and not allowing ethnic cleansing to recur that we all share that no matter where be came from because we are Americans, and that is the basis. I had a conversation this morning with Ambassador Chris Hill in Skopje, and he said, "If you have a chance to talk to people today, tell them to take a look at the pictures of the refugees on both sides of the border, and that is what we are fighting for." It is our values, our values of not seeing people separated from their loved ones, of having military-age men taken off and incarcerated. And I can go on with that. So this is an American value, and I am very proud to be a part of it and proud to have been someone that had the opportunity to come to this country where those values are so broadly shared and that we stand up for.

Let me also say that we will have plenty of time to go back and look at what we did or did not do. I am now completely focused on what we are doing now and what we have to do in the future. And when, as Mike has said, I can come to Brookings-[Laughter]--we'll talk about it.

Barry.

Participant: [Off mic]

M. Albright: Wait, you need a mic. Even you need a mic. [Laughter]

Participant: Both you and the president, unsurprisingly using similar phrases, have said NATO's determined to prevail. Can the U.S. prevail without ground troops? What's holding up that decision? Is the president's ear close to the ground? I mean, you have here in this folder certainly this type of institutional academia, or some people would say the intellectual elite, saying that ground troops indeed should be considered. Can you prevail without ground troops is the basic question?

M. Albright: Well, we are engaged in a sustained air campaign which is in its initial phases. We have all said that weather hampered some of the activities early on, and we are going to continue in this intensive air campaign. And we will do so until there is an agreement that allows for all the Serb--for the Serb forces to be out, for the refugees to be able to come in, and for there to be an international security force that is able to be in a permissive environment.

As we have repeated over and over again, the president has no plans or intentions for ground forces in a non-permissive environment. And we believe that a sustained air campaign can accomplish the objectives that we have laid out and also to severely degrade, damage and make it increasingly difficult, if those particular conditions are not met, for Milosevic, to loosen his grip and be prevented from this kind of butchery.

Participant: Alton Frye, the Council on Foreign Relations. Madame Secretary, you indicated a firm view that those engaged in war crimes in Kosovo should remain vulnerable to prosecution and, if I understood, carry this threat with them for the rest of their lives. I think that was your phrase. Can you imagine an outcome in which Slobodan Milosevic, having ordered the actions in Kosovo, would not himself eventually be charged for war crimes?

M. Albright: Let me say that the War Crimes Tribunal is working its way through this, and it is following the facts. And the war crimes--there is no statute of limitation on war crimes. I am not going to predict a legal issue, but I think that politically, if one looks at it, it is very hard to not say that these orders are being given from the top and that this is not some kind of a spontaneous ethnic cleansing by lower-level officials.

We believe that it is important for all countries to contribute as much information as possible to the War Crimes Tribunals. We have sent--we have already over the years contributed a great deal to the war crimes tribunals. We are contributing more in terms of getting personnel over there to interview the newest victims and to be able to put together for the War Crimes Tribunal their best possible case. But--I think it's inappropriate to predict specifically the outcome of a legal proceeding, but I think it's very hard to disconnect Milosevic from what is going on.

Ambassador Jeszenszky?

Participant: Well, we are all Central Europeans, so we are all --

M. Albright: The ambassador of Hungary.

Participant: The secretary knows me from the '90s, (early '90s?). And we in Central Europe have every reason to value your knowledge and experience, so I think the United States, the whole world, is indebted to your knowledge and wisdom. But we all agree that foresight is needed to prevent new dangers.

It is obvious that this tragedy could be foreseen and there were efforts to prevent it. But there are also other possible danger spots in Yugoslavia, particularly the Vojvodina and the Sanjak, where a sizable non-Serbian population lives.

In your view, what precautions, what measures can be done right now to prevent a possible spreading of these terrible atrocities?

M. Albright: Yes. First of all, I think that we are very aware of the dangers for the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina and I have actually had a chance not only to discuss it with you but with your foreign minister, Martonyi, to talk about the potential threat.

I think that we have to, and we will, continue to make very clear that the spreading of this holds very dangerous consequences for Milosevic, and I think a very important part here is to do exactly what you have done, Mr. Ambassador, is to alert ahead of time that there is this danger also in Vojvodina.

I think that we all have a tendency to focus on the unpronounceable name of the day, and it is now important to keep thinking about the other regions and to acquaint the American public with the surrounding areas and the fact of the dangers of spreading in Vojvodina and Montenegro.

In the back, there.

Participant: Klaus Lieber [sp] with German television.

Madame Secretary, I wondered whether you could explain the term "permissive environment"? Does that require a written permission? Or could there be an alternative, such as the--Serbian troops in Kosovo being degraded to a point that they cannot put up a significant fight and, thus, making the territory a permissive environment?

M. Albright: Well, I think we believe that there has to be a clear indication by actions, either the signing--there has to be some way to know that it is a permissive environment; so that there has to be acceptance of the fact that there will not be Serb forces that will attack the populations or the forces that would go in, in such an environment.

So we believe that a signed agreement is the best way to go; an agreement, as we have all said together, based on the framework of Rambouillet, the framework of Rambouillet being that Serb forces must be out, refugees must be in, that there needs to be an international security force and that there be a move to self-government. As the president said, you have to be able to have the people that go there be able to live up to--be able to fulfill their dreams.

So I think that we believe that there has to be provable actions that it is a permissive environment.

Yes?

Participant: Madame Secretary, Andrea Koppel with CNN.

Is it still realistic to expect that, once the fighting is gone and there is a permissive environment, that the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs would continue to live side by side in a province of Yugoslavia? If not, what do you think is realistic?

M. Albright: Well, I think that, as one looks at it now, it looks very difficult. But I think depending upon how we are able to end this part of the conflict, we have to see; that has to be our hope, is that they can in fact live side by side. And we are seeing that that is possible in Bosnia.

None of these things, difficulties, can be overcome immediately. But it is very important that we move in a way that allows for the Kosovo people to have self-government and for the Serbs to be able in some way, to have their holy places protected and accessible. But those are all, I think, in the future. We now have to end this butchery.

[Inaudible]

Participant: Mrs. Albright, I am Ben Barber with the Washington Times. I'd like to know what your policy is towards Russia. How do you view Mr. Primakov's policies? Is Russia fishing in troubled waters by sending its ships into the region right now? Do you fear that this conflict could help to destabilize Russia by, you know, assisting the nationalists against perhaps more democratic elements in Russia?

M. Albright: Well first of all, as I said, and I've said a number of other times, is that we disagree, obviously, with Russia about the NATO bombings and the NATO actions. We do not disagree in terms of short-, medium- and long-term goals of working together on a number of issues, and we've proven that in the last days by signing agreements and continuing negotiations on CFE and issues that are of long-term importance to both the countries.

We have said that it is important for the Russians to participate in trying to find a solution to this. And tomorrow there will be a Contact Group meeting at a non-ministerial level, to see how we carry on. I speak to Foreign Minister Ivanov on a regular basis. We are in touch with Prime Minister Primakov. And there is a genuine process, a working process to keep us all together because we understand the importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship, and Russia's--as I said in my remarks--their stake in a peaceful and stable Europe. And I believe that ultimately Russia would prefer to be on the side of a peaceful and stable Europe and not on the side of darkness and the kinds of evils perpetrated by Milosevic right now. But I can assure you that it's a relationship that we are working on; we consider important to understand some of the domestic political pressures and problems within Russia at this stage.

Yes?

Participant: Peter Scheottle, Brookings. One of the benefits or good things that might come out of this horror is a strengthening of an international consensus that governments are not allowed to mistreat their citizens to this extent; and secondly, that international intervention is permitted into a sovereign area when these kinds of horrors are perpetrated. And my question to you is, (A) would you--two part--would you agree that this might be a goal, striving toward strengthening this element of international law, international custom; and (B) if so, what steps might you and the government consider to move toward such a goal?

M. Albright: Well, first of all, last night I went to a very moving event, which was the honoring of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the president of the War Crimes Tribunal, an American judge, who talked about first of all the fact that the War Crimes Tribunal is now six years old and everybody--I was there when it--at its birth, and people were very skeptical about it and thought, you know, nothing would come of it. It is now--she described--I urge you all, actually, to try to get her remarks, because she described the fact that before, there were no prisoners, they had nothing to do, they were in an insurance building, no courtroom. They now have a lot of business, and they have simultaneous trials going on. And there is a process that is really working. That is building. And they had no procedures. They didn't--they really developed a whole new case study for international law in this, and I consider it a very important step. And we will continue to support the War Crimes Tribunal.

I think that I believe that at the end of the bloodiest century, where a lot of the blood was caused by the fact that horrendous things were happening inside borders that people were not paying attention to, that today in our completely open systems, that it is impossible for people with values to stand by and watch the kind of horrors that we are seeing in Kosovo and not do something, and that the concept of humanitarian intervention, I think, is something that needs to be examined very closely. There obviously are questions of sovereignty. I think the whole issue of sovereignty is one that is complicated by the fact that when somebody like Milosevic has been an aggressor in other places, he in some ways gives up some of his rights in terms of protecting what is going on inside his country. He has transgressed in the most serious way on the fabric of how the international community operates.

So I'm not prepared to give you definitive answers, but I can tell you that it is moving in a direction where there is a sense of co-responsibility by nations for what happens inside. And I'd like to return to a point in my remarks, and I think a good way to conclude, because I think I must, that what has been so remarkable to me through this terrible period is not just an attempt to find a silver lining, but also to express what is going on, is that the unity of not just the alliance but other countries in Europe in their pursuit of the right ending here is something that I think we should all rejoice in. I spent--I spend I can't tell you how many hours a day talking to my fellow foreign ministers and laying out strategies for how now--whereas before, force was supporting diplomacy, now how diplomacy can support the use of force, how we are acting together and the sense of unity that is there now that has never been there as far as we have had to work in real time on a serious problem. And I think that it shows that when countries with similar values are able to work together, that we will prevail. We won't prevail in 36 hours or very quickly, because this is a tough problem, and democracies have the right values, and they also must develop the right patience.

