Transcript
Richard N. Haass: Good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution.
I am Richard Haass, the vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies. With me today is Professor Shibley Telhami, who is both a nonresident senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution, as well as holding the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland. As you know, our topic this morning is Camp David II.
What we plan to do is speak about the summit that will be convened just outside Washington, beginning Tuesday, July 11th, where President Clinton is going to host Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, and Ehud Barak, the prime minister of Israel.
The way we plan to proceed this morning is, first, I'll turn to Professor Telhami, and he will essentially outline the principal issues that remain to be negotiated, as well as the politics behind the issues; that is, the willingness and the ability of the two parties to reach compromise. I will then speak again: in this case, on the dynamics of the summit, the possible outcomes, what I think will be the likely outcomes; its consequences, and my recommendations for the role of the United States.
All of this, we expect, will take approximately 20 minutes, though estimation is dangerous in this game. And then we will reserve the bulk of our time for your questions. And we'll have a microphone. And I'd only ask that you be relatively direct and identify yourselves. But first, let me turn to my colleague Shibley Telhami.
Shibley Telhami: Good morning.
This summit is certainly a gamble. It's a gamble, but it's an inevitable gamble. It's a gamble because it clearly is not precooked. The gap remains wide, and the chances of success are not especially high. It's inevitable because I think everybody knew that, ultimately, you are going to have to have a summit because there is no way of bridging the gaps at the level of the negotiations that are ongoing. And the only question was when to hold the summit; whether to hold it now, to hold it later, whether to hold one summit or to hold more than one summit.
And the decision was make to hold it early, rather than late. Perhaps one reason for it is that there is an assessment that time is no longer on the side of an agreement; that actually the later you hold it, the more difficult it will become. And the second reason probably is to preserve some time to recover in case this fails, to have a second chance; so, therefore, the timing.
Nonetheless, I would say that, despite the fact that the gap remains wide on the major issues between the parties, I think there is a reasonable chance that it could work. I think it's a gamble worth taking. Let me go over some of the issues.
Certainly, the official positions of the parties remain very far apart. They have not shifted their positions officially on the negotiating table much at all on the key issues. Unofficially, there's been a loosening of positions, and there are contours that are emerging on the major issues, and there are gaps that could certainly be bridged. And one can envision, if not a total comprehensive agreement, at least an agreement on major issues that may require some additional negotiations on some specifics.
So what I'd like to do is actually go through some of the issues, the core issues, and give a read on where I see them, based on the unofficial around-the-negotiation sentiment--how positions have shifted, unofficially, and where there is room for bridging a gap.
First of all, there is the terms of reference. You know, the Palestinians and the Israelis have been negotiating for the past number of years on, really, different reference points. The Palestinians have been negotiating on the basis of what they assume was 242, U.N. Resolution 242, which they understood to mean, quote, "full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza," and to the extent that there would be modifications of that, they would have to be on practical grounds--security issues, settlement issues, whatever concessions that have to be made--but the frame of reference for them has been U.N. Resolution 242 and 338, which essentially is a reinforcement of 242.
The Israelis, on the other hand, have been, in practice, negotiating on the basis that 242 does not apply in the same way to the West Bank and have, in fact, been negotiating in terms of how much more to give to the Palestinians, more than they now hold, more than they now have. And that's a huge gap, since the Palestinians don't hold much of the West Bank at the moment.
So the terms of reference have been contested. In practice, there has been a conversion, sometimes, of reference. In fact, last week, certainly the Israeli attorney general had a finding which said 242 does not apply to the West Bank in the same way as it applied to Sinai and the Golan Heights, reinforcing that Israeli position. The State Department came and said, "No, 242 does apply. The American position, in fact, is that the frame of reference is U.N. resolutions." And that was a reinforcement of, in essence, the Palestinian position.
