Transcript
N.B.: [joined in progress]
MR. STEINBERG: Today we have once again a very distinguished group of scholars with us, and it reflects some of the developments that we have seen in the past weeks since we've held our last briefing. There's been a remarkable continued flurry about investigative and diplomatic activity over the past week. We have seen a number of arrests and detentions not only here in the United States, but I think importantly we are seeing important activity abroad as well, with arrests in Brussels, U.K., Spain and Germany, which I think are a reflection of the fact that there is both new levels of cooperation going on globally, but also a real recognition of the global reach of the network that we are trying to uncover here.
There's also been a continued stream of key foreign visitors to the United States. King Abdullah of Jordan is here. We've had the Saudi foreign minister here, the Turkish foreign minister was here, the Indian national security advisor, the Italian foreign minister. And so the efforts of the administration to continue to build this diplomatic coalition are moving forward. We have reports today in the papers that the administration has made progress with the Saudis on military cooperation.
But at the same time we have had some very important steps forward, most notably in the discussions with the Russians and others. We've also had some cracks in the level of cooperation, particularly in the voices we have heard out of Iran from the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, suggesting that Iran would not be a partner for the United States in the fight against terrorism; and also some anxieties coming out of Pakistan about the potential for U.S. policy to move towards a strategy of overthrow of the Taliban, and the Pakistani foreign minister indicating very strongly the concerns that Pakistan would have with that course.
As I said, there have been some remarkable developments on the Russian and Central Asian front as well, with a very strong statement from both President Putin and the defense minister in Russia about military cooperation involving Russian bases in Central Asia, and indications that other Central Asian states are prepared to cooperate with the United States militarily. And so it's fitting this morning that we have first Martin Indyk to talk about the developments in the Middle East and the various efforts to build a coalition, and the consequences for some of these countries; followed by Fiona Hill, who will talk about the Russian and Central Asian dimensions of this challenge.
Just a few more words by introduction. I think we are all watching with interest and anticipation to see how the military dimension of this effort will unfold. A very significant statement by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz meeting with NATO allies in Brussels hinting that the military response may not be as near term as some may have thought. But I think we are all cautious in recognizing that it's unlikely that the administration would announce in advance exactly when they would begin, should they have decided to do so.
And we're also seeing some new signs of life on Capitol Hill as the—while the strong spirit of bipartisanship continues to prevail. Some of the substantive issues are beginning to counter real debate, most notably on Attorney General Ashcroft's proposals involving electronic surveillance and immigration, where for the first time we are seeing some questioning on the Hill and some reluctance simply to accept the administration's proposals at face value. And to discuss this and some of the other issues from the legislative and political perspective, we have former Congressman Bill Frenzel here this morning.
So let me turn it over to our panelists—first to Martin Indyk.
MR. INDYK: Thank you, Jim, I'll try to be quick. Naturally enough, most of the focus of diplomatic and military activity has been on Afghanistan, because that's where the head of the snake is located. But I think it would be obvious to anybody at the moment to look at the terror network itself and the individuals involved, we'd quickly come to the conclusion that the head of the snake may be in Afghanistan, but the source of the problem is in the Middle East. The hijackers were all from the Middle East. Their grievances are against the United States—not just because we are a West in a centuries old conflict between East and West, or the West and the Middle East, but because the manifestation of that Westernness comes through our backing for pro-Western, moderate Arab governments in the region. And if you look at some of the profiles that have been detailed of some of the hijackers, you see that in many cases, and of course in the case of Osama bin Laden himself, their original grievances against their own governments because of their opposition to them, and because of their opposition to the United States comes from the fact that we support them. So how these governments react in this situation is going to be very important. And Abdullah of Jordan is in town today. Ahmed Maher, the foreign minister of Egypt, was in yesterday. And of course, most important of all, given Saudi Arabia's leading role in the Islamic world and its proximity to the source of the problem, the visit of Prince Saud, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia last week.
In this context, while the press play has focused on whether they are prepared to give us military access, particularly the Saudis, and just see in the press this morning that issue is being dealt with in a kind of kabuki dance about what exactly the Saudis will do for us. But I would make the point here that military access to bases in the Gulf—and it's not just Saudi Arabia—we have access arrangements and basing provisions in all of the GCC countries. And one of the things that was done over the last eight years after the Gulf War was to ensure that we have such arrangements, so that we wouldn't need to spend six months building up forces in the region before we could deal with the kind of threat posed by Saddam Hussein. And so it's of lesser importance, because we have a lot of capabilities and a lot of options. But it's also of lesser importance, because as you can see, at least for the time being, the Pentagon has not focused on an armed invasion of any country, Afghanistan in particular—at least at this stage. And so the combination of the excess capacity that we have and the nature of the task that we are facing, I would say, makes that of lesser importance.