And I thank you all very much for your attention today and also for your dedication to this work, because, as I look around the room, this is the group of people who have asked questions and prodded and supported the kinds of comments that I made in my last remarks about the unity and the importance of NATO. We might not all agree on every aspect of the NATO goal or as policy wonks look at what the various aspects of how we move forward. But I think we are agreed that in celebrating the anniversary of NATO, we are not only celebrating the history of the world's strongest military alliance, but the history of an alliance that has belief in the right values.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

Panel Discussion:

Panelists:
Richard N. Haass, Brookings Institution
Michael E. Brown, Georgetown University
Ivo H. Daalder, Brookings Institution
James M. Goldgeier, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution
Charles Kupchan, Professor, Georgetown University

R. Haass: I don't think any of the four people on the panel was here when NATO was born, which is either a reassuring or troubling fact depending upon your perspective.

We meet here today approximately two-and-a-half weeks before more heads of government and state descend up on Washington than at any other moment, to the best of my knowledge, over 40 governments are expected here to send their most senior people, and until perhaps a month ago this really would have, in and of itself, a discussion of NATO's future would have taken center stage. Obviously the meeting here later this month will very much take place in a context, indeed, in something of a shadow caused by the crisis in and around Kosovo.

The basic questions surrounding the NATO summit, the 50th anniversary summit do involve basic questions of NATO's future mission, and NATO's future size and composition. If you will mission and enlargement are very much at the center of things. If these questions seemed abstract and only interesting to a foreign policy elite several weeks ago, again because of the situation in Kosovo, they now seem terribly real. Indeed, all too real.

During the Cold War, NATO was essentially an organization that was built around what is essentially known as an Article V commitment. Article V is part of the NATO charter that essentially commits each of its members to the defense of the territory of everybody else. To put it bluntly, attack on one is an attack on all. That said, NATO also did obviously have other functions during the Cold War. Principal among them was to provide an anchor for the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe and, above all, the tying of Germany to Europe, and also it had a trans-Atlantic function, that NATO was a bridge that linked the United States in peacetime to the security and future of Europe. The question therefore arises, what role for NATO in the post-Cold War environment. If you will what role NATO for its second 50 years.

Well, there are lots of ideas out there. Most of them are represented and will be discussed by the four distinguished people we have on the panel. But these ideas range from everything from NATO as a global organization there to essentially promote order around the world, to NATO being a European organization to basically dealing with situations like we see in Kosovo, not limited by the technical treaty area of the organization to NATO being something much more modest, what you might call a minimalist NATO, essentially continuing to focus on Article V, on the idea of external attacks, and being put somewhat in abeyance, or something on the back burner until such a time that an external threat might arise.

There are also questions about NATO potential mission dealing very much or tied very much to the future of NATO size and composition to enlargement. Again, the idea that NATO can provide a foundation and an anchor for stability and security within Europe itself. And it raises basic questions, therefore, about what NATO should do as well as about what NATO can do.

Let me quickly introduce the four people on the panel here this morning, each of whom will talk for some seven to ten minutes, then we'll open it up for a general discussion and for your questions. We'll begin here on my immediate right with Michael Brown. Michael is the director for research of the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, just a few miles form here. Until recently, he was the managing editor of one of the most prestigious journals in this field, the Journal of International Security.

To his right is Charles Kupchan. Charles is also at Georgetown University, where he is a professor. He has experience on the staff of the National Security Council earlier this decade, where he worked on European relations. And he is, like Michael Brown, well published in this field, and one of his books is particularly germane to today's subject since the title of it is, Atlantic Security: Contending Visions.

To his right is Jim Goldgeier. Jim is here at the Brookings Institution as a visiting fellow for this year. We're fortunate to have him. His base, however, is at another university with George in the title, George Washington, where he is a professor. He is also someone with experience on the staff of the National Security Council, indeed four of us sitting up here, myself as well as Charles Kupchan, Jim Goldgeier and Ivo Daalder have all served on the staff of the National Security Council at one time or another. I'm not sure whether what exactly means but it is a fact worth pointing out. Professor Goldgeier is the author of a forthcoming book entitled, Not Whether But When: The United States' Decision to Enlarge NATO. And his writings to date on this subject, I believe, have been authoritative.

Last, but far from least is Ivo Daalder. Ivo is also a visiting fellow in the foreign policy studies program here at the Brookings Institution. He is on leave from the University of Maryland, where he's an associate professor at the school of public affairs. Like his three colleagues on the panel, Ivo is prolific. His forthcoming publications include NATO in the 21st Century, and Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy.

Again, though, I plan to begin with Michael Brown, and then we'll go in the order that we are seated. And then, again, I look forward to your questions and comments. Why don't we come up here for the opening presentations if you will, and take off the microphones, and then we can take the questions from there.

M. Brown: Okay, Richard. Thank you very much indeed.

The argument that I'm going to lay out is radically different from what you've heard in this room over the past hour, hour and a half. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 1991, NATO has embarked on a campaign to redefine and reinvent itself. That campaign has led to NATO embracing what I call an expansionist agenda, and that, in turn, involves taking on two new missions. The first of these two missions is to bring new members into the alliance with the idea of promoting stability in these new member states. The second mission is to promote stability in non-NATO Europe, the so-called out of area operations.

Since 1991, NATO's leaders, individually and collectively, have stated and restated that these are NATO's new purposes for the post-Cold War era. They argued that this has made NATO relevant to the post-Cold War era, and has redefined the alliance in ways that will enable it to endure in the years ahead. I believe that they're fundamentally mistaken, and that NATO is on a path that will make its demise more rather than less likely.

I believe that NATO's mission should be redefined, as Richard suggested, almost more minimalist lines. And first let me say a couple of things about why I think NATO is currently off course. First of all, I think that NATO enlargement will continue to be problematic, and I don't want to get into that debate here, because it's a debate with which many of you are familiar. Suffice it to say that I think that this enlargement of the alliance is both unnecessary and likely to be counterproductive. Unlikely because the member states that are being brought into the alliance are already stable. In fact, states that are unstable aren't eligible for membership in NATO by definition. So, the idea that NATO is going to promote stability in these states strikes me as specious at best.

I think NATO enlargement is also quite possibly going to be counterproductive in terms of the effects that it will have on U.S. and NATO relations with Russia. Many people in the United States and NATO aren't realists, but many leaders in Russia are. And they look at their map of Europe turning blue, and that bothers them a great deal. I think NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of Russian Nationalists and opportunists getting the upper-hand in Russian domestic politics.

Now, NATO's second mission is to promote stability, it's second new mission is to promote stability in out of area parts of Europe. And let me just say at the outset that my main area of research, when I'm not looking at Europe and NATO, is ethnic conflict, civil war, and genocide. And I think the track record of the United States and its European allies and the so-called international community in general is appalling in dealing with these kinds of problems. I very much wish that the United States and its allies individually or collectively would take action to deal with these kinds of problems, early and effective action to keep genocide and ethnic cleansing from breaking out in places like Rwanda and Kosovo.

I fear, though, that the United States and its NATO allies are unlikely to take early and effective action to deal with these problems on a regular and consistent basis. And there are many reasons for this. First of all, NATO members will rarely have important interests at stake in remote parts of Europe where ethnic conflicts are likely to break out. Second, they'll rarely reach consensus on what to do with respect to these problems, because they'll have different perceptions about what the problems are and what should be done about them. And, third, even when they do agree to take action, they will find it extremely difficult to use military force in an effective way, especially in terms of putting ground forces on the ground because of the possible costs associated with taking these actions.

And, as I'm sure many of you know, and as I can assure you from my own work on ethnic conflict and genocide, if you want to stop ethnic conflict and genocide, by and large, you have to have troops on the ground. And I think the U.S. and its NATO allies are unlikely to be willing to take that step on a consistent basis. And it's because they're unlikely to do it on a consistent basis that I think it's a huge mistake for NATO's leaders to link the alliance's credibility to the performance of these kinds of missions. You know, as people say here in the states, if you're going to talk the talk, you have to walk the walk. And I think NATO's leaders have created a huge credibility gap for the alliance by setting a standard of performance that the alliance is unable and unlikely to meet on a consistent basis. And because of that ongoing credibility problem, which I think will eat away at the alliance, I think it's demise is likely to be accelerated by the steps that we've taken.

So, I think that NATO should be reconfigured along minimalist lines, and this is unlikely to happen at the NATO summit later this month. But when NATO's leaders meet at some point in the future to reconsider NATO's mission, I would argue that NATO should be defined in ways that will enhance its prospects for survival in the long-run. And I say this because I think NATO is fundamentally important to European security, because the U.S. security commitment to its allies is important to European security. It reassures Germany and the other members of Western Europe about Russia, which despite all of its many problems remains a nuclear superpower, and it reassures the other members of Western Europe about their own security vis-a-vis each other. It will help to prevent what Western Europeans call in diplomatic mumbo-jumbo, the renationalization of Western European defense policies, which is a fancy way of saying that the U.S. security commitment to Europe will help to prevent a reemergence of balance of power politics in European security.

So, I think NATO should do five things. First of all, it should scale back its aspirations and NATO leaders should state that NATO's purpose is to provide a hedge against Russian expansion in the future, to reassure Germany and Western Europe about their security, and that's it. And for those who say that Russia doesn't pose a threat to European security today, I would say two things. First, Russia remains a nuclear superpower; and, two, Germany didn't threaten anybody in January of 1933. It would be a huge mistake to assume that Russia cannot bounce back from the situation its in today.

