Transcript
S. Talbott: [Applause.] As I looked out across this room at first I thought maybe there was one of these mirror deals that doubled the appearance of the size of the room, but since all the faces are pointing in this direction I guess it's one big room. And I've been passed a note asking me to inquire whether folks can hear in the back, whether the sound system is working. A little louder please? Okay, I will do that. That's raising this — okay? Is that any better in the back? Somebody wave in the way back — can you hear me back there okay? All right, good.
Well, then the first thing I want to say, now that I am sure everybody can hear me, is thanks to my friend Mike [Armacost] — not only for that kind introduction, but also for the very important work that Brookings and the Council on Foreign Relations have done together to improve both national and international understanding of the very important and complex issue that we are going to be talking about today, which is the United States' interest in peace and security and prosperity in the Asian subcontinent.
I've got a couple of colleagues with me today from the Department of State — Rick Inderfurth, our assistant secretary of state for the region; Lee Feinstein of the policy planning staff of the State Department, who I know is in a state of high anxiety about who his new boss is going to be at the policy planning staff; and a couple of other friends and colleagues who join me in expressing deep gratitude to Richard Haass and to Mort Halperin and Stephen Cohen and everybody who took part in the Brookings-CFR task force that has proved really very valuable to us in our own diplomatic efforts.
Now, before giving you a progress report on the diplomacy that we have been carrying out for the last six months or so, I want to pick up on a theme that Mike already struck in his opening remarks, and that is to emphasize that our interests in South Asia are long-standing, they are enduring, and they are broad gauge. I would like to think that even if it had not been for the explosions that took place six months ago in the Pokhran Desert of Rajasthan and the Chigai Hills of Baluchistan we would still be meeting here today for a wide-ranging discussion of a region that is the cradle of several of the world's great civilizations and religions, and home to well over a billion people, almost a fifth of all humanity.
I would agree with Mike, what he said a moment ago, and that is that India and Pakistan deserve more attention than they have traditionally received from the United States government, and I dare say even from Brookings and the CFR. And I am quite sure that my two friends and workmates, Ambassadors Chandra and Khokar would agree with me on that. And certain President Clinton has felt that way for a long time.
A year and a half ago he instructed his foreign policy team to explore ways to put our relations with India and Pakistan on a sounder and more mature footing. The premise with respect to India was the relations between our countries were in a rut. We needed to get beyond the correct but rather chilly exchanges of the past, even the mantra about how the United States and India were, quote, "the world's oldest and largest democracies," unquote, while a factual statement and a source of pride too often sounded like lip service. The president looked to India to continue its emergence as a global power. He also saw India and the United States to be natural partners in making our shared expertise in high technology a source of dynamism in the global economy.
As for Pakistan, there too the president felt that we needed a fresh start. The end of the Cold War had created the opportunity for a new, more sophisticated basis for U.S.-Pakistani relations. He saw Pakistan as a deeply religious, Islamic society and a democracy situated on the crossroads of the Near East, the South and Central Asia, and he saw it as a country to be facing choices that will resonate far beyond its own borders.
When the president gave us the task of intensifying and diversifying our engagement with India and Pakistan in early 1997, the question of their nuclear and cruise missile programs was of course very much on the agenda. We did not believe our commitment to non-proliferation was in any way at odds with our interest in better relations with both of those countries. Quite the contrary, we saw those goals to be mutually reinforcing. We hope and believe that they still are. But the task is unquestionably more difficult now. The tests in May have increased tensions, highlighted the consequences of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and posed a serious challenge to the viability of the global non-proliferation regime.
That means that we have no choice but to adjust the focus of our diplomacy accordingly even while our long-term objectives and interests remain very much intact. A starting point for that diplomacy is that India and Pakistan need security, they deserve security, and they have a right to determine what is necessary to attain security.
The essence of the case that we are making to them is that there are ways to enhance security without testing nuclear weapons or deploying missiles, and that they will assuredly undermine their security unless they move quickly and boldly to bring under control the action-reaction cycle that has developed between them.