But in practice, the Israeli position has been shifting, and it has been shifting--you can read it when you read the question of territory. Only a year ago, the talk was about possible Israeli withdrawal from 60 to 70 percent of the West Bank. Unofficially, there were floated proposals--actually, one formal proposal--of pulling out from about 80 percent of the West Bank. Then there were floated additional proposals of, perhaps, Israeli withdrawal from 92--92 to even 95 percent of the West Bank.
So the terms of reference have shifted, and actually, the Israeli arguments about maintaining chunks of the West Bank have been focused on issues, rather than on principle. That is, on "We cannot afford to pull out of these settlements on the green line," or "We need to have a security presence in the Jordan Valley." So they have been security- and settlement-specific, rather than principle-specific, and that is a very important convergence, I think, in terms of reference.
On the specific issues there has been also some convergence. I think one of the most difficult issues, clearly, is the refugee question, and here there are some red lines for both sides, but there is also room for reconciliation. I think that issue is bridgeable. In particular, despite the fact the Palestinians are insisting to this day, officially, on the right of return, which means, in practice, the return of all refugees to what is now Israel, in fact, there is no Israeli government that will accept that position. I mean, this would negate the idea of Israel and, as a consequence, clearly, the room for flexibility is there.
There is an understanding in the Palestinian camp of this particular Israeli need, but there is an insistence on the recognition of the right of return as a principle. And the reason for it is much more complicated than the actual practical settlement of the issue of right of return. I think it's very helpful to think of the right of return as a principal issue, and then of a settlement of the right of return.
What the agreement will do is settle the right of return question and, in a way, in order to settle it you have to have an acknowledgement. And the settlement of the right of return, which Israel clearly sees as one of the benefits that it would get out of an agreement--Israel wants to close that file once and for all. This is one of the positives that Israel would get out of the agreement, is to settle this issue once and for all, to close that file.
And in order to close it, there might need to be some acknowledgment of the principle coupled with a settlement that clearly would have various components, including the principle that Israel has already floated of accepting a certain number of refugees, perhaps on the principle of family reunification, and numbers have been floated for about 100,000 or so. But clearly, there has to be a resettlement of the refugees, and that resettlement package, permanent resettlement of refugees, has to be included and there have to be some places for those refugees to be settled. And it can't be forceable settlement and there has to be a compensation package. Certainly the Palestinians have floated the last couple of days a number of $40 billion for settlement, for compensation. That is, obviously, a figure that is going to have to be negotiated.
There are, by the way, numbers that are already out there. The U.N. has done a lot of homework on documenting properties. There are 400,000 properties that are documented with actual valuations of properties at the U.N., so it's not starting from scratch. There's already a stock of data available that makes assessment of properties.
So I think that while this is a complex issue, it's an emotional issue, it's a--for the Palestinians it's a question of identity, it's sort of--the acknowledgment of the principle of return, in a way, reinforces their feeling that their struggle has been worthwhile--the practical solutions are out there, and I think people are realistic about what to expect.
The question of Jewish settlements. Clearly that is a huge issue; perhaps, in my judgment, the most difficult issue because it entails a relocation of populations, and that is politically very, very complicated. And it's emotional for the Palestinians, it's emotional for the Israelis. I think, nonetheless, there is an emerging solution. Clearly, Israel expects that at least the major blocks of settlement along the green line would be annexed to Israel. And then you would be left with some perhaps as many as 60,000 settlers scattered in other settlements that would be essentially inside a Palestinian state.
Now, the real question is, what happens to these? I think the question of annexation of settlements that are adjacent to the green line, certainly the Palestinians are open to it. They have put forth the idea of exchange of land because they want to negotiate on the basis of 242, and they put forth the idea of getting, quote, "land of equal size and quality," perhaps to expand Gaza. That's going to be an issue to be negotiated.
But the real question is, what happens to the 60,000 settlers or so who would remain in the heart of a Palestinian state? There is a clear understanding that you can't have extraterritorial powers. That would be a prescription for disaster down the road. What do you do with that?