Now, the second thing I think that NATO's leaders need to do is to find a form of words that will make this politically acceptable, both in Russia and Western Europe. And so I think that NATO's leaders should abandon the collective defense terminology that they've relied on for the past several decades, and instead come up with a formulation based on strategic reassurance that I think gets the main point of NATO's mission across but without antagonizing Russia in particular.

Third, on NATO enlargement, I think that NATO should put a freeze on bringing further members into the alliance, unless and until strategic circumstances dictate. That is, NATO should not bring any more member states into the alliance unless Russia starts to behave in ways that threaten its neighboring states militarily. If the strategic requirement is there, we should bring these states into NATO. If the strategic requirement isn't there, we shouldn't bring them into NATO. NATO is not a social club, it is first and foremost a collective defense organization.

Now, forth, on out of area operations, let me say once again that I really wish that the United States and its allies would take action in places like Bosnia and Kosovo early and effectively. But I think they're unlikely to do that on a consistent basis. Therefore, I think that NATO's leaders should scale back the promises and commitments they're making to undertake these kinds of missions. They should say that when members of NATO are willing to form coalitions of the willing to undertake these operations, they'll do so, and they can draw on NATO's formidable organizational assets to do that, if they decide to undertake these missions. But these should not be considered NATO responsibilities, and the failure of NATO's leadership to take action in places like Bosnia and Kosovo should not be put at NATO's doorstep. These should not be considered NATO failures.

Fifth, and last, I think that in accordance with this minimalist conception of NATO, American standing forces in Europe should be brought down substantially from their current levels of around 120,000 to 50 or perhaps 70 thousand, but no more. If NATO's mission is scaled back, there's no need to keep large forces in Europe on a regular basis, bring the costs down.

Now, critics will say three things about this minimalist conception of the alliance. First, they'll say that this is going to antagonize the Russians, it's going to drive them crazy to talk about strategic reassurance and pointing to them as a possible source of instability in Europe. My response to that is, actions speak louder than words. Our current posture is that we keep making soothing sounds about promoting stability throughout Europe, at the same time, we're bringing new member states into the alliance, and bombing Serbia. Now, Russians, I think, look at NATO's actions and see those as provocative. The minimalist conception of the alliance speaks rather forthrightly about what the alliance is about, but would not bring new members into the alliance, and would reduce NATO's standing forces in Europe. I think those actions would mollify Russia.

Second, critics will say, well, gee, what NATO is doing in Kosovo proves that the alliance is, indeed, willing and able to take on these kinds of out of area operations. We can talk about this more later if you want, and I want to keep my remarks brief here, but I think that NATO's handling of the Kosovo crisis proves precisely the opposite. NATO didn't do anything in February and March 1998, when Milosevic began his crackdown in Kosovo, and when the regional autonomy option was taken off the boards because the Kosovars came to embrace the goal of political independence. NATO dithered in the summer of 1998 when Milosevic mounted his counter-offensive. NATO retreated in October and November of 1998 when Milosevic broke his commitments on the cease fire. NATO finally took action very late in the day, as we all know, just in the last couple of weeks, and even now, despite its claims to the contrary, has not taken effective action to stop or prevent an escalation in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And my view is that if NATO stays on its current course, Kosovo is soon going to be without Kosovars altogether. I think that this proves that NATO has very serious problems in dealing with these kinds of crises, and that it's a huge mistake to link the alliance's credibility to these kinds of problems.

Now, finally, critics will say that the conception of the alliance that I've outlined will make NATO irrelevant to European security and that it will consequently wither and die. And those who embrace the expansionist conception of the alliance have been saying ever since 1991 that NATO has to go out of area or out of business. And by repeating this constantly, it's become part of the mantra of the NATO establishment. I've always found this logic suspect, and even more so today. I mean, the expansionist argument in a nutshell is that NATO should engage in a lot of activities that are secondary to both European security and to the United States. Bringing Hungary into the alliance, dealing with out of area problems, and it should do this at a very high cost by maintaining high standing forces.

The minimalist conception of the alliance is that NATO should focus on core interests to the United States and Europe, and do this at low cost. I don't see why engaging in secondary activities at high cost is going to appeal more to the American people and the American Congress than engaging in core activities at low cost. And so, I very much hope that somewhere down the road, NATO's leaders will take a fresh look at this issue, and instead of continuing incrementally along the path that they've been on, take a fresh look, and try to approach the problem fro the standpoint of a clean slate.

Thanks very much.

R. Haass: The next speaker is Charles Kupchan.

C. Kupchan: Thanks, Richard.

In the spirit of lively academic debate, I'm going to present an argument that is exactly the opposite of that of my colleague Michael Brown. But, before I do that, let me put it in the following broader context. I think that if you were to give a grade to the Clinton administration's foreign policy on any particular front, Iraq, China, the Balkans, except for Kosovo, you'd give them a reasonably good grade, a B-plus, maybe an A-minus, maybe an A-minus over a B-plus. But, the real problem with the administration has been that the whole is much less than the sum of the parts. And that when you add up each of these separate pieces they don't seem to create some overriding strategic vision that is based upon a coherent logic. You have the Dayton Accord, but it's predicated upon by Milosevic, as one example of these inherent contradictions. You have NATO enlargement, but at the same time were supposed to be building a new relationship with Russia.

What I'd like to try to do in the next 10 minutes is try to answer some of the bigger questions about U.S. policy toward Europe, and provide some sense of what I think our strategic targets and goals should be, because I think one of the problems we have right now is that we're doing short-term planning, and we don't have big, long-term goals in sight. I want to articulate those long-term goals on three fronts, Kosovo, enlargement, and the broader strategic relationship between the United States and Europe, as one begins to move into the next century.

On Kosovo, I think that the United States by moving toward military action against Yugoslavia has finally put into the works a viable solution to building a stable peace in the Balkans. And I believe that because I think that the Yugoslav regime and Milosevic in particular have been behind much of the war and bloodshed of the past decade. And that there is no way to think about a stable Southeastern Europe, unless the Milosevic regime is neutralized. I think neutralizing that regime is of importance and strategic interest to the United States for two main reasons.

One, because of the likelihood of spread of the war. And people will argue that wars don't spread, dominos don't fall. In the Balkans we know they do, because they've been falling before our very eyes, from Slovenia, to Croatia, to Bosnia, to Kosovo, maybe now to Albania and Macedonia. And secondly, because I take very seriously the idea that the United States and Western Europe have carved out an unprecedented zone of peace that is embodied in NATO and the European Union and that we can't take that for granted.

We assume the Franco-German rapprochement will last forever, that the British-American rivalry of the 19th Century is gone for good. I don't think we should be so facile in assuming that those relationships are going to remain, especially if the United States and Europe stands by as war occurs in Southeastern Europe. So I think that there will be a real problem for the viability of NATO if nothing is done, if Kosovo isn't seen through to a conclusion.

It's not the credibility of NATO in Russia or to the other nationalists, it's the credibility of NATO right here at home, and in France, and in England, and in Germany. What's the purpose of having this alliance around if it's not going to do Yugoslavia, because that's about as close to home as we're going to get in Europe.

And I disagree with Michael here, I think if you restrict NATO and you make it only a collective defense organization, to balance against a Russia that can barely get out of bed in the morning, NATO's days are very numbered. So I think that this Kosovo crisis is critical, it's a watershed for the alliance. But, I think that NATO and the United States have to step up to the plate.

I find it mind boggling that this operation began with no substantial ground forces in the region, in Macedonia, in Hungary, not because we might use them to invade Yugoslavia, but at a minimum to prevent against the spread. Milosevic may well take this to Vojvodina, maybe to Hungary, maybe stage some sort of attack into Macedonia. It's irresponsible not to have heavier force in the region. I find it beyond mind boggling that today the Secretary of State is still ruling out ground troops, is still talking about this process of the air campaign is working, talking about Rambouillet and getting some sort of agreement. The war that she described this morning, there's no resemblance to the war that I see taking place in the Balkans.

So I believe that it's imperative that the United States and NATO act quickly to get necessary ground troops into the region to neutralize the Milosevic regime, and to either carve out a pocket of space in Kosovo for Albanians, or all of Kosovo for Albanians after expelling Serb forces. I don't think we have time, I don't think the United States government should continue to ask for patience. If we give them a lot of patience, there will be no Albanians left in Kosovo in a matter of weeks.

Onto enlargement. I have always felt that the Balkans sit very uneasily with enlargement. Enlargement is too easy, it's a laying on of hands, it's a blessing that these countries belong in the West. But, just to the south of Hungary, a country which has just joined NATO and received an Article V guarantee, there is a major war going on, and this is the best test case of America's willingness to get involved in building security in Europe. I believe that the enlargement strategy doesn't make sense if the United States and NATO aren't willing to do the Yugoslavias of the world, because if they're not going to do Yugoslavia, they're certainly not going to do things further East. And so it seems to me that enlargement loses its credibility, its meaning, its momentum if NATO simply were to stand by and let Yugoslavia continue to build, or to create wars and twisted nationalist myths in the region.

I think that NATO if it is to survive needs to focus almost exclusively on out of area, on building security to Europe's east, because nobody threatens NATO territory at this point, and it seems to me that to focus our resources, our money and our time in defending territory against a non-existent threat makes no sense. I am someone who opposed NATO enlargement from the very beginning. I don't think it makes sense, but it's too late, it's happening. I believe that those of us who were opposed and those of us who were for now need to put our minds together to figure out what to do next. My own view is that now that enlargement has started it must proceed, and it must proceed at a fast pace, the door must be open.

Although I believe that instead of moving sequentially from West to East, it is time to focus seriously, in deed as well as in rhetoric, on Russia's ultimate inclusion in NATO, because it seems to me if NATO is to be the centerpiece of the Atlantic security order, and by moving forward with enlargement the United States is basically anointing as the centerpiece of that order, it is imperative that Russia ultimately join for three reasons.