In making this case, I might add, we are drawing not only from our own experience with nuclear weapons but from what we believe is a misreading of that experience by India and Pakistan. Since May we have heard from quite a few Indians and Pakistanis the notion that the tests will usher in an extended period of nuclear stability in South Asia, comparable to the one that preserved the peace between the United States and the USSR for half a century. It's almost as if people of all this view saw Cold War brinkmanship between the superpower as something to be emulated.
Well, I would modestly suggest that they should look again and afresh at the record — not from the vantage point of having seen the Cold War end peacefully, but rather from the hard-headed perspective of what it took to manage that rivalry.
Now, Mort Halperin and any number of Brookings sages who are here today, particularly Hal Sonnenfeldt and John Steinbruner, could provide our Indian and Pakistani friends with a reading list. I might even have a suggestion or two of my own for that reading list. But the point is that the United States and the Soviet Union had more than one narrow escape. India and Pakistan have even less margin for error than the U.S. and USSR did over Cuba and Berlin — if only for geographical reasons, since no ocean separates India and Pakistan.
Moreover, during the half century of the Cold War we and the Soviets never shed a drop of each other's blood on the battlefield, at least not in direct combat. India and Pakistan, by what I think is a very germane contrast, have over approximately the same span of time fought three wars, and there continue to be frequent and sometimes fatal exchanges of artillery fire across the line of control in the disputed territory of Kashmir.
And then there's the economic dimension of security. Before India and Pakistan decide to replicate the U.S. and Soviet nuclear competition, they should look very hard at the price-tag. A recent Brookings study estimated that maintaining the nuclear capability of the United States costs this country just under five and a half trillion dollars. And on the other side of the Iron Curtain comparable expenses contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet system and the Soviet state.
The massive spending that is required to develop nuclear weapons is only a fraction of what is required for safely managing even a modest capability. The tense military situation generated by a nuclearized subcontinent would further drive up overall military budgets — military budgets by the way in countries which have very pressing priorities in other areas. But perhaps the most serious economic threat to these two developing nations is the near certainty that foreign capital, which is critical if either is going to rehabilitate its infrastructure, will decline as risk-averse investors back away from what will look like an unpredictable environment.
Now, we all recognize that this issue, which is complicated enough just in terms of the dynamics between India and Pakistan, is further complicated by the China factor. Indian officials point to security concerns not just with Pakistan but with their giant neighbor to the north as well. We respect India's right to make that determination. We understand that this is a deeply felt matter steeped in history. We ourselves have an ongoing strategic dialogue with China, including about critical regions. And our determination to foster peace and security in South Asia will continue to be very much part of our own diplomatic agenda with Beijing.
In discussing these concerns with us, Indian strategists often refer not to any new or burgeoning military threat but to the possibility of competing interests between India and China at some time in the future.
We believe that the best way to head off any such competition is for New Delhi and Beijing to resume an intensive bilateral effort to enhance transparency and confidence and to overcome or at least narrow existing differences. In particular, we hope India and China will engage in a candid exchange on their strategic perspectives, goals and concerns. India has said that it wants the world to consider its security in a geographical scope that goes beyond the subcontinent itself. So the world should do, and so we the United States certainly do. But by precisely that token we hope that the Indians will come to see their security in a context that includes a worldwide trend in support of non-proliferation. Especially since May India and Pakistan have been bucking that trend and putting it into some jeopardy.
Now, I can understand how from an Indian or a Pakistani standpoint the monopoly of the five NPT nuclear weapon states might look discriminatory. But I would also hope that over time Indians and Pakistanis would not try to redress what they might see as an historical injustice by embracing the bomb, just as the rest of the world is trying to wean itself off of the view that the bomb bestows either safety or stature on those who possess it.
We Americans take very seriously our own obligations in this regard, and we believe we are meeting them. The U.S. and Russia have already dismantled or deactivated 18,000 nuclear weapons. We are prepared to cut the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War levels. We've also cut our stockpiles of shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons by 90 percent. The point here is that when we urge the Indians and Pakistanis to call off their own nuclear arms and ballistic missile race before it gets underway, and certainly before it's too late, we are practicing what we preach. And when we urge nuclear restraint and warn about the nuclear danger, it is not from a position of smug superiority — rather it's from a position of having been there and done that. And we are trying to share the cautionary lessons of our own experience.