And I think here you have a sense that there may be a solution by--not necessarily by forced relocation, but by giving most settlers the option of either getting compensation or new housing under Israeli sovereignty or coming two years down the road to be under full Palestinian sovereignty. And the assumption is that if settlers in those territories have a choice, that they would choose the former rather than the latter. And that would be a way for Barak to manage that politically without having to have television screens showing him removing settlers from their settlements.
The question of Israeli security. Clearly that is a big question for Israel. Barak has made his reputation on the basis that he is tough on security. That is, in fact, why he was elected. And as a consequence, he is going to need to show that Israeli security is actually enhanced, rather than weakened, by this particular package. And he's going about it actually in a number of ways, including one way of consolidating the strategic relation with the U.S. and getting something as a side payment from the U.S. for Israel.
But on the ground, the major issue for Israel is, first, demilitarization; that is the Palestinians would not have a serious army in the Palestinian state. Number two, that they would not have the right to forge military alliances with other states without Israeli approval. And three, the Israeli military having access to the Jordan Valley in order to defend against possible threats that would come from Jordan or Iraq. And in that regard, there has been, I think, a softening of the Israeli position, because initially, clearly the Israeli position has been that Israel would annex--in any settlement would annex that territory. Right now the Israeli position is, "As long as we can address this military issue, the security issue, we can live with a different status on sovereignty." And I think there is definitely a lot of room--a lot of flexibility in this position.
On Jerusalem, obviously, one of the most emotional questions, and perhaps some aspects of it may not be resolved either this month or next month or by September, but nonetheless, despite the gap, and some issues of principle that remain very, very difficult, particularly within the Walled City; I think, for example, their irreconcilable positions about the Walled City of Jerusalem--I'm speaking of the one square kilometer where most of the holy sites are placed--where I think there is no major room for compromise, at least on the question of sovereignty, I do not envision that any Palestinian leader is in a position to accept full Israeli sovereignty over that part of the city, and I do not envision that any Israeli prime minister is willing to accept full Palestinian sovereignty over that part of the city. So that's an area that is going to be shady, it's going to have to be finessed, it's going to be very complicated.
But beyond that, it is interesting to see that there is then a softening of both sides' positions on Jerusalem. In particular, up until really just a few months ago in Israel it was very hard to hear any voices speaking of any compromise on Jerusalem, that Jerusalem would remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. Today you hear voices that accept the notion of expanding Jerusalem, maintaining it as a unified city without borders, but given some control, not just functional control, of Palestinian neighborhoods to the Palestinian state.
The most interesting recent example of that is a statement by Yosi Katz, a member of the Knesset from Barak's bloc, two weeks ago in the Conference on Palestine in Cairo--I have a copy of this with me--in which he floated the idea of giving the Palestinian state sovereignty over clearly Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem, in areas such as Beit Hanina and Silwan. So there is a vision that enables that already on the table.
Obviously, I've only touched on some of the core issues that are very complicated and are going to be difficult. And just to say that while there is a gap and an important gap, there has also been narrowing of that gap unofficially, much more than the official positions would reveal, and therefore, there is a chance that they might reach an agreement on it.
There are a number of very important issues that I didn't touch on, such as water, for example, which is going to be very complicated, very important to both sides. The details of the compensation package, any compensation package, very complex. The actual demarcation of boundaries. You might talk about generalities and percentages, but the bottom line is you're going to have to set boundaries. That's not going to be something that's going to be easy. Timing. All those sorts of issues are very complicated, and that's why it's unlikely that this agreement will be a comprehensive agreement in the sense of settling all the details. The most optimistic scenario would have it that there would be a major agreement on all the major issues, perhaps leaving a lot of details to be negotiated again, and perhaps coming back for another summit down the road.
I was going to speak on the domestic political limitations on both Barak and Arafat. I will leave that for questions and answers so I'd allow Richard to speak for a little bit more.
Thank you.
R. Haass: Let me go through five issues: why a summit now, whether it's correct to convene it, what are the likely outcomes, what are the consequences of failure, and lastly, what the United States should and should not do.
First, why a summit now? You've got three clocks that are ticking, and it's the ticking of these three clocks that essentially, I think, has led us to Camp David on Tuesday.