One, a Europe without Russia is not a stable Europe. The most potent and fundamental transformation of this century has been the gradual democratization and pacification of all of Europe's great powers, starting with Britain, moving to France, then to Germany. I believe that Russia is next in line. NATO should be doing everything in its power to ensure that that process of democratization and pacification works. It should be embracing Russia, not aggregating its power against Russia.

Secondly, I believe that to move sequentially from West to East will only worsen the relationship with Russia, create the gray zone problem. By expediting Russia's own inclusion in NATO, by bringing the Baltics in at the same time that you bring in Russia, you side step this intractable strategic problem.

And then finally, I believe that by bringing Russia in and focusing on Eastern Europe, one engages in that part of Europe where the real strategic dilemmas of the coming century lie. Central Europe now faces no real threats to security. Eastern Europe does, that's where we ought to be engaging.

Let me end by making a few comments about European defense, because I think that in some ways the most interesting questions for the next decade are really not about Kosovo, assuming that we get that one right, or enlargement. They're about the emergence of a more self-possessed and independent Europe. I believe that the American uni-polar moment is already beginning to wane, and will be short-lived, and I believe that for three reasons, because of the diffusion of power globally that will continue, because of EMU, a shift from an intergovernmental union to a union that is largely super-national. And I think that as Europe continues to integrate and become a more substantial political player, the United States will respond by saying, fine, you want more say on trade and finance, you carry more of the burden on defense.

And finally, I think that American foreign policy is going to get less internationalist, not more, because of generational change, because we've been enjoying a massive economic boom, that at some point will slow down, and because I think that in some ways the Kosovo crisis, even if it goes well, is going to make Americans less willing to run the security show in Europe, especially if lots of Americans end up dying. So I believe that as this next century opens, the United States and Europe need to focus on a rebalancing of the strategic relationship, that the United States should welcome openly Europe's efforts to build a much more robust defense capability, to recast its defense spending, to have the institutions and the capability needed to act on its own, because in the end of the day, something will happen in Europe soon, something of major military importance, and the United States is going to say, we're going to pass on this, and Europe had better be ready to take action on its own.

So what I'm saying, suggesting here is that NATO is the action for the near-term, but in the long-term I think one has to begin imagining a security relationship that is less Atlantic and more European. Not that NATO by any means be dismantled, but that Europe carry much more of the burden. And I believe that because I think that the current level of European strategic dependence on the United States is simply unsustainable in this country. And I believe we're seeing some of that right now in this battle in Kosovo.

So to end, we've got to get Kosovo right, and I believe that means ground troops and following through. Two, full steam on enlargement, the second wave should begin immediately, but non-provocative to Russia, probably Slovenia and Romania, maybe a neutral country, but focus from here on out on getting Russia in. And finally, I think we really need to take seriously the idea that by the year 2010, if the alliance is to be healthy, it needs to be much more European, and much less American.

Thank you.

J. Goldgeier: Thank you, Richard, for the earlier introduction, and I'd like to take the opportunity to thank both Richard and Mike Armacost for inviting me to spend a wonderful year here at Brookings.

I've been asked to focus on the issue of NATO enlargement, some of which Charlie has just addressed. And I would start by saying that as we witness this war in Kosovo, we should recall one of President Clinton's chief arguments for extending NATO membership to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. His belief, as he put it in October of 1996, when he recommended that new countries join the alliance in the spring of 1999, as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic did a few weeks ago. He said, "that NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West, prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish." He had often stated that NATO enlargement was an instrument for creating a unified, peaceful, democratic Europe. And he reiterated his desire for a unified, peaceful, democratic Europe in his address to the nation on the night that the bombings began in Yugoslavia.

The idea that the prospect of membership in leading Western institutions such as NATO could serve as incentive for countries to implement reform and settle problems peacefully has been borne out in much of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland's development of civilian control over the military, Hungary and Romania's efforts to settle their border issues peacefully, Slovenia, Lithuania, Bulgaria adopting Western political and economic norms and institutions in order to become accepted as full members of the prosperous and peaceful Western order, which includes NATO and the European Union.

Now when deliberations first began on NATO enlargement in 1993 and '94 within the Clinton administration it was highly contentious both inside and outside the administration to use NATO membership for this purpose. As the debate raged within the Clinton administration at this time about the best way to prevent future Bosnias and create peace and stability in Europe's East, the overwhelming view was that the Partnership for Peace, the military program designed to include all former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet States, as well as the traditional neutrals in Europe, was the perfect program for enhancing NATO's peacekeeping abilities, and for eliminating Cold War divisions.

This program, not enlargement, was popular at the Pentagon, in Europe, and of course in Russia. It offered inclusion, without having to extend NATO's defense commitment, and without increasing the unwieldiness of alliance decision making. Now, the administration chose by the middle of 1994 to begin going beyond Partnership for Peace, and to promote NATO's enlargement, and the next several years were spent getting on board its own bureaucracy, the allies, the Russians, and then the United States Senate.

I think it's important to recognize in thinking about the future of enlargement that at the beginning of this process that led to the first round, there were few in the executive and legislative branches of the United States government who were enthusiastic supporters. Most within the administration, most within the executive branch were opposed, particularly at the Pentagon, most in Congress were indifferent, having not really focused on issues of NATO and its future. There were only a handful in Europe who liked the idea, and the Russians hated it.

While supporters of enlargement prevailed to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, they face a similar overwhelming opposition in Washington and in Europe and in Russia to a second round. It's even more difficult to go forward with a second round of enlargement for s second round of enlargement, because the coalition that was put together for this first round was a very diverse and fragile coalition of idealists and realists. Each group had misgivings that will only grow as NATO considers next steps on membership.

Those who sought enlargement primarily as a means for consolidating reform in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Clinton team, were concerned and will remain concerned about the effect on Russia. With the signing in 1997 of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, they were more confident about their ability to bring in the first three, but they worry about fissures in the relationship with Russia that will grow with future rounds, particularly once Lithuania and perhaps others in the Baltic region are considered.

This concern was true even before Kosovo, but it will be exacerbated by the fact that NATO-Russian relations would appear to be at their worst point since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, those who sought enlargement primarily as a means of securing the victory of the Cold War and preventing a future Russian threat to Europe, Congressional Republicans, will grow wary that too many members will dilute the effectiveness of NATO as a military alliance, which they view as the primary purpose of NATO. The dilution concern was also there before Kosovo, but it too will be exacerbated by reports of the difficulties of fighting war by committee, even though that problem is not due to the presence of the three new members.

Now, the administration recognizes the difficulties with going forward with a next round or enlargement, which is why even before this war they had planned little more than rhetoric about the promise of the open door when convening the summit later this month. And nothing that the Secretary of State said this morning dispels the notion that they will do little more than say that the door is still open, they will announce that they have these concrete steps, but they're certainly not prepare to discuss names or lay out a real time table for a next round.

However, I agree with Charlie. Despite the concerns about the future rounds of enlargement, the central issue is, enlargement never made sense as a one time event, if you accept

President Clinton's vision of using NATO as an instrument to create a unified, democratic, peaceful Europe. If it is a one-time event then it just redrew the line a little further to the East. The logic of the policy is that as countries meet the criteria laid out in Article X of the treaty, namely their ability to further the principles of the alliance and contribute to security, they should be able to join.

Now, only the President of the United States can lead the alliance to fulfill this initial vision. And that's why I believe that if the president is serious about his diplomatic, as opposed to the political purposes of this first round of enlargement, he should use the summit as an opportunity to keep the process firmly on track, reminding NATO, the aspirants, and the domestic and international audience that one of NATO's major purposes, that is to be an institution of shared values, is just as relevant if not more so in the midst of this war in Kosovo. And that's why I believe that at the summit, while battling a leader in the Balkans who has carried out aggression for most of this decade, President Clinton should recommend that the alliance prepare to invite the one aspirant country that most independent analysts, that many in the Pentagon believe has already met the membership criteria, at least as well as the first three who were admitted on March 12th, namely Slovenia.

And by recommending Slovenia's admittance, he would demonstrate that he's serious about his own stated reasons for NATO's enlargement, and is not simply putting the issue off for his successor to deal with, and also would be able to make the argument that there are countries in the Balkans that have carried out reform, that are willing to contribute in whatever way they can to alliance security, and who thereby will then be included in NATO, and hopefully in Slovenia's case before long in the European Union, as well. In this way by fulfilling the initial promise of NATO enlargement, NATO would be able to continue to help to foster the political and economic reform that's necessary for truly creating a unified, peaceful, and democratic Europe.

Thank you.

I. Daalder: Being the fourth member on a morning panel is like being the first member after lunch. So I'll be brief. NATO's strategic concept was supposed to be one of the two major new developments to be enunciated and celebrated at the summit in 17 days time, the other being NATO's enlargement. Both of course are now going to be overtaken by the events in Kosovo. So what I wanted to do briefly, very briefly, was to discuss with you what impact Kosovo has on the development of the strategic concept, and in particular on the three issues that continue, as far as I can tell, to divide the alliance.

The first issue is what is the balance within that concept and within NATO's mission between its collective defense requirements, and what NATO calls its crisis response and peace support requirements, i.e., what is the balance between defending NATO territory, and doing Kosovos. Second is the issue of how far should NATO reach geographically, beyond NATO territory, beyond NATO territory in Europe, beyond Europe to the Middle East, or Northeast Asia, or globally. That issue needs to be reexamined in light of the Kosovo crisis. And third is the issue which NATO refers to as the mandate, but what really is the real or legitimate basis for the use of force. How has that been affected with what happens in Kosovo?