The second half of the 20th century has unfolded under the shadow of a mushroom cloud. The U.S. has played its own role in keeping that sometimes frightening drama from becoming a tragedy. And now we are doing everything we can to lift that cloud from the next century.
Let me turn now to the subject of the sanctions that the United States has imposed on both countries in the wake of the tests. They were necessary, and they were necessary for several reasons. First, it's the law. Second, sanctions create a disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option, even if they are contemplating it. And, third, sanctions are part of our effort to keep faith with a much larger number of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them. Several of those nations are living proof that having nuclear weapons is not a prerequisite for survival or security.
Now, let me here acknowledge a warning that is contained in the Brookings-CFR joint task force report. Richard, Mort, Stephen and their colleagues have pointed out that congressionally-mandated sanctions are often a blunt instrument, and unilateral sanctions are worse than that since they can have the perverse effect of isolating the country that opposes them rather than the countries on which they are imposed.
I am convinced that in this case we have mitigated both of those dangers. First, we have worked assiduously, and I believe quite successfully, with the Congress to develop a firm but flexible regime for implementation of the sanctions. We found that there is a high degree of bipartisan support for two propositions. First, that the United States must engage with India and Pakistan as constructively as possible; and, second, that we must strike a balance between our profound differences over the tests and our equally profound desire to see those countries continue to develop as strong, safe, prosperous democracies.
We have already taken advantage of the targeted waiver authority that the law now provides to the president so that he can facilitate progress on non-proliferation — and more about that in a moment — and also so that he can assure that there are no unnecessary and unintended consequences for our other interests that are at stake in this important region of the world. Specifically we have decided to resume support for U.S. business and investment for programs under the auspices of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Ex-Im Bank and the Trade Development Agency. We have also decided to waive restrictions on lending by private U.S. banks, and to bolster our military-to-military contacts by restoring modest education and training programs. Finally, we have signaled our support for the IMF's efforts to help Pakistan avert a total economic collapse.
As for the concern and the occasional criticism that the United States has reacted unilaterally to the challenge posed by the tests, nothing could be further from the truth. From the outset we have been working in concert with many other countries. The U.N. Security Council, the G-8, the P-5 have each endorsed a set of benchmarks that provide for the Indians and the Pakistanis a map of the past away from the nuclear brink and back into the mainstream of those countries that are part of the solution to the problem of proliferation rather than being part of the problem itself.
An unprecedented ad hoc task force of over a dozen nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, including several that abandoned nuclear weapons aspirations or status — countries like Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine — have joined in forging a common response. So have regional groupings like the European Union, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several others. It's very much in this framework, and the framework of an international consensus, that we have conducted our own bilateral diplomatic efforts with the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi.
At the time of the tests in May, President Clinton and Secretary Albright asked me to go to work with the Indians and Pakistanis on three goals that we believe reflect everyone's interests — theirs, ours and the world's: One, preventing an escalation of nuclear and missile competition in the region; two, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime; and three, promoting a dialogue between India and Pakistan on the long-term improvement of their relations, including on the subject of Kashmir. So far I have held six rounds of discussions with my Indian counterpart, Jaswant Singh, the deputy chairman of the planning commission; and I'll be holding a seventh round with him in Rome next week. On a parallel track I have held seven rounds with Shamshad Ahmad, the foreign secretary of Pakistan, including one just last Wednesday here in Washington.
Two principles have guided the American side in this effort. First, we remain committed to the common position of the P-5, G-8, the South Asian Task Force, notably including the desirability, the importance of the long-range goal of universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is to say we do not, will not concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapons states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT. This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy, not least because otherwise we would be breaking faith with those many states that forswore a capability that they could have acquired; and we would inadvertently be providing an incentive for any country to blast its way into the ranks of nuclear weapons states.