Where we need the help though—that is, the Arab governments who are themselves a target, the initial target of the Islamic terrorists—where we need their help is in the PR battle. And not a lot of attention has been paid to this PR battle. But I think that the lessons of the intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is marking its first anniversary this week, is how so much of the battle is played out on the air waves in its public relations warfare. And the same will apply for the war on terrorism that we are engaged in.
You can already see how a word used by the president, "crusade," immediately causes ripple effects in the Islamic world, and is played up by those who oppose us. And the same thing with the words "Infinite Justice" for the name of the campaign.
As we become more sensitive to these kinds of things, we also are going to find that we cannot win this PR battle for the minds of the Arab and Islamic world on our own. In fact, anything that is done with an American accent is by definition suspect in this effort. We need the Arab governments to take a leadership role in this regard. And, in particular, they need to address a problem that has become—that is really out of control in the Iran press, which is the anti— Americanism. If you go back to the week before September the 11th, you will see in the Arab press just a quick show of anti-Americanism. It's the kind of thing that was convenient for all concerned—it united the left and the right in these countries. The United States was the enemy for all of them. And it also served the governments to deflect criticism from themselves onto the United States. And so a climate of anti-Americanism has been created over many years in the Arab world in particular. That needs to be addressed in this process.
The same goes for the legitimization of terror as a weapon used by the weak and the oppressed. Hamas and Hezbollah suicide bombers have been revered in the popular Arab press. And that has helped, again, to create a climate in which terrorism against innocent people is seen as somehow acceptable. The fact of the matter is that it is anti-Islamic, that the Koran specifically enjoins against the taking of innocent lives. But this point needs to be made clearly, loudly and repeatedly by our governments to their people. They need to address this climate. I think the Saudis have taken a very strong and brave stand in their statement that in the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Taliban where they in particular refer to the acts of Osama bin Laden's terror network as causing harm to Islam and besmirching the name of Muslims everywhere. That is the kind of message that has to go out to the Arab world and the Islamic world in very clear terms, and we need the Arab government and the religious leaders in this country to be doing it. We can't do it ourselves.
On the other hand, I think it's important that we not fall into this trap about presenting the evidence, an argument that is being made by the Taliban and others that first of all we have to see the evidence before we can do anything. This is a phenomenon that we see often used. It's a kind of denial process in the first instance, and you hear it in the Arab world a lot in the last couple of weeks that this couldn't have been done by Middle Easterners. Some even in the Arab press go so far to suggest it was actually an Israeli plot—a familiar kind of approach. But I think that as it becomes clearer and clearer who was involved in this, and the connections to al Qaeda, the case will make itself.
Secondly, we already have enough evidence in the public record about Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorist attacks on Americans. That particularly came out in the course cases in the cases of the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. And, of course, Osama bin Laden himself makes no bones about his intentions to destroy America. I might note that if we held some of these governments to the same—I mean the evidence to the same standard, when they fight against Islamic extremists, they would have a much harder time.
In passing, I would just point out that they have set an example in this regard in terms of how to deal with Islamic extremists. They stamp them out. We're talking about Syria, Egypt, Algeria. They did it. They did it brutally, they did it ruthlessly, and it actually worked. And they expected and in many cases got our support and understanding when they took these actions. I think that given what has happened to us we should expect no less from them.
Finally, let me make one other point, and that is about the Palestinian issue. In the PR battle, the Palestinian issue inevitably comes up in the Arab world. They will argue that this is the core of the conflict, that there is a distinction between Palestinian terrorism, which is used to liberate, designed to liberate the Palestinian territory, as opposed to what happened on September the 11th. It is not the core issue as far as the terrorists themselves are concerned. In fact, Israel and Palestine have succeeded practically not at all in the category of demands of Osama bin Laden. But he will now try to make it an issue. We see in two statements that he made in the last week the way in which he talks about Jews and crusaders as being the enemy. He wants to turn this into a war against Islam, and for him a war against the West—Israel, the United States, Jews and crusaders.