Let me start with the first issue, the question of the balance between collective defense, the commitment to defend NATO territory against a direct attack, and NATO's involvement in crisis management operations, such as it is--it has in the Balkans since 1993. Is NATO really about defending alliance territory as Michael Brown would argue, or is Kosovo NATO's future, as Charlie Kupchan would argue? Before March 24th it may have been possible to argue that NATO is or ought to be about defending alliance territory, and really ought not to be involved in questions like Kosovo. After March 24th that stance, it seems to me, is no longer possible. NATO is doing Kosovo, and the only question is, will it do it right, in which case it can continue to do Kosovos in the future, or will it do it wrong, in which case it won't be doing very much at all in the future.

The implication it seems to me of Kosovo, therefore for NATO's strategic concept, is that these kinds of operations are very much what NATO is all about, which means that in Kosovo we cannot afford to lose, and I would regard losing anything that does not guarantee the return of all Kosovar Albanians into a Kosovo in which they can feel that they live peacefully and securely, which probably will require a large military presence on the ground to be there. And second, it would mean that the long-term commitment that the United States and its NATO allies are making to the defense of Europe now is inexorably extended to the defense of much of the Balkans. And I think we should start thinking about having forces permanently, semi-permanently, whatever permanently means in this world, in the Balkans, that that is, in fact, what NATO is increasingly all about.

We have had forces in Germany since 1945, and since 1949, as a means to stabilize that country. We have had forces in South Korea for 50 years, as a means to contribute to the stability of South Korea, and as a deterrent to a possible attack by North Korea. There are, admittedly not U.S., but other forces in Cypress, as a means to undergird stability there. We are, for all practical purposes in an open ended commitment in Bosnia, and whether we like it or not we are, U.S. as well as NATO. And I would argue that those who would make the case that ground troops cannot be put into Kosovo, because it would entail an open ended commitment, as I believe the president made just a short while ago, forget one that we were already committed to an open ended, long-term commitment in Kosovo, it was called the Rambouillet Agreement. There was no way we were going to leave that part of the world any time soon, even if Rambouillet had been signed. And second, we are now in a long-term commitment whether it is permissive or non-permissive, or however one wants to define it, by committing U.S. forces to a Kosovo in a post-war situation.

Let's make a virtue out of this necessity, that is, the presence of NATO troops in the Balkans contributes to stability and security of that region. And that ultimately is what NATO is about. So on the question of balance, I think we need to decisively strike towards the sign of crisis management involvement, and that will mean military extensions of commitments that reach far beyond where we are today.

On the question of geography, how far should NATO reach? There were many in this administration who argued that NATO should have no geographical or functional limits. That NATO should become an alliance that is dedicated not just to defense of collective territory, but to the defense of collective interests, interests that may be threatened, not just in Europe, but well beyond Europe, in the Middle East, in South Asia, perhaps even in Northeast Asia, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by terrorism, by threats to energy supplies. And that NATO ought to be the instrument of choice for the United States and Europe to deal with those kinds of threats militarily.

There were others who said, you know, Europe is quite enough. This is a difficult continent, and committing ourselves to extending stability and security within that continent ought to be first and foremost our purpose, and if we really start talking about what happens beyond Europe, the differences that divide us on those issues, on the interests that are at stake, on the threats to those interests, on the way we ought to respond to those threats are such that making this part of NATO's mission is bound to undermine cohesion within the alliance. I think Kosovo settles the issue. This is, as we have seen in the last two weeks, a rather difficult military operation, one that has exacted quite a lot of energy and effort on the part of the alliance, one that in my view is still under--not underfunded, but certainly the capacity being brought to bear here is less than we would like, since it still excludes ground forces.

And to think that the same NATO which has difficulty mounting a major military operation in Kosovo right on its doorstep ought to become the instrument of choice of defending the Persian Gulf, of dealing with energy crisis in the Caucuses, let along police Kashmir, if not South Korea, is to reach a little too far. So I think Kosovo settles the question of NATO's geographical reach. It is to the Balkans, and if anything no further than that, but certainly not beyond Europe.

Finally, the issue of the legal basis, the mandate that has so preoccupied the alliance in theory, though in practice apparently it hasn't been a major problem. There are those, most European allies, who argue that NATO should not be able to act in a non-Article V contingency, that is, if it does involve the self-defense of alliance members, without a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. That is, that NATO can only use force in a Kosovo-like situation, if and when the U.N. Security Council has authorized that use. There are others, particularly the United States, that believes that there may be circumstances under which NATO can "mandate itself," that is can act on a basis that is still legitimate, because 19 democracies deciding to act provide a level of legitimacy that does not exist.

Clearly, Kosovo sets the precedent, whether we like it or not, or a NATO acting in these kinds of situations without a U.N. Security Council resolution, and to insist that Kosovo is an aberration and one that is so much an aberration that NATO should insist in its own documents that it will not act unless there is a U.N. Security Council authorization for such action strikes me as putting a degree of legal constrain on NATO action that its own actions in the last two weeks have demonstrated is not necessary. More importantly, given the reaction that Russia has had to NATO's action in Kosovo, the likelihood of getting a U.N. Security Council resolution for action in future instances like these strikes me as being rather small.

In addition, it is well to remember that one of the reasons we did not go to the U.N. Security Council, in addition to the fact that we believed that Russia would veto a resolution, was China's behavior with regard to the U.N. presence in Macedonia. This was a country, China, that vetoed the extension of the U.N. presence in Macedonia, ostensibly because that presence was no longer necessary, tell that to the Macedonians, but in reality because Macedonia had signed--the poorest country in Europe, by the way, had signed--had opened diplomatic relations with Taiwan in return for a $1 billion assistance payment. And if I were Macedonia I don't blame them for that. But, China vetoed the U.N. presence at precisely the moment that the U.N. presence became more important than ever.

Therefore, to rely on the U.N. Security Council as the organization that can authorize one's action is to ensure that one will not have actions that are authorized. And, in fact, that you have to break the kind of legal precedent in order to do what is right.

Let me end on the note that I think Secretary Albright ended with, something I agreed very strongly with. We are moving in a Europe, in a situation in which governments are treating their citizens--in how governments treat their citizens becomes a fundamental determinant of the degree of sovereignty that those governments ought to enjoy. And I think one of the things that has happened in the last two weeks is that NATO collectively has made a statement that if you behave in the manner that Serbia has behaved, vis-a-vis its Albanian citizens, then its sovereignty, its right to expect non-interference in its internal affairs is, in fact, being questioned and may, in fact, be subject to military intervention.

R. Haass: Thank you, Ivo.

Let me just sum up very quickly what I see as two points of clear consensus, two points where I wish there were consensus, and two points where there is clearly no consensus.

Where there is consensus, the first is on the consequences of Kosovo. What is at stake might have begun as a less than vital interest. What in Kosovo a month ago might have been largely a humanitarian concern, but clearly it has become more than that. And clearly, very much, because of what the United States and NATO have done, vis-a-vis Kosovo, we have raised the stakes for ourselves and for NATO. And the humanitarian stakes are enormous, and would normally be large enough, indeed, the greatest thing. But, I think what you're hearing from this panel, and I think it's right, is the sense that we have invested interests in Kosovo that go far beyond now the immediate humanitarian situation. And like it or not, a lot of NATO's future is on the line.

Secondly, what I think you're hearing, and this is different than perhaps you would have heard from a year or two ago, is the idea of an extremely ambitious role for NATO in the post-Cold War world seems questionable. There was a mantra for a while, NATO goes out of area or out of business, and out of area meant not simply out of the treaty area, but still within Europe. But, when people said that they essentially were referring to a global NATO. And increasingly what I think you're hearing is that sort of out of area role is essentially out of the question, that it's simply asking too much, given the disparate interests of the members, their domestic problems, and their lack of common capabilities. So an overly ambitious NATO there is simply unreal.

There are two areas I said where I'd like to see some consensus, one Ivo Daalder just referred to is the sense that the United Nations Security Council, its mandate ought not to be taken as a prerequisite or a requirement for effective international action. To look to the U.N. as somehow the only legitimizer would mean that the international community would essentially sit on its hands in all too many crisis where there's a lack of a consensus. You simply do not have a concert among the five permanent members of the Security Council. So to base international relations as if you did have that consensus, essentially, I think increases the odds or prospects for disorder in the world.

Secondly, something referred to here as well as by the Secretary of State in response to the last question this morning, there is a growing doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The idea of sovereignty as an absolute is gone. Sovereignty is increasingly a contract between governments and the governed. And when governments violate that contract in the process they lose some of the advantages of sovereignty. The question then becomes, though, for the international community, if it has the right to intervene, will it assert that right, or to put it another way, will it assume that obligation. So a doctrine of humanitarian intervention only works if the international community is willing to assume that obligation.

And then lastly there are two areas I think or fundamental disagreement that this panel highlights. The first deals with what NATO's purpose is, or its mission. And if I had to sum up what I think are the two fundamentally different approaches, one is the idea that NATO has to do more or it will become less, essentially people rejecting the idea of a minimalist NATO. And then on the other hand, as Michael Brown articulated, that NATO risks becoming a lot less if it tries to do a lot more. That essentially NATO cannot survive the idea of an expanded role for itself. That if it tries to do that it will essentially fail, and that failure will undermine not simply the more ambitious idea for NATO, but it will undermine what good NATO can still and should do. So there really is, I think, a fundamental question about what NATO should try to do, what it needs to do to continue to survive.

The second question is the question of enlargement. And the idea being that regardless of where one came out on the original round of enlargement, should enlargement now continue? Does NATO have to continue to enlarge? If it does, should it include Russia, or to put it another way, if NATO includes Russia is it still NATO? And indeed, coming back to where I began with the other question, could you have a NATO that included Russia, and would it still be an organization that was able to undertake the Kosovos of the future? So is there ultimately a tension or a challenge between the idea of an ever enlarging NATO, an ever growing NATO, and an ever more relevant or effective NATO.