Our second principle applies to the near and medium term and to the practice of diplomacy as the art of the possible. We recognize that any progress toward a lasting solution must be based on India's and Pakistan's perceptions of their own national interests. We are under no illusions that either country will alter or constrain its defense programs under duress or simply because we have asked them to. That is why we have developed proposals for the near term that are, we believe, fully consistent with the security requirements that my Indian and Pakistani counterparts articulated at the very outset of our discussions. The prime ministers of both nations have said publicly that they seek to define those requirements at the lowest possible levels. In other words, while universal NPT adherence remains our long-term goal, we are not simply going to give India and Pakistan the cold shoulder until they take what we see as that ultimate and desirable step. Rather we are working intently with both countries to encourage them to take five practical steps that would help avoid a destabilizing nuclear and missile competition, and more generally reduce tensions on the subcontinent and bolster our global non-proliferation goals.
Let me now if I could say a few words about each of the steps that we are suggesting. First, we've urged India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There has been some progress in that direction. Both countries have declared voluntary moratoriums on further testing, and at the United Nations General Assembly in September the two prime ministers pointed their governments towards CTBT adherence within a year. We hope very much that India and Pakistan will take that step as soon as possible, and we applaud the work that the prime ministers have done in their respective countries to build public support for an agreement that has long been demonized but that now in the wake of the tests in May represents an opportunity to stabilize the region.
The second step we are urging India and Pakistan to take in the near future is to halt all production of fissile material which constitutes the essential building block of nuclear weapons. On this point too there have been some encouraging developments: the agreement earlier this year of India and Pakistan to join talks at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, on a fissile material cut-off treaty allowed those long-stalled discussions to go forward. This agreement could be an important milestone in promoting international acceptance of a key principle of nuclear arms control. But even if as we hope those negotiations go well and move forward quickly, completion and formal entry into force on a cut-off treaty is still several years away. To prevent accumulation of fissile material during that time, we urge India and Pakistan to join the other nations that have conducted nuclear test explosions in announcing that they will refrain from producing fissile material for nuclear weapons pending conclusion of a treaty.
The third key objective of our discussions with the Indians and the Pakistanis involves limitations on the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The point here is that the testing of explosive devices is not the only threat to peace. Unless both India and Pakistan exercise genuine restraint and great care, the delivery systems themselves could become a source of tension and could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in a crisis. They could also increase the risk that weapons would be used as a result of accident or miscalculation. That's why in keeping with their stated desire to define their security requirements at the lowest possible levels. We have urged our Indian and Pakistani counterparts to consider strategic restraint measures, a package of prudent constraints on the development, flight testing and storage of missiles, and also on the basing of nuclear-capable aircraft.
Now, the principles of prudence and restraint also apply to the fourth issue that we've raised with our Indian and Pakistani friends, and that is tightened export controls on sensitive materials and technologies that could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Both countries have good track records on which to build in this regard, and both have agreed that it makes sense to bring their existing policies and regimes up to international standards. Hence our discussions have moved beyond the realm of principle into that of the practical, including the exchange of information and expertise.
Now, while the first four benchmarks that I have mentioned deal with the overt manifestations of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition, the fifth deals with the underlying causes. The long-standing tensions and disputes between these two countries. My Indian cooperation, Jaswant Singh, often says that India and Pakistan are born of the same womb. Yet they have been prisoners of their animosity and distrust. No amount of diplomatic exertion on our part or anybody else's on non-proliferation or on any other subject is going to have very much effect unless and until India and Pakistan can liberate themselves from their own enmity. And while we and others can help through our good offices with both, that liberation is going to occur only through direct high level, frequent, and above all productive, dialogue between the two of them. In this crucial respect we have seen some favorable developments, especially the resumption of talks between the two foreign secretaries in Islamabad last month.
These two countries and their leaderships are now talking about Kashmir. They are talking about confidence-building measures, about better communication between civilian and military experts, about bus-lines across the border, about trading in energy. Moreover, India and Pakistan are far more likely to move towards stabilizing their military competition, and we would hope ultimately meeting the non-proliferation benchmark we and the international community are urging them to take if each knows through bilateral dialogue what the other is doing and planning. In that spirit we hope the direct contacts between India and Pakistan will not only complement but will eventually supersede the efforts of the United States. We hope that for two reasons. First, it would be as it should be two great countries dealing directly, normally and peacefully with each other to their mutual benefit and in pursuit of their many mutual interests. Second, a breakthrough between India and Pakistan would allow us, the United States, to get on with the task that President Clinton set before us back before the tests. And that was the task of developing the kind of broad-gauged, forward-looking bilateral relationships with these countries, each in its own right, that they and we want and deserve.