The first is Mr. Barak's clock. His domestic base has been gradually eroding--or crumbling, if you prefer a slightly worse metaphor--since he became prime minister. It is not just difficult, it is impossible to see how the simple passage of time will strengthen his domestic base. There are multiple fault lines in Israeli politics, and essentially whether it's the peace process fault line between hawks and doves, if you will, the secular-religious fault line, or any other number of them, the combination of them is increasingly undermining Mr. Barak's capacity to govern. Time will not strengthen him.
Secondly, it's the clock of September 13. This is the day that the Palestinians have increasingly committed themselves publicly to declaring statehood unilaterally, and everyone is worried about it, including the Palestinians. And I'll get to this later, but the bottom line here is, no one knows what will follow from a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians, but very few people, including Palestinians, are sanguine about the consequences. The feeling is, that is likely to set in motion a chain of events where everyone will be worse off. That is worrying not simply to the Palestinians but the Israelis and to the Americans.
The third clock is Mr. Clinton's and the fact that he is now in the last 16th, if my mathematics are correct, of his presidency. And we're right up against the conventions. Then we're right up against the election. And if he is going to do anything in the Middle East in his remaining time, there is no time like next week.
Is it--secondly, is it correct or was it correct to make the decision to convene Camp David II? I would give the answer "yes," with one caveat, which is that if it does fail completely, it will likely add fuel to the fire come September 13th.
That said, I think it's a risk worth taking, because right now we are on what you might call a drift towards crisis. Taking the risk, investing the time, seems to me more than worth it.
Thirdly, what is likely to happen? I would say there's three possible outcomes.
The first is success. And by "success," I mean essentially resolving what has been the core dispute between Israel and the Arabs, which is the Israel-Palestinian dispute. And this would mean taking all the issues that Shibley just outlined--territory, Jerusalem, refugees, settlement, the nature of a Palestinian state, water, what have you--and resolving them, and essentially having a treaty that would resolve this conflict once and for all.
I would describe the prospects for that happening as remote, and I say that despite the extremely generous Israeli position that is reported to be on the table. What Mr. Barak has been suggesting is far more generous and far more comprehensive than any Israeli government at any time has ever put forward. But the gaps are still quite large. I think Shibley Telhami gave you "The glass is half full," I'm perhaps more prepared to give you "The glass is half empty" on the remaining gaps, in part because I don't see a lot of capacity to compromise.
On the Israeli side, I have already noted Mr. Barak's weakened political base. On the Palestinian side, I have seen no evidence of serious preparation of the Palestinian public for compromise. Instead, we have had a lot of positions talking about, not simply going back to the '67 lines but even beyond those lines. And I simply do not think right now the Palestinian polity is psychologically and politically prepared for taking half or two-thirds of a loaf.
Indeed, I'd say here is where in some ways the comparison to Camp David I breaks down. And I think people have to be careful with saying that this is another Camp David. The geography is the same, but there are important differences. You have got much weaker leaders politically, than you had at the time of Camp David. Mr. Arafat is not in the position, say, of President Sadat; Mr. Barak is not anything like as strong as Prime Minister Begin.
You have also got tougher issues. At Camp David I, we were basically dealing with desert and strategic real estate; largely unpopulated or the population density was very low; very few settlements, very few settlers.
Think of the difference here: We are dealing with territory that's close in; that's not just strategically important but is theologically important, psychologically important. You are dealing with 200,000 settlers and over a hundred settlements. You are dealing with the holiest places in Judaism, very holy places in Islam. Again the differences, it seems to me, are fundamental.
You are not talking about making a Palestinian entity whole; you weren't talking about making Egypt whole. Plus here, you don't have an existing state you are negotiating with in the first place. What you are negotiating with is a Palestinian entity, represented by a Palestinian Authority, but not a government. For all these reasons, it's very hard for me, again, to see how an ambitious agenda could possibly be realized.
I would even add to this the idea that if I am wrong--and imagine that you could have everything agreed to o