And so you've got these two very basic debates. And I hasten to add, these are not the only debates. We could be up here sitting, talking about the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's future, we could be sitting up here talking about the balance between the United States and Europe in NATO's future, and so forth. But, I think these are the two fundamental debates, which is NATO's purpose, and NATO's size, and composition. And the question is, is there any tension, or any trade offs between the two?

With that, let me open it up to you all. And on the off chance that you're all too modest, I will open up for these people. There are microphones coming, please identify yourself.

Andrew Pierre, you've got the first.

Participant: Thank you. Well, first of all, I think it was a great panel. And thank you all very much.

I'd like to ask Michael Brown a question. I'd like to say that although I don't fully agree, Michael, with what you were saying, I think the fact that you're saying it so well and thoughtfully is a real contribution to the debate. I'd like to press you a bit further on your comments. If NATO is to be a minimalist organization, following your argument, then what should be the Pan-European security structure of the 21st Century? We haven't had much, except for some of the comments by Charles, we haven't had much discussion of the future of the European Security Defense entity, the European Union. Do you see this as a provider of security, or do you believe that the countries of Eastern Europe can get by without being within some overall security framework? That's my first question.

The second relates to let's call it a minimalist NATO force posture in Europe. I think you said going down to 50,000 or so, but the numbers specifically aren't important. More, I'm looking at what type, even of a minimalist NATO, what type of actions it might take out of area, be it Europe or out of Europe itself? You spoke about coalitions of willing, but what are coalitions of willing? As I see it, coalitions of willing are groups of countries that decide to act together, based upon force capabilities, which I would argue need to be trained and developed and are, in fact, within NATO today. Aren't we really then talking about combined joint task forces, which are you know are an evolving NATO instrument. So that in order to, call it combined joint task forces or coalitions of willing, in order to undertake coordinated and integrated military action, don't we still need a militarily effective NATO, which by definition then is not quite as minimalist as you recommend?

M. Brown: Okay. Thank you very much.

I would have touched on those issues in my remarks, except that Richard threatened to use air power against us if we went over 10 minutes or so.

On your first question of what the overarching strategic security architecture for Europe should be, I think the key is coming up with the right division of labor between NATO and the EU, and I think right now our leaders, in their wisdom, have it basically backwards. Right now, NATO has an expansionist agenda, and the EU is moving very slowly on expansion for all sorts of political and economic reasons. My view is that the key to promoting stability in places like Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and so on, is EU membership. The EU is much better positioned to address the roots of ethnic conflicts and domestic instabilities in these countries than NATO. The EU, as you know, is a very robust organization that involves all sorts of activities geared to the promotion of democracy, to conflict resolution, to political and economic development, the protection of minority rights and human rights, and so on, plus it has all sorts of mechanisms, such as the European Court of Justice, which are very much involved in adjudicating and mediating these kinds of disputes. So, I think the key for European security in non-NATO Europe is EU expansion, the sooner the better.

And what makes the current situation, I think, especially problematic is, by moving forward very quickly with NATO enlargement, we've essentially left the EU off the hook, so that they can move slowly on enlargement because, after all, at least a few countries are being brought into NATO. And I think this is politically unsustainable, because sooner or later, I think, the American people and American Congressmen are going to say, well, gee, why are we taking steps to bring countries into NATO and essentially sticking our necks out, making security commitments to these countries, when the EU is dragging its feet. I mean, shouldn't the Europeans be moving faster to deal with these kinds of problems. So, I think the division of labor here is a minimalist NATO and an expansionist EU. I think both are extremely important for European security ,and OSCE has a role to play as well. But I see NATO and the EU as the twin pillars of stability in Europe, and that's the division of labor there.

Now, on force structure issues, I mean, I would very much hope that even in a minimalist NATO that the United States and Western European powers would still take action to deal with problems out of area if they came up. They would form coalitions of the willing. They would form combined joint task forces, and they would bring their own national military forces to bear on these kinds of problems. And I think your question is, well, gee, if we have a minimalist NATO, is it going to have the force structure in place to deal with these kinds of problems? Well, right now we have quite a robust NATO by force structure standards, but we still find that all sorts of stuff would have to come from the United States if we were to put troops on the ground in Kosovo. And we would still have to draw on national military forces in Western Europe.

And we keep hearing about how it would take weeks, if not months, to put a couple hundred thousand troops into the Balkans to deal with the problem. And the solution that most people talk about as the short-term solution to getting ground forces into Kosovo is to bring the 82nd Airborne in from the United States. So, I think to deal with these kinds of out of area problems, you have to bring stuff in from the United States and from Western Europe anyway. And I don't really see where having a large in-place force structure really gets you all that much.

And I think one of the myths of the current path that we're on with NATO is that by having these 120,000 troops in Europe, we've got a lot of stuff prepositioned to deal with lots of problems in Europe, and the Gulf, and elsewhere, and it's true that having that prepositioned material in place, and have those forces in place in advance helps a bit.

But the fact of the matter is, when you want to do anything serious, even a relatively small deployment in a place like Kosovo, you've got to draw on Continental U.S. based forces anyway. And if you have to do that anyway, I would argue that you could draw down forces quite a bit, and I don't think it would really affect our ability to carry out these kinds of operations. I mean the key to carrying out these kinds of operations is political will, and clearly the United States and Western European leaders are adamant in their timidity about using ground forces in Kosovo. It's a will problem, it's not a prepositioning problem.

Participant: Charles Kupchan used an exquisite phrase, neutralizing Milosevic's regime. I would like to address your sense, and I realize I'm addressing you as a specialist in security policy issues and not Balkan area specialist. I realize that's the focus. But, on the premise that we're talking about a category of missions for the alliance, although the category may have an end of one, namely the break up of Yugoslavia. The category of missions that we're defining here is the peace support in the immediate environment of the treaty area. How far--what is the capacity of the alliance, what should be its sense of limits in its ability to target a regime to specifically attempt to remove individuals or groups of individuals from power in an area, how far should the alliance think about going in this kind of case? What is its capacity to do that? And how far downstream does it have to look? Does it have to think in terms of having a successor regime in mind, or can it take refuge in Tom Friedman's observation a few weeks ago that there are cases where simply removing an individual or a group of individuals, whoever you get, you're better off?

C. Kupchan: I'm very suspicious and reluctant to advocate targeting military operations against either particular individuals or regimes, because I think history suggests that when you use military force to create some type of particular outcome, it almost always backfires, U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, Israel in Lebanon. You go in, you try to create something, and it morphs into something else.

What I think military force is good at is boxing in, hemming in, cutting down military establishments to size. And so, when I think about neutralizing Milosevic, I have Iraq in my mind. I don't think we should go to Belgrade and try to get rid of him, although it would be nice if that happened, but the military operation that I'm envisaging is one in which Bal or some part of Kosovo is under some sort of NATO control or protectorate, and that the regime in Belgrade is watched like a hawk until it falls of its own accord, because I think that's the only way that you get reasonably stable political transitions.

I. Daalder: Actually, I was thinking he was going to say something different. Using the word neutralization, but I fully agree that the way you neutralize him is to deny him his strategy. And the worry I'm having here is that he's so close to succeeding that, in fact, reversing his success is going to be extremely costly for us, because it basically means kicking him out of Kosovo on the ground. And we, therefore, will be very, very tempted to accept the status quo, or virtually the status quo that he has created. And in that case, we're not neutralizing him. He's winning. The way to neutralize him is to defeat what he's doing.

R. Haass: Alan.

Participant: Thank you, Richard.

I want to press Ivo to think of it further about the easy acquiescence on the panel, and more generally in the United States, in the acceptance of NATO's self-legitimizing operation here, because clearly there is greater discomfort among some of our allies in the notion that we can proceed in cases of this nature without United Nations Security Council approval. It does seem we are directly in disregard of the Article LIII provision that bears on this, and I wonder if we can lift our sights to reflect a bit on possible strategic consequences in the big picture?

For example, have we, in this action, laid the seeds of future rapprochement, closer collaboration between Russia and China on a range of issues to impede American national security objectives? Have we set the precedent now in which we might contemplate crises in Central Asia in which together or separately, the Russians with minorities sprinkled in some of the Central Asian countries, or the Chinese with energy preoccupations and some ethnic connections might find themselves justified in excusing an intervention downstream in areas that are beyond our reach as a practical matter. I'd like to hear a bit more about whether there's any concern on the panel that, however justified on a humanitarian grounds, as a security and international legal precedent, we have crossed a line here that could be very problematic for us in the future?

I. Daalder: You're absolutely right. And I think the debate inside the administration which is sort of blithely says, it doesn't matter what the U.N. Security Council thinks, I think was the wrong tact from the very beginning, and it's starting to change its language, including what we are willing to accept in the strategic concept. We are getting closer to looking at this as an exception rather than the rule. But you're faced with a fundamental conflict, clearly from an international legal perspective, what happened here did not follow the rules of the Charter of the United Nations. I don't think there can be any debate about this issue. I.e, it may not have been legal, but I still think it was legitimate, which is an important distinction.

My sense is, what the action was designed to do was to uphold a set of values, and a set of norms to which the Yugoslav government was a signator. And they were not just in the U.N. Charter, which are very difficult to figure out, but they are fundamentally within key documents of the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe, particularly the Helsinki final act, and its revision in the Charter of Paris of 1990, in which it was set that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom is fundamental to peace and security in Europe, and that I would argue that the actions taken by NATO within Europe, i.e., against a signatory state of the OSCE, bear greater legitimacy than if NATO had done it outside of Europe.

Nevertheless, it is clear that a precedent has been set, not only in the direction of what NATO can do, but also in the direction of what the Chinese and the Russians can do in these kinds of situations. And it becomes very difficult to oppose, let's take Kazakhstan as a good example on which there are about seven million Russian minorities, a Russian intervention in order to protect the minority population that is being oppressed in Kazakhstan, if it were being oppressed in Kazakhstan. It becomes very difficult to do, and you move from norm-based, rule-based international relations to a case-by-case based international relations, which is what most foreign policy experts do in any case. But it is unsettling.