Meanwhile, and I suspect it will be a fairly long meanwhile, we will continue to work the challenges and the dilemmas at hand, we will continue to be open to thinking that's outside the box and that comes from outside the government. And with that in mind, let me conclude this progress report with an reiteration of my thanks, Mike, both to you and to Les for the work that Brookings and CFR have done in this regard, and with an invitation for more help — most immediately in the form of your comments and suggestions and questions right now.
Thank you very much.
Moderator: There are microphones for questions. I think there's a mike in the back. [Inaudible] — has one here. So if you would identify yourselves and ask your questions, I'll let Strobe field the questions.
S. Talbott: Yes.
Question: [Inaudible.]
S. Talbott: No questions. Okay, that's easy. [Laughter.] Yes.
Question: My name is Mark Reedy [sp] with the law firm of Thelan [sp], Reid [sp] & Priest [sp]. How does the current independent power situation in Pakistan feed into your thinking on allowing loans back into Pakistan, particularly with respect to the U.S. position on abstaining from the IMF and putting, as a condition on the funding for Pakistan, that they resolve the IPP situation?
S. Talbott: A key feature of the president's decision of a week or so ago — I guess it was the beginning of last week — with regard to the sanctions was that while we remain opposed to going forward with non-basic human needs, lending from the international financial institutions to both countries, we're going to make one exception to that, and that exception is to do what we can, through the IMF in particular, to address an emergency situation in Pakistan.
We feel that it is a real threat to U.S. interests in the region, and we hope that our Indian friends would concur in this, if Pakistan were to go into an even more serious crisis economically. Therefore, we do not feel it is appropriate or, for that matter, consistent with our non-proliferation goals, since a financial meltdown of Pakistan could lead very well to political instability and uncertainty that could have quite dire proliferation implications.
We do not feel we should stand in the way of the IMF coming to terms with Pakistan on an emergency program of some kind. But that requires that they do indeed come to terms. And the problem with the independent power producers is a significant obstacle in those discussions, just as it is a significant obstacle to Prime Minister Sharif's plans for economic reform generally in Pakistan.
Yes, sir.
Question: I'm Marvin Liebstone [sp], Global Security & Trade Journal. Could you describe some of the political problems that exist internally within each of the countries, and also externally, that could set either country toward a worse situation than exists now?
S. Talbott: I don't think so. I do not think I will take the invitation to comment on the internal political developments of two sovereign democratic states, except to say that these are both very vigorous democracies. We have been reminded of that over the last several years. Our Indian friends are in the midst of some very important elections right now. I don't think there's any question that the process of democracy is thriving there, and we've seen plenty of evidence of that in Pakistan as well.
But I don't think it is useful or appropriate for me to comment, except to say that we hope very much that the substance and the spirit and the intention of U.S. policy will be correctly portrayed and understood, since it's very important, obviously, if our policy is going to succeed, that it have some sympathy and support, since basically what we're trying to do is support both of these countries as they move forward.
Yes.
Question: [Name inaudible] — the Telegraph, India. The reaction in India to the partial lifting of sanctions has been rather negative. Indian politicians have said that you have intervened for Pakistan to help them out on a one-time basis. At the very same institutions, you're blocking loans to India. Now, how do you respond to that? It seems to many of us that you still are — you know, when it comes down to a crunch, U.S. policymakers come to Pakistan's help but discriminate against India.
S. Talbott: Well, you have certainly accurately summed up what I have — what Rick and I have seen over the last several days. This is — I'm happy to say, given the healthy degree of pluralism in all respects in India, this is not a unanimous or universal view, but certainly this point has been made. I really do not understand how it can be argued on factual grounds that we are differentiating in a way that is prejudicial to India or discriminating against India or tilting towards Pakistan.
