The release of the Congressional Budget Office's new baseline budget projections on January 29 offers the opportunity to reassess the fiscal status of the federal government as Congress and the administration consider a new set of budget proposals. This article examines the current budget outlook, the magnitude and sources of changes in the outlook since January 2001, and adjustments to the official data that more accurately reflect the continuation of current policy and the government's underlying financial status. Based on this analysis, we also provide a very preliminary and brief assessment of the administration's new budget proposals. We reach the following conclusions:

  • CBO now projects a 10-year baseline unified surplus of $1.3 trillion for fiscal years 2004 to 2013. But the budget outside of Social Security faces a baseline deficit of $1.2 trillion, and outside of the Medicare and Social Security Trust Funds, the baseline deficit is $1.6 trillion. (None of the figures in this article include recent tax proposals, a Medicare prescription drug benefit, or the cost of a war with Iraq. Incorporating these items would make the budget outlook look less promising.)

  • These figures represent staggering declines from the baseline forecasts made two years ago. The projected unified budget outcome for 2002 to 2011 deteriorated from a projected surplus of $5.6 trillion (4 percent of GDP) in January 2001 to essentially zero ($20 billion) in January 2003. The budget outcome for 2002 alone declined by $471 billion (4.6 percent of GDP).

  • The short-term changes are due primarily to worsening economic conditions, which account for about two-thirds of the decline in 2002 and about half of the projected change for 2003. The longer-term changes are due as much to the 2001 tax cut—which accounts for 40 percent of the deterioration in the budget outlook for 2010—as to economic and technical changes, which account for 37 percent.

  • The official projections significantly misrepresent the government's underlying fiscal position because of unrealistic assumptions regarding the continuation of current policy and because retirement programs are merged with other programs in the budget.

  • Making realistic assumptions about how current policies will be maintained—in particular, that expiring tax provisions are extended, a moderate AMT fix is provided, and real per capita discretionary spending is held constant—we estimate that the adjusted unified budget is in deficit for each of the next 10 years and will cumulate deficits of $1.1 trillion over the decade. These deficits emerge just from efforts to maintain the policy status quo. The differences between the official and our adjusted projections for the unified budget grow over time. In 2013 alone, the difference exceeds $600 billion (3.6 percent of GDP).

  • The unified budget figures above include large cash-flow surpluses accruing in trust funds for Social Security, Medicare, and government pensions over the next 10 years. But in the longer term, Social Security and Medicare face significant deficits. The adjusted budget outside of these trust funds faces a deficit of $4.5 trillion over the next decade, including an adjusted deficit of 4 percent of GDP in 2003 and an average deficit of just over 3 percent of GDP during the rest of the decade.

  • Policymakers face three sets of budget challenges: near-term deficits (over the next two years), medium-term deficits (over the next three to 10 years), and long-term deficits (beyond the 10- year horizon). The near-term deficits are not a major problem in and of themselves—the economy could use a boost right now and unusual events like a war should be at least partially funded via deficits.

  • The implied medium- and long-term deficits, however, are troubling. First, our adjusted unified budget shows a deficit in each of the next 10 years, even though the economy is predicted to have reached full employment within the next few years. This indicates a persistent and fundamental imbalance between projected tax and spending policies even before the bulk of the baby boomers will have retired. Second, the medium-term deficits will be followed by a period in which projected deficits rise substantially. The time profile of projected deficits implies that if fiscal responsibility is not established in the remainder of this decade, it will prove much more difficult to do so after the baby boomers start retiring.

  • Ignoring the medium- and long-term fiscal gaps would represent a significant policy mistake. Making the fiscal gap worse would be an even bigger mistake. Policymakers should be particularly wary of proposals that would raise medium- and long-term deficits; that reduce medium-term deficits by shifting revenues from the future to within the 10-year budget window; or that detract attention from these issues.

  • The administration's new budget is replete with such problematic proposals. These include making the 2001 tax cut permanent, massively expanding Roth IRA treatment of saving, encouraging rollovers of existing IRAs to backloaded saving plans, and focusing on a five-year budget horizon. The administration's policies would produce unified "deficits as far as the eye can see" even though the economy is projected to return to full employment in a few years. The deficits would be much larger if the retirement trust funds were not included. The administration's proposals would exacerbate the nation's fiscal problems in the medium and long term.