But faced with, on the one hand, doing nothing because the Chinese were going to veto the resolution or the Russians were going to veto the resolution, and on the other hand doing what we did, I don't think we had any choice, including the French government, which is most insistent on a U.N. Security Council resolution prior to action says in this case we had to act. And their argument is one, as an ambassador from that country told me, they're Catholics, they sinned in this case, but that doesn't mean we're going to change the dogma. Whereas in the United States case, obviously we're not very good Catholics because not only did we sin, we don't believe that what we did is sinning. And I think that's the debate that we're seeing within NATO.

The best we can do and we can come up with is an agreement within the alliance that as a matter of course, NATO will only act after U.N. Security Council provides authorization for such action. But that NATO recognizes there may be circumstances in which such authorization is not available, either because the Council doesn't agree, or because the situation is so dire and of such immediate nature to act that NATO will reserve the right in those circumstances to act if that is in accordance with the spirit, and the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, and other relevant documents of international law. That's about as close as you can come without drawing a red line which basically would have said, we can't do Kosovo because the Russians say no.

R. Haass: I would simply say that you've got to competing ideas of international relations. One is the one that's dominated for three-and-a-half centuries, which places the state at the center and said sovereignty was essentially an absolute. And that's brought a lot of advantages. International relations has improved a great deal over the last four centuries when intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was the norm. On the other hand, we've also seen some of the limits, and non-intervention is not a cost-free policy. And this is something that people have struggled with also for all of these centuries. And I think what you're seeing in this crisis is, yes, there are costs of intervening without international endorsement. And there clearly would be costs of not intervening should you not be able to get that international endorsement which you would not be able to get.

And I think what we have, this is the equivalent of case law. We're working our way to a new balance between sovereignty, which is respect for the primacy of the state, and the fact that individuals have rights, too. And what you're seeing is, the international community is struggling with these two competing ideas, and it's going to be inconsistent and it's going to be messy, and there's no cost-free answer. There is a bit of, you're going to pay a price if you intervene, as you rightly say, and clearly a price would be paid if the international community refused to intervene simply because it didn't have a U.N. Security Council seal of approval.

And until we have such a time when there really is an international consensus and something of a concert, which is then reflected in the Security Council, we are going to constantly have to face this dilemma. And there will be no cost-free intervention decisions whether we go in or stay out. In Rwanda in the absence of blessings, we stayed out, nearly a million people lost their lives. Here we're going in, and we'll obviously break some crockery in bilateral relationships, and it may actually at some point let others think that they have a right to intervene when we wish they did not. And that's why, alas, none of us will be out of jobs soon.

Jonathan.

Participant: I think you know where Mr. Kupchan has put the grounds down on the inclusion of Russia. I just wondered if briefly the other three could say just a word or two about their view of inclusion of Russia at any point in the future?

R. Haass: Jim, you want to take it?

J. Goldgeier: Yes. Well, I have a similar view in spirit to Charlie's, but slightly different in substance. I agree with the view that the administration has laid out that the door is not closed to potential Russian membership in NATO, but I do believe that that's something that's a long ways off. I mean, the idea is that it's a Russia that chooses to join the West, that adopts the principles of the alliance, and at that stage, later down the road, then you have the opportunity to consider it. Now, I also depart slightly from the administration on the way in which they think about a future Russia in NATO, because I'm in agreement on the view that you need to hold out that prospect so that Russia makes the choice we want them to make. There's a place for them, and they need that place in Europe beyond what was provided for in the founding act, if they go in the right direction.

I think that becoming a full member of NATO is probably not that realistic either from NATO's standpoint or Russia's standpoint. What I think that in fact will need to be worked out at some point is some notion, for the right Russia, an associate membership down the road that would allow Russia to participate more fully in NATO without perhaps going all the way toward thinking about either its obligations or the right of the Article V guarantee.

One of my concerns about this present case, and why I would depart from Charlie on thinking about doing this quickly with respect to Russia is that the hope has been that over time Russia would come to share NATO's values on dealing with problems. And here you have an alliance that is united, 19 members, seeing this as a threat to NATO values and seeking to deal with this in an appropriate way. And Russia has not chosen to join in support of this effort.

R. Haass: I might leave it at that because I see about a half-dozen hands up here, and I want to see if I can do justice to particularly the many ambassadors who have their hands raised. As a former State Department employee, I hate to say no to ambassadors.

Participant: I think a few weeks ago we were a bit worried that the summit may not be exciting enough. Now there is no longer such a kind of fear, and we have enough to comment upon and report. But, facing the question of enlargement and bringing in perhaps Russia, it seems to be that the criteria seems to be value, and everybody, I think, on this panel agrees that NATO is somehow guided by a certain system of values, and that is why I think the United Nations failed until now, because it isn't guided by the same values wisdom, and that's why there's no agreement in the Security Council, and that's why the Security Council cannot be relied upon as much as, let's say, in 1945 when it was envisaged.

But I, in principle, would be very much in favor of bringing in Russia and I think all the former Communist countries. We don't bear a kind of grudge against the Russian people. But we are increasingly alarmed by the line, by the kind of thinking in Russia, or in especially Serbia, misunderstanding and deliberately misinterpreting NATO's intentions.

So my question is, how to bring in Russia and other countries as long a they are ill-informed, and so how to spread information about the real intentions of NATO, about the values of NATO? Because in 1992, as I have personal experience, there was no opposition in Russia to the idea of enlargement, and opposition to enlargement grew as Russia took up this position.

And just one final comment, and perhaps you might also say something on that, that European Union, simplified, is concerned with prosperity, and NATO is concerned with stability. So, I agree that if the European Union had been open, had been ready to open, perhaps we would have less worry today, but NATO took the right decision, seeing the reluctance of the European Union, it was essential to ensure stability, and that is the interdependence between the two. So, how do we bring this message home to those people who should be addressed?

M. Brown: On Russia being a member of Russia, my view is that Russia is at least 10 or 20 years away from being at a point politically where its values would be essentially in harmony with those of the other members of NATO, and it might be even farther away from that. So, I think this is something that's very much in the future. Now, if you just suddenly assume away that problem, then bringing Russia into the alliance is less of a problem from that standpoint.

But I would want to make one point in conjunction with what Alton Fryler [sp] is saying, and that is to think about the strategic ramifications of these kinds of decisions. I mean a lot of people have come to think of NATO as a sort of democratization club and a place where like-minded souls get together for a beer on Brussels on a Friday night. It's still a collective defense organization. The NATO treaty still includes a collective defense clause. Are we really prepared to make that kind of collective defense commitment to Russia? And if we do, it's going to drive the Chinese absolutely crazy because they already think that the United States has launched a containment policy against them. And bringing Russia into NATO, I think, would drive them absolutely up the wall, and we would want to think about the strategic ramifications of doing that, even if it were conceivable and reasonable to bring Russia into the alliance. And, as I say, I think we're at least a decade or two or maybe several decades away from really having to face up to this issue.

R. Haass: That then opens us up to the next question on whether China should be a member of NATO. We'll save that for our next Brookings briefing. Jim Goldgeier wanted to say something.

J. Goldgeier: Yes. I wanted to respond to the ambassador by saying that one of the concerns that I have as I watch these events unfold is that, you know, much time was spent in '95, '96, '97, prior to the signing of the Russia-NATO founding act and then after trying to convince the Russian government that NATO's enlargement and NATO as an institution was not directed against them. And that the United States and NATO wanted to have a place for it in Europe for a Russia that wanted that place in Europe. And, at the time you had a population in Russia that, according to every opinion poll, did not see NATO as a threat in the post-Cold War period.

And my concern today is, beyond the opposition expressed by the elite across the board within Russia, you have this igniting of popular passion within Russia against NATO and against the NATO action. Bringing to the fore a hostility toward NATO that was not there before, and I think that, in the current climate, may get exacerbated by the Russian government. And I would hope that, as we think about the long-term, that NATO can work closely with the Russian government to get back to where we were moving before, which was trying to make it clear that the efforts that NATO has undertaken were undertaken not against Russia, but rather designed to provide this place in Europe for Russia.

R. Haass: Do you want to say something?

C. Kupchan: Yes, just a quick remark.

I fully acknowledge that Russia is not ready for NATO, and am distressed by Russia's reaction to the operation in Yugoslavia. But I think that we need to take seriously the idea that Russia is moving in the right direction, not write it off, elevate the importance of embracing Russia in a broader European and Euro-Atlantic space, because it seems to me that remains the real prize of the end of the Cold War.

And so my desire to talk seriously and sincerely about Russian inclusion in NATO is a product of my sense that we have a window of opportunity that still remains open, but that we must act urgently to try to push Russia in the right direction. We don't have a lot of leverage on that, but to the extent that we have leverage, we ought to be trying much harder to make sure that Russia moves in the right direction and becomes anchored in Europe.

R. Haass: We've got time just for a couple more questions. The gentleman behind the Romanian Ambassador.

Participant: I still have a supplementary question, again, about the limits of NATO's enlargement, NATO is still a defense alliance, and for example the OSCE is a security system rather than a defense alliance. So, as the alliance expands, I would like to direct this to Mr. Kupchan, your vision of NATO is transforming NATO from a collective defense organization into a collective security system, like OSCE, and would that not then be redundant? And how do you see the future relations between these building blocks of the European security architecture including OSCE and the NATO relationship?

R. Haass: Good question.

Charlie.