India and Pakistan have a number of similarities. They also have some profound differences. And alas, our Pakistani friends are in very dire economic straits. Fortunately, while obviously India hopes for a great deal more in the way of economic development in the future, and so do we, India is not in a comparable crisis. Pakistan desperately needs help from the IMF. India does not.
And I will just reiterate a point that I made a moment ago. Whatever the differences between India and Pakistan — and we all understand that they are many and profound — surely India and all clear-eyed Indians realize that it is very much in India's best interest that Pakistan remain on a path of political stability, economic development and integration with the rest of the world. Those goals are in jeopardy right now. And the United States does not feel it's in anybody's interest, including India's, for us to stand in the way of the IMF helping, if the IMF can do so on the basis of a sound program worked out with the Pakistani authorities.
Yes, sir.
Question: Bob Turgan [sp] of the Los Angeles Times. You spoke earlier of one of your goals is to search for prudent restraint in terms of flight testing, development of missiles and weapon systems. What I'd like to know is what your sense is as to how far along both countries have gone towards deployment; and secondly, how confident you are on the command-and-control systems that are currently in place or are being considered.
S. Talbott: That's a very fair question, as was, by the way, the earlier question inviting me to comment on the international politics of the two countries. I think I will, rather than vamping, I will simply say I'd rather not get into that. It goes to the heart of some quite technical discussions that we're having with the two sides. And I think I've gone about as far in public with a progress report as I really should do. I hope you understand.
I feel I may be discriminating against the back of the room. Does somebody way back there — somebody back there. Somebody give a microphone to somebody in the far back.
Question: Mr. Talbott, Aziz [sp] Hanifar [sp] with India Abroad.
S. Talbott: You just barely qualify. You're right on the border between the two, but that's all right.
Question: Yeah, the line of control, I guess. One of the key demands that the U.S. wants India and Pakistan to achieve is signing the CTBT, to drive the non-nuclear proliferation agenda forward and if India-U.S. relations and Pakistan-U.S. relations are to get back on track. But the U.S. has still not got to first place with [Uncle?] Jesse Helms with regard to ratification of the CTBT, and the entry into force runs out next year. What optimism have you all got that this treaty can be ratified? Because India and Pakistan are very much cognizant that the entry into force perhaps may not really enter into force because the CTBT — the administration has not got to first base with Jesse Helms.
S. Talbott: Well, for a couple of reasons having to do not only with the perils of sports metaphors but also American sociology, I think I won't speak in terms of what base we've gotten to here. I will simply say that I agree that we have not yet, shall we say, crossed the finish line — switch sports — with regard to the CTBT. We have an ongoing dialectical process with the United States Congress on this subject, which will resume as soon as the new Congress comes back.
We think that the South Asian issue provides us with even — with additional strong arguments on why the CTBT is in everybody's interest and why the United States should move to prompt ratification. That is very high on the legislative priority list both of President Clinton and Secretary Albright and, I might add, Secretary Cohen as well. So we will fight that good fight, and I'm quite optimistic we will win it when the Congress comes back. But your point is, of course, well-taken.
In the far back now; one in the way back.
Question: [Name inaudible] — with the Institute of International Finance. You have referred several times to the IMF program and the fact that you have decided that you will not step in the way of IMF going ahead. Given that a lot of the economic damage in Pakistan has already taken place, the financing requirements, if one works at the numbers, are fairly large. And the IMF program and the financing that are allowed under the program are rather limited.
So my question is, have you also decided to not stand in the way of other lending — that is, lending by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, et cetera? And do you think that the IMF program can, in fact, avoid a financial meltdown in Pakistan, given the IMF's record of preventing economic crises? So —
S. Talbott: Would you repeat just the last part of the question?
Question: Given the IMF's record on dealing with economic crises and their effectiveness in taking countries out of the crisis, we are facing a fairly dire situation in Pakistan. So I'd like to ask if the United States is now prepared to support the amount of financing that might be needed to prevent a meltdown in Pakistan.
S. Talbott: Well, a number of parts of your very astute and sophisticated question, I think, should better be addressed by the Treasury Department, obviously. I will give you a general answer, which is that we're under no illusions that even the best possible IMF program would be an automatic guaranteed panacea for what ails the Pakistani economy right now.