That's the reality of what we face. But behind that actually I believe an opportunity has been created to stop the violence, to end the intifada, and to put the Israeli-Palestinian process back on a negotiating track. I won't in these opening remarks go into the details of that, but suffice it to say that Arafat finds himself in a tight corner; there's a danger the Palestinian cause could face a disaster if he comes and the Palestinians come to be identified with the terrorists and those who harbor them, rather than with the United States and the international coalition against terror. On the other hand, he sees that maybe he has a new card to play, particularly with the United States, that we may want the Palestinians to be on our side in this effort. And he has a new explanation to his own people for why the violence should stop, because of what has happened here. Israel, on the other hand, understands that they need to try to keep the situation calm. They have their own intense interest in seeing the violence stop. So, as a result, finally Arafat and Peres met. The security people are meeting today in Gaza. They are developing a series of reciprocal steps that's already been outlined in the (Tenet ?) plan and the Mitchell recommendations for stopping the violence, arresting the terrorists; and on the Israeli side for easing the closures, allowing the Palestinians to return to some kind of normalcy, redeploying the IDF—all of these things have already been articulated. They are working out a time table for implementation now. I believe that there is a real opportunity here—a kind of silver lining in this dark cloud—to take advantage of the impact that these horrendous acts here have had on the calculations of Yasser Arafat and the Israelis.
But a last word here. I do not believe that left to their own devices—we have seen so many times before the Israelis and the Palestinians can in effect do it on their own. They need our own, and we have a tremendous amount of leverage now because of what has happened. And it is time —it is a good time to appoint a special envoy. It is simply not possible for our principals—the secretary of State, the president?to devote attention to this issue while they have so many more important things to deal with. But by appointing a special envoy, we will be able to say to those in the Arab world that you have to do something about the Palestinian problem. We are doing something about it. And in the process I believe we would be able to actually stop the violence there, and that will help in our overall campaign in terms of the war on terror.
Thanks very much.
MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Martin. And for those of you who have not had your fill of Martin's insights about some of these problems, Martin has a very thoughtful op-ed in the New York Times today. You can either read it in the New York Times, or shortly on our Web site.
Fiona?
MS. HILL: Thanks, Jim. Well, as Martin said, the crisis has actually opened potentially some new opportunities in the Middle East. And if you look at the future of U.S.-Russian relations, clearly we can see some new opportunities there too. Obviously we are now moving beyond the fairly limited agenda that we had with Russia before September 11th, which as you all remember, if you can remember back that far now, given everything else that has happened, focused very much on missile defense, and then debates about the next rounds of NATO enlargement that might take in the Balkan states and other European security issues. Well, now obviously we are on a completely different footing.
In actual fact, it hasn't been that difficult to bring Russia on board, because the Russians have been trying to get the United States on board on a very similar campaign against terrorism for at least the last year and a half. Just earlier this year, President Putin, Ivanov, and many other Russian officials, were exhorting European leaders to join in a concerted campaign against what they were calling an arc of terrorism stretching from Afghanistan, through Chechnya to the Balkans. And Putin and the United States have already collaborated to some degree in supporting the United Nations sanctions against Afghanistan and the Taliban in December last year. So already there was a precedent for cooperation in the beginnings of what is now going to be obviously a major campaign of cooperation against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.
And obviously the terrible events of September 11th have made the threat that Putin was invoking a year ago, which seemed very dim and distant at the time, now very real indeed.
Of course the big questions are: What does Russia want in return for this support? And Russian commentators have already been saying that if Putin has given this agreement without asking anything in return, then that's been a very big strategic error.
Now, we have already I think got some clear signs of what that will be, certainly from the latest press coverage. Obviously Chechnya is right at the top of the list of Russian desires. The Russians have been making linkages between the Chechens, Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network for some time, so Putin will expect that there will be muted criticisms in the future of Russia's conduct of the war in Chechnya. There may also be some demands or some hope that the United States will acquiesce in Russia's rights or Russia's desires to extend their campaign against terrorism into neighboring countries. There's already been some threats made to Georgia about the activities of Chechen forces who are based in the Pankisi Gorge, which is the area right on the border between Georgia and Chechnya. It's definitely the case that there are many Chechen refugees there. It's highly likely that there are some Chechen fighters. And Russia has made several diplomatic and other overtures to Georgia demanding the right to intervene in this area to root out the terrorism and the forces they see operating there. So far they have been held back in part by strong U.S. support for Georgia. So we'll have to see what happens there.
And we can already see a major shift in the Russian approach to Chechnya. Prior to September 11th there were already some preliminary talks underway—at least they had just started—under Boris Nemtsov to try to find a way of opening up negotiations with the Chechens. After September 11th, obviously with the power balance shifting entirely, this talk of beginning negotiations is now being turned into the form of an ultimatum to the Chechens to begin negotiations immediately. That ultimatum actually expired yesterday. There are reports that there have been some overtures from the Chechen government under Aslan Makharov, but those are yet to be confirmed. But the Russians have now given the Chechens an ultimatum to begin negotiations on their terms, and also basically to lay down their weapons. And there are rumblings in Moscow about punitive actions if this