C. Kupchan: You sort of answered it in your question. I do believe that NATO does need to move from collective defense to collective security. I think that Article V as commonly understood is dead, politicians just don't want to admit it. But the idea that we're going to go running off and defend the borders of new members, either that just came or that will come in, I think is just simply no longer the case, and that NATO is really going to become more and more an all-purpose vehicle for coordinating military operations in Europe. And in that sense, it would move in the direction of being the military arm with the teeth of OSCE, assuming that it ultimately does move further East and embraces Russia as well as Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

R. Haass: I want to give the Romanian Ambassador a chance at the last question. Then I want to give the panelists a chance to say whatever they feel frustrated that they haven't had a chance to say.

Sir.

Participant: Thank you, Richard.

It seems that America has a sort of a historical positive tendency of moving forward with its principles set in its interests. And also doing this only after America learns it the hard way. It was the case after the First World War, we needed a Second World War to go and do Western Europe. We needed a Cold War to do Central Europe by enlarging NATO to vote on the Czech Republic and Hungary. And I think that after the fourth Balkan war now, I think the time has come for Southeastern Europe to be addressed in a comprehensive, strategic, moral, economic way by America and its Western allies, because I respectfully disagree that we should put such an antagonist distinction between NATO and the European Union. Most of the major players in the European Union are also members of NATO, and I think it's high time to work together to decide who extends first. If it's a problem with expanding the European Union in one place for economic reasons, then perhaps NATO should take the lead in coordination with the others. So, I'm hopeful that the time for Southeastern Europe has come.

My question is about the future of this in terms of NATO's and America's commitment to European security, and I will address the question not about Romania, which would be a self-serving problem, but towards Ukraine. And it seems that the impact of the NATO actions in the public opinion in the Ukraine, and the damage which has been done to the pro-Western forces in Ukraine is significant. Ukraine is getting closer to elections. And I would just ask, how do you feel that we should support Ukraine's pro-Western tendencies, which by the way is a national interest of my country as well?

R. Haass: Let me ask the panel if they wish to respond to the question of the Ukraine to do so. At the same time, if they wish to have any final comments, they should take advantage of it. And let's go in the reverse order that we spoke, so let me begin with Ivo Daalder.

I. Daalder: Let me first comment on the first part of your own comment, which is Europe's role in Southeast Europe. The way I look at our strategy, if we have one, the one we ought to have is, we've been trying now for a century to have a Europe that is whole and free. With the end of the Cold War, we have made giant strides in the positive direction. And if you look at the map of Europe you see two increasingly black blots, and one is on the Eastern part of Europe, and it's Russia, and the other one is Southeastern Europe, and it is Serbia, that is this ink blot that is spreading out.

And I think the fundamental challenge for NATO and for the United States and for Europe is how do you deal with those black blots and make them part of the rest of Europe. And I think NATO is a major part of that answer. Since we had so many questions I never answered the question of where I believe Russia is. I'm with Charlie on Russian membership. I believe that the prospect of NATO membership has done more for transforming the economic and political and military climates in Central and Eastern Europe, than anything else.

It isn't, as Michael Brown says, that NATO only takes in countries that are stable. It is that NATO takes in only countries that have become stable because they have been offered the prospect of NATO membership. And your own country has taken steps, giant steps economically, politically and militarily that you probably would not have taken if the prospect of joining the West through NATO would not have been there. I think one of the reasons Slovenia should enter as quickly as possible is not only because it has completed those steps, but in order to demonstrate to the former countries of Yugoslavia that if you behave in a certain way you become a member of NATO, listen Croatia, listen Bosnia, listen Macedonia, which I think actually has made major steps in that direction as well, and to isolate, neutralize, if you want to use that term, those who reject the path that the West has been--that has been moving further and further East. And it is that prospect that is likely to increase the pressure for reform, economic, political, as well as military in Russia.

I think the same policies should apply to Ukraine. I think we ought to divorce Ukraine from Russia, and make very clear the Ukranian membership in NATO is not dependent on Russian membership. It is dependent on its own behavior. That's what ultimately determines when a country becomes a member of NATO is what they do themselves, is when they treat their minorities in a way that they ought to be treated, when they have open political, democratic systems, when they have economic systems that are geared to the prosperity of their citizens, when they have militaries that are under civilian control and transparent.

Then they become members of NATO. That's what's important, that's why it's important to keep the door open, and in fact to allow people to enter into NATO when they have met that test. The great failure at the summit is not inviting Slovenia, because of that very action. They have met the test, and yet they're not allowed in. The message to Romania and Ukraine is, it's not good enough just what you're doing, you have to also depend on what the Russians or other neighbors say. That's the wrong way to go.

R. Haass: Thank you, Ivo.

Now, let me turn to Jim Goldgeier for some brief final comments.

J. Goldgeier: Okay. Two quick points on Ukraine, and then one on the link between EU and NATO. As I understood it part of the emphasis at the summit, as the planning went forward, was to highlight the charter that has developed over the last two years between NATO and Ukraine, and I hope that that NATO-Ukraine relationship will have a prominent place at the summit, as had been previously planned. Another issue that's not as well understood, or at least not as recognized that the United States needs to work hard on, before it becomes a real problem, is the effect on Ukraine of EU expansion when that occurs. Ukraine has benefited tremendously from the openness with its neighbors, and its ability establish trade relationships across borders. As countries like Poland ascend to the EU, those borders will become closed off as the new members of the EU assume the obligations of the EU And this will have a negative effect on Ukraine, and that's something that in policy terms needs to be addressed early to ensure that any EU expansion does not damage Ukraine's prospects for economic and political reform.

On the EU-NATO link, the notion that NATO enlargement lets the EU off the hook, I think has a somewhat perverse logic, which essentially says, we're going to penalize those countries that are ready to join NATO, because we're not happy with the E.U.'s pace of enlargement. I think that we should work with the EU in order to ensure that the EU takes in new members as quickly as they believe is feasible, given the economic issues at stake. But, as countries like Slovenia or Romania, over time Lithuania, and others become ready to join NATO they should not be penalized because the EU has gone more slowly.

R. Haass: Thank you.

Charlie Kupchan?

C. Kupchan: I fear that one of the worst side effects of the operation in the Balkans is that Ukraine, Russia, China, other parts of the world see NATO and the United States as a sort of wayward, aggressive, unilateralist entity. And that we live in an era which I think is quite unique. A very preponderant America, but a world that for the most part doesn't balance against American power. It wants American power. If American power is seen as malign elsewhere, it's a very different and a very dangerous world. And so I think it's a big concern. I would make two comments, though. One, I think in this particular case it's worth running that risk, because I believe that stopping this war is worth it. And two, and this is probably naivete more than anything else, I think that in the end of the day this anti-NATO, anti-American political momentum will subside, in part because I think that people are going to watch TV and see the humanitarian crisis and say, you know, maybe there was a reason for this. It may not have been, to use Ivo's words, legal, but perhaps it was legitimate.

And then finally, on the EU-NATO issue, I sort of come down where Mike does, if one looks way down the horizon. That ultimately it's going to be the EU that is the core security organization in Europe, not because it has all the military stuff, but it's going to be the heart of Europe. But, I think that's going to take time. It's going to take time for the EU to cohere, and to move East. And in the meanwhile, the United States needs to be there. But, I think it needs to send a clear message, that Europe needs to work hard to get its house in order, because its current level of dependent on the United States it unsustainable, and that the United States welcomes a more independent and self-possessed European Union.

R. Haass: Thank you.

Last word, Michael Brown?

M. Brown: When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 and the Soviet military threat to Western European security disappeared, the rationale for U.S. security engagement in Europe, and the rationale for NATO changed in fundamental ways. Those rationales were weakened in fundamental ways. And ever since then a lot of policymakers, and analysts have scrambled around trying to come up with new rationales for NATO, which I think are highly problematic. Some people say that NATO will deal with out of Europe problems. But, in fact, we haven't been able to get our act together to deal with Saddam Hussein. If NATO's members can't agree on what to do about Saddam Hussein, what are the chances that NATO's members are going to agree to deal with other problems outside of Europe? Very slim.

A lot of people have said that NATO should deal with security problems outside of the NATO area, in Europe. I think that's naive and dangerous. Naive to think that we're going to have the political will and consensus to take those kinds of actions on a regular consistent basis, dangerous for those poor people in places like Bosnia and Kosovo who come to believe that we're actually going to follow through on the promises that we've made.

As far as NATO enlargement is concerned, a couple of people have said that this does give states incentives to get on their best behavior and to move in the direction of political and economic reform. I think it's hard to talk about NATO in the absence of the EU, and I believe that Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe will move in that direction anyway, because they want to join the EU NATO helps to reinforce that, but EU membership is the big prize for these countries, and they would move in that direction whether or not NATO enlargement was part of the picture or not.

As far as bringing Russia into NATO as a concern, my view is that we already have one ineffective collective security organization in Europe called the OSCE, we don't really need two. I think it's really important to focus on what it's going to take to keep the American people and the United States engaged in European security affairs. I think core American interests in Europe are limited. We need to focus on those interests, and figure out how we can pursue those interests at low cost, if we want to keep the U.S. in Europe, and if we want to keep NATO around. And as I say, I think that's fundamentally important for European security, and therefore for American security.

When I look in the future 20-25 years down the road, I think NATO's chances of being on the scene are about 50/50 at best. And if we don't get it right, those odds are going to drop dramatically. Don't think we have it right now, and I think NATO's future, as a result, is very much in question, which bothers me a great deal.

Thank you.

R. Haass: Thank you.

I saw a political cartoon last night, and it showed someone saying, what does NATO stand for? And the answer was, not altogether thought out. I want to thank this panel for helping us think some of it out, and I think for genuinely advancing the ball. It defied conventional wisdom in the process. I thought it was impossible to get four people talking about NATO and have it be anything but deadly dull. This was intellectually interesting and creative. And I want to thank all four of the members of the panel.

I also want to thank the audience for spending the morning here at Brookings. And I hope we see you back soon. Thank you very much.

[Applause and end of event.]