We are convinced, however, that while it may not be sufficient, it is certainly necessary and therefore should go forward. And, yes, our decision with regard to the IMF does open up and trigger some other instrumentalities. But I would strongly suggest that you pursue this with Treasury.
Yes, sir.
Question: [Name inaudible] — Center for Naval Analysis. Many of us, in the Cold War context, thought that ballistic missile defense was bad and destabilizing. If we think a little bit to the longer term and look at the Indo-Pak situation, the U.S. has plans to deploy theater ballistic missile defense, some of it deployed on ships which could be stationed in the Indian Ocean. Has anyone given thought to the role — the ability of the U.S. to provide a protective screen against mutual ballistic missile threats and threats from China to, let's say, India? Could that play a long-term stabilizing role in the region, given your objectives?
S. Talbott: I asked for some thinking that was out of the box, and you certainly provided it, Jerry. [Laughter.] It sounds like — I think the next director of the policy planning staff at the State Department should take this one on, whoever he or she might be. But I want to answer — there are several aspects to that I want to address very seriously.
We have a tricky calculation to make in the way we conduct this ongoing dialogue with our Indian and Pakistani counterparts. On the one hand, we want to share with them as much as we possibly can about our own experience, gleaned often the hard way during the Cold War. And indeed, we have already started to do that. We have — on the margins of the dialogue that we've been having on the diplomatic side of this, we've been making available to our counterparts some very serious discussions with military experts about some of the questions that are in the air of this discussion.
However, we do not think that it is useful or helpful for us to provide what I might call a user's manual to India and Pakistan, because that would concede a basic point, and namely that they are going to be possessors and users forever.
I think that we have to stay on the right side of, if I can use this term, a red line. And the red line is not conceding the fundamental point that the best outcome for everybody, notably including for the two parties here, is universal adherence to the NTP. And in India and Pakistan's case, that means as non-nuclear-weapon states. That still leaves us plenty of room to talk about offense and defense, although defense is tricky for all kinds of reasons that Mort can explain to you.
Yes, the lady right on the border.
Question: I wonder if I can just switch gears for one moment to another part of the world, and that's Iraq. And I wanted to ask you, Mr. Talbott, as confrontation seems to certainly be looming in that area, if you could tell me — some have kind of questioned what the administration may or may not be planning for after a confrontation; kind of the end game. I wonder if you could articulate what the end game is with Saddam.
S. Talbott: Okay. You didn't identify yourself, I don't believe.
Question: (Inaudible) — CNN.
S. Talbott: Aha. [Laughter.] Not that my answer will be any different. [Laughter.] If you weren't from CNN, CNN would be right over here somewhere, I'm sure.
First of all, no final decisions have been made here. This crisis can end peacefully. It can end peacefully if Iraq, which is to say Saddam, comes back into total and prompt compliance and ends a pattern of systematic defiance of the Security Council that goes back 13 months, and in many ways years before that.
I can assure you, without getting into anything like details about such military planning as going on, is that we have thought well beyond hour one and day one and week one. And if he insists on continuing to play this as a zero-sum, win-lose game, there are lots of ways that we can make absolutely sure that he loses on day one and thereafter.
I think I'll leave it at that. Yes.
Question: Howard Schaeffer [sp] of Georgetown University. The prime minister of Pakistan will be coming here early next month. I wonder if you could tell us what you hope to achieve through that visit.
S. Talbott: Well, we're very delighted that Prime Minister Sharif is going to be making what we regard as an important visit to Washington. He and President Clinton held a very good, focused, substantive meeting, largely, though not 100 percent exclusively, on the issues that we have been concentrating on here during the United Nations General Assembly. But there is still a lot to talk about.
I think that for the reasons that we've talked about, this set of issues — that is, the non-proliferation and security issues — will continue to be topic A. But the economic crisis and the way in which the prime minister and his government are dealing with the economic crisis, with as much help as the international community can possibly provide, will also be very much on the agenda.
President Clinton will also be interested to get Prime Minister Sharif's view of how the resumed Pakistani-Indian dialogue is going. They t